

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University

UDC 1:78.01

Manuscript copyright

NURFER TERCAN

AL-FARABI'S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

8D02202-Philosophy

Dissertation for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy

Domestic Scientific Adviser:
Gulzhikhan Nurysheva, Professor, Doctor of Philosophy

Foreign Scientific Adviser:
Georgios Steiris, Ph.D., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Republic of Kazakhstan
Almaty, 2023

AL-FARABI'S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

This dissertation's approach is to acquire Al-Farabi's point of view on the philosophy of music. Under the heading of Farabi's music philosophy, we determine that music is not just about art and entertainment. For this reason, he carried the theme to a higher level in terms of science and philosophy with his proof method studies. First of all, we aimed to discover the traces of Farabi's inquiry method from his works. A philosopher and musician, Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, wrote on the perfect city, logic, astronomy, linguistics, politics, mathematics, geometry, medicine, optic, philosophy, and music, known as the 'second teacher', the first being Aristotle. This investigation contributes to practical and theoretical music proposing formation in the context of correlation. From this perspective, a musical system's consistency level relies on a sense-perception, a method of relevant indications within other comparable and correlated systems. This inquiry analyzes correlations' modalities, exploring their general and particular attributes and their operational bounds. This article evaluated the description of meaning from one cognitive domain to another mental part, such as from mathematics to music or astronomy or psychology correlated with music science. Approaching music science with dimension and paradigm determined the requirement for detailed music research in science and measurement criteria. His book 'Ihsa', which describes the nature and enumeration of science in philosophy and science classification, was recognized in the Middle Ages. However, 'Musiqa' tops the list of Arab theoretical studies and has had a remarkable impact on later Arab music theory.

This thesis aims to understand the effects of music on our mind and body, which cannot yet be measured in metaphysical thought, by discovering the great philosopher and scientist Al-Farabi's Great Music Book. We claim that it is the only work in the history of philosophy where we can hear the roots of historical tunes for truth and philosophy lovers in a time tunnel stretching from East to West. Due to its philosophical and scientific scope, this treatise has the depth to redound solutions to many questions that are still sought answers in the current age. Philosophy in music can be revealed, felt, and heard by thinking in the language of music. We can think with music, which might be called "musical" thinking. With the usual view of academic philosophy, the language of music is not the language of philosophy. Philosophy is a field where analysis, concept explanations, inquiries, and discussions are made in the language we speak and write. It has its unique concepts and vocabulary. It is "music" that prepares us for philosophy in music, philosophy in music, and philosophical thought, and it is our companion in philosophy with its interpretation.

1. TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	3
DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICS	5
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	6
INTRODUCTION	7
PHILOSOPHY AND MUSIC	15
1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DEFINITION AND HISTORY OF MUSIC.....	21
1.1 Origin of Lyric Music and General Music Definitions	27
1.2 A Brief History of Music	28
2. MUSIC AS A FORM OF KNOWLEDGE	45
2.1 Music in Philosophy and Explanation of Listening to Music as a Science of Perceptual Cognition	48
2.2 Music, Philosophy and Aesthetic	53
3. MUSICAL FORM AND AESTHETICS AS A PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION	62
3.1 Aesthetic pleasure: perception, sensation, cognition and emotion in aesthetic concepts	67
3.2 The Affective Impact of Music Examined through Philosophy	85
3.3 Analyze of conscious and unconscious in aesthetic experience	95
3.4 Hidden Emotion: Awareness of Synesthesia in Music Philosophy and Synesthetic Perception	111
3.5 Aesthetic Appreciation in Terms of Aesthetic Theories	118
3.6 Aesthetic Experience as an Aspect of Interpretive Activities	124
3.7 Availability of the Aesthetic Object	141
3.8 The Presence of Music: The motion of Sounds to Emotions in the Philosophy of Music	143
4. RECIPROCITY IN TERMS OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTION	149
4.1 Reciprocity in Art in the Context of Intersubjectivity.....	149
4.2 The form of music: Reciprocity in Art in the Context of Interobjectivity	155
5. UNDERSTANDING AL-FARABI'S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC.....	162

5.1 Introduction to Al-Farabi's philosophy of music.....	162
5.2 Structure formation, development and methods in Farabi's System: A Philosophical Paradigm in the Art of Music.	165
5.3 Life and Works	167
5.4 Content of Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir	190
5.5 Summary of Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir	195
5.6 Cross-cultural Heritage of the Silk Road: The Philosophy of Al-Farabi .	211
5.7 Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir: A Profound Treatise on Music	213
5.8 Philosophy of Music and Related Disciplines.....	223
5.9 Causality, Matter, and Consciousness from One Source	229
6. PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC	236
6.1 Theme of knowledge in the "Big Book of Music"	236
6.2 The doctrine of the mind and the philosophical epistemology of Al-Farabi	237
6.3 The Affective Impact of Music Examined through Al-Farabi's Philosophy	249
CONCLUSION.....	258
Reference	264

DECLARATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICS

I declare that the present thesis is all my work, except where I indicate otherwise by proper use of quotes and references. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. This Ph.D. thesis, which I prepared within the department of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University of Philosophy and Political Sciences, is an original work written by me and in my own words and this thesis;

1- When I benefit from the works of various authors, I clearly and refer to the authors by showing the relevant parts of these studies;

2- If all or only some of the texts I have written have been published anywhere before, I have clearly stated this;

3- I have cited all the data (including tables, graphics, figures, etc.) of others that have been cited;

4- I accept that, as I have cited the texts of other authors that I have quoted in their own words, I have also cited the issues that belong to other authors but that I have expressed in my own words, without exception, by citing the source, and that I will bear all the consequences if I violate the statement and these ethical principles.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to submit my greatest admiration for my major professor and life coach, Prof. Dr. Gulzhikhan Zhumabaevna Nurysheva. I would also like to thank my mentor, who gave me a broad understanding of the field of Education, instilled in me the search for truth, and encouraged me to take responsibility.

It was a unique journey to start the studies with the original main training program prepared with the eternal perspective of philosophy. During my doctoral Education, I was honored to work with unique professors who could offer their students all the educational background requirements.

I thank my Educational Consultant, Prof. Dr. Tatiana Lifanova, who can instantly provide all kinds of technical solutions during the transition period to the Online Smart University education system during the pandemic period in 2020.

I would like to state my gratitude to my International Consultant Professor, Prof. Dr. Georgios Steiris supported my selection request for my doctoral thesis and shed light on my inner journey with his inspiring words at the beginning of my studies.

Since the research theme I chose did not have more than five reference sources that I could cite and review, I had to access the original text of Kitab Al Musiqā Al Kabir. I would like to present my gratitude to Abdullah Kızılcık, who provided resources and support in translating Al-Farabi's original Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir from Arabic to Turkish.

I am honored and grateful to meet Mehmet Arslan, who encouraged me to complete my doctoral Education and opened the doors of Al-Farabi's endless world of philosophy and science to me.

INTRODUCTION

General description of work: This dissertation is aimed at studying the Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Music. The work describes the history of music, the correlation of music, philosophy and aesthetics, as well as the essence of music. This dissertation reveals the peculiarity of Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Music based on the study of Al-Farabi's work "Kitab Al Musiqā al Kabir".

Relevance of the research topic: The recognition of Al-Farabi as the first philosopher of the Islamic world and his treatises were studied in Europe many years ago encouraged us to take an inventory of his works. Al-Farabi was included in the memorial list by UNESCO on the occasion of the 1150th anniversary of his birth in 2020 and that encouraged us to focus on this topic. Among the works of Al-Farabi, his philosophical arguments about music stand out. The art of music has had an important place in human life since early times. Man perceives music across time, so music is a temporal art. However, it is also spatial because a transmission medium is required for sound to be heard. Finally, music is not only temporal and spatial but also formal. The importance of music for rational and vital perception in human life is indisputable. Philosophy has examined causality in music perception and values on a multidisciplinary basis. Music is at the basis of universal existence and helps to illustrate the harmony, rhythm, and aesthetics required for the formation of order. Philosophy uses methods developed by the sciences. Art likewise determines its concepts through science and philosophy. Science is a group of methods used for analyzing reality in terms of human perception and understanding of the world. Knowledge is a process in which a subject is directed toward an object (Davidson 1992). Societies that have developed with the advancement of scientific research and philosophical thought have an important place in the history of the philosophy of science. Science seeks facts. Beginning with the work of Aristotle, the First Master, science has been considered not just a separate branch of philosophy but as its system within the framework of good philosophical thinking and understanding, according to the age of each society, carrying it forward as a holistic system. Researching what music is and how it has been understood, and used since ancient times is like diving into a deep ocean and discovering its vast layers without ever sinking to the bottom. So much so that in every word of wise thinkers, pages of thoughts can be produced. But the point of this dissertation is that every precious word vibrates a "voice" that exists within us and inspires us to live the idea that we will deepen. This work aims to understand the effects of music on our mind and body, which cannot yet be measured in metaphysical thought, by discovering the great philosopher and scientist Al-Farabi's Great Music Book. We claim that it is the only work in the history of philosophy where we can hear the roots of historical tunes for truth and philosophy lovers in a time tunnel stretching from East to West. Due to its philosophical and scientific scope, this treatise has the depth to redound solutions to many questions that are still sought answers in the current age. Philosophy in music can be revealed, felt, and heard by thinking in the language of music. We can think with music, which might be called "musical" thinking. With the usual view of academic

philosophy, the language of music is not the language of philosophy. Philosophy is a field where analysis, concept explanations, inquiries, and discussions are made in the language we speak and write. It has its unique concepts and vocabulary. It is “music” that prepares us for philosophy in music, philosophy in music, and philosophical thought, and it is our companion in philosophy with its interpretation. For those who seek to broaden their understanding of music by examining both the systematic and historical areas of research and knowledge of philosophy of music, this study presents the information covering the practical and theoretical arts education of researchers and musicians in the field of general philosophy and as an interdisciplinary review of these fields as a whole. Musicology is concerned with the discovery and systematization of knowledge. To access all information directly, awareness, intuition (perceptual intuition, as philosophy states), and reflection, thus musicology is the discovery and organization of everything we consider the application of musical values and scientific methods on direct musical experience or a sudden sensibility, to be able to learn about music. In a sense, musicology is the science of music. However, philosophy responds to those who think it is inappropriate to apply the word science to an art. For this reason, it seems necessary to consider the relationship between art and science in the field of music philosophy.

The degree of development of the problem: The role of music in the life of a human and society has been the subject of research by philosophers since antiquity to the present day. It was considered in their works by Plato and Aristotle. The legacy of Al-Farabi was studied by Western philosophers A. Metz, F. Copleston, A. Masset, F. Gabrieli, as well as Islamologist and Arabist Muhsin Mahdi, specialist in medieval philosophy Majid Fakhri, Professor of the American University of Beirut Fuad Haddat, historian and researcher of the Middle East Professor Shukrin Abed, British philosopher Salim Kemal, American philosopher and political scientist Christopher Kolmo, Greek scholar, specialist in ancient and medieval philosophy Georgios Steiris, as well as American political scientist and comparativist Alexander Orvin. French Farabi studies are of particular value. The French School of Philosophy studies the legacy of Al-Farabi and other medieval Arabic-speaking philosophers as an indivisible corpus of texts. For example, the philosopher Henri Corbin considers the philosophy of Al-Farabi in the context of the history of Muslim philosophical concepts as its integral component. Another specialist of the medieval East, Ali Benmakluf, speaks in favor of the theory of the Turkic origin of Al-Farabi. The philosophy of Al-Farabi is also studied in the works of Amor Czerny, German-American historian of philosophy Leo Strauss, Professor of Arab-Islamic philosophy at the University of Tunis Mencia Mokdad Arfa, Doctor of Philosophy and Philology at the University of Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne Maroun Aouad and others.

In Kazakhstan, back in the 60s, the fundamental principles of the study of the systematization and interpretation of the teachings of Al-Farabi were laid. The Kazakh school of Farabi studies was founded by representatives of various areas of theoretical research: philosophers and theologians, geologists and translators, diplomats and

orientalists, writers and poets: Al-Mashani, Agyn Kasymzhanov, Anuar Alimzhanov, Absattar Derbisali and many others. In our time, this work continues fruitfully. KazNU named after Al-Farabi regularly conducts Farabi readings with the participation of well-known foreign and domestic Farabi scholars. New studies, hermeneutical interpretations of his works, philosophical articles and monographs are published at all levels. The works of Abdumalik Nysanbayev, Mukash Burabayev, Galiya Kurmangaliyeva, Galymkair Mutanov, Natalia Seitakhmetova, Zhakipbek Altayev, Gulzhikhan Nurysheva, Aliya Massalimova, Ainur Kurmanaliyeva, Anar Tanabayeva, Asya Khassanova, Laura Turarbekova are devoted to the study of Al-Farabi's philosophy. The doctoral dissertation of Saida Daukeyeva is devoted to the philosophy of Al-Farabi's music. Despite this, we believe that the work we have done should make a certain contribution to the study of the great legacy of Al-Farabi.

Object of study: The Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Music.

The subject matter of the dissertation: The history of Music, since antiquity, and the Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Music.

The purpose and objectives of the research work: This study's ultimate purpose is to provide a contemporary, in-depth and systematic analysis of several critical aspects of Al-Farabi's Music and Science.

Objectives:

- to consider the correlation of philosophy, music and aesthetics in ancient philosophy;
- to study music as a form of aesthetic consciousness;
- to reveal the essence and structure of Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Music;
- to present the content of Al-Farabi's work "Kitab al-Musiqā al-Kabir" and determine its role in world culture;
- explore Al-Farabi's consideration of music through the connection of sensation, perception, emotions, thinking and reasoning.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study: As a starting point, this dissertation aims to find hidden meanings that have remained unresolved in ninth- and tenth-century themes. Such legacy, which has been unexplored by sophisticated contemporary researchers but has continued to be valid in the current age, will be revealed through meaning, evidence, analysis, and translations of studies. We attempt to strengthen the dialogue between interdisciplinary perspectives and new methodologies across the philosophical spectrum. Capitalizing on the opportunity to question and rethink Al-Farabi's traditional research methods, this research focuses on his methodology, a multifaceted conceptualization of the scope and interrelation of the sciences. First, the fundamental question shaping this debate is both epistemological and methodological: What analytical tools and disciplines can people use to study musical influences and know the principles that govern them? Second, this study highlights the link between physics and metaphysics as a scientific method, its arrangements, techniques, the importance of observation, experience, and the nature of the evidence associated with these sciences. In

this sense, this study's direction is driven by Al-Farabi's synthesis of works dating back to Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism.

Scientific novelty of the research: The primary material of our dissertation started with the Arabic-Turkish translation of Al-Farabi's Arabic work that we made with Istanbul University Farabi Center Coordinator Prof. Dr. Abdullah Kızılcık. Furthermore, with the analysis of this study, I completed the English translation with the leadership of My Dissertation Supervisor, Prof. Dr. Gulzhikhan Nurysheva. Along with this, we also analyzed some library analysis studies.

In addition to the written treatises of philosophers, research theses that provide information about the history of philosophy, philosophy dictionaries, and written research that provides information about the teachings of Plato and Aristotle are among the sources we use.

Provisions for defense.

1. All scientific theories with the names of Greek philosophers, including the theorems of Tales and Pythagoras, were used in Mesopotamian civilizations at least a thousand years ago. The Greeks just thought and accomplished the methodology of scientific theory that we still use today in the sports-science school called "Academy," Plato had the most decisive the basic structure of the system of academic sciences. Systematic thinking is based on implicit or explicit founding rules, axioms, or a priori. It is the same as producing scientific theories based on a paradigm: In a scientific crisis, the question should be: How can paradigms be compared scientifically, or can new ones be formed in a scientific crisis?

These are only possible with such pure theoretical intuition. This faculty is the source of intuitive and irrational intelligence. Intuition is an evolutionary extension of the inner sense. The application of cognitive categories, or understanding, is used to create a whole through the unity of some elements intuitively. Achieving the aesthetic form of totality and conceptual universality is the most general aim of intelligence. So, there is an intuition behind understanding or intelligence. The products of pure reason cannot be obtained through experimentation but can be proved hypothetically, like scientific theories.

Aristotle established logic and a methodology of science that we still use today. Its methodology is based on a logical classification to construct the Prote Philosophia (Metaphysics) system. The integrity of the classification is also based on a logical principle: A field with fewer principles has more certainty and priority and is the foundation of the following field: the priority of arithmetic over geometry. To understand and learn is to discover the "middle term" that connects a general principle or concept with a related object. Logic > Ontology > Ethics > Politics > Arts and Education. Aristotle's Meric system was followed throughout the Middle Ages. Muhammad al-Farabi al-Turki has been called the "second teacher" of humanity after Aristotle. Farabi restructured Aristotle's system. He authored a remarkable book, entitled Classification of Sciences (Ihsau'l-Ulum).

2. Confronting an art object, perceiving, making sense of, and analyzing that art object is quite different from our daily life experience. A person repeats the usual experiences in his daily life. However, they encountered art objects that needed to make sense of it and re-interpret analyzed it. The art object can contain meaning beyond its visible form, and the art audience shares the analysis of this meaning. The boundaries between art, science and technique are losing their former clarity, and the intersections are growing and expanding rapidly. In other words, art, science and technology have destroyed the walls between them and have turned into an intertwined production area. There are different forms of consciousness: aesthetic consciousness, historical consciousness and scientific consciousness approach, we discussed the basic information in general. Consciousness forms express people's various attitudes towards life, the universe, and human relationships. These forms were formed during the historical development of man. Each reflects various and specific aspects of human life. Our aim in this study was to deal with aesthetic consciousness, which is one of these forms of consciousness that has an important place in the life of the individual.

In general, one of the most essential elements of the presence of aesthetic objects to meet their audience is that another subject is the artist (creator) of that aesthetic object. The subject who makes sense of an aesthetic object is not only confronted with the object but also with another subject. In particular, studies on objects and perceptions contribute to cognitive studies. From a philosophical point of view, the problem of intersubjectivity and discussions are precious in terms of understanding the consciousness of the other. The language-thought-world axis has left its place to the aesthetic object-thought-world in the problem of aesthetic intersubjectivity.

The idea of experiencing music in the body as a concrete form of perception is examined by studies in cognitive psychology and cognitive musicology, mainly related to the movement of body movements in the field of movement. Data on which musical element is associated with which bodily movement, which musical element turns into which bodily movement, and the concrete appearance of this interaction will explain the subject.

3. Abu Nasr Al Fârâbî is undoubtedly the instituting philosopher of Islamic philosophy. There are tens or even hundreds of philosophers in the Islamic logic and philosophy tradition, and each of these philosophers has made significant contributions to the history of thought. However, the philosophizing abilities and performances of each of the philosophers mentioned in the history books of philosophy are not the same. Being able to recognize and evaluate the position of the read and studied philosophy and logic text in the general structure requires having a certain understanding of what logic and philosophy are. If we do not have a philosophy master with the universal mind feature, we may not be able to understand the place of the philosopher we are working on or working on in the universal existence of philosophy. Writing a history of philosophy is a very valuable service in terms of meeting our social needs.

Measure is an indispensable element in both poetry and music. Fârâbî is the first philosopher who applied measure and rhythm to music in a complete system and wrote two comprehensive labor on this subject. Before Al Fârâbî, Ishaq al-Mawsili and Kindi, who were zealous in laying the foundations of Music, also focused on the theory of music. Ishak al-Mawsîlî and Kindî, who were diligent in laying the foundations of music before Fârâbî, also focused on the theory of music. However, Fârâbî criticized them for writing in the philosophy of music, the cosmological basis of knowledge, and scientific theories. The essence of this discussion is that the concepts in the works they examine are translated as they were written in ancient Greece, without knowing whether they make sense in practice. Fârâbî negotiated about tunes and rhythms that are suitable for human nature in his works on music, as if reversing the claims of some ethnomusicologists who saw early Islamic Music as consisting only of theory; He focused on the applicability of these not only in theory but also in practice.

4. Al-Farabi is a master musician, performer, and music theorist well known for his compositions. Registered as the Great Book and Encyclopedia of Music in some countries, the treatise of the Second Master remains the single most comprehensive treatise in the history of music science, aesthetics, and philosophy. Al-Farabi's *Kitab Al Musiqā Al Kabir* involves a wide range of experiences, observations in philosophy, and proof theory. However, the great book explains the importance of induction in the most systematic and detailed approach. Many principles are acquired through sensitivity experience, as in astronomy, optics, medicine, and other sciences. Al-Fârâbî defines a theoretical art as the result of a deductive method that examines a relationship from cause to effect, from the foundations of existence to the foundations of cognition. This paradigm was emphasized in his work *Kitab al Musiqā* in relation to the science and philosophy of music. Understanding the auditory processes that occur while listening to music can assist in inferences about the causality of music and may even provide some clues to its origin. Music provides a powerful stimulus to explore interesting auditory phenomena. Al-Fârâbî mentions knowledge and the recognition of primary meaning through the power and foresight of science and philosophy. *Kitab al Musiqā* focuses on the true nature of music in terms of content and structure. The order of evaluation is based on the hierarchy of sciences, from established knowledge to logic, mathematics, physical socio-ethics, and metaphysics to knowledge. Al-Fârâbî points out that deduction and experiment are complementary, as are history and logic.

The *Kitab al Musiqā* has given us an idea about the causality and necessity of working on the philosophy of music, along with the scientific method leading to the knowledge of the unknown first and subsequent foundations. The philosophy of music helps to interpret and make sense of thoughts. From a phenomenological perspective, as Al-Fârâbî also writes, the body and the senses determine a person's philosophy and thought.

5. One fascinating feature of the educational accounts of philosophers and scientists is that it pays attention not only to the content of stories and songs, as we might expect,

but also to their form or style. The main idea is that the musical mode and measure or rhythm of a song affects the human mind independently of the lyrics that are sung. The question whether music contains emotions or has an effect that can reveal emotions is still at the center of music philosophy in the current age. In summary, the search for an answer to the fascinating question of how music can encode emotions continues. The view that music encodes the emotion it contains rather than just triggering memories in the listener further supports the need to ask this question.

Each effective new technology finds a response on the level of philosophy and society. Therefore, every innovation reaches a relational equivalent in art, which shares the same vital values with cultural dynamics. Although the actions and outputs defined as art show multi-layered features related to knowledge, they are embodied as objects or actions of perception and sensation. Thus, as the extension of media that affect and even determine the relationship between humans and changes in the environment, the actions and outputs of art that are embodied or abstracted will also undergo a transformation, and in the same way.

Farabi argues that sensation is an abstraction realized through sense organs within this framework. That sensation, which represents the lowest level of knowledge, consists of acquiring material forms by the mind by preserving their human relations. Accordingly, sensation envisions the object's form within its secular state. The stage of abstraction after the sensation is determined by imaginary perception. Nevertheless, the imagination grasps material forms in their temporal relation, not in complete abstraction. However, he envisions the object not with its characteristics but within its generic structure. At the last stage of abstraction, form is perceived in its universal reality, utterly independent of its material relations, according to Farabi. So, while it corresponds to an abstraction process that essentially takes place in the mind, passing through the stages of knowing, sensation and imagination, it expresses an ascent from the particular to the universal or from the material form to the fully intelligible form.

Practical significance of the study: This dissertation's consequence has theoretical and practical significance. The cognitive approach allows more extensive research to examine artistic creativity from a philosophical perspective. Inferences and conclusions are consistent with interdisciplinary research and can be used in teaching a general course of philosophy, philosophy of music, psychology, cultural studies and other social and humanitarian sciences, as well as in musical practice.

Approbation of the research results: The scientific results of the dissertation work were published at scientific and practical conferences, in scientific publications. 9 articles have been published on the research topic. Among them, in the journal recommended by the Committee for Quality Assurance in Education and Science of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan - 3 (Journals "Adam Alemi", "Al-Farabi", and CAJAS); at scientific and practical international conferences - 2, 1 article published in the MLA International Bibliography (EBSCO), Linguistic Bibliography (Brill), Central & Eastern European Academic Source (EBSCO), Social

Sciences Bibliography Indexes Archive Data, ULAKBİM TR-Dizin, 1 article published "Ethnosocium" Mission of the Confessions in Moscow and 2 article published in the International journal "Open Access" in the Scopus database, WoS Subject Areas.

Dissertation discussion: The dissertation was discussed on 28 November 2022 at an expanded meeting of the Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy and Political Science of the Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi (Protocol No. 5) and recommended for defense.

Structure and scope of work: The structure of the dissertation work is determined by the goal set and the objectives of the research. The thesis consists of an introduction, six sections, a conclusion and a list of sources used. The work is presented on 272 pages of printed text.

PHILOSOPHY AND MUSIC

While the effect of music on society in the history of thought is a way of thinking that goes back to ancient times, approaches that comprehend the relationship between music and society in a mutual interaction process have emerged only in modern times. The scientific research method based on specialization in separate fields of study of the modern period often prevented this reciprocity from being addressed holistically; especially music remained a field of activity closed to itself for a long time as a field of expertise of a specific segment. However, the music-society relationship is increasingly included in an interdisciplinary field of activity in current debates. In a sense, this means that music's polymorphism/layering and polysemy are also accepted. Because of its unique character, music is an object of study that is difficult to grasp on the intellectual plane. This difficulty manifests itself in the activity of thinking about the relationship between music and society. Considering music's high level of abstraction as an artistic activity, this situation necessitates a social scientific approach that allows for a potentially open-ended development. Before discussing the forms of relations between these two planes, which we consider musical fields, it is necessary to determine the position of the musical field concerning the social context and physical nature. We think that these two musical fields are historically and socially included. In other words, both fields are constructed as two autonomous structures that can be produced from the social context shaped by the historical situation. In doing so, accepting music as a product of purely historical and social conditions and considering it as a manifestation that necessarily emerges under the decisiveness of these conditions is incompatible with the autonomy claim of this thesis.

The direct relationship between music and society arises only from the organic relationship of the agents who produce and consume music with the social and the instruments' obligatory technical content. However, these essential elements are outside the areas where we claim their autonomy. All the symbolic and imaginary components of the form and content of the musical work can be drawn into a social understanding through these means, which is how they are in their emergence. The priority of the musical field over the social field is also determined by the importance of the musical field over the social field. Through these approaches, all of the symbolic and imagined components of the musical work's shape and substance can be integrated into a social understanding, which is how they are in their emergence. The quality of the relationship established from the social field to the musical field is also determined by the importance of the musical field over the social field. The perception of the musical field must first be at the imaginary level, and society's inclusion in the musical field begins at the image level. It is possible to consider the first reason for this initiative as the social actor's orientation toward physical nature to know. Compared to the symbolic plane that emerges later and allows people to reproduce music in the social space, the "imaginary space" is any musical talent or skill brought about by the subjective positioning against the musical

product - the historical subject's world of meaning and its specific effect and knowing styles. It would be appropriate to understand them as the processes of reception that emerged at the associative, incidental or sensory levels created in the past from the "wholeness" periods of the human being before being informed.

For this reason, the content of the imaginary field can continue to exist without being subjected to the separation of mental categories. In terms of its priority on mental design, this area is a primitive zone of liberation. This framework makes sense to characterize the imaginary with the concepts of contingency and unconsciousness and place it beyond the necessary network of relations. However, unconsciousness does not refer to another category of mind or to a way of knowing that exists in this field. On the contrary, "excess" is meant precisely outside or before the competence of the mind. The imaginary placement in symbols is realized by the conscious intervention of the social subject in the imaginary field. In other words, we establish the symbolic space as the named region content and the meaning of the imaginary space as the first moment in which the musical is included in the social context. This is the domain of rational authority.

The musical material obtained through the imaginary field is transformed into a brand new system of signs and codes through mental processes. This is the part of the music produced by the social intervention. Images are reproduced in this area by being transformed into symbols. Here, the musical is planned, designed, and shaped. That is, it gains form. In this sense, musical form preserves a part of the musical integrity in symbols. The symbolic space is a region where such partial parts coexist or come together. In this sense, it is the expression of what is opposite to the imaginary field; it is a fragmentation, a partial consciousness, a conceptual field.

The enthusiasm for reproducing what is taken from nature (we mean the priority of music) by dividing sound into parts and bringing it together with temporal units by human hands goes back thousands of years. In this sense, the musical structure, which is established as a system of symbols, has created a mechanism within itself as a rational and hypothetical knowledge generation field that reveals its mathematical character, as a symbolic plane detached from its object, and as a self-consistent structure. At this level, we can claim that the symbolic plane, as a secondary level established by consciousness from within the imaginary field, establishes a system within itself, with its internal dynamics, but under the determination of the elements of the social rationality that establishes it. This is the level where music is the most music in itself, the region where it is an objectless field of activity. From this point of view, we think that music, in a way that nature has been exposed to throughout history, has turned into an object of desire in social dynamics, the effort to be obtained by this field. As a result of this effort, the musical has turned into a material that can be processed by the social sphere on two planes: imaginary and symbolic planes. Music exists holistically in nature and is drawn from here into the imaginary realm, the area of social context; that is, music is discovered by imitating nature.

It is impossible to ascribe music, one of the oldest branches of art in human history, to a particular society. The subject of thinking is the effort to give meaning to everything that exists, understand it deeply, and make sense of it. Choosing this way of life is a call to plan, severe, and good thinking; that is, an invitation to be the perfect human being. "What is meant by philosophy?" Considering what religion and aesthetics are, or which religion and which aesthetic theory questions are added to simple but basic questions such as these, the difficulty of the issue and the methodological problematic it contains will be immediately noticed. The Greeks called "methodology" (Caws 1987) the concise reasoning that allows doing what is helpful to be done more correctly and efficiently, avoiding the waste of thought. The breadth and ambiguity of the subject to be examined make it almost necessary to draw a border and avoid waste of thought. First, it should focus on what philosophy wants to tell or the meaning/meanings attributed to the concept of philosophy. When the history of philosophy is examined, it is not possible to talk about unity in the definition of philosophy.

It is seen that they act with the idea that "if philosophy had a definition, philosophy would cease to be a philosophy." But even this thought pattern gives us a definition of philosophy and is sufficient to show what can and cannot be the subject of philosophy. Once a topic or thing has been precisely defined or described, it can no longer be the subject of discussion. It is no longer a problem with which philosophy deals. For example, things that have been scientifically proven, precisely determined, and defined, are no longer the subject of philosophy. Therefore, no one makes a philosophical argument about whether the earth is round. But this does not mean that philosophy will not benefit from scientific data and evidence or that it will not make philosophical analyzes of science (J. Runzo 2001) . There are three principal areas or three fundamental pillars that constitute the subject of philosophy: These are the philosophies of knowledge, existence, and value. Religion and aesthetics; good, bad, beautiful, etc. are a discipline of "axiology" that deals with values and conducts research on the nature, criteria, and metaphysical status of values (Ewing A.C. 1985). The fact that philosophy is divided into fields such as knowledge, existence, and value does not mean that there is no relationship between them. For example, a person who knows and finds something excellent or injurious behavior is the subject of both knowledge, existence, and value philosophy.

Although the field of values has nothing to do with epistemology or epistemology, it is said that values are based on beliefs. The philosophy of knowledge itself is based on beliefs. It is impossible to separate the philosophy of value from knowledge because values must use knowledge to ensure their continuity and source. Because a person does not act by taking power from a principle that he does not know or cannot know, values that are seen as beautiful or good present themselves to others in a meaningful language.

In short, neither morality, the law, religion, nor aesthetics give us a rule that has nothing to do with what we know/knowledge and addresses us in a way we cannot understand. If they do, they will not be able to find applications because they exceed our world of understanding and meaning (Warnock 1982). An interdisciplinary comparison

and separation in philosophy should be avoided, but if it is claimed that disciplines such as religion and aesthetics belong to the field of values and that the field of values cannot be known. Therefore it is still "empty talk" to talk about them; they should be reminded of the term meaning of philosophy. The Greek concept of "philosophy" means "love of wisdom," not the love of knowledge (episteme); because "sophia" means wisdom (Frede 1987)) The concepts of wisdom and love are directly related to the field of values; For wisdom, in its simplest sense, is a profound knowledge of the meaning and value of human life. Wisdom is what adds meaning and value to the life of Socrates, who said that wisdom should be loved, not knowledge, against the sophists who see him as a scholar and even risked death for this cause. The concepts of wisdom and love are related to the field of values, For wisdom, in its simplest sense, is a profound knowledge of the meaning and value of human life. Wisdom is what adds meaning and value to the life of Socrates, who said that wisdom should be loved, not knowledge, against the sophists who see him as a scholar and even risked death for this cause. In short, the field of values is the effort of the conscious entity to understand or make sense of itself and its environment, which is related to all disciplines of philosophy and even permeates all other fields of philosophy.

After this brief analysis of philosophy and philosophy of value, explaining what is meant by "philosophical perspective" is necessary. Philosophy in the most general sense, and philosophy of religion, in particular, is meant to think and talk about the subject to be analyzed in a rational, objective, comprehensive and consistent manner with a "philosophical view"(Aydn S. Mehmet 2002). But this point of view claim does not seem entirely acceptable; because philosophers are always free to reject any of the points of view mentioned and to add other approaches to them. For example, a philosopher may define his philosophy as an "irrational" philosophy; another philosopher may easily reject the principle of consistency: "Consistent according to whom? Or objective according to what?" the philosopher may say. Although he accepts it, he can attribute different meanings to the concepts. To the person who defines their philosophy or philosophical point of view as above, "Why do you describe yourself like that?" It cannot be said that trying to get a philosopher who defines his philosophy as "irrational" to accept the idea that "Philosophy requires being rational or approaching events with a rational eye" will not go beyond an empty and unnecessary effort. While considering the above perspectives, our study will also include new methodological construction that includes subjectivity from the subject's perspective. Emphasize understanding and experience; there will be a "risk of happening" one way or another. During the current study, the aesthetic relationship should also be emphasized after the "methodology" to be applied regarding philosophy, philosophy of values and philosophical perspective. Since Aristotle, it is known that as a method, four situations are possible between two concepts or two fields in terms of their intensions and extents.

However, art does not show activity with concepts. Artists use their intuition and enthusiasm instead of explaining the phenomenon with concepts like philosophers. They present their works using their imagination, emotions, inner impulses, and creative

intelligence. Establishes the relationship with the object aesthetically. Artists create their works with the contribution of their skills and intelligence, taking religious, social, and psychological factors into account. This creation is unique and an expression of that artist only, so it cannot be imitated.

The human mind is at the highest level of practical and functional in acquiring philosophical knowledge. Philosophy is not only knowing but also a way of living. In this sense, knowledge of art is based on individual, sensual intuitions and imaginations. Because of this feature, it is subjective, and these are the general characteristics of this information that express the results concretely. Philosophical knowledge, which is entirely abstract, is also partially subjective in that each philosopher has their ideas. However, the philosopher tries to define objective reality according to the principles of reason and logic.

Thus, we can move on to the questions that arise in analytical approaches to music and language to analyze the nature and purpose of philosophizing about important determinations among the main traditions of philosophy. Peter Kivy, one of the relatively few analytic philosophers who has dealt extensively with music and whose work in the 1970s contributed significantly to the aesthetics of analytic philosophy, claims that of all the arts, "it is philosophically the most unexplored and philosophically most misunderstood where it is discovered" (Kivy 1997).

The place of music in Philosophy is a sub-discipline of Aesthetic philosophy. As the philosopher of the 21st century, Nick Zangwill explains music within the framework of aesthetic philosophy with the following words: "It is to be aware of certain sounds and sound structures and their aesthetic properties. This is the content of the music experience" (Zangwill 2015).

The knowledge that emerged as a result of the relationship established between the human subject and its environment (object) has been tried to be defined since the first Age philosophers. Knowledge is the consequence of methodical thinking (reflection). It is generally defined based on the subject-object relationship. Knowledge emerges from the action between the subject (subject) and the object (object). The subject is the person who knows, who can know. Object (object) is everything other than human. In addition to sensible and experiential (empirical) knowledge, thinking, imagining (imagination), and remembering are among the fields of knowledge. Philosophy and art are the activities of man to understand, explain and make sense of himself, his environment, and the universe. Philosophy is a discipline that includes creating concepts. As Nietzsche said, "The philosopher must start by producing, creating and revealing concepts. It should persuade people to resort to these concepts." For example, we can think of Aristotle's "substance," Descartes' "cogito" (I think), and Kant's "condition."

The aim of all the history of science and philosophy is to organize knowledge, showing a constant tendency. The more comprehensive and consistent the systematization of relevant facts and relationships, the more adequate and functional the knowledge. The concepts of space and time provide the most basic axes for guiding knowledge and experience. A particular note in a musical composition becomes essential in relation to

other notes played at the same time and concerning what has happened before and the anticipation of the future. "A genealogical time sequence appears with each " inventor " or "genius " towering above his fellows on a scale of value, each adding his contribution until there is a " culmination" in the art of one supreme composer.

A particular experience becomes meaningful at various levels of complexity concerning simultaneously existing facts and appropriate general concepts and the course of history in which it is significantly embedded. For this reason, Glen Haydon states that musicology deals with the epistemological concepts of space and time under the leadership of philosophy under two main headings: systematic and historical. Haydon explains that the subdivisions of Systematic musicology are based on both logic and convenience: "The various auxiliary sciences that contribute to our knowledge and understanding of music are listed as follows: (i) acoustics, which attempts the descriptive analysis of music in its physical nature; (2) psychophysiology, which treats of problems related to music as a phase of man's behavior; (3) aesthetics, which concerns questions of value in music; (4) pedagogy, which treats of problems of music education; and (5) anthropology, which deals with music as an element in the sociocultural make-up of the various peoples of the world" (Haydon 1941).

One of the critical features of the art object is that it functions as a "memory trigger" for social memory. All human activities that are meaningful, sacred, and exemplary are recorded by various means and preserved for reuse with the motivation of not losing storage. In this process of keeping and not losing, people form the three essential elements of the story to be conveyed with the various forms they take in time and space. Since all human activities represented in the storyteller art tradition are spread over time and take place in space, the way they are represented and recorded is also a fundamental problem for art disciplines. It is common to trace members or traditions of the community to which one feels oneself through the aural arts. The various forms that time takes, and the preferences for the methods of intensifying or disseminating the succession are also decisive elements in the expression and concealment actions of the auditory culture. Audio-visuals frequently display heroes, migrations, and genealogies as memory boards and lend legitimacy by transforming them into parts of sacred time and space. In this context, memory is significant for immigrants and exiled communities to preserve their identities in the changes experienced, and it shows that traditions are preserved through audio. The conflict of modernism with traditional aesthetic values and its effort to break away from its ties with the past are decisive in how time and memory are handled.

The structure of modern thought, which breaks its ties with tradition or the past, predicts that it will proceed to the future as a project from now on. The utopias of modernism quickly turned into dystopias. This uncertainty of the future and the disappearance of the project ignore the possibility of the past that sets the standards that will determine it. The 'modern' remains a break from the past and the future, an absolute, discontinuous 'postmodern' now as a break from the project and the future" (Hünler 2003) .Time and space trapped in such an absolute present form the basis of postmodern

perception. What could represent the compression of time and space? If there is a crisis in the representation of time and space, new ways of thinking and feeling begin to be required. With the effect of the tension created by the break from history and the roots of the individual, understanding history has been reduced to many memory objects in which understanding history is tried to be re-established. A pure romance seeks to dispel this tension by combining it with a genuine sense of history. By wandering among the melodies of a music album or museumized spaces, the individual wants to revive the sense of historicity lost in his memory.

As Stuart Hall mentions, “identities are the names we give to the different modes we are and are situated by narratives of the past” (Huysen 1995). The concept of memory has become the subject of many different disciplines today due to its relations with the perception of time and space, identity and place issues, history, knowledge, consciousness, existence, and representation. Many factors fuel this popularity of memory, and the recording possibilities of artificial memory, thanks to new electronic media, are one of them.

The texts written by Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno on the art and culture industry in the age of mechanical reproduction were nourished by memory and temporality. The possibilities of the technique seem to complicate the memory problem, this time via electronic media.

The emergence of artificial memories seems to be a cultural revolution equivalent to the invention of writing and printing. Memory and recall have now taken other forms. Memory loss caused by high technology makes this problem obvious. Another reason for the popularity of memory may be the effort to remember and understand the past culture of the old and tired continental Europe, which seems outdated. The discipline of archaeology, which emerged as an extension of the desire to create a shared past, serves the attitude that perceives today's culture as the successor culture of the past. The coloring of the face, which he defines as the Aryan white race, and the emergence of different sources of the cultures of the past also raise the issue of memory.

Researchers such as Jan Assmann and Andreas Huysen state that the near extinction of the living memory of the Holocaust, the humanitarian disaster of this century, also plays a role in the reality of the memory problem (Assmann 2011). Due to the complicated structure of cultural remembering styles and the contingent and variable nature of memory, social memory seems to be on the verge of a period of change. Memory and representation are questioned again at such a threshold.

1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DEFINITION AND HISTORY OF MUSIC

This is where knowledge of what music is needed. There are two aspects to the subject since music produces an abstract and a concrete product in one aspect. Producing a musical work means both are composing a musical work and writing music. Therefore, the right to produce music and freedom of expression is more complicated than in other

concrete fields such as literature and history. The job becomes more complicated when evaluating the subject with approaches such as Tawhid (holistic worldview, holism, unity, and oneness), Civilization, Islamic Civilization, Human Civilization, and Knowledge Civilization. Writing a book about music is often no different than any other book. The difference is that it has a particular field of knowledge that is more abstract than concrete concepts and terms. Everyone knows the law of gravity, but music is nothing but particular sounds; It is necessary to find out whether the sounds the oud makes are the same as the piano sound. Tone, rhythm, polyphony, and form knowledge should be built on basic musical knowledge. We must be aware of the right or wrong perceptions and limitations regarding the art of music.

Therefore, to produce an idea about a piece of music, to write a book, on the one hand, musical sounds, major and minor or quartet/quintet/genus/scale structures formed by musical sounds, basic music information such as mode, tempo, polyphony, form, genre, that is, general-conventional information. It means building an idea on it with the inspiration you get from fields such as musical knowledge, culture, history, and literature. Current discussions are an opportunity to build new ideas on the unknown in the current knowledge field. How can a musical work be registered? When published or registered by the relevant institutions, that work is registered. However, all the information in a printed book is original to the author and belongs to the author; it does not mean that it is the author's original idea. How to understand the original idea? Suppose there is an idea that remains when you remove the common knowledge or information that has been revealed by others before. It might be a new and original idea unless others wrote that idea.

The thing to note here is that the idea should be original, not the sentence. The expression of each produced idea does not necessarily mean that it will find a response in its time frame. The importance of the brick you put in the wall of civilization may not be appreciated enough by people of your own time. Like Farabi's book about music. Just like it was translated into a language that can be understood by those who know Turkish, precisely 1088 years later.

“Knowing the rules of putting that idea in writing is as important as saying I have an idea. If you have produced a musical piece, there is no problem when you say that you imitated it. I transferred it from something like that (in the academic community, methods of transferring knowledge and ideas are taught). However, it is severe freedom of expression to say that this is my composition, work, and opinion. As stated in the second article of the Civil Code, the principle of honesty must be followed. There is the right to labor, and there is the right to use” (Recep 2022).

Every civilization has a world of values from which it originates. From this world of values, the members of that civilization produce information about all areas of life, from Education to the economy, law, architecture, health, literature, art, environment, and human relations, and life forms are created from this information. The life forms produced are the carriers of the world of values. Therefore, we can only talk about the construction of civilization if life forms are created from the world of values of civilization and can be

brought to life. In other words, life needs forms, and civilization values can only be lived and sustained with these concrete forms. The forms used in every contact area reflect the values of the civilization to which it belongs and facilitates the living of these values. People are affected by the values of the forms they come into contact with in their lives; they get used to it and internalize it over time. As forms cover all areas of life, civilization begins to cultivate its own people.

When this efficient transition between the world of values and life forms is not ensured or problems are experienced, critical tensions and contradictions regarding the transfer of the values of that civilization to life begin to appear. The history of music, which is an indispensable part of human life, is as old as human existence because of this indispensability. Fascinating effects have never been separated from music. As civilization developed, music gained a complex structure, but people were constantly under the influence of the imaginary beauty that music brought them. Music is the indispensable crown of religious ceremonies, dances, rituals, festivities, celebrations, fiestas, and weddings. In the ancient Greek world, art was intertwined with life.

It does not seem possible for an envision of a civilization with a social consensus to survive unless urbanization, that is, the space where the forms it produces live, are formed. In this case, other forms fill life, and of course, these forms reflect the values of the civilization they originated from and facilitate the transition to life. Therefore, another civilization cannot be built using the forms of one civilization.

Opinions on music aesthetics, "What is music?" It consists of the responses given to the question in the attitudes taken in response to the question. We find the first thoughts on music in Pythagoras (580-500 BC) and Confucius (551-478 BC), more accurately, among the Pythagoreans and Confucians, who lived at about the same time, one in ancient Greece and the other in ancient China. The common aspect in these thoughts is that both views have approached music in parallel with each other in an ontological and anthropological way, and they have adopted the "sensory effect doctrine", which will perhaps be seen as the most effective and widespread understanding in the philosophy of music in the following centuries. For now, we are content to express this teaching, which we will discuss at length below, as the effect, stimulation, impression, and affect that music arouses in the listener.

The research carried out here has reached an even more promising position by philosophy, with certain details of the musical phenomenon associated with the term music (*mousikē*). In the field of philosophy, the history of music will play a role in understanding a wide cultural heritage, its artistic importance, and its relationship with the music of the present and past centuries, accompanied by science.

The origin of the word music comes from the Greek *Mousa*, the name given to the muses in Greek mythology. (Latin *musa*) *Mousa* is derived from the root "men", which includes the concepts of mind, thought, creativity-power. *Musas* are semi-human, semi-divine beings and thus they inspire poets, poets and artists. The nine muses are young girls, and they sing and dance all the time. The names of these nine daughters of Zeus

from Olympos are as follows: Klio, Euterpe, Thalia, Melpomene, Terpsichore, Erato, Polhymnia, Urania, and Kalliope, the head of them all. Although the Musas did not have a story of their own, there is hardly a festival in which they did not participate, and there is no poem in which their names are not mentioned. Homer's Iliad and Odyssey epics and Hesiod's Theogonia begin with an address to Moses. The areas in which the Musas were significant vary according to the ages and poets: Calliope epic poet or lyric poetry; Clio history; Polyhymnia pantomime; Euterpe flute; Terpsichore dance; Erato choral poetry; Melpomene tragedy; Thalia comedy; Urania astronomy.

It is impossible to ascribe music, one of the oldest branches of art in human history, to a particular society. It is assumed that when, where, how, for what purpose, and by whom it was created, music emerged simultaneously with the history of humanity. In the process, music has become more disciplined, and different musical instruments and different types of music have emerged to accompany various activities. The biological and cultural existence of man dates back two million years. Research on this process is the subject of anthropology, archeology, and ethnomusicology, not music history. Anthropology evaluates the evolution of humanity in three primary epochs:

1. Paleolithic age (ancient stone age, Paleolithic, or pre-production).
2. Neolithic age (starting from ten thousand BC, new stone, polished stone age, or the beginning of production and agriculture).
3. Industrial age (starting from 1800 BC, bronze and iron age). The biological evolution of man went through the following stages: Homo heidelbergensis (five hundred thousand years ago); Homopresapiens (three hundred thousand years ago); Homo sapiens diluvialis (one hundred thousand years ago); Homosapiens alluvalis (ten thousand years ago BC).

Man's obligation to live in nature and be at peace with nature led him to observe and learn about nature. People who observe enough of their environment have led to making sounds from their bodies and the materials around them, eventually finding and using their voices. The ancestor of music as a form of expression is the word. The process that allowed the word to transform into a song included the need to seek rhythmic support during collective work in primitive societies. It is known that in primitive societies, music was used in spells, celebrations, and more religious events. Music was a vision of life that could reveal its actions in societies through music, ritual, and dance. That's why it took thousands of years for music to reach the level of art. In all ancient societies, they would discuss existence with songs, music, and dance, and everything would have a musical equivalent. "Music, which has an important place in Mesopotamia, was believed to have divine origins, so music was performed in all religious ceremonies in the region. It has been understood from the Mesopotamian written documents that there are many areas related to music" (Dinçol 2003). "Music, both with instruments and the human voice, played a major role in Sumerian life. Some of the musicians had become important figures in temples and courts. Beautifully made harps and lyres have been excavated from royal tombs in the city of Ur. Flutes made of reed and metal were common, as were percussion

instruments such as drums and tambourines. Poetry and song flourished in Sumerian schools. Most of the artifacts recovered were hymns to gods and kings to be sung in temples and palaces. But there is every reason to believe that music, song, and dance are also an important source of entertainment in homes and markets”(Kramer 2002).

The Sumerian music was somewhat shaped by the Babylonians of the Semitic race, who had also migrated to Mesopotamia, while the Assyrians regularly brought together the existing musical accumulations (Dinçol 2003). Phrygians were also highly developed in handicrafts and music. The ancient Greeks saw them as creators of various musical instruments and as prodigious musicians. The Ancient Greeks made them work as enslaved people because of their excellent music and their graceful (polite) disposition (Cox 1990). The role of musical theory was indeed preëminent. Philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, and historians made their contributions.

The music itself and the psychology and physiology of sound perception were frequent scholarly search and reasoning themes. And so was acoustics, the physical aspect of music. Vibrations were discovered to be the cause of the sound, and there is little doubt that the discoverer was Lasos of Hermione, who, around 500 BC, was Pindar's teacher. A hundred years later, Archytas of Tarentum found that hearing even implied two vibrations: stationary waves within the instruments and the throat and progressive, spheric waves in the surrounding air to convey them to the ears. And the fourth century B.C., established a complete (though not fully preserved) theory of rhythm and melody under the leadership of Aristotle's disciple, Aristóxenos of Tarentum (Sachs 1955).

Greek philosophy was born as a "philosophy of nature": it is known to depend on experience as natural philosophy. Another critical point is that healthy determinations and concrete evidence in old data have reached the present day. Ancient Greece left a source that could be the basis for later ages. Contemporary science illuminates the past based on these sources. What are the primary sources of ancient thought? What tangible evidence is there for this idea today? The works of the first Greek philosophers remained only in fragments. These are revealed as quotations in the works of later authors. My philosophy and science world have Plato and Aristotle's essential structure, including today's age. Only fragments remain of the ancient Stoics, Epicureans, and Septics. From the later period, we have Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelios, and Cicero from the Roman Stoa; The works of the Septic Sextos Empirikos and Philo of Alexandria; remnants of Neo-Pythagorean literature; Plotinus Crops; some works of the Neoplatonists (especially Proclus); Commentaries (commentators) on the works of Plato and Aristotle by Neoplatonists and others. The works of Al-Farabi, who unlocked the world of philosophy of all times by analyzing the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, are the primary legacy of world history.

The Greeks thought that some gods were also related to music. They organized festivals in honor of gods such as Apollo, Dionysus, and Athena, and they sang hymns in the name of their gods at these festivals. In the big festivals organized, music competitions were held and sports competitions. The ancient Greeks knew that well-educated youth

would form the basis of an ideal society. For this reason, “We may accept the traditional view that Education consists in * Music or culture of the soul, and Gymnastic, or culture of the body. Music' must be begun before gymnastics. Now ' Music' includes literature, and literature is either true or false. We shall educate our children with false literature before we teach them true. However, we shall eschew all legends that inculcate views inconsistent with those we desire our Guardians to entertain when they are men. Our young men will seldom need the help of judges and doctors, thanks to their Education in Music and gymnastics. They will pursue both arts with a view of the soul's cultivation rather than of the body. Exclusive devotion to one of the two makes men, in the one case, hard and fierce, in the other effeminate and mild. The psychological elements of Spirit and the Love of Knowledge must be attuned to one another. Music and gymnastics are intended to affect this harmony: excess or deficiency in either of these educative instruments reflected in morbid and degenerate phases of character. He who can best blend Music with gymnastics is the true musician; and such a one we must provide in our city if it is to last (Plato 1943).

Music was performed in joyful events and in social severe events such as wars, and the sound of music was used to command the soldiers and encourage them. “A party of Thynians turned back. As the men ran past in bold relief against a burning house, they let fly a volley of javelins out of the darkness, into the glare and wounded two captains, Hieronymus, a Euodean, and Theogenes, a Locrian. No one was killed. Only the clothes and baggage of some of the men were consumed in flames. Presently up came Seuthes to the rescue with seven troopers, the first to hand, and his Thracian trumpeter by his side. Seeing that something had happened, he hastened to the rescue, and ever the while, his bugler wound his horn, which music added terror to the foe. Arrived at length, he greeted them with an outstretched hands, exclaiming, "I thought to find you all dead men” (Xenophon 2011).

The ancient Greeks benefited from the benefits of music in the medical field. They are the disease; They thought that the treatment was given by God, and they asked Apollo, whom they believed to be the god of medicine, to find a cure for their problems by singing songs called "paian". (Pind. P. V, 60-70) Although medical practitioners argued that music could not cure physical illnesses, the belief of the time was otherwise. It is believed that the musician Thaletas, who lived in the 7th century BC and wrote ‘paian’ songs, went to Sparta and saved the people there from the plague with his songs(West 1992). In fact, it was conveyed to us by the scholars of the period that the Ancient Greeks, who applied music in the treatment of various mental illnesses, were successful in this practice. It is said that the idea of therapy with music was first put forward by Pythagoras and that some of the songs he composed healed problems such as sadness and hopelessness (Iamblichus 1818).

Music discipline was used in the construction of this section. In this section, where we encounter a general definition of music by combining the definitions of music accepted by academic circles with the philosophers' thoughts on music, we will clarify where the

definition brings us today and from which point we examine music. It is imperative to understand the subject and be able to reveal the evidence, origins, and history of music, which is the main element of the subject we will examine, from the first sources to the present day. Since it will make it difficult for us to understand the unique historical journey of music, examining the definitions in the history of music in the form of language, content, field-branch, metaphysical, religious mystical, formation or structure-form and each of them divided into sub-branches, general theories and assumptions are especially included. Our music history research is complex because of the particular form of music.

“If today's Romanesque or Gothic cathedrals are architectural monuments in everyone's eyes, despite the temporal distance separating them from us, if a Gregorian song or a bard's song is so psychologically distant to us, it is not only because the former have become permanent in space and the latter dissolved in time” (Fubini 1990).

Music is a complicated history to follow because it is a temporal art and has difficulties transferring it. The history of European Classical music, a deep-rooted musical tradition, and Ancient Greek modal music, which was accepted before, will be given importance. Thus, it will be accepted that there is an environment in which all civilizations create music in a way and grow it without going out of context. Also, it would be unreasonable to think that cultures and civilizations do not influence each other.

1.1 Origin of Lyric Music and General Music Definitions

The origin of the word music is Greek. He appears as 'Mousiké Tekhné', that is, the Knowledge of the Musas, who was the assistant of Apollo. These fairies, who are the helpers of Apollo, have arts, crafts, and some mystical abilities (Can 2021). No song, no knowledge was foreign to them. The words 'musique' in French and 'musiki' in Arabic in Turkish, including 'küğ' (commonly used until recently) in Old Turkish. Turkish is one of the rare languages that shows the word music in three unusual ways. If we briefly review the definitions of music, an acceptable standard definition can be reached (Uçan 1996). Mental (cognitive), movement (motor), and emotional (emotional) production designed by a man with life to select the sound material offered by nature, organize them, and create combinations with the resulting 'musical sounds' (Say 2002).) Apart from this, it is helpful to see the different understandings of music by looking at the different views of many philosophers and musicians.

“Music is part of life.” Music is a tonal art. It is combining sounds in a purposeful aesthetic structure. “Plato defines music as an education that reveals measure, harmony and good morals” (Ridley 2007b). Beethoven defines music as a divine art. Some arts imitate through sound; Accordingly, in all the mentioned arts, imitation, in general, is carried out either through rhythm or through words or harmony (Aristotle. 1961).

Tones are perceived. It is not possible to discuss understanding them because they do not express anything. Therefore, music is just an art of perception. Any object that makes a sound can be a musical instrument. It is said that the music begins with two voices, and in order for two sounds to occur, there must be silence in between. The sound is divided into the perception of the sound with the different vibrations that occur in

succession during the sound coming out of the instrument and the sound. The vibrations that occur during the progression of the sound in the ear become deafening. Confucius describes all sounds as coming out of the mind.

Music is also a gateway between their differences and relevance. Those who know sound but do not know harmony are birds and animals—people who know the tone but don't understand the music. Only great people know music... (Koç V. 2008). On the other hand, Pythagoras describes the sounds he makes from the harmonious movements of the Realms (planet-sphere) as music. Avicenna claims that music is a mathematical science that investigates sounds and the time processes between these sounds to know how a melody is composed, in terms of whether they are in harmony with the philosophy he inherited from Al-Farabi (Avicenna, ., & Marmura 2004). Although we cannot accept all these definitions, we agree with some because music is an act. Therefore, many different definitions and interpretations of music emerge among musicians and philosophers.

1.2 A Brief History of Music

In this section, where we will look at the history of music from Primitive Societies to the Modern Age, especially the Greek civilization, the purpose of music, how it is used, and when it is accepted as an art will be discussed. In this way, it will serve as a philosophical background to the history of music, as it is shaped by the intellectual structure of the Greek civilization and the historical path up to the present day.

Primitive Societies

We use the term primitive societies compared to the era we live in. We do not have any data on the "sound product" made in ancient times, called music or not. While we have no evidence of what music was like in early societies, we can try to make sense of music in some way based on our human history. The main views and thoughts in various sources, which explain the origin, birth, and formation of music or the art of music, can be compiled and summarized in three main clusters in certain aspects (Storey 2000).

The main views and thoughts in various sources about explaining the origin, birth, and formation of music or the art of music can be compiled and summarized in three main clusters in certain aspects:

- a. Opinions arose from myths, religious sources, and mythical information,
- b. Views arising from some observations in human history,
- c. Views arising from certain practices in human history” (Uçan 1996).

Man's obligation to live in nature and be at peace with nature has led him to observe and learn about nature. A person who observes his environment adequately has ensured that he can make sounds from his own body and the materials around him and ultimately find and use his voice.

“The ancestor of music as a form of expression is the word. The process by which the word turned into song also included the need to seek rhythmic support in collective work in primitive societies.” Say, *The Book of Music*, p.259. It is known that in primitive societies, music was used in sorcery, celebration, and most religious events. Music was a vision of life in societies that could reveal their actions with music, ritual, and dance.

That's why it took thousands of years for music to reach the level of art; "It means that primitive music is both communal and individual. The delayed feature of creativity has experienced an important preparation period that continues from age to age and sows the seeds of cultural evolution. The mainstay of primitive music is its function: magic. For millennia, this function has prevented it from reaching the level of amusing or glorifying, elevating it to "art" (Say 2002).

In all ancient societies, they would discuss existence with songs, music, and dance, and everything would have a musical equivalent. There are opinions that the reason for this is that music is in harmony with the harmony of nature. It is plausible that music originated and was used for work and growing up in early societies due to the ability to make a sound, the act of "word," and the unity as a community against nature. "...it was a means of organizing the collective labor of the tribe in real actions such as hunting, planting seeds; It was the beginning of the attempt to understand nature. There were rites of hunting, warfare, planting, harvesting, youth initiation into puberty, and burial rites. Each had their dance or song" (Finkelstein 2000).

Although the opinions that the music of the old times is monophonic and simple are dominant, there are also opinions to the contrary. In the old periods of most civilizations, large choirs and instrumental groups were belonging to the ruler, maqam names were given and music systems similar to today were used.

According to available instructions, in Chinese temples and palaces at that time there was music sung by the choir and usually accompanied by up to three hundred instruments. It is known that this music was monophonic, but at the same time that polyphony began to develop in the west, in China there was a kind of organ, based on the fourth and fifth, in parallel with the first polyphony of the west(Mimaroğlu 1987).

However, since there is no written data left and the remaining data is not understood, there is no certainty about this, and since these systems are not regular and sustainable, they cannot be compared with the music systems of our age. A lot of data has remained from the ancient Greek civilization to the present day. Because of this;

"We see that the development that will form the basis of today's classical music by creating a synthesis from the high cultures of the first era has begun to flourish in the Ancient Greek civilization. Pythagoras' invention, which is accepted as the first big step in the physics of music, determines the number of vibrations of the sounds and determines the range of sounds. Thus, both leading to the production of instruments that produce precise and accurate sounds and providing new opportunities for ear training is an important transformation in the history of music. Ancient Greek verses, called Doyen, Phrygian, Lidyen, Miksolidyen, established a bond between music and people" (Say, The Book of Music, p.252) (Say 2001).

"In addition, in Plato's Republic dialogue, he stated which of the modes could be beneficial and which could be harmful to education" (Plato, The Republic, iii p. 104-105)(Plato 1943). Ancient Greek music was systematically written down and brought to

the present day. Music series and systems to be made will be built on the Ancient Greek Modality.

Music in Ancient Greek Philosophy

In Ancient Greece, which gave importance to music so much that it could be described as a musical society, philosophers did not remain ignorant of music but interpreted it from various angles. In this context, the first philosopher to look at is Pythagoras. Pythagoras developed some formulas by applying mathematical rules to sounds. For this reason, he was seen as the first music theorist in the Western world (Aktaş 2012). Pythagoreans thought that harmony emerged from the oppositions at the foundation of the universe. The most basic absolute harmony in the universe is harmony, and the highest harmony is in music (Bayladi 2008)). The Pythagorean idea that everything known contains numbers and that nothing can be thought of or known without numbers has also been applied to music. One of the few things that is known for certain about Pythagoras is that he demonstrated a relationship between the musical pitch and the length of the vibrating harp. Pythagoras and his relatives saw that certain string length ratios produced octave, quintet and quartet intervals and realized that there was a pattern hidden behind the beauty heard in music(Ferguson 2012). Pythagoras, who spoke for the first time about the relationship between beauty and mathematical harmony, likened harmony in the universe to the harmony between the length and tension of the string in music and the sound produced. Thus, the Pythagoreans tried to put the curtains in music on a scientific basis for the first time. The Pythagoreans claim that harmonious sound is related to the length or precision of the string and to some degree of numerical ratio (Özen, H. Ömer and Elmalı 2018).

Music meant more than just a fun hobby for Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, who discovered that the source of beauty and harmony in music was a mathematical ratio. For them, the way to understand the universe was to understand music. Because the whole universe is built on the principles of music (Aktaş 2012). Also, the Pythagoreans believed that celestial bodies produced musical notes in their tracks(John Burnet 2013). The Pythagoreans claim that there is music emerging from the sounds of celestial bodies in the universe. The question of why this existing music is not heard by people was asked and an answer was tried to be found. Discussing this issue, Aristotle said:

“So the theory that music comes out of their motions (the planets and the outer sky) because they make harmonious sounds, although nicely and cleverly stated, is not valid. According to some, the motions of such large objects should inevitably make a sound: Even the objects on earth, which do not have such a large mass and speed, make noise, while the sun, moon, and stars of so many sizes and numbers are moving so fast that more significant noise is not heard. Those who assume this and claim that the velocities correspond to the musical harmony ratios depending on the distances suggest that the sound of the stars as they rotate is harmonious. The Pythagoreans were interested in the relationship between music and human and the relationship between music and the universe. They argue that the different tones and various tones used can influence the

development of one's passions and enthusiasms(Cetinkaya 2014). Knowing that music affects the human soul, Pythagoreans applied music to positively change the listeners' moods. The Pythagoreans, who believed that music could heal physical problems by changing one's inner world, used music to create peace, joy, and excitement (Aktaş 2012). This use of music by the Pythagoreans is consistent with their understanding of cosmology. As it is known, according to Pythagoreans, the universe is a harmonious and ordered structure—the source of this harmony and order numbers, which are also the principle of the universe.

It is desired that order and harmony prevail in human beings, a part of the universe, which is an orderly and harmonious structure. Pythagoreans state that man can achieve a harmony similar to the harmony in the universe. Considering what W. K. C. Guthrie conveyed, man's identity with the divine should consist of numbers in harmony since individual souls, although embodied according to Pythagoreans and thus far from purity, still have the exact nature in their essence.

The element of disharmony in man, that is, the element of infinity is a raspy note and arises from a defect in the numerical order of the souls. The purification that philosophy will bring is to eliminate this dissonance(W. K. C. Guthrie 2011). The Pythagoreans aimed for the harmony prevailing in the universe to emerge in human beings as well, and they applied both philosophy and music for this purpose. These views are based on the similarity that they think exists between the cosmos and man. Mathematical harmony in the universe causes music, and a similar harmony can be created in man through philosophy and music based on mathematical principles.

Plato, who greatly benefited from the Pythagorean heritage and the values and acceptances of Ancient Greek society, is probably the Greek thinker whose most discussed views on music. The effects of both Ancient Greek society and Pythagoreanism are seen in Plato's views on music. One of Plato's most essential views regarding music in the society he lives in is the thought that music should be included in the education curriculum.

For Plato, who said in the Gorgias dialogue that the state should make its citizens as good as possible, education is the primary tool to enable the state to reach this goal(Plato 2009). According to the definition given by Plato, education is “to attract and guide children to the principle which is rightly expressed in the law and which people of old age find right by their experience”(Plato 2007). Plato, through education, wants young people to love beauty, resemble beauty, be one with it, and mingle with it, which is the most beautiful education (Plato 2005) .

While Plato aims to make the citizens better and love the beautiful through education, he states that music should be included in the education curriculum. Music education to be given in schools should only serve these purposes. Other than that, music with different characteristics should not be allowed. As Eduard Zeller puts it, in Plato, poetry and music are subject to strict limitations, and he only allowed hymns to the gods

or songs dedicated to the praise of nobles. No Homer, no tragedy or comedy is allowed in Plato's state (Zeller 2008).

Plato, who gives a great place to music in education like the Greek society he lived in, does this very restrictive, unlike in his society. In contrast to Athenian society, where tragedies, Homer, and comedy exist freely, they are entirely forbidden in Plato's ideal state. The reason for this ban is the power of music and words. Like words, music is so powerful that it can shape the human spirit and mind with its emotional intensity. If young people listen to the right tunes and the right music tone, it can help them grow into better people. However, they can become corrupt if they listen to inappropriate music (Aktaş 2012). Plato states that there is a distinction between right and wrong in music and other areas of life.

However, some may be mistaken because of their folly in music and argue that there is no truth in music and that the correct rule is that the person who enjoys it decides according to their taste. This understanding, assuming that the audience can distinguish what is beautiful and what is not in art, causes "aristocracy" to be replaced by "audience dominance" in art management. Plato explains that the consequences of this misunderstanding will not be limited to this. After the music, the idea that everyone knows everything and breaking the rules emerges, and then disorder begins. Plato interprets this situation as arrogance because we know everything, giving birth to arrogance (Plato 2007). Plato states that music is too important to be left to everyone's taste, but this does not mean that music has nothing to do with pleasure. Plato's music has also been evaluated in terms of giving pleasure. But art is the most beautiful art, which is liked not by random people but by the best and the properly educated, especially by a single person who stands out for his virtue and education (Plato 2007).

Plato gives a great place to music in his education curriculum, but music does not form his education curriculum alone. Plato is against this kind of one-sidedness. He thinks that music and gymnastics are the cornerstones of children's education, and gymnastics trains the body and makes the child brave and resilient.

On the other hand, music trains the soul and makes it thin and soft. Therefore, both are necessary for education. A strong, beautiful, and balanced personality will emerge by giving music and gymnastics education together (Störing 2015). For Plato, an education that includes only music or only physical education and does not combine these two is an incomplete education. People who have spent their life in gymnastics and have not been interested in music fall into rudeness and harshness. When a person is not only interested in gymnastics, good food, and drinks but is not interested in philosophy and music, the desire to learn will weaken, atrophy, and disappear because he does not enjoy learning, does not engage in any research, does not deal with art and music. Such people are hostile to thought and speech and alien to music. They can't get along with words and try to get whatever they want by force and rudeness like an animal. Their lives are spent in ignorance and folly, devoid of measure and order (Plato 2005).

Conversely, people who are only interested in music and do not care for their bodies fall into softness and looseness. If the sound of music comes from all over the person, if soft, sweet, sad tones are poured into his ears, his life will pass by humming folk songs. When the process continues in this way, the power in him completely softens and melts, and eventually, that person's valor disappears. In education, what is desired is to turn hardness into valor and softness, not into laxity, but a measured gentleness (Plato 2005). Together, music and gymnastics sharpen and nourish the mind while softening anger with measure and order (Ozcan 2006). . Music and physical education develop the feelings of harmony and measure in the child (Ozcan 2006).

For this reason, both music and physical education should be included in Plato's ideal education in a way that balances the effects of each other. However, Plato's importance to music and physical education should not cause us to ignore that mathematics is also essential for him. Pierre Hadot reveals this situation by saying that the mathematical sciences were born in the Academia founded by Plato. The axiomatic, which formulates the presuppositions of reasonings according to his statements and organizes the theorems by deducing them from each other, is discovered here (Hadot 2011).

Although music is compulsory in Plato's ideal education, music that is incompatible with achieving a good and solid personality, which is the purpose of this education, has no place in this education. For this reason, he does not allow crying and whining in education, and he does not see maqams suitable for sad words. Like the sad ones, the loose modes and suitable for the drinking table are also prohibited by Plato.

Plato suggests two types of music instead of this music that he forbade. One of these maqams is harsh; This rank is suitable for the valiant behavior of a person in war or in the face of difficulties, injured, defeated, faced with death, and who can defy his destiny despite all kinds of unhappiness. The other is a soft office, which is suitable for living in peace and for work done freely without force. The condition that Plato brought to the maqams "to be both brave and suitable for a measured life" is also valid for rhythms like maqams, and Plato opposes that they are also different and diverse. Because according to him, rhythms, like modes, are compelling to people, and some rhythms can lead to indulgence, exuberance, insanity, and other evils (Plato 2005).

Pythagoreanism also influenced Plato in music. He explains this effect with the words of Socrates: "I suppose we could say that just as our eyes were made for astronomy, so our ears were made for harmonic motion, that astronomy and harmony are sister sciences, as the Pythagoreans said, and we must be affirmed." Although Plato accepted these views of the Pythagoreans, she finds their views on music incomplete and expresses this deficiency with the following expressions: "They try to find the numerical relationships between the chords they hear, but they never get to the point of raising the issues and questioning which number relationships are compatible" (W. K. C. Guthrie 2011). Despite these criticisms of Plato, it can be said that he generally followed a Pythagorean line. According to Guthrie, Plato's arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmony curriculum is clearly a Pythagorean curriculum, and the metaphysical

understanding of mathematics exhibited here is also taken from Pythagoreanism (W. K. C. Guthrie 2011).

As can be seen, Plato, who was influenced by both the practices and acceptances of the Greek society in which he lived, and Pythagoreanism, is one of the thinkers who put forward the most remarkable ideas about music.

For Plato, music is more than simply a matter of taste. According to him, music is a very important issue related to social, political, moral and education. Music, which has an important role in raising morally right citizens, is too important to be left to people's preferences and wishes in an ideal state. Music, which should be listened to for educational and moral purposes, was never seen as a matter of pure entertainment by Plato.

Aristotle is a philosopher who made important statements about post-Platonic music. Aristotle, like Plato, was a thinker who cared about the kind of music that causes emotional changes in the listener. The difference is that his views on music are mostly related to the concept of catharsis, which means purification and cleansing. Aristotle counted music as one of the most important tools to provide catharsis(Esgin 2012).

Aristotle first examined the question of why one should deal with music. According to him, music can be used for entertainment and relaxation, as well as to contribute to the formation of a certain character quality or to use free time correctly . (Aristotle, 2013, 258). These views of his are quite different from those of Plato. As it will be remembered, Plato found it appropriate to use music only to transform the character quality. However, Aristotle argues that music is a part of these three elements. It can also be used for entertainment purposes. Entertainment is for rest, and rest is necessarily a pleasant thing. Fun is medicine for the pain of hard work. However, music is also a suitable tool for the correct use of free time. Because the correct use of free time includes not only the noble but also pleasure, and happiness consists of these two. Music is one of the most pleasant things, and it gives pleasure to people. Third, Aristotle looks at the effects of music on character. He asserts that music excites the souls and that the spirit's character is changed by enthusiasm. Also, when people listen to imitations of emotions, they share these emotions. They change in spirit while listening to music. Acquiring the habit of feeling pleasure or pain from similar people is close to acquiring the same habit regarding their original. People are affected differently by each of the music they listen to.

Some fill people with anguish and grief, some make people weak in spirit, some calm, and some arouse excitement and enthusiasm. Based on these examples, Aristotle concludes that music has the power to change the character of the soul. He states that if music has such a power, it should be used, and young people should be educated with Aristotle, like Plato, thinks that music can affect the human spirit and that this power should be used in education.

Music education should not adversely affect the body in youth and the mind in maturity in terms of the performance of citizenship or military duties. Aristotle, who evaluates music in terms of its effect and imposes restrictions on musical genres according to this effect, also deals with musical instruments from a similar point of view. For this

reason, he opposes the use of kithara and wind instruments in education, as they cause excessive excitement and negatively affect the mind. However, he does not eliminate the flute, one of the musical instruments he considers to cause excessive excitement. The flute, which was removed from the education life, can be used to purify emotions (John Burnet 2008).

In general, it is seen that Aristotle deals with music in terms of not one but many benefits and lists its four benefits. Music can be beneficial in education, purification, the correct use of free time, and relaxation. Unlike Plato, Aristotle, who opened a broader field to music and allowed it to be used for other than educational purposes, again differs from Plato and argues that moving and energetic music can also be used. The views of Plato and Aristotle, who made introductory statements about music, have similarities and differences. Plato deals with the use of music for educational purposes and does not allow any music that he thinks will not contribute to the formation of the right character. However, while accepting the role of music in character education, Aristotle shows a more tolerant attitude than Plato about music, although it is not to the extent that it allows all kinds of music because music can be used for different purposes. For example, according to him, the flute, which is not suitable for educational purposes, can be used to purify emotions. Despite this tolerant attitude, it should be kept in mind that Aristotle also did not tolerate all kinds of music and did not allow music that would have bad consequences. As a result, it can be said that Ancient Greek society and philosophy cared about music in terms of its effects on people, and the main criterion in music was the question of how music affects the human spirit.

An overview of the concept of 'Psyche' in ancient philosophy

From an etymological point of view, it is seen that the Ancient Greek term «psyche (soul)» derives from the verb «psycho- (to breathe, to blow; to cool, to freeze; to dry),» and its first meaning is «breath-air). Other meanings can be listed as follows: Sign of life, life, spirit; ghost (in Homer); the soul or spirit of a person (as opposed to his body); where the will, passions, and desires reside (the heart); mind, mind (Dürüşken 2013). The term "psyche," which we encounter with the concept of "soul," has gained various meanings depending on the thinkers of every age in the history of philosophy. Thus it has a different meaning from its first meaning. Since the writings of pre-Socratic thinkers have not survived, we try to learn their thoughts from other thinkers (especially Aristotle and Theophrastos) with different interpretations.

It is necessary to consider the changes in the meaning and interpretation of the term "psyche," the intellectual structure of that period, and the various motives that make up this structure, and consider the concept's content in a broader framework. We aim to understand the perception and cognitive field of the mind in music philosophy by considering the evolution of the term "psyche" in Pre-Socratic philosophy within this broad framework.

In the 1st Book of Aristotle's *De Anima* (On the Spirit), which is an essential source in explaining the concept of "psyche" in antiquity, the views of the previous period were

exhibited and criticized: Aristotle considers the oldest view of "psyche" from two perspectives on the basis of "the principle of motion (kinesis)" and "the principle of sensation (aisthesis)". According to this idea, "Psyche" had two distinguishing features: movement and sensation. (Aristoteles On the Soul 2015: 403b25). However, in order to obtain a better knowledge of "Psyche", first of all, it is necessary to examine an important point that Aristotle did not mention: the pre-philosophical use of the concept of "Psyche" and its treatment as a religious phenomenon (Peters 1967).

In the first ancient Greek thought, "psyche" was seen as a being that keeps man alive and leaves his body when he dies, closely related to breathing. In the terminology of Homer, one of the most important representatives of early Greek thought, «Psyche» has two meanings: «the principle of life» and «the dream (or shadow) of a dead person (eidolon).» In Homer, "psyche" is also defined as "the breath of life" coming out of the mouth of a dying hero." In addition, according to Homer, there is also *athymos* (spirit, consciousness, Latin *animus*), which is located in the diaphragm of man, which causes him to think and feel, which is considered separately from "psyche".

They argue that Homer used "thymos" (or the names given to the heart and other organs of the body that react effectively) instead of the term "psyche". The reason for this is that the concepts of "thymos (consciousness)" and "psyche (life)" were considered within the concept of "soul" in Homer's time) The term "thymos" is derived from the verb "thuo (to sacrifice)"; it indicates a warm flow of blood. The term "thymos" is associated with the lungs, hence the breath, the heart, and the mind; it is regarded as the source of consciousness and sensations such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling. "Thymos" is a dynamic, fluctuating breath, or a breath mixed with blood, that can change when feelings and thoughts change. Breathing is not outside air; It is the air that decreases when the body is sick and increases with the body's healing. These two terms are very different in meaning from each other. Particular attention should be paid to the following point: The meanings stated as the original meaning of the terms in the Homeric epics is the secondary meanings of the Ancient Greek terms. For this reason, it would be helpful to consider this situation when commenting on this period.

Another thinker-poet who used the concept of "psyche" after Homer is Pindar. According to Pindar, "every human body submits to the mighty call of death. However, an illusion (*eidolon*) remains from life. Because only this dream is of divine origin, it sleeps when people's limbs are active, and while they are asleep, it announces divine decisions that will bring joy and sadness to the person. Pindar speaks, indeed, of the human soul as "from the gods" in one of the fragments from a dirge (fr. 131 b). "The body of all", this fragment says, "follows mighty death, but the *σώματος εικόνα* is still alive; for that alone is from the gods, and it sleeps while the limbs are active, but while they sleep, it reveals in many dreams the coming decision of pleasant and of unwelcome things." The word *σώμα* is coupled with *ψυχή* at //. XVI 453: elsewhere in Homer, it means 'life', but after Homer 'lifetime'. Homer calls the spirits of the Dead *εικόνα καταστροφή*, and they

are usually imagined as images of the living man; thus, σώματος εικόνα means "image of life".

As can be understood from here, for Pindar, there is a second "I/ego (or imagination)" that is dormant in the body throughout man's life. This 'I/ego' becomes operational in one's dreams with death. In this thought, it is observed that the human soul is explained as having a divine origin. To In Homer, the dream is always a genuine apparition that comes to the sleeper. Indeed, he occasionally calls this dream apparition an eidolon, but he never applies this term to the soul as an organ for dreaming, as Pindar does. It would be pretty unthinkable for Homer to conceive the truthful dream as a vision in which the soul is set free from the body and exalted to the divine power that was originally hers. We have here two altogether different conceptions of the soul's nature, and they should be kept as distinct as possible. Rohde's animistic theory of the Homeric psyche as a double, a second ego that slumbers in man while he lives, and abandons his body at death to depart for Hades and lead an impotent vaporous shadow-existence, has nothing left to stand for upon. (Jaeger 1947: p.76) The concept of «psyche» found in Orphic epics in the 6th century B.C. has different content than in Homer and Pindar. This is evident from expressions like his psyche flew out of his mouth' or 'out of his body.' (Jaeger 1936: p.79) This belief led to a philosophical understanding that would later emerge with Anaximenes, showing "air as a life principle." In orpheism, whose beliefs are based on ecstasies, it is believed that the soul attains its proper form only when it is "outside the body." Here, "Psyche" is more than a faint copy of the "I/ego" as in Homer, but rather a god limited in power, who will attain his supreme form through purifications (katharmoi) and religious rites (orgia). The primary purpose of the Orgia was to "purify" the believer's soul and so enable it to escape from the "wheel of birth." To better attain this end, the Orphics were organized in communities. Religious associations must have been known to the Greeks from a reasonably early date, but the oldest of these were based, at least in theory, on the tie of kindred blood (J. Burnet 1930).

With the transition from pre-philosophical thought to philosophical thought, Aristotle assigns that all pre-Socratic naturalists treat 'psyche' as either the principle of 'kinesis' or 'aisthesis.' Those interested in this the movements of living things have considered "psyche" as the "superior motive." Those who examine this concept as "cognitive" and "perceptual" have identified it with its "first principles (arkhe)" According to Aristotle, concerned chiefly with the problem of the motion of living beings conceived the soul as pre-eminently motive; those, however, who gave their attention to the soul as cognitive and perceptive identified it with their first principles whether these were one or many (Cherniss 1935). According to Thales, the first of the pre-Socratic naturalists, «psyche» is the principle of «kinesis»; because he thought that the force that caused the movement proved the existence of the soul. Even Thales assigned that even the magnet has a soul because it moves iron. (Aristoteles On the Soul 2015; 405a20). Thales' view of the soul as a "state of motion" is a product of the spiritual understanding going on since Homer.

As stated above, Homer's concept of "psyche" is the only source of consciousness and life. If a man is alive, he can move his limbs and, therefore, other things; if she is a woman, her soul is withdrawn, and she is unable to act; when he dies, the soul is always in the state when a man is unconscious, and is only a shadow, as in Homer; because it is separated from the body, life and motion cannot form anymore. Thales's treatment of the soul as the "principle of motion" depends on unphilosophical animism." However, according to his understanding, the magnet cannot move and cannot change itself. A magnet is only an external object. Hence, in Thales, objects with spirit are limited. It is understood that there is a power of movement. Later, Thales attempted to explain things that move by himself with the gods, saying, "everything is filled with gods." His belief that there is a spirit even in inanimate things, that the whole world exhibits a power of change and movement, and the continuity and breadth of this power taken into account, suffices to prove that the universe in which the soul is immanent is divine"(Kirk, G. S. 1957).

We consider that the pre-Socratic naturalists, primarily Anaximanders, Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras, who came after Thales, used "psyche" to mean breath-air, as in Homer. This view is also in line with their materialistic understanding because air is the best and brightest form of matter (Popper, K. R. 1977). These philosophers, whom Aristotle spoke about, clearly stated the relation between "psyche and air" and firmly stated that life depends on this relation. Anaximenes has a special place in the evolution of "Psyche" in the history of philosophy; with this thinker, "psyche" was considered a principle that holds the body together. According to Anaximenes, "cosmic air" and "breath-air" are alike; Just as the spirit, taken in the sense of air, surrounds the human body, the atmosphere and air surround the whole world in this way.

The concept of the soul, which is considered a breath-air in this understanding, is connected with the archaic view that the soul is identified with the breath and compared to the "thymus," which is related to the emotional and mental life of the human being. In addition, the spirit holding the body together in Anaximenes' thought is perhaps the most important reason he thinks that the air surrounding the cosmos is the first principle (Kirk, G. S. 1957). While agreeing that the psyche is something light like air, for the first time, Anaxagoras brought the distinction between psyche and «nous (mind)» and argued that they were different from each other. Anaxagoras saw only "nous" as a fundamental principle above everything else. For him, 'nous' is the purest form of things; It contains the knowledge of everything and has the greatest power. It also governs everything (largest and smallest beings) that has a psyche (life). (Aristoteles, On the Soul: p. 405a10-15)

Aristotle stated that, according to Anaxagoras' thought, "nous", in the sense of practical intellect, is not found in every animal and not in every human being; he also emphasized that what Anaxagoras pointed out "exists in all kinds of individual living things" should be understood as "psyche"(Cherniss 1935). (According to Heraclitus, the «psyche» is made of fire and is in constant flux. According to H. Cherniss, author of

Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy, who expressed his thoughts on this subject, the reason why Heraclitus compared the soul to "fire" is that fire is the purest and highest expression of a continuous flow; It would be misleading to seek another epistemological and psychological basis under this definition. According to Alcmaeon of Croton, whose views on "Psyche" are in line with those of other thinkers, "psyche" is the principle of immortal beings, and this feature stems from its infinite power of motion. The thoughts of Alcmaeon are said to have played an important role in Plato's view of the heart as the seat of 'consciousness'(Cherniss 1935). An interesting view on «Psyche» belongs to the Hippo of Samos. Hippo explained the soul as "moisture." According to Aristotle, it seems to derive from the belief that "the seeds of all living things are in a wet state". The hippo responded to those who claimed that the soul was "blood" by stating that the seed (spermatic), which is the basis of the soul, was not blood. (405b5) Kritias and some other thinkers insisted that the soul is "blood". According to them, "sensation" is the distinguishing feature of the soul, which is due to the nature of the blood. (Aristoteles, On the Soul: p. 405b10)

In the Atomists and Empedocles, we find the treatment of 'psyche' as the 'principle of motion and sensation', which Aristotle put forward as the oldest view". Atomists saw 'psyche' as the principle of motion, claiming that the first principle of everything was 'atoms'. According to them, the soul is composed of very light and mobile atoms spread throughout the body, and like everything else, it has a material structure. On the other hand, the mind is formed due to the gathering of spirit atoms in one place. Therefore, "thought" is a process similar to sensation formed by the collision of soul and mind atoms with other atoms coming from outside. Considered the founder of atomism, Leucippus adopted the views of Heraclitus as the general theory of atomism in his understanding of the "psyche". In Heraclitus, "fire" was composed of spherical atoms. For Leucippus, the atoms that make up the soul must be spherical; Because atoms of this type can easily penetrate everything and move other things as quickly as they move. According to Democritus, who inherited his views on «Psyche» from Leucippus, the soul is made of fire and is like fire; It is also very mobile because it consists of spherical atoms. The mobility of the soul atoms and the relationships established with the atoms of external objects cause the body's movement.

As a result, the soul in the body is activated, and sensation occurs. Aristotle emphasizes that "soul (psyche)" and "mind (nous)" are identical in Democritus. "Nous", on the other hand, consists of the harmonious unity of spirit atoms gathered in a part of the body and is the place where the thought is settled. This is a traditional view among physiologists, but for the first time, it was expressed in atomic theory(Bailey 1926). Another important view on «Psyche» belongs to Empedocles. According to this thinker, "psyche" was considered the principle of "sensation (aisthesis)". In Empedocles, the soul is identical to the sensation of perceiving physical objects. Aristotle stated that behind this identity lies the following thought: If the soul knows, it must be composed of a knowing matter. Aristoteles, a.g\e., 405a30. However, it is said that when Aristotle put forward

Empedocles' idea of the similarity of the soul to sensation, he did this only to explain the reason for the occurrence of sensation, and had no other purpose. According to Empedocles, the soul is "blood (aimatos)", a perfect blend of the four elements he put forward as the *arkhe*. However, Empedocles, in his *Katharmoi* (Purifications), portrayed the "psyche" as "a daimon exiled from this world as a result of sinning." This daimon will take many forms on the "craggy paths of the material world." First the "air" will blow it towards the sea, then the "sea" will vomit it onto the ground; the "earth" will throw it into the bright rays of the sun; the "sun" will also push it back into the vortex of air; so it will go from one to the other and stop. All beings will despise him. This view creates a contradiction in itself with the idea of the soul, which he shows as a perfect blend of the four elements. This view of Empedocles is closely linked to orphic beliefs. In the myths about the soul originating from Orphic, it is believed that the soul pre-existed and migrated by taking on various material (mortal) forms. Also, this belief is similar to Hesiod's belief that the souls of the deceased live in this world as daemons (Jaeger 1967).

For the Pythagoreans, "psyche (and nous)" was a property of "numbers"; because, for them, the reality was in numbers. Some of the Pythagoreans thought that the soul was particles in the air, while others thought it was what moved these particles. Some Pythagoreans also saw "psyche" as a "Harmonia". «Harmonia» was the unity of opposites, and the body was made up of opposites. (Aristoteles *On the Soul* 2015: 404a27) Many schools of philosophy adopted this view.

However, it has been suggested that although the term «Harmonia» is Pythagorean. This theory has Pythagorean tendencies. This view comes from Alcmaeon and some other philosophers. They used the term «Harmonia» to explain «health», which means the balance of opposites (*isonomia*) in the human body (J. Burnet 1930). According to Aristotle, "psyche" is also a "Harmonia" for Empedocles. (Aristoteles *On the Soul* 2015: 407b27) Another view of the "psyches" within the Pythagorean circle was closely related to the ideas of Pindar. According to this view, the divine nature of the psyche is different from everything else. According to this view, the spirit of divine origin lives on its own after the body dies. The function of the soul is best seen in dreams in which the body is at rest and functioning.

If a general evaluation is made, it is observed that the pre-philosophical views on «psyche» in the Homeric period were handled in different dimensions in the history of philosophy, and the term «psyche» gained different meanings from its previous uses. The "psyche", whose first meaning is "breath" and thought to have a material structure, has gradually left itself to a thinner and lighter understanding than its first meaning in the history of pre-Socratic thought; It was seen as the source of "movement" and "knowledge". To understand the views of the philosophers, especially after Socrates, on the subject and to make evaluations on the "soul-body dilemma", which is an important problem in the history of philosophy; It is necessary to determine very well the semantic stages that the concept of «psyche» has gone through, starting from its most straightforward meaning.

Ontological Perspective

By looking at music in the light of today's positive sciences and separating and examining its elements, we can base its place in the field of material existence. This is because the physicality of music is different from the physicality of the visual. The perception of not only the visible world but also the sensible world is philosophically grounded. Music begins to be revealed as a 'primitive matter' that will take shape when the human-induced part of the sound, which is one of the essential elements of music, the functional mouth of the human, raises sounds to the level of sense-explanation. First, if we examine sound, "A moving object vibrates and creates sound waves" (Say 2001). We can handle sound in an area that can be studied in the light of positive sciences in the physical world. If we continue from here, we can say that the job of making sense of this sound belongs to humans.

"...Mankind has tried to analyze and evaluate the sounds they hear, and over the centuries, they have mastered the arrangement of sounds and created a form of expression from them(Say 2001)."

Thus, it proceeds from the primitive state of matter that will take shape and turns into a "well-processed sound material". Ought to this progress and mastery, the the sound turns into words, progresses together with written sources, and becomes one of the elements that reveal culture.

Because of this, it has reached a certain level,, and as the essential elements of music, sounds, principles, and methods of arranging sounds, and the composer's invention, creativity is presented. We can easily make the following deduction from here; music is subordinate to work, and its development requires a certain level of culture.

The idea that the musical perception is rooted in human nature and that the rules guiding musical composition are essentially the legacy of culture and, therefore history, has emerged in Western thought many times, though not in a single form (Fubini Enrico 2006)."

The ability to measure sound, make sense of it, and frame it with certain rules is only human. The part we have examined so far confirms the existence of elements of music. In this respect, music includes two essential elements: good material and its evaluation by human beings. The grounding of humans and culture presents a changing, developing, and differentiating field. It will be helpful for a general idea if we look at the ontological aspects of music by various philosophers.

Coming from Ancient Greece to the present, we can first see the ecstasy of Dionysus, the lively sensible arts, and Apollo's distinction between the 'imaginary' and very restrained formal arts and their conflictual combinations(Nietzsche 2009).) With the combination of these two understandings, it can be revealed that music can fully describe specific events and concepts. Besides, the rationales of philosophers with sensory world understandings are pretty different from visual thought-forms. Deleuze developed thought on a kind of 'ding a sich' of sound by using Schopenhauer's idea that defends the auditory and the ontic identity and Duns Scotus' concept of haecceities.

By making an analogy with music, he stated that there is a perception of the audible world for the concepts and evaluating those who do not have a voice on their own. Here the metaphysical foundations of an auditory world are being made. Since music is an expression of concepts, not events and facts, and if it is supposed to provide data about a single subject, a musical work must also use visuality.

Music optically determines the place of will and power in the sensible world. This may be why philosophers try to combine the audible and visual and develop ontological ideas on musical works. Examining how some philosophical thought systems look at music will help us see which aspects of his perspective consider music. Nominalist and idealist thinkers differ in their thoughts on the concrete (notes, performances, etc.) and mental existence areas of music.

The middle point between mental beings and concrete facts is 'Eliminative Materialism'. In this view, musical works are seen as 'intentional inexistent'. Realism is about musical works being abstract objects, and what kind of these abstract objects are. Platonism also states that musical works are eternal and time-space independent entities. In creationism, he thinks he is an entity that man can create over time (Kania 2007). In modern ontology, a stratified system of being is put forward. It is considered that there are four main asset layers: matter, organic, spiritual, and spiritual existence layers. Among these strata of entities are specific categories and novums. And these categories and novums can be seen within each other from bottom to top (matter > organic > spiritual > spiritual pyramid structure). "Since a musical work is also an objectification, it must also have two heterogeneous spheres of existence. On the one hand, the material structure, on the other hand, is an irreal spiritual structure. What is the real layer in a musical work? This layer is the tone layer. But every musical composition necessarily has an irreal existence outside of it. Because, in every musical work, in a concerto, as in a song, or a symphony, an emotion and an entity of meaning become objectivized"(Ismail Tunali 1979).

"However, it is stated that music is not only art created by sounds and tones but also has a psychic and metaphysical existence. Even though music is built on a real structure, it constitutes an irreal structure: the structure of the emotions. Because of this duality, we can see the place of the musical work, both in the world of culture and in the world of perception, in a sense, as an idea; Once created, it is not subject to formation and decay. It can be repeated countless times, and, unlike its creator, it is immortal"(Ismail Tunali 1979).

Ontic approaches to music; It is related to topics such as its elements, the areas covered by its elements in its field of existence, which concepts it uses, its areas of use, its aesthetic approaches, and what method should be followed because it is in the sensible world, people's will and need for music, their views on the creators and performers of musical works.

Psychological approach to music

Music is a fine art that can reveal human emotions. As a part of life, the music carries its historicity, which is one of the most basic conditions of life. Attempts to understand music by abstracting it from concepts and historicity are unlikely to yield satisfactory results. When we look at it in this context, musical tones and roles have changed; what counts as music and how it is perceived and thought of have changed over time. The Pythagorean metaphysical music has been religious, entertainment music, music as high art, protest music, and commercial music. So we tend to tend our musical experiences as complex development, decline, and adoption products. From the moment of birth, music is conditioned by the conditions in which it was born and the concepts surrounding it (human, culture, society). It is a symbolic whole created by composers using tonal, rhythm, and instrument possibilities. This symbolic whole includes concepts of composer, period, and cultural conditions. The composers use every sound pattern (bird sound, wind sound, machine sound, etc.) they hear in their living environment within this symbolic whole. Differences in perception in listening to music can differentiate that work in transferring it.

There is also a 'kind of relationship between music and emotion. Some approaches adopt the similitudes based on this relationship. We can say that music embodies internal mobility such as joy, anger, stillness, flutter, and excitement in sounds. These can be similar to the lives of the individual. These sounds or sound patterns create emotional responses in the listener as a musical stimulus. When musical tension and relaxation patterns are perceived by the listener who understands the music, emotions are triggered by associating with their experiences. However, although it does not evoke an experience, in a musical work, joy, sadness, fear, gloom, romance, etc., emotions can be felt. To feel the emotional structure in the musical work, it is not a necessary condition for the listener to have a similarity of experience.

The listener comprehends the semantic quality of a musical work, the nature of the emotion expressed, with their experiences based on their 'imagination' (Ridley 2007a). The audience's imagination is narrowed in a musical work with lyrics. The lyrics of the musical work give clues about the understanding and comprehension of the listener. Verbal, musical works should be approached with the awareness that they are a combination of words and music. It enables us to comprehend the harmony between the music of words (measure, rhyme, change, etc.) and musical sentences. Suppose the listener cannot grasp the thought and emotion that the lyrics create in the composer. If their knowledge is culturally deficient or different, their evaluation of the piece will be at the level of their own experience and expectation. When we look at music from the perspective of philosophy, we see that it does not just sound. Sounds from the musical work by arranging them. In this arrangement, silence can also be part of the music. Editing is a conscious act and requires 'human.' It is inconceivable without purpose.

It is the art of expressing life itself pleasantly through changes reflected in feelings and thoughts due to 'internal tensions.' It is to embody any content musically. But for someone unfamiliar with that language, words and syllables will be just a musical tone.

For that person, that piece of music can exist to the extent that they understand musical sounds.

It is not reasonable to think of music, whose existence depends on human will, independent of prejudice, desire, need, and emotion. Music is the expression of emotions, but some musical works do not recognize this opportunity, so they do not use music as a tool but still create a state of expression (Kania 2007). This feature is a feature of the music itself. As an accepted analogy, music is a "language" that gives people the opportunity to express what they hear and think with sounds" (Say 2001). When music is performed in this language, "...music tells people things that cannot be said otherwise with the help of notes" (Webern, 1998, p. 22) reflects a familiar feeling and uniquely does this from language, "...mediation of intentional language through music takes place according to different laws. ... (Adorno, , 2005, p. 323). Since the effect of music is unique, the creators and performers of musical works often cannot fully predict such an effect. However, musical works containing lyrics can at least provide a certain orientation in the direction that needs to be understood. However, some think that verbal music has lost its musical effect, "The similarity between music and language emerges when it moves away from language." (Adorno 2005: p. 323) The view here shows that a verbal and expressive piece of music will end. With 'just one thing,' music tends to say the general thing. This is to direct or even limit the music, but; "We can hypothesize that there is a kind of isomorphisms between musical expression and the senses. This isomorphism in verbal language occurs when the verbal expression is vocalized. In this case, the musical element may not only strengthen the effectiveness of verbal discourse, sometimes it may contradict or nullify it" (Fubini 1990). Considering this point, we can divide a musical communication situation into two; "Communication with music and communication in music", music is a tool in communication with music and it is presented to what is wanted to be told with the help of music. But it should not be forgotten that "Every listener has a thought about what the music is saying for him." Although we know that it provides the emergence of different feelings and emotions, it should not be overlooked that it has an important effect. "The most important sentence that Aristotle used to explain catharsis is this; "The task of tragedy is to cleanse the soul of passions, with the feelings of pity and fear it evokes. From this point, it turns out that "catharsis" is a phenomenon that takes place at the end of a process caused by a tragic external stimulus and purifies the soul." (Mutsan Dönmez p.ii) "the performer, in his work, reveals the physical and instinctive connection with the musical work; The wave of creation, the melodic flow with its inner rhythms, vibrations, the pauses, the sound changes are made by the interpreter who physically lives them at first hand and makes them real audible and palpable through the concrete performance of his art, which is both an intellectual and a physical operation" (Fubini Enrico 2006).

2. MUSIC AS A FORM OF KNOWLEDGE

Sound has been an essential stimulant since the birth of a person, a social creature, and musically harmonious and beautiful sounds have complemented his spiritual existence in all phases of his life. Music, which people feel almost like a need, has not been tied to a genre or a style of expression and continues to exist by diversifying from the past to the present. Human and music are among the main topics, concepts, and phenomena that are emphasized in the life of individuals and society today, as in the past, and gain new dimensions every time they are handled. Perhaps the unique form of expression among the forms of expression in which sounds are transformed is music. Music, one of the common cultural values of humanity, contains the unique beauties of every society. Every society creates and maintains its music in line with its own culture. Many elements from society's life, mentality, and identity are included in this music. Music is a particular language regarding belonging to the culture and reflecting the culture (Şen, 2016: 89). Various elements and relations between elements play a role in the phenomenon of music. The main elements that play a role in the phenomenon of music are the composer, the musical work (piece), the speaker/interpreter, the listener/audience, and the communication/interaction between them and the environment/environment in which they take place(Uçan 1996). Undoubtedly, the audience/audience constitutes the most significant and most expansive segment of the musical environment. Everyone without discrimination is at least a listener. This means that everyone, at least a listener, is a natural (spontaneous) member of the musical environment (Uçan 1996)

In a way, music, which we perceive as aesthetic-based or aesthetic-dimensional, content, specific sound synthesis, differs from non-musical sounds in terms of source, formation, type, purpose, and function (Uçan 1996) . The basic concepts of knowledge theory are subject, object, and knowledge, and the truth data, reality, and grounding. With the explanation of truth and data, it is possible to dominate the subject. It is the correspondence between perceptions, concepts, scientific theories, and objective reality. In other words, it is the conformity of a statement to its object. It is not a question of things and events in the world (what is happening) being right or wrong. Truth is only the property of thoughts, judgments, and propositions. Accuracy is also the quality we give information about the object. Reality is the revelation of data. It is all that exists in time and space. That is the object itself. Reality and truth should not be confused with each other because reality is the totality of concretely existing things. Truth, on the other hand, is the property of knowledge about the existing (whether actual existence or intellectual existence). E.g; Softness of cotton - Reality Law of gravity - Truth. Mathematics and logic rules are also a fact.

It means showing the correctness of a thought, a judgment, a proposition, and presenting the grounds and reasons for this correctness. Verification is a way of experimental sciences, and justification is a way of formal sciences and philosophy. For example: In philosophy, since there is no question of verifying propositions and judgments through experimentation and observation, they are justified by giving reasons and

grounds. The Theory of Knowledge investigates the concepts or questions it aims to ground in depth and breadth and tries to illuminate it. And it usually does this through analysis and description. There are two lines on which human development takes place. The line of knowledge and being. It is necessary to understand knowledge not as a value in itself, but as something related to existence. Each person looks at the world with different eyes and interprets events, objects and everything in different ways. In the same way, man creates his creations for different reasons, in different ways, with different feelings. In summary, while objects that are not created by humans – objects found spontaneously in nature – can be perceived by people in different ways, objects that are also human creation, that is, subjective objects, are created by each person with different meanings and are interpreted in different ways by other people.

As a philosophy discipline, aesthetics or philosophy of art generally deals with the nature of the sense of beauty and artistic creation and experience in the context of human perception experience. Since the whole process of perception, emotion and artistic creation of man is mediated by human knowledge, it can be easily said that the discussions on aesthetics or philosophy of art also have an epistemological essence. In this context, epistemological tendencies and movements in the history of philosophy point to a unique aesthetic and artistic understanding. All beings that we hear or do not hear in the universe are melodies. So the question to be asked here is: Music is a form of knowledge. The second question to be answered is the definition of music as a source of knowledge. Since "music" and "knowledge" can be taken in a variety of meanings, and the definable meanings of these terms are most likely sensitive, the concept of music as knowledge is broad and very diverse in possibilities.

It is clear that the efforts of science and, in this context, natural and social sciences to acquire knowledge in their particular fields, will be better comprehended by the discussions on the nature and essence of knowledge in epistemology. Ancient period natural philosophers, who were classified as the first philosophers with a common view in the studies of the history of philosophy, tried to comprehend all natural phenomena in a systematic whole, starting from a principle or starting point, which they thought as the main entity, that is, from the Greek name *arkhe*. Thus, at the beginning of philosophy, the condition of grasping reality, that is, knowing, was based on knowing existence. What the subject recognizes and knows is something that exists in this or that kind or manner. The subject of the act of knowing can be a material or spiritual, necessary or contingent being.

Every person who speaks, sings, or plays a musical instrument is a preconscious, formative principle through access to a sound premise of expression that can be called by various names; It is the unfolding of recorded, given, knowledge, presence, intuition knowledge. As is known in heuristic research, the dimension of silence not only made it possible, but was somehow willing to give this principle an external presence in certain, understandable ways, and it was strengthened by this action. I have not yet touched on the conceptual or emotional content of these forms, whether they are in linguistic or musical contour, or even their particular tone. But I am referring to the fact of the utterance. This

knowledge and empowerment, which we are naturally accustomed to accepting, is implicit in our being as human beings; in our being human. A chosen genre of knowledge is conveyed by all musical genres and in combination with all music genres, by the fact of the existence of music.

As human goes beyond his simple physical nature with his actions, he also goes beyond his physical nature with his perceptions and emotions. The work of art targets human perception and intuition and realizes its production on this ground. This perception and intuition, mediated by human knowledge, wants to be content with the beauty of its own existence and to live all other interests in this satisfaction.

In the context of our epistemological interests, empirical reality is tried to be known through universal thoughts and concepts, while poetic or artistic creation goes beyond this theoretical interest and directly transforms empirical reality into the reality of an aesthetic and artistic perception. In aesthetic experience, the subject is not content with passively perceiving the existing empirical reality, on the contrary, he accepts his perception equipped with his own knowledge as the actual reality and enjoys the experience of this reality. A correct knowledge and consciousness transforms the direct superficiality of our perception into a deep and spiritual perception and experience. If music is a matter of making a certain kind of alteration to a certain kind of material, then musical acts are neither natural nor accidental. The acts of the music are done intentionally or "intentionally". But to act consciously is to do something deliberately.

First of all, the principled stage as the most important first mover; Deciding, choosing and judging are all aspects of thinking. Deciding, choosing, and judging requires a person to conceptualize what is important (and what is not) in a particular context. In summary, the deliberate actions involved in any musical performance emerge in the world of thought. "More specifically, the thinking-acting relationship involved in musical performing is not a simple two step sequence of think-act, think-act, and so on. Contrary to popular wisdom, action is not a matter of alternating mental and physical events. The glossary of terms in which intellectual powers and operations are traditionally described contains such words and phrases as judgment', 'reasoning', 'conception', 'idea', 'abstract idea', 'concept', 'making judgments', 'inferring', 'drawing conclusions from premisses', 'considering propositions', 'subsuming', 'generalising', 'inducing', 'cognition', 'apprehension', 'intuition', 'intellection' and 'discursive thinking'. Such expressions are employed, not indeed by the laity but by theorists, as if with their aid, and not easily without it, correct descriptions can be given of what has at a particular moment been occupying a particular person."

Revealing, mastering, or "understanding" a technical knowledge are aspects of knowing that cannot be separated from one's sensory and bodily life. "Though we may prefer to speak of understanding a comprehensive object or situation and of mastering a skill, we do use the two words nearly as synonyms. Actually, we speak equally of grasping a subject or an art. A peculiar combination of skillful doing and knowing is present in the working of our senses."(Polanyi and Grene 1996)

The approach to the view of mind, meaning, and thought that I developed in this research is based on cognitive science research placed in a perspective of experience, nature, cognition, and values, which I find most comprehensively and powerfully articulated in Farabi's pragmatist philosophy. In fact, my aim here is to examine the Great Music Book of all times, Al-Farabi's philosophical work with its epistemological results, within the scope of the philosophy of art, science and music.

Al-Farabi, who considers music as an activity as important as metaphysics when it comes to solving the riddle of existence, thus claims that there is a much closer relationship between music and philosophy than is thought and most people can accept. The reason for this is that the problem of the essence, value and meaning of existence has revealed the joint use of these two activities in the 10th century. Thus, music reveals itself in the Second Master as a way of doing metaphysics, even though it is actually performed in a completely different way from the philosophical method, and even though it is completely foreign to conceptual knowing in its essence. However, in order to present the unity between philosophy and music, the philosopher has to show that music performs at the level of philosophy, both ontologically and epistemologically. For this, Al-Farabi tries to prove that music corresponds to universal, ideal, essential and eternal knowing.

As a result, music science has attracted researchers from many different disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, cognitive science, communication, neuroscience, psycholinguistics, psychology, sociology and semiotics, and the number of gesture studies has increased. The full part of the definition may be the predicate to the defined. Likewise, whole parts of the definition can sometimes be ascribed to each other either universally or particularly. That is why it is not impossible to prove the existence of one of its two parts for the other. It may also be possible to prove its existence for definitions of each of its parts.

2.1 Music in Philosophy and Explanation of Listening to Music as a Science of Perceptual Cognition

The power of musical philosophy and art lies in their ability to sense the universal in the particular, whether or not that the particular really exists. 'Art gives us the motions of the human soul in all their depth and variety. But the form, the measure and rhythm, of these motions is not comparable of any single state of emotion. What we feel in art is not a simple or single emotion quality. It is the dynamic process of life itself' (Meyer 1956). If the purpose of a musical composition is to be the carrier of an emotion, the value of the work is in proportion to its revealed effect. 'There exist two routes by which inanimate nature can come to symbolize human nature: either as a representation of emotions, or as a representation of ideas: Emotions, of course, are by their very nature impossible to represent directly; but they can be represented with respect to their form, and indeed there already exists a much beloved and effective type of art, which derives its thematic material from just such forms of emotion' (Schiller 1999). This art is called music; it is a representation of our emotional faculties and thus an imitation of human nature. The

plausibility of the art-as expression thesis is particularly strong in arts based on imitation, where words and images express such features.

Plato was one of the first to study oral music. Even if the philosopher only uses the word music, he refers to songs, which consist of elements of poetry, musical mood and rhythm. He is sometimes understood to be proposing that the soul, like a scale, may contain several more parts than these three. However, he may instead be conceding that a musical scale—unlike the soul— does, as it happens, contain more than three elements. He noted that a just man tunes the three parts of his soul as a musician tunes a set of three notes of the scale ‘and any others that as a matter of fact lie in between’ (Ferrari. G. R. F. 2007). One fascinating feature of the educational accounts of philosophers and scientists is that it pays attention not only to the content of stories and songs, as we might expect, but also to their form or style. The main idea is that the musical mode and measure or rhythm of a song affects the human mind independently of the lyrics that are sung. The question whether music contains emotions or has an effect that can reveal emotions is still at the centre of music philosophy in the current age. In summary, the search for an answer to the fascinating question of how music can encode emotions continues. The view that music encodes the emotion it contains rather than just triggering memories in the listener further supports the need to ask this question. Farabi first deals with this problem by classifying the melodies that trigger emotions. ‘The frameworks of the more perfect melodies as ‘strong’, ‘temperate’ or ‘soft’ extending the polarity that also serves to classify tetrachord species as relatively ‘strong’ (i.e., diatonic) or relatively ‘soft’ (with less distance between their smallest intervals). Al-Farabi names four emotional states evoked by strong frameworks—enmity, cruelty, anger and boldness—and four evoked by soft frameworks—fear, compassion, anxiety and cowardice—without arranging the emotions along a continuum from strongest to weakest’. (Blum S. 2013: p.103)

Levinson approaches this issue with formalism. ‘The music’s persona should be understood as the persona with which we hear a given stretch of music to be invested, the subject of the imaginary act of expression we hear as going on then and there. The expressive hearing of an extended piece of music, as opposed to a particular passage, may thus involve a series of personae, rather than a single one’ (Levinson 1996). This formalistic thesis is attractive in many ways. When listening to music, many people focus on their own feelings created by their experiences rather than listening to the melody, feeling as if the music is telling them something about their dreams and memories. People with a history of depression are more likely than those without to endorse dysfunctional attitudes after a negative mood induction (Miranda et al. 1998). Knowledge is not limited to the subject’s perception of the object. Moreover, human beings can acquire knowledge through thinking, remembering, dreaming and designing. ‘The most sublime genus that encompasses all the species that expresses the nature of a sensible object is called a quality. This sublime genus, which includes all the species denoting the position of the sensible object, is called locality (i.e., site or place). The supreme genus that encompasses all the species that tell the time of the sensible object, whether it is in the past or in the

future is called time. The supreme genus that encompasses all the species that declare the sensible object to be relative is called relativity. The highest genus that encompasses all the species that states that the sensible object is in a position or is placed in a position is called position. The most sublime kind that expresses the influence of the sensible object is called influence. The most sublime kind that expresses the affect of the sensible object is called influence' (Al-Farabi 2007).

Information is based on the communication phenomenon, and the communication phenomenon determines whether the message received is information. Many systems can be viewed in terms of information theory: text messages, communication lines and spoken language, to name a few. Music, too, can be productively analyzed from this vantage point (Manzara, Leonard C. 1992) . There is no other human cultural activity that reaches, shapes, and controls human behavior as much as music does (Merriam 1964). The structure of the ear and brain implicitly determines a number of evaluations, which is appropriate in the case of speech or music transmission (Shannon, Claude Elwood 1964).

Music philosophers have focused on psychology and cognitive science to explain traditional philosophical matters such as the emotional expressionism of music. An individual perceptually acquires a mental understanding of form through felt tensions and decisions. As music is part of human nature, our musical experience is subject to the neurobiological constraints of the human mind. Many philosophers, through empirical observations, have sought to understand this, explored the field of preconscious and irrational responses, and applied the theory to cognitive science. The importance of perceptual, cognitive music theory is clear to understand musical patterns, particularly such metaphorical maps marked by changes in speed and intensity and voluntarily translated into force and motion. The two main approaches to human cognition and the conflict between them are a focus of the psychology literature. These approaches are defined as the cognitive tradition, which explains human cognition in terms of symbolic operations, and the other as the situated action or situational cognition approach, which focuses on the interaction of the environment, context, and sociocultural conditions in human cognition (Thompson L 1999). The first of these approaches directed attention to explaining human cognition in terms of information-processing processes such as analysis, the establishment of cause-effect relationships, and memory. The second approach, however, has evolved into a kind of closed-box model trapped in some processing of human cognition in the mind. In other words, it refers to the mutual interaction between the individual and the environment in the processes of reception, use and production of information, which does not consist of specific processes. Thompson and Finedefinition of socially shared meaning was defined as socially shared cognition by Levine et al, (Levine, Justin 1993; Thompson L 1999) who also argued that the processes are based on the notion that what goes on in the human mind is too profound and too much the product of interaction with the outside world to be attributable to the individual alone. When the concept of shared cognition is evaluated in terms of actions and products, the notion of culture immediately emerges.

‘Neuro philosophical pragmatism, or neuro pragmatism, is a scientifically informed treatment of cognition, knowledge, the body-mind relation, agency, socialisation, and further issues predicated on sound judgements about these basic matters’(Solymosi T 2014).) Making sense of any complex intellectual or historical discipline requires system and method structuring. Philosophers and scientists have also highlighted the reasons for dividing and classifying research fields according to a rationalised network or hierarchy. A key consideration for a philosopher who studies music aesthetics is the potential of the cognitive sciences to influence long-standing philosophical debates.

The essence of the cognitive science of music lies in the causal origins of our musical inclinations. Reflecting the essence of philosophy, the Latin *logos* means not only ‘word’ but also ‘sound’. It is vibration, motion amplified; its first meaning is awareness and signals the first moment creation recognises itself. ‘To account for hierarchical organizational systems like tonality and meter, as well as more general musical concepts like melody and voice leading, consonance and dissonance, and harmony, sensory explanations take as their starting point the mechanisms responsible for organizing complex auditory environments into. In this context, the concept of stability is an emergent property of a more general organizational principle we might call coherence, which refers to the mechanisms by which acoustic components or events cohere as a single entity’. (Stephen McAdams 1984) It is vibration, motion amplified; its first meaning is awareness and signals the first moment creation recognises itself. ‘To account for hierarchical organizational systems like tonality and meter, as well as more general musical concepts like melody and voice leading, consonance and dissonance, and harmony, sensory explanations take as their starting point the mechanisms responsible for organizing complex auditory environments into. In this context, the concept of stability is an emergent property of a more general organizational principle we might call coherence, which refers to the mechanisms by which acoustic components or events cohere as a single entity’(Stephen McAdams 1984). Although word, sound, light and thought are relative to one another in neurological, philosophical and theological contexts, they are derived from a unique source.

Different kinds of music constantly stimulate diverse impulses and emotions, triggering specific classes of mental experience known as emotion. Of course, the brain mechanism that mediates emotional stimulation through music can be scientifically explained. Therefore, what is the intention of evoking emotions according to the characteristics of music? This idea seems difficult for a philosophical mind to follow, namely that there can be knowledge without words. Indeed, the problem of describing a ‘language’ of feeling permeates the whole area of philosophy and neuroscience research, and highlights the relative futility of trying to classify our emotions—’Music is revealing, where words are obscuring’(Langer 1951). In recent years science professionals have offered some conclusions about the in-depth details and functionality of the brain, and many experiments have focused on the power of neuronal activity to produce music. From these experiences, neurons have been observed to follow collective dynamics and relate

to one another, inspired by a complex but non random community event. Neurons have also been seen to naturally exhibit inhibitory actions that create extremely rhythmic and bass tracks. One of the main manifestations of life is the expansion of one's memory function, including the diversification of one's working memory, making it possible for humans to pursue different areas of experience simultaneously. The collective consciousness includes faculties focusing on abstract symbolic structures that are fundamental to life forms, tactile and visual images, movement, emotions, sound, language and thought. Such an idea may support the theory that memories—a mental function unique to each collective consciousness—are somehow intertwined with a different type of consciousness. 'What I have called logical musical thinking is the consequential working out of a sustained musical impulse, pursuing a result constantly implicit in it. It is not in any sense a shrewd calculation of what should... happen next. The aural imagination is simply the working of the composer's ear, fully reliable and sure of its direction as it must be, in the service of a clearly envisaged conception(Gardner 2011).

Our perceptions directly present us with a picture of the world. Humans reach rational knowledge by processing these formal concepts, and in this sense, rational knowledge consists of "marking what the consciousness already knows in a different way with the concepts of the mind." What we know is what we perceive directly and indirectly. The mind, on the other hand, fixes directly acquired knowledge with concepts(Gombrich 1969). In this case, essentially, our knowledge does not expand; only the form of our knowledge changes. Schopenhauer refers to the concepts as "universalia post rem": Unity that comes after objects. In this case, the perceived objects are called rational. This is just an abstraction that is the work of our minds. The concept is abstract, disordered, completely ambiguous in its field. It is defined only by its own limits, is accessible and open to anyone with reason. And the concept can be expressed in words without the need for any other tool and can be fully explored by its definition. The concept is useful, functional, in the service of science and life, but limited and insufficient for the arts. Seen from this perspective, the value of rational knowledge for Schopenhauer lies in its practical applications and in allowing communication It is the reality of the world or the real will. This is the objective side of the world. Sound, in its most basic sense, "is formed by the activation of a vibrating material (eg a stretched wire) by a stimulus that provides the necessary energy" (GökberkMacî 1980a) In linguistic context; It is defined as "vibration perceived by the ear" (Vardar 2002: 167) as the equivalent of the English terms 'sound' and 'phone'. It can be thought that the 'sounds' that the language gives meaning to, together with the meaning-laden 'movements', create a meaning-transmitter such as 'rhythm', while the 'word' has not yet been loaded with meaning. With a natural spontaneity, there is sound at the beginning: sound in its purest, purest, purest form! It is the magical, extraordinary power that governs existence, enables people to hear not only the universe outside but also the universe inside, keeps them vibrating constantly, while protecting the electromagnetic frequency of the planet, forming every detail of vitality,

and transforming silence into a symphony in another dimension of existence. The common denominator of words and music. In a way, it is the purest sound in life that both poets and musicians seek to find.

At the root of aesthetics and all arts lies the perception of rhythm. When it comes to rhythm in language, poetry, music, painting, cinema, architecture, ballet, modern dance, and theatre, there are different definitions depending on different realities. When going over the clues in the perception of rhythm; The attention to the perception of the rhythmic structure will probably be decisive.

2.2 Music, Philosophy and Aesthetic

“The theoretical science of beauty in art and life, the beautiful sense, with the general laws of artistic creation... The branch of philosophy, which deals with beauty and the effects of beauty on human memory and emotions, is defined as "beautiful sense". In the Dictionary of Fine Arts Terms, “Eng. esthetics (Greek aisthêsis = sense of beauty) defines beauty as a branch of philosophy that deals with the effects of beauty on the human mind and senses. On the same page, the Dictionary of Philosophical Terms includes the following information about aesthetics: Aesthetics comes from the ancient Greek word "Aisthesis". Sensation means to perceive with sense. Aesthetics is also defined as the science related to the information given by the sensible perception. Immanuel Kant (Immanuel Kant 2011) uses the term aesthetic to mean "sensuousness". A. (Guyer 2007) (1714-1762) expresses “Aesthetics” as a science in his work *Aesthetica* and defines it as follows: “Aesthetics is the theory of free arts, the theory of inferior knowledge, reflection on beauty, and a mind-like science of the faculty, the science of sensory knowledge”. While Baumgarten gave the name of aesthetics by stating that it was based on human sensibility, some thinkers argued that because its subject was beauty, its name should be the science of beauty. 18th century Its philosopher, J.G. Herder, called this science "kalligone" (beautiful), G.W. Friedrich Hegel also called it "kalliologie" (I. Tunali 2004) . As defined by the French theorist Etienne Souriau (1892-1929)(E. B. (2001). Condillac 2001), one of the pioneers of contemporary aesthetics, aesthetics is a form of reflexive thought. In other words, "it is the human mind's reflection upon its own action which enables it to bring forth all the temples, cathedrals, palaces, statues, paintings, melodies, symphonies, and all poetry." This definition connects aesthetics to the human mind's reflection on its own artist's action, and it is not possible to discuss about an art that is valid for every place at all times, therefore, a universal and unchangeable aesthetic (Dogan 2003)

Kagan (Kagan 2008) defines aesthetics as “the science that explores the richness of all aesthetic values that can be detected in art, which reflects reality and which lies around people, reveals in their practical activities”. In this sense, aesthetics can be defined as “the science of the aesthetic assimilation of reality by people”. When we look at the history of aesthetics, it is seen that it has a speculative and dogmatic period. This period lasted from Socrates to Baumgarten. Then comes the period (1750-1850), a critical or scientific period, formed by Kant and later philosophers(Kagan 2008) . Showing a genuine

enthusiasm for aesthetics and art, Hegel taught aesthetics at the University of Berlin between 1818 and 1830.. Hegel defines aesthetics as "the philosophical theory of the beautiful and concretely of art", and explains the "elements of art and beauty" with his aesthetic approach. What he means by aesthetics is "Philosophy of Fine Art". This means that he limits aesthetics to artistic beauty and excludes the concept of natural beauty from aesthetics. However, this beauty, called "art beauty" in terms of "Hegel's aesthetics", has a deep meaning; It can be said that the foremost subject of Hegel's aesthetics is "beauty". (Lightning, 2014, p. 55). Although aesthetics is understood as a philosophy and science of value, this science includes not only beauty but also sublime, tragic, funny, elegant, interesting, childlike and ugly values. Because these values also have an aesthetic meaning (I. Tunalı 2004). Every problem in aesthetics is related to beauty. For this reason, aesthetics is defined as the science or knowledge of the beautiful. To be in an aesthetic effort is to pursue the factor that makes beauty beautiful (Timuçin 2006). Aesthetics is also a way of looking and a foresight. It is a general order of taste, a system of rules that embody this taste. Aesthetics is a unique design, a way of combining with its own peculiarities(Timuçin 2006) .

One of the most important aspects of aesthetics as the "science of the beautiful" is revealed in its relationship with the ethical. Although it is tried to be evaluated separately from each other in general or classical philosophy and to draw their boundaries, the identification of the beautiful and the good enough to be used interchangeably necessitates aesthetics to be handled in an ethical framework. As a matter of fact, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Hegel did not make a distinction between beauty and goodness and truth in this sense(I. Tunalı 2004). Aesthetics explores the beauty of philosophy or concepts that are closely related to beauty, such as the good, the ugly, the nice, the sublime, the tragic. It is the branch of philosophy that analyzes the values, attitudes, pleasures and tastes that are in question in judgments and experiences about beauty in products that are natural objects or human creations. It is a philosophical discipline concerned with the solution of problems and the analysis of concepts in contemplation directed towards aesthetic objects, objects of aesthetic experience. Aesthetics deals with beauty as a whole, rather than just the beauty in works of art.The expression of beauty has been the subject of research and judgment in philosophy. It can be said that the fields of philosophy generally have an aesthetic part as well.

Etymology of Aesthetics

The word aesthetics and its subject have been defined together with many opinions from past to present. Before moving on to its definition, the knowledge of the etymological origin of the word aesthetic from the Greek words aisthanesthai or aisthesis should be discussed. The word "aisthesis" means "sensation", "perception", "sensible perception" and the word "aisthanesthai" means "perceiving with the senses". Since Plato, ideas have been put forward with the word aesthetics or the word preferred instead, and aesthetics has started to be discussed with different aspects as the effect of religion in Europe has

started to be replaced by rising individuality. In this context, aesthetics has also been used in philosophy in the sense of sensation or perception theory.

“Baumgarten used the term aesthetics for the first time in 1735 as the name of an independent discipline, in the context of associating the term with sensory knowledge, depending on the origin of the concept of αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)” (Akgün, Ali E. and Keskin 2018).

Alexander Baumgarten, who is accepted as the founder of modern philosophical aesthetics, compared aesthetics with logic and placed aesthetics as a sub-discipline of philosophy. Baumgarten stands out as the first person to use the concept of aesthetics in the history of modern philosophical aesthetics and to deal with aesthetics as an independent theory. Here, after giving a brief information about the history of aesthetics, the prominent features of the aesthetic attitude will be taken with examples and some concepts will be tried to be evaluated in this context.

The History of Aesthetics

In the concept of aesthetics, which can be translated as the knowledge provided by audible perception from Greek, sensation means comprehension. In other words, it is the acquisition of information by perceiving an object, person or entity with the sense organs. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who was the first to say that sensory knowledge should be a science, laid the foundations for this in his two-volume work titled *Aesthetica*, published in 1750 and 1757.

Baumgarten, who was the first to use the term aesthetics in its current meaning, used aesthetics as a technical term in the sense of sensation or perception knowledge. Baumgarten, who formed the theoretical foundations of aesthetics, defined aesthetics as the "science of sensory knowledge" that does not exist clearly and distinctly, and argued that clearness is not the measure of aesthetic knowledge. While the logic investigating the upper knowledge area is located in the field of the mind's conformity with the objects in order to reach the truth, it seeks the aesthetic beauty competence that deals with the lower knowledge area. In other words, while clarity and clarity are the measure of mental knowledge, the characteristic of aesthetic knowledge is that it is blurry and not clear. It is only concerned with beauty, not with all aesthetic sensibility, which is considered as the art of thinking about beauty.

Aesthetics is wide enough that it cannot be limited only to the concept of beauty. For example, it is accepted that aesthetics is related to values such as sublime, funny, interesting, naive, ugly. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant explained aesthetics in the sense of the doctrine of sensation and perception in the chapter of "Transcendental Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason". In his Critique of Judgment, Kant mentioned the word aesthetics in the sense of perceptual competence, that is, the science or teaching of the beautiful and pleasant. When the concept of aesthetics is viewed from a historical perspective, it is seen that it is associated with the concept by previous philosophers. Plato, a student of Socrates, the founder of Greek philosophy, systematically questioned the concept of beauty for the first time and tried to explain it within the framework of his own

philosophical studies. In Aristotle, the concept of beauty was examined. More recently, thinkers such as Platinos and Augustine have questioned their thoughts on the concept of beauty.

Due to the influence of the church in the Western Middle Ages, it could not show much presence in the philosophical field in this period. However, Eastern cultures came to the fore with some of their thinkers and revealed their systematic thoughts on the concept of beauty. “The foremost of these is Farabi (840-950 AD). Later, Ibn Sina (980-1037), Gazali (M. 1058-1111) and Mevlana (M. 1207-1244) based their thoughts and research on the word beautiful” (Gökçe, 2015, p.15). With the Reform and Renaissance, especially starting with painting, in the process where art came to the fore and the closedness of the middle age was abandoned, the questioning gained momentum. The analysis of aesthetics, which was perceived as beautiful until the Renaissance and in Renaissance art, meant measure and harmony. However, the Renaissance also contained the existence of artistic research stemming from the advancement of science and the superior genius of artists, and an aesthetic perception based on the science of art (Söylemez 2017). Inquiries in the context of aesthetics and beauty, on the other hand, reached the 19th century with Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant. After Kant, Friedrich Schiller and Hegel, who questioned the concept of beauty and made serious contributions, are among the important philosophers. In the 19th century, Karl Marx, Benedetto Croce and Henri Bergson came to the fore. Plato is considered to be the philosopher who thought about the word beautiful and tried to make sense of this concept by questioning it systematically for the first time. He also continued his own works within an aesthetic. According to Plato, Beauty was an idea or Form of which beautiful things were consequence. However, there are beauties in nature that we perceive with our senses. These are beauties that change according to people, time and place, and Plato called them relative beauty. The purpose and aim of human life is to reach absolute beauty by starting from these individual relative beauties (I. Tunali 2007). Aristotle criticizes Plato's view of the beautiful. According to Aristotle, art is related to imitation (mimesis) of reality. In this context, Aristotle's understanding of art is more concrete. In Aristotle, art not only reflects the ideal, but also tries to show us the ideal. “When Aristotle is examined in this context, it can enable us to better understand the artistic arrangement elements of his aesthetic understanding that emphasizes the form in the process of modernism”(Gokce 2015).

Al-Farabi's thoughts on beauty are closely related to his approach to the philosophy of being. Farabi argues that beings are either beautiful or not. So either its essence is beauty or it is beauty with things like color added to it. According to Farabi, who shows a metaphysical approach, a beautiful source is the revelation of existence. Other assets are; According to the degree of their closeness to this being, they receive a share of this essence beauty and they approach the essence called beauty as much as the share they receive. The philosophy of being is also important for Ibn Sina's understanding of beauty. In the philosopher's system of thought, beings are of two parts: necessary and possible being.

According to Ibn Sina, the obligatory existence is Allah, and true beauty is the beauty that belongs to Allah.

Kant mentioned the word aesthetic both in the sense of sensuality and in the sense of today's science of aesthetics. According to Kant, what is beautiful gives us disinterested pleasure without benefit (I. Kant 2001).. He stated that the universality of aesthetic judgments is subjective universality. In aesthetic judgment, we start from personal pleasure and reach the universal. While examining aesthetics, Hegel stated the subject of the beautiful, showed its legitimacy and emphasized its method. Then he tried to indicate the nature and purpose of art. He argued that aesthetics, which is a fine science, is found both in art and in nature(Yetkin 1976). Hegel argued that the purpose of art is to reveal the beautiful. Benedetto Croce gave great importance to aesthetics and stated that the subject of aesthetics was intuition. He prioritized the beauty of art over the beauty of nature. Although there are many philosophers and opinions about aesthetics, it is necessary to mention the characteristics of aesthetic attitude through the ideas put forward.

Subject of Aesthetics

The subject of aesthetics is to search for the beautiful and the individual, to reveal it. It is to try to make the emotion, thought and concept that the artist has revealed in his work visible to us in the context of artistic beauty.

Aesthetic Subject and Object

Aesthetic subject means ' I ', the consciousness being that perceives the aesthetic object, grasps it and enjoys it aesthetically(I. Tunali 2011).

Characteristics of Aesthetic Attitude

Aesthetic subject means "I", the consciousness entity that perceives, grasps and aesthetically enjoys an aesthetic object. Such an aesthetic subject, while grasping the aesthetic object and enjoying it, takes a stand against this aesthetic object. Because perceiving an object means grasping it, enjoying it, taking a stand against it. According to Tunali, the attitudes taken towards the object are explained in three ways. For example, trying to understand when, by whom, the artistic value, historical dimension and style of a work is an informative attitude. On the other hand; Trying to understand the material value of that work is a practical/economic attitude. The third attitude is to turn towards that structure just to watch it, without asking any questions, to watch it to enjoy and enjoy it. This attitude has nothing to do with anything other than watching the work. Such an attitude is defined as taking an aesthetic attitude (I. Tunali 2011).

Auto Telos

The word auto-telos can be used for an aesthetic attitude. Its aim (purpose) means to be in oneself. The sentence that Kant uses while explaining the concept of the beautiful, "not to have a disinterested pleasure that does not serve us," comes up again with the concept of 'auto-telos' (being one's own goal). Relationships such as artist and object, artwork and audience, artist and audience are the relations discussed over this concept. Looking at a landscape with the sole motive of pleasure, listening to a symphony without any conflict of interest means there is auto-telos. It is not possible to discuss about an

aesthetic attitude if there are likes, commercial concerns or other interests. An aesthetic attitude can occur with the mere sense of pleasure and self-awareness. Why do we listen to music? To enjoy it? For distraction? Or is it for educational purposes? If we listen only for pleasure, for enjoyment, it is an aesthetic attitude and has no other purpose. The purpose of the aesthetic attitude is in itself as such.

Contemplation

Etymologically the word "contemplation" derives from *templum*, which signified the space marked out by a seer with his divining rod as a location for his observation, but which later came to mean the actual observation made by a seer. The Greek origin of the word is *θεωρεῖν* meaning to regard or look at a spectacle or religious ceremony, though some trace it back to *θεός* (God) and others to *θέα* (vision). Both in Latin and in Greek the word has the general meaning of speculative study, admiration of beauty, or consideration of wisdom.

Contemplation means "to admire something and think about it." The word contemplation comes from the Latin word *contemplatio*. Its root is also that of the Latin word *templum*, a piece of ground consecrated for the taking of auspices, or a building for worship, derived either from Proto-Indo-European base **tem-* "to cut", and so a "place reserved or cut out" or from the Proto-Indo-European base **temp-* "to stretch", and thus referring to a cleared space in front of an altar. The Latin word *contemplatio* was used to translate the Greek word *θεωρία*. In a religious sense, contemplation is usually a type of prayer or meditation. Contemplation, which can also be of an aesthetic nature, is "a free mental gaze towards the wonders of wisdom, accompanied by admiring surrender". (...) At the moment of ecstasy, the soul is completely lost in the object and expands and exalts with the beauty it perceives.

Concept

The concept, which can be expressed as the abstract and general design, meaning, and semantic load of an object, an emotion or a thought in the mind, is in a prime position for the formation of an aesthetic attitude. The distinction between the aesthetic attitude and the cognitive-conceptual attitude is also important. Here, the informational attitude means the conceptual attitude. The aesthetic attitude should not be associated with the conceptual structure, which is a general object. We look at a tree with aesthetic pleasure, as an object of pleasure. It doesn't matter if the tree is a chestnut or walnut tree or if the chestnut tree is one of those tree species. Here we take an aesthetic attitude by enjoying the tree without knowing the conceptual structure. Therefore, the aesthetic attitude is not related to the conceptual structure of the object. It is possible to discuss about the lack of the concept of aesthetic attitude here.

Sensation

Sensations are the source of all human knowledge of the world, as well as the source of artistic knowledge of the world. Art is a set of sensations. It is not possible to take an aesthetic attitude without involving sensory foundations. The sensations, which are the basis of the aesthetic attitude, are also extremely important for aesthetics with their

indispensable qualities for human beings. Modern psychology divides sensations into ten classes and studies them. The order of these sensations according to their importance is as follows: “sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, temperature, muscle movement sensations, balance, pain, vitality sensations.” The primary sensations in taking an aesthetic attitude are vision, hearing and muscle movement sensations. These sensations are very important to auto-telos.

Emotions are also important in that they accompany taking an aesthetic attitude. Because the aesthetic attitude is ultimately resolved in a feeling, which is called aesthetic pleasure. If the existence of an object of knowledge is mentioned for human beings, it is also necessary to talk about an object of emotion. There is a fundamental difference between the emotion of a landscape painting created by an artist and the emotion of a landscape in nature. Aesthetic feelings are feelings that have nothing to do with reality. Because the emergence of these feelings depends on the fact that they were created by an artist. (Anar, 2014, p.32). The physical senses are at the bottom and the mental senses are at the top. An aesthetic attitude is an attitude made in the mind. We perceive the outside world through sensations.

The senses of sight and hearing take precedence over other senses. Because we learn more with them. For this reason, it has a special importance in terms of aesthetics. Sound or appearance is unforgettable. It is permanent and holistic. So there is later. There is a mental understanding. In this respect, it is seeing and hearing that is continuous in the aesthetic attitude.

Perception

Aesthetic perception is among the elements that initiate the art and aesthetic process. It is also necessary until the end of this process. Aesthetic perception begins with the orientation of the sensory to the aesthetic object. For aesthetic perception, the individual's previous knowledge, experience and interest are required. Aesthetic perception is related to the way human beings see and approach the outside world. Man does not look at things in their natural state, but divides them into classes according to the benefits he will get. For example, a person who sees a table does nothing but say that he has seen a table. He puts her in his class and thus ceases to care for her. The same goes for a beautiful rose.

We see the species and put it in our classification and turn our attention to another object. However, an individual watching a work of art or a sunset does not have such a perception. Individual contemplation is liberated from the necessities of reality. Except for the subject of observation, everything disappears. (Artut, 2004, p.6).

Feeling

Aesthetic feelings are an emotional response to any beauty. In this context, beauty can also be a work of art, a landscape, or a specific person. All are valid as long as they have an emotional impact. Aesthetic feelings are not always fun, positive and pleasurable, they can also consist of negative emotions.

Emotionality is different from sensuality. Emotions communicate objectively when subjectively related. Emotional bonds are established with what we perceive with our minds. It's about aesthetics. So there is an identification here. Here, however, experiences are important. Experiences are enough for feelings to pass. There is participation and participation. After we do something, we feel a sense of satisfaction when it ends, which is the sense of status.

Although the concept of empathy, which is familiar to almost everyone today, came from a Greek word (*empathia*, *εμπάθεια*), its current meaning arose from the concept of *Einfühlung*. Edward B. Titchener (1867-1927) put the term empathy into practice as the English translation of the *Einfühlung* at the beginning of the 20th century. (Titchener, 1909: p. 21) After this interlingual transfer process, empathy continues to develop as a central concept especially in psychology. This sudden transition between disciplines may seem strange, but German thinkers, who developed the concept of *Einfühlung* as an aesthetic theory, already gave more importance to the psychological or subjective aspect of aesthetics; In their works, they acted from the subject looking at the aesthetic object rather than the aesthetic object. Moreover, for Theodor Lipps (1851-1914), in whom the theory of *Einfühlung* reaches the most comprehensive explanation, aesthetics is already a psychological discipline. However, with Titchener's new interpretation that transfers the concept to an interpersonal cognitive relationship, the increase in its use in areas such as psychotherapy and psychoanalysis narrows the meaning it has as an aesthetic concept and even undergoes some significant changes. Thus empathy—and, in part, the concept of *Einfühlung*, to which it translates—is increasingly deprived of its strong connection with aesthetics.

A connection between *Einfühlung* and empathy can be considered to have been established by Lipps before Titchener. Because Lipps, with a distinction such as "aesthetic *Einfühlung*" and "*Einfühlung*", uses the Greek *empathia* (*εμπάθεια*) expression in his explanations, as well as expanding the concept from art to intersubjective understanding by enriching it with a meaning other than its aesthetic use. For Lipps, however, the *Einfühlung* is essentially similar to the old understanding of sympathy. (Jahoda, 2005: p. 151) Moreover, *empathia* is not what we mean when we say empathy. *Empatheia* expresses intense passion or an ongoing emotional state. *Pathein* (*παθεῖν*) means "to suffer, to endure, to feel". The prefix *em* and *en* (*εν*) means "in". Accordingly, *empathia* means that one's own experience enters the mood. It is more often expressed as a state of passion and is the opposite of *apatheia* (*απάθεια*, apathy/numbness), which is often seen as a philosophical virtue. In any case, it is not meant to tap into the feelings of others or, more generally, to put oneself in another's shoes, like the current meaning of empathy. (Depew, 2005: p. 100-1)

In the case of the Identification [*Einfühlung*] we grasp and experience objects from within. But what we perceive and experience in objects is not the object itself, but our own feelings that we attribute to the object. For example, the feeling we feel about a collapsed pillar is our own feeling, not the pillar. However, we do not experience this sense of

oppression in ourselves, but in that ruined column. [...] This shows that we establish a relationship of identity with objects, as if we identify with them by attributing our own feelings to objects. Such an emotional association of identity with objects is called an identification event. (Tunali, 1979: 51)

Sich einfühlen means diving into objects outside of us, melting in them, reflecting on them, interpreting the self of others according to our own, experiencing their movements, gestures, feelings and thoughts, animating impersonal rivers, from the simplest formal elements to the highest manifestations of art and nature, personify; to stand with a vertical, to lie on a horizontal, to turn on ourselves in a circle, to jump with a sharp and short, jerky rhythm, to sway with a heavy rhythm, to stretch with a sharp sound, to soften with a soft sound, to darken with a cloud, to roar with a river, to sway ourselves to give to what is not ourselves with such generosity and enthusiasm that, in all this aesthetic situation, we are not aware of what we are giving; It means to think that we are really line, rhythm, sound, cloud, wind, rock, river. (Yetkin, 1976: 49)

This process occurs when we attach emotionality to objects by creating an emotional unity between us and objects. As a result, objects gain emotional vitality, just like people. These qualities that we attribute to objects are rage, enthusiasm, arrogance, etc. These are all qualities that belong to us, that belong to our spiritual life. We attribute these qualities to the mountain and the sea. We establish a sincere relationship between our spiritual emotional life and these external objects, transfer the qualities we find in our emotions, such as enthusiasm and pride, to objects, and then grasp and live them in these qualities that belong to us, as if these objects have these qualities. (Karagöz, 2005, p. 168). This commitment is called identification.

Aesthetic Pleasure

Emotional and conceptual excitement or intensity, which begins with the subject's orientation to aesthetic objects and is felt with this communication, can be expressed as aesthetic pleasure. The word synthesis for aesthetic pleasure is important in explaining this concept. For a certain synthesis It requires knowledge, experience and knowledge. The knowledge and emotions acquired throughout life play an important role in creating the structure of human aesthetic pleasure by re-transforming in people. Aesthetic pleasure is a phenomenon that changes depending on how a person perceives and interprets the environment and himself. It is an aesthetic communication process that creates enthusiastic, sincere and instant feelings in the person.

Aesthetic pleasure is objectified self-pleasure [Selbstgenuss]. To enjoy aesthetically means to enjoy myself in a sensible object outside of me, to live myself in it. What I hear in him is life in general. and life; strength is a sincere operation, aiming and realization. Life, in a word, is activity. But effectiveness is what I live in for an effort. This activity is essentially an activity of the will. Activity is the will to aim or action. (Worringer 1911: p.4)

3. MUSICAL FORM AND AESTHETICS AS A PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION

Art products are not only the subject of aesthetic taste related to enjoyment, but also objects waiting to be interpreted and resolved. Whether beauty and other aesthetic values are objective or subjective is a constant matter of philosophical debate. In aesthetics, in other disciplines of philosophy, in epistemology and metaphysics, and in ethics as another branch of value theory, there have been dilemmas that multiply arguments on both sides of the debate over the years. Discussion accordingly focuses on the problem of whether some form of aesthetic objectivism rather than subjectivism is correct, theoretically defensible by argument and sustainable in light of challenging criticisms. If and when these more basic metaphysical and epistemic matters can be decided, then inquiry can proceed toward favoring a particular version alternatively of aesthetic objectivism or subjectivism over competitors, and exploring the account's explanatory implications and applications, as a further test of the favored theory's acceptability.

The art object is the carrier of the intellectual adventure of the artist rather than being an inanimate object. This adventure stands before us as a product of human cognition and his life. It is also necessary for the spectator subjects to come face to face with this experience, to perceive the art object correctly and to make sense of it for the analysis of this language. Evaluating an aesthetic object requires a special vision. This thesis deals with the subject of perception based on the characteristics of the aesthetic object, aiming to raise awareness of this special vision. Based on this, the main problematic of this study is to investigate the possibility of identity that occurs as a result of the interaction of the subject's perception and form within the scope of reciprocity in aesthetic taste. "Meaning first appears in perception, sensations are devoid of meaning. Perception is closely related to sensations. The senses give us individual sensations about the outside world, and our perceptions build a world of perception based on them. In this sense, perception gives meaning to objects and comprehends them as a meaningful whole"(I. Tunali 2011).. Blending perception with meaning and judgment in aesthetic taste, Soykan mentions, "It is the subject that attributes value to the object. Even if such judgments are accepted by people, that is, by all subjects, their validity is not objective, but subjective, intersubjective," and underlines how objective and subjective the perception, interpretation and analysis processes of an aesthetic object are within the framework of the determinations regarding sensation and perception. (O. N. Soykan 2015). In addition, we understand from these expressions that the perception data of the object obtained by one subject and the perception data obtained by another subject on the same object are identical/correlated to each other, is effective in the evaluation of that work. Thus, in terms of the history of philosophy, the problem of perception in aesthetic taste has been conceptualized as the result of different but accumulated discussions and approaches within the framework of truth, reality, universality, reasonableness, finding expression in language, giving meaning and evaluation activities. Therefore, the aesthetic

understanding has led to the subject of mind researches through the subject-object interaction.

Man and the problem of knowing have been the subject of discussion since ancient times; In this sense, both the subject itself and the substance are conceptualized. Especially in Plato, the concepts of knowledge (episteme) and illusion (doxa) confronted us with the question of what reality is. Plato does not point to the concept of beauty itself, but its reflections. Intellect (intellect) is required to approach the beautiful itself. Therefore, knowledge of episteme can be reached through reason. Reaching the knowledge of the episteme means, of course, to perform a different mental operation in this context. Just like this mental determination of Plato, we must be in active mental action, not passive, while making the final judgment of an art object. This knowledge is also the condition of being able to interpret that work correctly. The information we can obtain from an aesthetic object is not subjective, but the objective information that the object carries on itself, that is, its quantitative properties. The subject's reaching these judgments in a healthy way is directly proportional to the knowledge of quantity. At the end of the 18th century, at the beginning of the 19th century, there were movements in interpreting the work of art and experiencing the works of artists of various art branches through the works of other artists.

Thus, a problem of intersubjectivity between artists can be mentioned, as well as the processes of comparing and influencing two or more works of art with each other. These movements have often been evaluated under the category of mysticism and have tried to obtain special judgments based on imagination based on feeling art objects. To what extent can an art object be analyzed in close proximity to itself? As we know, what should be noted here is that Kant asked in the Critique of Pure Reason, "What can I know?" how competently we answer the question. An art object is the sum of space-space, relation, quantity and quality. Subjects are in front of the object with their body, sensation, perception and mental processing abilities as well as their physical existence. In this case, it is necessary to investigate the subject of perception in depth, how these features, which we have counted in the aesthetic object, first correspond to the perception of the subject and then how they are interpreted and analyzed. The subject's reciprocity with an aesthetic object means that the space-space, quantity and qualities enter into a reciprocity with the mind, and what makes this reciprocity possible is necessary for this determination.

The form of an object can be expressed mathematically and is one of the most basic determinants of the above-mentioned reciprocity relationship. Just as the form of an ordinary object can be expressed mathematically, the form of an art object can be expressed in the same way. While Aristotle made determinations of the object in the study of matter and form, he also comprehensively explained what quantity and qualities are in his work called Metaphysics. While the expression of quantities such as size and weight of an object is precise, expressions such as quality (color) can be relative. One of the best examples of the knowledge of form and quantity is music, which is also expressed in the philosophy of Pythagoras. It is also clear in terms of the perception of the subject that the

qualities meet with the quantity to express the definite. Branches of art; In this sense, painting, music, sculpture, poetry, literature and theatre differ from each other in terms of their forms. The perception of the art branch, which has different forms, also differs by the subject. Not only the art object itself, but also the construction of the place where it is located or the structuring of the space of the art object can make a difference in terms of perception. In this sense, formalism and new formalism movements that carry out studies on the form of a work of art have discussed the importance of the knowledge of form in its relationship with perception, although they have discussions about the falling back of the emotional aspect of a work of art.

A work of art cannot be separated from the emotion it conveys to the viewer but acquiring morphology can prevent arbitrary interpretations of the art object, because morphology is objective. In the face of an aesthetic object, the subject should be able to grasp what the message conveyed by that object is. The accuracy and comprehensiveness of this understanding depends on having the most competent knowledge of the form of the object. This understanding of form-emotion reciprocity should also be a response to the relativity debates about the work. Kant states that emotion and taste are subjective. However, the object itself is outside of all these, and as such, the subject's connection with the object is not objective. If we rely on this understanding, the perception of the subject becomes more ambiguous in terms of an approach that examines the art object on the basis of reciprocity. However, in the light of the subjective data of the object, what can be the subject of objective perception can be researched. In the light of these data, the objective data of the art object has been the subject of many artificial intelligence applications with the help of computer science today. For example, it is with the help of this data that sensory elements can be transformed into pictures or three-dimensional models. Transformation of art objects into each other in this sense is possible by transferring quantitative properties by changing the form.

It is the artist who creates an aesthetic object and the one who watches it is the aesthetic subject. The spectator subject before the work of art, unlike the artist, is the here and now before the art object. However, unlike the audience, the artist is in the moment with the object. Therefore, the determination of the reciprocity of art is also the product of the union/confrontation of the conscious and unconscious in the art object-artist-viewer subject triangle. Here, what needs to be asked in terms of both interobjectivity and intersubjectivity is how an art object contains unconscious elements while it is being consciously created or, on the contrary, how the audience consciously incorporates unconscious elements into its evaluation while trying to make sense of the art object. While consciousness is the conscious side of the subject, the question of how it transfers unconscious (unconscious) elements to his work with this conscious side can be decisive in terms of perception. Or “can a viewer correctly evaluate the work with his unconscious data?” question seems to be a point that should not be missed in terms of art object-subject perception reciprocity. Hegel's determinations regarding the stages of perception and interpretation, which he explained in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, draws attention to the

mental structure of the subject and the dialectical processes against the object. In this sense, the determination made by the fact that the subject's mistake against the object falls to the share of the subject also sheds light on the questions of how unconscious data are formed. As a matter of fact, Carl Gustav Jung's statement that keeping the conscious and unconscious separate from each other -unlike Freud- that all data including the unconscious are processed in the conscious and that the data pushed to the unconscious consists of energy loss, Hegel's experiences through the mind-object mediation and that the subject and the object are interconnected. It raises the question of whether what you experience is a waste of energy until you identify with your mind.

This loss of energy is called forgetting according to Jung, and it is not an act of forgetting in the real sense, but also the source of unconscious data. Revealing the determinations of the unconscious in terms of perception, meeting the aesthetic taste is decisive in terms of the readiness of the aesthetic subject and the aesthetic object. The human mind makes sense of and analyzes the world with all its conscious content. In this case, knowing the conscious and unconscious characteristics of both the artist and the audience can provide a phenomenological approach from a different perspective. Informational aesthetics, phenomenological aesthetics, Marxist aesthetics, structuralist aesthetics, etc. Many theories are aimed at investigating how and according to which criteria the taste of the subject is determined. Among these theories, informative aesthetics and phenomenological aesthetics, within the framework of the main problematic of our study, primarily give clues about the perception of the subject. Informative aesthetics complement each other in terms of examining the knowledge of the art object, and phenomenological aesthetics in terms of examining the perception of the subject while turning to the art object. However, in the light of these data, it may be possible to talk about the readiness of the aesthetic subject against an art object. The aesthetic subject's presence in front of a work of art takes place in accordance with the world of qualities he has in his mind (the mental world determined by all the categories related to quality-quantity) and his feelings and experiences about this world. In this sense, it is also necessary to investigate the qualitative aspects of perception and the emotional world in terms of the subject's judgment of the art object. The readiness of the aesthetic object also differs between art objects. Each art object differs from each other in the context of space-space. Accordingly, they need not only the mental perception of the subject, but also components such as body and duration -in the light of Bergson's concepts-. For example, while a piece of music is subject to time, a sculpture needs the body of the subject due to its three-dimensional structure. However, with the help of the body, other dimensions of the sculpture can be perceived. The privileges that we have briefly determined about perception lead us to the question of what is their reciprocity in terms of perception forms. The subject is alone with the object, thought and world connections in the face of an aesthetic object. These connections also differentiate his intellectual processes. The dialectical processes of the subject can also differ according to the art objects. Accordingly, it is possible to talk about symbolic dialectical processes and dialectical

processes of language. It would be appropriate to give examples of symbolic dialectic processes through music. However, the dialectical processes of verbal expressions can manifest themselves in literature and other branches of art. Again, within the framework of Croce's determinations regarding the subject's readiness, the subject of intuition should be handled together with the perception research. Especially the relationship of intuition to experience, memory and probability should be evaluated together with today's cognitive psychology research. The determinations we have made about the readiness of aesthetic objects and the examination of individual art forms in the context of Schelling's aesthetic understanding also provide us with clues about how it can be transformed into another art object form. The artist and aesthetic, who have the structure of art forms, also have the knowledge of transforming and making sense of it among the branches of art. Sensation and perception are the first steps of making sense. At the end of the interpretation, a judgmental result for the object occurs. However, sometimes we come across different types of perception, especially in the field of art. One of these is synesthesia, experienced by the artist and most aesthetic subjects.

Within the scope of phenomenological perception from the point of view of the subject, the handling of synesthesia brings a different perspective to the subject. Synesthesia can be called as the state of perceiving the object in an object in multiple forms by the subject. What is remarkable here is that perceived multiples are not integrated with that thing, when considered in the context of phenomenology's principle of "back to the things themselves". However, the discussion of the existence of mental phenomena within the framework of Husserl can give us a clue about synesthesia, unlike Brentano. Again, the collective cultural returns specific to this type of perception, even if the connection of images and art objects is not under the name of synesthesia, it is the subject of today's research as it was discussed in Goethe's Theory of Colors. In the history of philosophy, the debates about perception that we have discussed form the basis of the debates about aesthetic perception and taste. While making a judgment about an aesthetic object, how we perceive it and the problems of liking (liking) and dislike are among the content of perception. When perceiving an art object, which features of that object do we perceive on the intersubjective common plane or which features do we perceive differently between subjects? This problem emerges as a perceptual reciprocity problem. Again, while addressing this problem, the extent to which sensation and perception are separated or integrated from each other in historical discussions, the independence or unity of judgment from perception, and the object and subject relationship of the analytical and phenomenological approach shed light on the subject. These interests gain importance for the aesthetic attitude. In the first part of the thesis, the problem of perception and form, and then the interaction of perception and form, has been comprehensively discussed within the framework of the literature review of the history of philosophy, and it has been tried to reveal what can and cannot be known about the perception of the subject and the structure of the form. In this section, beauty, perception, art object, sensation, taste, phenomenological aesthetic approaches, etc., until the 20th century, based on the

philosophy of Antiquity. discussions have been addressed. The aesthetic debates of the 20th century become evident with the analytical tradition and the expansions of the phenomenological approach. In this context, in the first chapter, the idea of Wittgenstein, one of the representatives of analytic philosophy, that objects create a world by adding objects to each other in their relations with space and time, and that this is the place where objects are proven is included. In Kant's philosophy, space and time are a priori forms of vision. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, accepts that the error in the expression of the world, which is defined as the ground of reality, is the ambiguity of language. In Kant's determinations, on the other hand, the place of proof of objects seems to be the mind. Post-Kantian German idealists state that perception is grounded in the dialectical process of thought. It has been concluded that the perception directed towards the object is inwardly and outwardly directed perception in Fichte, and whether the perception directed towards the object is identical to it in Hegel, and it is the subject who has a share of the error of the object's reality ground. Again, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty gave the information that, contrary to the expression of perception at a simple glance, it occurs gradually. Thus, in this section, the discussion of reciprocity in taste in terms of its historical background is discussed within the scope of perception problematic and perception-form unity.

3.1 Aesthetic pleasure: perception, sensation, cognition and emotion in aesthetic concepts

With Alexander Baumgarten's bringing the concept of aisthesis to the field of discussion of philosophy, it also brought with it the problematic of how the cognitive processes of the subject can have a different functioning in the context of the relationship between sensation and perception and the art object. Thus, aesthetic research has also enabled the investigation of the cognitive functioning of the subject, apart from just making an evaluation about the artwork. Perception, within the framework of contemporary psychology and epistemology: perception is the apprehension of ordinary objects such as trees, houses, chairs. Perception has been defined firstly as sensation, and secondly as imagination and intellect and design processes. Attributes from perceptions obtained from previous sensations also help define the perceived object. (In the definition of Runes, sensation and perception are considered together. Accompanying the emotions obtained through the art object through sensations is under the roof of perception. Within the framework of the definition of perception, the problem of aesthetic taste has been discussed from many different perspectives. The transfer of the object created by the artist to another artist or the audience, and the perception, interpretation and finally making a judgment on this object, how much the subject's taste is covered as a result of this judgment, has again been the subject of different aesthetic views.

Ages before Baumgarten's book *Theoretische Aesthetik* (1750), Plato and Aristotle investigated the effects of theatre plays, which were especially common in their own time, and later music, on individuals and society, and tried to determine the effects of both individual and social sensations on social life and on the characters of the subjects.

Ancient philosophers generally debated whether art could be seen primarily as a source of information. Plato and Aristotle dealt with the problem of whether art is a source of information or not. The subject's sensations of art and its product, the art object, have been the subject of curiosity, and what kind of information the subjects acquire about these objects, if they obtain information from these objects. Plato deals with the processes of making sense and analyzing the information obtained from the art object in his discussion with Socrates in the *Ionian* dialogue. In the dialogue, he especially considers how much the perceived thing between an artist and other artists is mutual, and finally, the possibility of perception for the audience, is explained with a description suitable for the period. First of all, in the dialogue, the object created by the artist as a result of inspiration and how this inspiration passed to other artists is tried to be explained: "Because, as I was just now saying, declaiming Homer well is not your skill; what moves you is divine power like that in the stone which Euripides called a magnet (Magnesian stone) but the majority of people know it as the stone of Hercules. For this stone not only takes iron rings to itself but also puts into them the power to do the same as the stone, and attract other rings in turn. So sometimes there is indeed a long chain of rings and bits of iron hanging one from another; all of them empowered by the stone"(Plato. 2013). The Musas mentioned in the dialogue are depicted as a source of inspiration for the artist. The analogy of "Heracles stone" also exemplifies the effect of the object created by the artist with the inspiration bestowed upon him on the sensation of another artist. Thus, all the designs that the artist transfers to the object regarding his sense and perception during the creation of the art object become perceptible by the subject who senses that art object. The emotion conveyed by a painting, music or a staged play is experienced by the subject. The *Ionic* dialogue continues to argue over this experience: Socrates- (...) The last ring that closes the magic that comes out of Heracles' stone is the audience. You are the ring in the middle: Bard, actor. The first link is the poet himself. By passing the value in himself from one to the other like this, God takes the souls of people wherever he wants, like iron rings hanging on that stone. Rows of poets are hung on the rings attached to all four sides of Moses. (...) Others are attached to the first link, the poets, and some are inspired by someone, for example Orpheus, some by Musaios, and most of them by Homer(Plato. 2013). .

As in the *Ionic* dialogue, it is explained how the perception of the artist, which he conveys to his object, intersects with the perception of other subjects. In particular, the effect of a mentioned poem on other poets and the audience and the display of emotion are emphasized. Socrates' confirmation that what we hear about poetry is heard by others, shows that the targeted effect can be transferred to another subject rather than accidental feelings on the art object. The type of emotion conveyed by the artist to the created object, anger, love, disgust, etc. It has been discussed that emotions are transferred to other subjects in *Ionic* dialogue and create the same effect.

We see that the unity of perception and sensation continues in Plato. What is felt is also within the scope of perception. In Plato's *Theaitetus* dialogue, he makes determinations about knowledge, perception and sensation. Socrates conveys in the

dialogue, he accepts the argument that the measure of everything is man, the measure of things that exist and do not exist. In the light of the teaching that "things are as they appear to you, as they appear to me", it expresses that "seeing" is perceiving (Plato. 2013).

In Plato's Theaitetus dialogue, it is stated that the number of perceptions is infinite as a result of sensations. According to him, perception is divided into "with names" and "without names". Perceptions with names are experienced and named by subjects; unnamed perceptions, on the other hand, are those to be experienced. Thus, things that have been sensed and perceived before will be different from things that will be sensed and perceived for the first time.

There are two kinds of movement: both are limited in quantity, and in their internal structure, one is active and the other passive. From their participation and interrelation there are an unlimited number of products, but this is always doubled, one perceived and the other perception, they always arise and arise at the same time as the perceived. For perceptions, we have words such as seeing, smelling, coldness, warmth, and as a result, pleasure, pain, greed and fear; The number of perceptions that have no names is endless; those with names are a heap. Perceived ones always correspond to individual perceptions; Different perceptions of vision correspond to different colors, hearing perceptions of sounds, and other perceptions in terms of their proximity to other perceptions (Plato. 2013).

Finally, the Theaitetus dialogue bases perception on existence and knowledge on perception with the following statements: Since what acts on me is for me and not for anyone else, then I am certainly the one who perceives it; I am not someone else (...) So for me, my own perception is real; because it always rests on my presence. According to Protagoras, I am the one who judges for me that what exists exists, and that which does not exist does not exist. (...) Then, since I do not err and do not err in my judgments between the existing and the existing, shouldn't I also be the knower of the things discussed, since I am the perceiver? So, knowledge is nothing but perception(Plato. 2013)..

When we look at this inference, it may be possible to conclude that the person who perceives something also receives information from that thing. These expressions of the Theaitetus dialogue "Does the art object provide knowledge?" When we think in the context of the question, when we think in terms of aesthetic perception, it may be possible to think that it provides information specifically to the perceiver. Again in the history of philosophy of art, whether an aesthetic object provides information has been discussed by philosophers.

Aristotle, in On the Soul (De Anima), says that acts such as thinking, sensing (sensation) must first be defined; "Acts and operations logically precede powers". Again, Aristotle distinguishes between "potentially sensing" (as thought) and "actual sensation" (as an act). According to this, potential sensation is the sensation that has not yet encountered any object: "The enquirer who approaches this subject must ascertain what each of these faculties is before he proceeds to investigate the questions next in order and

so forth. But if we are asked to state what each of these is; that is to say, what the cognitive, sensitive and nutritive faculties respectively are, we must begin by stating what the act of thinking is and what the act of sensation is.”(Aristotle, De Anima 1957)

Now to have sensation has two meanings: we use the terms hearing and ' seeing of that which has the capacity to hear and see, even though it be at the time asleep, just as we do of that which already actually hears and sees. And therefore sensation, too, will have two meanings : it may mean either potential or actual sensation. Similarly with having sensation, whether potential or actual. (Aristotle, De Anima 1957). In this case, an effect is required for the sensation to become a verb, “the term being affected is not a simple term: In a sense, it is a certain deterioration with the effect of the opposite” (Aristotle, De Anima 1957). Deterioration with the effect of the opposite also describes a change as a result of the union of sensation and perception. This change shows that the subject against the object interacts with the perception of the subject by the qualitative and quantitative structures that the object contains.

Sensation of real sensibles is always correct or less likely to be mistaken. The perception that these special sensibles are accidents comes later, and there may be a mistake here: Because the sensible is white, it is an impossible point to go wrong; but it is possible to be wrong about white being this or that thing. “For example, a particular motion can be perceived by touch as well as by sight. What is meant by the indirect object of sense may be illustrated if we suppose that the white thing before you is Diates' son. You Perceive Diates' son, but indirectly, for that which you perceive is accessory to the whiteness. Hence you are not affected by the indirect sensible as such. Of the two classes of sensibles directly perceived it is the objects special to the different senses which are properly perceptible : and it is to these that the essential character of each sense is naturally adapted” (Aristotle, De Anima 1957).

Aristotle mentions that the basic thing in qualitative perceptions does not change, but can change in degree by the subjects. If we remember the expression that Plato said in the Theaitetus dialogue, how something looked changed according to the subjects. Accordingly, Aristotle stated that it is possible to be mistaken for a quality to be this or that thing. The philosopher again argues that he is "identical to the object of actual knowledge" and continues with the following statements.

“Sensation, then, is analogous to simple assertion or simple apprehension by thought and, when the sensible thing is pleasant or painful, the pursuit or avoidance of it by the soul is a sort of affirmation or negation. In fact, to feel pleasure or pain is precisely to function with the sensitive mean, acting upon good or evil as such. It is in this that actual avoidance and actual appetite consist : nor is the appetitive faculty distinct from the faculty of avoidance, nor either from the sensitive faculty ; though logically they are different. But to the thinking soul images serve as present sensations and when it affirms or denies good or evil, it avoids or pursues (this is why the soul never thinks without an image)” (Aristotle, De Anima 1957).

Since Plato and Aristotle's acceptance of perception and sensation that the difference between previously experienced and newly experienced sensations will make a difference in terms of perception, it can also be thought that the subject may also affect emotional expressions such as like/dislike. However, the fact that the object is foreign to the subject, that this perception has not been named (experienced) before and that it has been named (experienced) can also create differences in terms of emotional response. The subject's perception towards the object and the emotion he/she experiences from the object and the re-experiencing of this emotion by the subject show that the perception is two-sided.

In the tradition of ancient philosophical thought, the perception/experience or sensation of aesthetics manifests itself as the subject's processing of existing sensations on the one hand, and the subject's evaluation of what is happening in his inner world with a new perspective, on the other. On the other hand, acquired sensations. Medieval history of philosophy includes examples of reorganizing the way of experiencing, which will be called perception, both in the object-object relationship and in the universal-singular relationship, especially in the axis of the existence of a higher ordering consciousness than human. Medieval Philosophy was shaped on the axis of Plato and Aristotle, and a harmony was sought between the outer world and inner perception. It may be possible to observe another structural feature of perception, especially in medieval philosophy. This structure is the effect of belief on perception. The fact that the processes of sensation and perception are not affected by any structure makes the judgment of the subject free. Belief structures, on the other hand, are effective in directing perception and analysis processes. Medieval philosophers Anselmus and Augustine wanted "belief to come before every thought and every thought of religious things." Accordingly, the structure of perception means the confirmation of an accepted premise. It seems that an accepted proposition can be analyzed without being the subject of sensation, perception and judgment. The discussion of universals has determined the structure of reality for the medieval system of thought and beyond. One of the most intense discussions of medieval philosophy is the discussion of universals.

Rocelinus is considered the founder of nominalism. "Nominalism does not accept that universal concepts are real, that they exist on their own. According to this epoch, universal concepts are what man has thought for similar objects; are the names that people give to the common similar aspects of objects" (GökberkMacî 1980b). In this case, if we go back to ancient philosophy, Plato's universals were given back to human consciousness by Rocelinus, and Anselmus's Platonic universal acceptance seems to have taken a hit. Abelard's student, Thomas of Aquino, said, "revelation (religious truths) and reason (hence experiment) are two separate sources of knowledge, they teach us different things. Therefore, the fields of "believing" and "knowing" do not overlap completely" (GökberkMacî 1980b). Thus, believing and knowing are separated from each other. Experiment needs the subject's sensation, perception, interpretation and analysis processes. Thus, a new approach to consciousness was introduced by A. Thomas. In the

discussion of universals, "universal concepts are found in the object (in re), they are the essence of the object, they are essential forms (forma substantialis)" (GökberkMacît 1980b). This idea makes the object the material of the experiment. In the last periods of medieval philosophy, Duns Scotus and William and Roger Bacon of Ockham prepared the building blocks of the road to the New Age. Duns Scotus brought a brand new perspective to the subject by emphasizing the will. His philosophy is the view that asserts the priority of will (voluntas) over reason (ratio)" (GökberkMacît 1980b).. The glorification of the will may require obedience to the rules of will instead of reason. Thus, facts can be shaped around will. For William of Ockham, "only the individual has reality; therefore, experiment (internal and external experimentation) is the basis of all kinds of knowledge" (GökberkMacît 1980b). Thus, O. William seems to have made man the measure of all reality, in a way, and separated him from the religion phenomenon peculiar to the medieval period. Finally, Roger Bacon, O. William brought "in addition to the external experiment, there is an experiment that gives us information from our soul, whose purpose is to be enlightened by God, and the highest step of this is to be one with God in the state of ecstasy" (GökberkMacît 1980b). He ended medieval philosophy by making the unknown reality known again through the subject's inner experience. Therefore, in terms of our subject, medieval philosophy deals with the internal experience that aesthetics makes research problematic in terms of its relations with its concepts. This approach will evolve into a subject-based understanding with the new age.

With the New Age, the science movement changed the subject's mentality and succeeded in directing the subject's perception to the unknown. Giordano Bruno now discusses of revealing the universe as a working system. "The universe is the principle of the universe, its eternal cause, natura naturans". As a matter of fact, the God of Bruno is neither the creator nor even the first mover, but the soul of the world; he is not the transcendent and temporary cause, but, as Spinoza would say, the immanent cause, i.e., the inner and permanent cause of things ; he is both the material and formal principle which produces, organizes, and governs them from within outwardly: in a word, their eternal substance. The beings which Bruno distinguishes by the words universe world, natura naturans and natura naturata, really constitute but one and the same thing, considered sometimes from the realistic standpoint (in the mediaeval sense), sometimes from the nominalistic standpoint" (Weber 1927).. Bruno argues the human soul as "the highest opening of universe life"(Weber 1927). . Another philosopher, Campanella, made determinations on the subject's mind that could be called scientific. Our knowledge springs from two sources: sensible experience and reasoning; it is empirical or speculative (Weber 1927) This determination made by Campanella has transferred the responsibility of sensation, perception and judgment of the knowledge of the outside world to the subject. At the same time, it seems to have loaded the mistake of knowledge of the external world on the subject. Francis Bacon, who is known for his criticism of scholastic philosophy, argued that the perception based on faith is wrong. Thus, the philosopher proposes to get rid of a priori thought structures whose antecedents are approved.

“The problem is, to begin the whole labor of the mind again, to raise science upon an absolutely new basis (instauration magna). If we would ascertain the hidden nature of things, we must not look for it in books, in the authorities of the School, in preconceived notions and a priori speculations. Above all, we must give up imitating the ancients, whose influence has retarded the progress of knowledge. With the exception of Democritus and a few positivists, the Greek philosophers observed but little and superficially” (Weber 1927).

Bacon's proposal also paves the way for science, as quoted by Weber. This mentality also seems to enable the subject to turn to external experience. Another philosopher who claims observation and experiment on the basis of human knowledge is Thomas Hobbes. “Philosophy is denned by Hobbes as the reasoned knowledge of effects from causes and causes from effects. To philosophize means to think correctly; now, to think is to compound and resolve conceptions; i.e., to add or subtract, to compute, or to reckon; hence, to think correctly means to combine what ought to be combined, and to separate what ought to be separated. Hence it follows that philosophy can have no other object than composable and decomposable things, or bodies” (Weber 1927) Inner perception, the primary condition and basis of intellectual life, is merely our feeling of brain action. To think, therefore, is to feel. Knowledge consists in the addition of sensations. Sensation, again, is but a modification, a movement taking place in the sensible body. Memory, the indispensable auxiliary of thought, is simply the duration of sensation: to remember is to feel what one has felt. Sensations cannot be explained, in the manner suggested by some of the ancients, as effluences emanating from bodies, and similar to them(Weber 1927). Hobbes defends inner perception as the basis of all mental operations. Hobbes now seems to have revealed that perception is subjective. These thoughts, on the other hand, can be said to be the initiator of the theories related to perception in the philosophy of the seventeenth century and afterwards.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who was the determinant of 17th century philosophy at the beginning of the new age, examined such aspects of perception with his perception determinations in his work *Emotions or Moods*(and N. K. S. Descartes, René 1958). The Philosopher “our perceptions are of two kinds; one defines it as perceptions caused by the soul, and the other as perceptions caused by the body. “The different kinds of sensation; and firstly of the internal, that is, of the passions or affections of the mind and of the natural appetites. The diversities of these sensations depend firstly on the diversity in the nerves themselves, and then on the diversities of the motions which occur in the individual nerves. We have not, however, so many individual senses as individual nerves; it is enough merely to distinguish seven chief different kinds, two of which belong to internal senses, and five to the external. The minute nerves, which extend to the heart and the neighbourhood of the heart, operate in the other internal sense which embraces all the emotions of the mind or passions, and affections such as joy, sadness, love, hate and the like. For, to take an example, when the blood is pure and well-tempered, so that it dilates in the heart more readily and strongly than usual, this so enlarges and moves the little

nerves scattered around the orifices, that there is thence a corresponding movement in the brain which affects the mind with a certain natural sense of cheerfulness; and as often as these same nerves are moved in the same way, even although it be from other causes, they excite in us this same feeling” (and N. K. S. Descartes, René 1911). Descartes states that the perceptions caused by the soul depend on "will" and "intention"; expresses that the perceptions formed by our body are connected to the nerves. “We must conceive that the motor force or the nerves themselves derive their origin from the brain, in which the fancy is located, and that the fancy moves them in various ways, just as the external senses act on the common sense, or the lower extremity of the pen moves the whole pen. This example also shows how the fancy can be the cause of many motions in the nerves, motions of which, however, it does not have the images stamped upon it, possessing only certain other images from which these latter follow. Just so the whole pen does not move exactly in the way in which its lower end does ;nay the greater part seems to have a motion that is quite different from and contrary to that of the other. This lets us understand how all the motions of the other animals can come about, though we can ascribe to them no knowledge at all, but only fancy of a purely corporeal kind. We can explain also how in ourselves all those operations occur which we perform without any aid from the reason” (and N. K. S. Descartes, René 1958). Descartes, accepting the unity of emotions with perception and accepting that they are active as a result of a special stimulation, opened the subject of perception to a comprehensive discussion.

Within the scope of the perception of the subjects, the qualities in the external objects themselves become a judgment by integrating with the subject's perception, determinations, meanings. As Descartes stated, the situations associated with the body are the subjective experiences of the subject. It seems necessary for the subject to associate his sensations with objects, to name that object and to try to describe it. Descartes' remarkable determination is that apart from the influence of the qualities of the object, he can feel the stimuli caused by the objects he brings to the subject.

When we achieve to the 18th century (Age of Enlightenment) Philosophy, John Locke (1632-1704) conducts an in-depth study of the functioning of the human mind in his *Essay on the Human Mind*, and separates perception from the act of thinking (Locke, John 1979).

“Perception, as it is the first faculty of the mind, exercised about our ideas ; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active ; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers any thing. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive ; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving”(Locke, John 1979).

If we consider what Locke mentioned within the framework of perception, interpretation and analysis, we encounter the active structure of thinking. However,, we can say that the subject that encounters the object receives only the qualitative and

quantitative features that the object provides. Another determination of Locke is that the ideas of sensation can often be replaced by judgment.

“We are farther to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, v. g., gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind, is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we having, by use, been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light, by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies, the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes ; so that from that, which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour ; when the idea we receive from thence, is only a plane, variously coloured ; as is evident in painting” (Locke, John 1979).

Locke used the term "habit" in relation to perception. Locke has discussed in a different way the effect of the spatial effects of objects on the perceptions of the subjects. Locke reaches the final conclusion about perception as follows; Perception is a door to knowledge. “Perception then being the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it, the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath ; and the fewer, and duller the impressions are, that are made by them, and the duller faculties are, that are employed about them, the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees, (as may be perceived amongst men,) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too, to imagine, that it is perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture, by the by, it being indifferent to the matter in hand, which way the learned shall determine of it” (Locke, John 1979).

Condillac developed an epistemology on sensations influenced by the empiricism of John Locke. His *Treatise on Senses* (1754) carried out an examination of individual human sensations, and his *Essay on the Source of Human Knowledge* (1746) carried out an examination of how knowledge is realized. He expresses the initial state of the subject against the object as follows: “Let us consider a man at the first moment of his existence. His soul first has different sensations, such as light, colors, pain, pleasure, motion, rest ± those are his first thoughts. Let us follow him in the moments when he begins to reflect on what these sensations occasion in him, and we shall find that he forms ideas of the different operations of his soul, such as perceiving and imagining - those are his second thoughts.” (E. B. (2001). Condillac 2001).

Thought firstly expresses that the subject comes face to face with internal and external perceptions, as Descartes stated. In the second stage, Condillac explains the

thinking activity: Thus, according to the manner in which external objects affect us, we receive different ideas via the senses, and, further, as we reflect on the operations which the sensations occasion in our soul, we acquire all the ideas which we would not have been able to receive from external objects (E. B. (2001). Condillac 2001). The actions that come through sensations and perception have started the thinking process. This act is However, the thinker describes making a final decision about the object as follows: "Thus the sensations and operations of the soul are the materials of all our knowledge, materials that are employed by reflection as it explores the relations they contain by making combinations of them. But the whole success depends on the circumstances we pass through. The most favorable are those that provide us with the greatest number of objects that may exercise our reflection. The great circumstances in which those who are destined to govern mankind and themselves constitute, for example, an occasion to form very extensive views; and those which continually repeat themselves in the world at large produce the sort of disposition we call natural because, since they are not the fruit of study, we cannot identify the causes that produce them. Let us conclude that there are no ideas that have not been acquired: the first come directly from the senses, the others from experience and increase in proportion to the capacity for reflection" (E. B. (2001). Condillac 2001).

Making a judgment about the object after the process of thinking and making sense on the object ensures that the object is named by the mind and defined according to the subject. But if we ask about the idea of the absolute magnitude of certain bodies, or even their relative magnitude and about their true shape, we will have reason to doubt our judgments. Depending on whether an object is near or distant, the appearances of size and shape in which they present themselves will be altogether different.

"It follows that we must distinguish three things in our sensations: (1) The perception we have. (2) The reference we give it to something outside ourselves. (3) The judgment that what we refer to things really belongs to them" (E. B. Condillac 2001).

Condillac states in his Treatise on Sensations that our knowledge comes from sensation, "all our knowledge comes from sensations; on the other hand, our sensations are nothing but our states of existence". Thus, the sensation seems to have gained a new expression with the thought that the information coming from the sensations is related to the existence of the subject. "When objects attract our attention, the perceptions they occasion in us become linked with our sentiment of our being and to everything that can bear some relation to it. It follows that consciousness not only gives us knowledge of our perceptions, but furthermore, if those perceptions are repeated, it often makes us aware that we have had them before and makes us recognize them as belonging to us or as affecting a being that is constantly the same "self," despite their variety and succession. Seen in relation to these new effects, consciousness is a new operation which is at our service every instant and is the foundation of experience. Without it every moment of life would seem the first of our existence, and our knowledge would never advance beyond an initial perception. I shall call it "reminiscence."

Apart from declaring that the only source of our knowledge is sensations, Condillac can be considered to have added a sub-title to the subject of sensation, with his examination of how the sensations that he examines one by one are like pleasure and similar feelings. Indeed, when we evaluate the sense-perception unity through aesthetic objects, which is our subject, these determinations of Condillac also open the door to the pleasure of the subject for the object and similar impressions. The idea that sensations are also the source of various emotions can also trigger the creative side of the subject by activating his faculties.

Continuing the discussion of perception and sensation from the point mentioned by Condillac, we encounter the following statements about perception in David Hume's (1711-1776) study of Human Nature(Hume, David 1896).

“Again, in his determinations about perception, Hume also made a distinction between instantaneous sensation and later re-enacting this sensation in memory. “What must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist”(Hume, David 1896).

Again, in his determinations regarding perception, Hume also revealed the distinction between instantaneous sensation and later re-enactment of this sensation in memory.

“The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produced with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark. And as in both cases a love or affection arises from the resemblance, we may learn that a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits, since an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to relation, acquaintance, and resemblance” (Hume, David 1896).

Hume separated mind perceptions from designs. The thinker makes the following statement about the perceptions that he distinguishes as impressions: “It has been observed that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. The mind can never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the term of perception; and consequently, that term is no less applicable to those judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every other operation of the mind. To approve of one character, to condemn another, are only so many different perceptions” (Hume, David 1896).

Hume acknowledges that the data provided within the framework of the senses and experience also constitutes the reflection and acknowledges that these reflections accompany our designs.

While the debates about perception in the thought plane of the 18th century were investigated, the effect of the sense-perception association on the subject's definition of the world, the thinkers of the Enlightenment thought and especially the German Philosophy considered the discussion as a philosophy of mind problem in terms of understanding and defining the mind. It is said that, with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) (I. Kant 2001), the subject of perception began to be examined as the subject of mental functioning: “Everything we perceive takes place in time and space, and every change has a cause. But according to Kant, that is not because of the way reality ultimately is: it is a contribution of our minds.” (Warburton, 2015, pp. 167-168). While this determination of perception expresses its subjective feature, however, the determinations of philosophers have also been a source for many psychiatrists working on perception.

“Space and time were claimed to be the 'pure forms' of all sensory intuition-the abstract background forms, that is, of all possible human sensory representations. And the organized family of the various 'pure concepts of the understanding' were claimed to provide the inevitable framework of expression for any of the judgments that we humans ever make about the empirical world. Accordingly, while the world-in-itself (the 'noumenal' world) is certainly not 'constructed' by us, the world-as-perceived-and-thought-by-us (the 'empirical' world of three-dimensional physical objects) does indeed display a substantial component that reflects precisely the peculiar contributions brought to the business of cognition by our own internal cognitive machinery (Churchland 2012).

While this set of arguments sheds light on later Critical doctrines, it also raises problems that subsequent work must resolve. While this set of arguments sheds light on later Critical doctrines, it also raises issues that subsequent work must resolve.

First, the characterization of sensibility as a passive force of the mind and the intellect as an active will remain at the center of many arguments in the Critique; however, Kant would also classify sensitivity in general under "cognitive faculties", and since "faculty" implies activity, this means that there is an active element in sensitivity as well. This corresponds to Kant's claim that the form of sensibility is actually provided by the mind. This cognitive structure has been tried to be determined within the framework of

the understanding of "categories", which constitutes the basic dynamic of explanation of Kant's philosophy. General logic abstracts from all information content and turns to another source for representations that it will transform into concepts through the analysis process. "Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but belong nevertheless among the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and thus they must always also affect the concept of these objects. Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. I call this action synthesis" (Immanuel Kant 1929)

Kant authorizes the synthesis of the multitude in the transcendental imagination if it is directed only to the a priori union of the manifold, without the distinction of intuitions. He mentions that the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if it is necessarily represented a priori in relation to the original unity of apperception. The Philosopher indicates that this unity of perception is the basis of the possibility of all knowledge, that the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge. The Philosopher indicates that this unity of perception is the basis of the possibility of all knowledge, that the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge. And he explains as that "through it, all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori". According to the synthesis of imagination, the unity of perception is understanding, and this same unity refers to the transcendent synthesis of imagination, pure understanding. In the understanding, then, there are modes of pure a priori knowledge (Erkenntnisse), which, in all possible manifestations, contain the necessary smallness of the pure synthesis of the imagination. "These are the categories', that is, the pure concepts of understanding. The empirical faculty of knowledge in man must therefore contain an understanding which relates to all objects of the senses, although only by means of intuition and of its synthesis through imagination. All appearances, as data for a possible experience, are subject to this understanding. This relation of appearances to possible experience is indeed necessary, for otherwise they would yield no knowledge and would not in any way concern us. We have, therefore, to recognize that pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding" (Immanuel Kant 1929).

Categories have taken their place in the world of thought as an important determination of the qualities of the mind. "Previously, categories were used to describe only those aspects of the universe that were reflected in our minds. With Kant's philosophy, they describe the qualities of our minds to allow the universe in any form to enter our minds. Therefore, the truths of the universe can never be reached, and the

categories change their character from structures of the universe to structures of perception.

Thus, the relationship between subject and object seems to have gained a completely different dimension. At another stage, the thinker talks about synthesis so that our thought can form the knowledge of the multitude: “

By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is pure, if the manifold is not empirical but is given a priori, as is the manifold in space and time. Before we can analyse our representations, the representations must themselves be given, and therefore as regards content no concepts can first arise by way of analysis. Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a priori) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. But it is the task of the mind to bring this synthesis to the concepts, and it is primarily through this task that the mind provides us with the perception/knowledge in its real meaning” (Immanuel Kant 1929).

In connection with the subject, Kant's expression that space and time are also a priori forms of the mind and that the subject evaluates an object within the framework of its own mental forms is again a subjective expression of the mind.

While making judgments, Kant examines the logical functioning of the mind under four headings: “1- Quantity of judgments: (Universal, particular, singular), 2- Quality: (Affirmative, Negative, infinite) 3- Relation: (Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive), 4- Modality: (Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic) (Immanuel Kant 1929).

Kant's determination is a determination of how the subject forms the judgment about the object, and again the number of these concepts of the mind is equal to the number of categories that Kant repeats by following Aristotle's footsteps. In this way, when applied a priori to objects of intuition in general, exactly the same number of pure concepts arise as logical functions are found to be found in all possible judgments. Kant makes his point about ensuring a full understanding of these functions and giving a comprehensive inventory of their powers. “These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, for our primary purpose is the same as his, although widely diverging from it in manner of execution”(Immanuel Kant 1929).

The post-Kantian 19th century German idealism, J. Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854), Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) discussed the subjects of subject, perception and consciousness intensely (Schiller 1985). Fichte states the following regarding the subject's perception of the object: "Every object obtains its own place in the space from its relation to the designing subject, and it is by no means possible to determine its place apart from this relation. However, in order to determine the position of something else in space, anything assumed must itself be in space” .

Thus, Fichte brings anything in the space into existence with the consciousness of the subject and the relation of perceiving it. According to Fichte, the person's perception of himself and his perception towards anything in the space is not completely independent.

“It is not possible to assume anything in space without discovering that one is also in space; However, if a person does not put an object in the space, he cannot discover himself in the space” (Fichte, 2006, p. 219). In this case, when perception is evaluated on the axis of inner perception and outer perception, the 'I' seems to exist as a single perception, both inward and outward. On the other hand, Schelling's Transcendental philosophy, a follower of Fichte, bases knowledge on the "subjective harmony of the objective because, according to this understanding, only what is true is known; but accuracy was often put into the harmony of the designs with their objects” (O. N. S. Soykan 2016). Again, within the scope of these expressions, we see that Schelling is in the same direction as Fichte. According to Fichte, “the objective and the subjective are so combined that it cannot be said to which of the two the right of preference belongs. There is no first and no second here; both are one at the same time (O. N. S. Soykan 2016). The subjective emerges as the cause of reality. Perception, together with Schelling, continues to appear as a reality that belongs to the subject. In this period, the determinations made about the subject and perception brought along the problem of what is the basis of reality. The reality of the object and the extent to which the subject's knowledge obtained through the object is subjective and objective has been the subject of discussion. At this point, aesthetics, which is the knowledge of the sensible field, has investigated what kind of taste is related to the art object and what kind of information it provides subjectively and objectively.

Until this stage, German idealist philosophers such as Fichte and Schelling continued the argument that the knowledge obtained from the object is a reality of the subject. Hegel, on the other hand, stated that the object is an indirect universal in his work called Phenomenology of Spirit. “Since the principle of the object, the universal, 'is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the object must express this its nature in its own self. This it does by showing itself to be the thing with many properties. The wealth of sense knowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, for which it was only the source of instances; for only perception contains negation, that is, difference or manifoldness, within its own essence”(Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Arnold V. Miller 1977). Hegel identifies consciousness as the perceiver, and consciousness can change reality as it receives objects. “Since they are expressed in the simplicity of the universal, these determinacies which are properties strictly speaking only through the addition of a further determination are related only] to themselves; they are indifferent to one another, each is on its own and free from the others. But the simple, self-identical universality is it self in turn distinct and free from these determinate properties it has. It is pure relating of self to self, or the medium in, which all these determinacies are, and in which as a simple unity they therefore interpenetrate, but without coming into contact with one another; for it is precisely through participating in this universality that they exist indifferently on their own account”(Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Arnold V. Miller 1977).

Hegel's determination about perception differs in terms of the thin border he draws between subject and object. Contrary to the fact that the possibilities of reality are completely handed over to the subject, it is stated that the object has a reality, and the

mistaken perception of the subject against the object is clearly mentioned. This error is not a reality of the object, but an error of the perceiving subject. Based on this mistake, the subject creates his own truth. In the 20th century, analytical philosophy left the ambiguous out of philosophical investigation and sought clarity in meaning.

In the 20th century, analytical philosophy left the ambiguous out of philosophical investigation and sought clarity in meaning. According to analytical philosophers, the World is already the totality of sense data. "In this period, perception will find its meaning with linguistic integrity, and one of its representatives, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1950), summarizes this point of view as follows: The world is everything that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not of things. The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case" (Wittgenstein 2015). Wittgenstein establishes an analytical link between facts and subject logic. The philosopher argues that the spatial object must reside in infinite space. "It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact. In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing" (Wittgenstein 2015). With this point of view, the philosopher establishes a link between the facts and the logic of the subject. He argued that just as we cannot think of spatial objects apart from space and temporal objects from time, we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of connection with other things. "The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions first formed by the configuration of the objects. Roughly speaking: objects are colourless. Two objects of the same logical form are apart from their external properties only differentiated from one another in that they are different" (Wittgenstein 2015).) In this case, an imagined world, however different from its real, has a form that has something in common with its real. We try to make sense of the function and ambiguity of the mind with definitions, concepts, the pattern of the information chain acquired through affect. However, as the Philosopher stated; "Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized"(Wittgenstein 2015).

From what has been conveyed up to this stage, we understand that while the Analytical tradition considers the ambiguity of language to be the obstacle to the relationship of perception with reality, the phenomenological tradition aims to make the consciousness that encounters the object turn into objects and grasp them clearly.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), his way of discussing phenomena; "Existence and non-existence are subtly intertwined, and phenomenology helps to think about them" (Husserl 2010). In other words, everything returns to itself, to its origin. It centers pure knowledge and consciousness with the concepts of immanent and transcendent. In his philosophy, "intuition" (Lat. *intuitus*, alm. *Anschung*) is very important to Husserl. "He uses intuition in the sense of the genus label of everything given to us in immediate

experience, corresponding to the faculty that directly gives us its object (Husserl 2010). In this case, to return to the things themselves in Husserl's philosophy means "to return to acts of consciousness and to the objective entities constructed within these acts, that is, to what Husserl calls phenomena" (Husserl 2010). Intentionality includes perception and post-processing related to the mind. The non-reflexive means that in consciousness we turn to objects and mean them, while reflection reveals this as having a special characteristic inherent in all experiences, although they are infinitely different in form. To be conscious of something is not to have an empty form of something in consciousness. Each phenomenon has its own intentional structure. For example, observing the appearance and dimensions of a cube perceived from different angles, and the synthesis relationship between them, will show that each phase and phase already has a "consciousness" of something in itself, and always remains the unity of one and the same object without losing its synthetic unity at any moment (Husserl 2010). . As Husserl stated in the cube example, he stated that the perception of the synthesis of the object within itself is also the consciousness of something at every stage, and he made a determination about how the perception process leading to the unity of the object and its integrity are reflected in the consciousness. In this case, perception, with Husserl's phenomenology, perception and therefore knowledge is "the knowledge of man alone. It depends on the forms of the human mind, it cannot reach the nature of the things themselves, the things themselves" (Husserl 2010).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), who also moves from Husserl's phenomenological view and interprets it differently, determines the perceptual position of the thinking subject against the object in her work called *The Phenomenology of Perception* as follows: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1962), who also moves from Husserl's phenomenological view and interprets it differently, determines the perceptual position of the thinking subject against the object in his work called *The Phenomenology of Perception* as follows: "hear is to have sounds, to sense (*sentir*) is to have qualities. "The power of expression is well known in the arts in music. The musical meaning of a sonata is inseparable from the sounds which are its vehicle: before we have heard it no analysis enables us to anticipate it; once the performance is over, we shall, in our intellectual analyses of the music, be unable to do anything but carry ourselves back to the moment of experiencing it. During the performance, the notes are not only the 'signs' of the sonata, but it is there through them, it enters into them" (Merleau-Ponty 1962). A work of art is something perceived. The philosophy of perception also means that it is freed from misunderstandings that can be brought up as objections. The perceived world is not only the sum of natural things, it is also paintings, music, books, everything the Germans call a "cultural world". Far from narrowing our own horizons or limiting ourselves to stones and water, we find a way to think about works of art, language and culture in all their autonomy and basic richness by being inserted into the perceived world.

Sensations of the sensory apparatus, which are supposed to correspond individually to local excitations, are considered to be the first data of consciousness. In order to reach

what we actually perceive from the data, it is necessary to assume the "processing" of sensations by memory, knowledge and judgment - "matter" by "form", the transition from a subjective "mosaic" to the world of objects. "The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'. A really homogeneous area offering nothing to be cannot be given to any perception. The structure of actual perception alone can teach us what perception is. The pure impression is, therefore, not only undiscoverable, but also imperceptible and so inconceivable as an instant of perception. If it is introduced, it is because instead of attending to the experience of perception, we overlook it in favour of the object perceived"(Merleau-Ponty 1962). In this expression, the thinker also evaluates perception as judgment in the triangle of perception, meaning, and analysis that we mentioned at the beginning. Perception seems to be equivalent to the concept of analysis in this framework. The thinker states that perception is almost an abstraction of the subject's habit and historical accumulation, with the expression "the given is not a thing alone, it is the experience of the thing, a transcendence in the trace of a subjectivity, a nature that becomes transparent by passing through a history".

"We make perception out of things perceived. And since perceived things themselves are obviously accessible only through perception, we end by understanding neither. We are caught up in the world and we do not succeed in extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve consciousness of the world. If we did we should see that the quality is never experienced immediately, and that all consciousness is consciousness of something. Nor is this 'something' necessarily an identifiable object. There are two ways of being mistaken about quality: one is to make it into an element of consciousness, when in fact it is an object for consciousness, to treat it as an incommunicable impression, whereas it always has a meaning; the other is to think that this meaning and this object, at the level of quality, are fully developed and determinate" (Merleau-Ponty 1962).

As Wittgenstein, one of the representatives of analytical philosophy, stated, if we summarize the issue at this stage between the analytical tradition and the phenomenological approach, we cannot perceive objects outside of their relationship to space and time. In Kant's philosophy, space and time are a priori forms of seeing. These belong to our mind's ability to receive, and Wittgenstein accepts that the falsity in the expression of the world, which is characterized as the basis of reality, is the ambiguity of language.

In Kant's determinations, the place of proof of objects seems to be the mind. When we come to the post-Kantian German idealists, we see that perception is based on the dialectical process of thought. It has been concluded that the perception directed towards the object is inwardly and outwardly directed perception in Fichte, and whether the perception directed towards the object is identical to it in Hegel, and it is the subject who has a share of the error of the object's reality ground. Again, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty gave the information that, contrary to the expression of perception at a simple glance, it

occurs gradually. In the light of all these discussions, the problematic of form will need to be examined first in the analysis of perception.

3.2 The Affective Impact of Music Examined through Philosophy

Can musical tonality be expressed as an enjoyable sensation and pleasure element? With this definition, can the relationship and interaction of music with the soul, mind and body be understood? This approach results in an aesthetic understanding based on likes and dislikes. An aesthetic based on taste in no way completes the problematic that needs to be explained, because it leads to the evaluation of music as pure satisfaction of taste. When we discuss about musical meaning, how can we treat music as a language? We can proceed with reasoning and knowledge-based questions to fully answer the problematic of this subject. When it comes to the relationship between music and language, it is seen that different forms and tendencies emerge. For some, the musical structure is vague and subjective; music is therefore considered an autonomous language of ambiguous emotions. In this respect, it is stated that musical meaning is the emotions that are thought to correspond. According to another approach, the musical structure is syntactic. However, there are also those who assume that music will be meaningless when considered only as a syntactic structure, and therefore the external world to which it refers should be included in the musical meaning. Based on these points, it should be explained that music cannot be seen as the language of emotions, by showing the similarities that can be established between formal languages and music. This approach will be based on the fact that music is man-made and specific in terms of meaning and syntax. We evaluate it in terms of musical meaning, reference and design concepts and argue that meaning cannot be equated with reference or design in musical works. In this respect, the relationship between formalism and music seems appropriate to be considered both in the context of art and in the context of language, logic and mathematics. In terms of philosophy of mathematics, formalism is the valid way of understanding what mathematics is, to investigate how the forms used in mathematics are organized. For formalism, the meaning of mathematical expressions is based on the forms that make up the expressions and the rules that will allow operations with these forms.

The influential name of formalism in the philosophy of mathematics was the German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943). According to Hilbert, an intuitive basis, which is a basic way of thinking and knowing, that allows the use of forms and design objects in mathematics should be assumed. In other words, man is an entity that can create symbols and design them. “All the formulas will have the meaning of universal judgments.” (Hilbert 1950: p. 60)

Form is the state of matter that makes it comprehensible by embodying it with its various properties, whereas art, on the contrary of the contents, transcends the emotions by expressing the definite aspects of the work of art. “As a philosophic term used by Cicero and Augustine in the sense of species, and similarly by Scotus Eriugena. Boethius and the mediaeval writers employed it in the Aristotelian sense of a constituent of being, synonymous with *causa formalism*. Generally speaking, it is an intrinsic, determining,

perfective principle of existence of any determinate essence. More strictly it is forma substantiate, or that constitutive element of a substance which is the principle or source of its activity, and which determines it to a definite species, or class, and differentiates it from any other substance. It is distinguished from a forma accidental which confers a sort of secondary being on a substance already constituted in its proper species and determines it to one or other accidental mode, thus a man may become a musician. A forma corporatist is one by which a being is a body, on which its corporeal nature and essence depend, and which is its principle of life. A forma non-subsistence or materialist is one whose existence depends on matter without which- it cannot exist and be active. It is distinguished from forma subsistent or immaterialist which can exist and act separately from matter. An immaterial form may be an incomplete substance, like the human soul, which is created to be united with a body to complete its own species, or a complete substance, a pure spirit, which is not destined to be united with matter to which it cannot communicate its being, hence it is also called a forma separata.” (Runes, 1942, p. 110-111) With these definitions, we deduce that the relationship between aesthetic taste and form is the mathematical, (measurable/formal) part of the effect of an art object on aesthetic taste in terms of making sense of that object by the subject. Again the form [Alm. Form, lat. Forma, Grek. Morphe, Eidos, Eng, Form] is “the opposite of matter and content, the “how” as opposed to the “what”, and in the state of chaos it refers to the “limited”, “ordered” versus the disordered and undetermined. Aesthetically, it refers to the appearance of the object perceived by the senses. In the light of these definitions, we can define the form as the quantitative structure of the object in its most general form. The problematization of the form in terms of the history of aesthetics has led to the investigation of how the quantitative characteristics of the aesthetic object, as well as its qualities, are effective on the subject's taste.

First, the Pythagorean philosophy mentioned that everything is countable with a definite judgment. “All things are countable and we can describe many things numerically” (Copleston, 1990, p. 35). Accordingly, it is possible to talk about the definite provisions of things. Things expressed numerically can be judged with certainty, can find meaning in the mathematical expression used as a common language “Thus, the relationship between two related things can be expressed by numerical ratio: it can be understood numerically between a given number. normal objects etc. (Copleston, 1990, p. 35). The Pythagorean philosophy again applies this idea to the field of music in art.

What seemed particularly striking to [them] was the discovery that musical intervals between notes on the lyre could be described numerically. It can be said that the musical pitch is dependent on the number to the extent that it depends on the lengths, and the intervals in the scale can be described by numerical ratios. Just as musical harmony is dependent on number, the harmony of the Universe is also based on number (Copleston, 1990, p.35).

The fact that especially the intervals between notes are countable in music justifies the connection of Pythagorean philosophy with mathematics and music. “Anaximander

produced everything from the Infinite or the Indefinite, and Pythagoras combined this concept with the concept of *to πέρας*, which formed the Infinite. This is exemplified in music, because in it proportion and harmony can be described arithmetically” (Copleston, 1990, p. 36).

Naturally, when we examine the C major scale, we see that the vocal ranges consist of two complete half and two full semitones. These intervals are expressed as the sound that is heard, namely the quality, finding its mathematical form. There are also mathematical expressions of the sounds that are considered as qualities outside of the sound ranges. When we evaluate art objects in different fields with the Pythagorean perspective, it may be possible to talk about the effect of mathematical properties of form on the perception of the subject. The size, shape of the object can be the subject of liking.

One of the most striking ideas developed by pre-Socratic philosophers regarding perception-form belongs to Empodocles. The thinker, who does not distinguish between thought and perception, expresses that things reveal themselves to us as they are. “In the sensory-perception there is an encounter between an element in us and a similar element outside. All things constantly flow out, giving information, and when the pores of the sensory organs are of suitable size, these fluxes enter and create perception” (Copleston, 1990, p. 79). In this case, when we evaluate what Empodokles said about perception, we can reach the conclusion that the form knowledge of the things in the outside world, that thing itself reveals its knowledge about itself to the subject, and that the subject thinks while perceiving it through the senses. In this case, things carry the form information within themselves and convey their quantitative characteristics as well as their qualitative characteristics directly to perception. The pre-Socratic philosophers continued their discussions especially on natural sciences, they evaluated the world through sensation-perception-reflection, and tried to reach certain information by arguing about the issues of formation-decay and the universe.

The early Greek philosophers were concerned with the object and tried to determine the ultimate principle of all things. In addition, the teachings of Heraclitus and Parmenides (...) resulted in a skeptical attitude about the validity of sense-perception. If existence is static and the perception of motion is an illusion, or if, on the other hand, everything is in a state of constant change and there is no principle of immutability or stability, our sense-perception is unreliable, and thus the foundations of cosmology have weakened themselves (Copleston, 1990, p. 103).

This interpretation of Copleston is important in terms of the validity and invalidity of the qualitative and quantitative features of the perceived aesthetic object on the ground of reality, within the scope of our subject matter and discussion. At this point, whether the knowledge of form is subjective or objective within the perception of care is shaped on the axis of these discussions.

When we examine Plato's views on real knowledge, he had the idea that reality exists within the scope of the doctrine of ideas. He was of the view that “knowledge is accessible, and that knowledge must be (i) infallible and (ii) factual (...) Plato shows that

neither sensory perception nor true belief in Theaitetus have these two characteristics; neither will then be equated with real knowledge” (Copleston, 1985, pp. 35-36). In Plato's time, it is certain that the reliable basis for truth exceeds the subject's perception ability related to sensation. “Plato adopts Protogoras' belief in the relativity of sensory perception” (Copleston, 1985, p. 36). Real knowledge should be permanent, not temporary. In this case, Plato thinks that the perception acquired from real knowledge is not from the sensations, but the knowledge that the subject can obtain as a result of cognitive processes.

In Plato's Doctrine of Forms, Copleston makes the following determinations in Plato's Doctrine of Forms: If things are collectively named by subjects, these things have forms corresponding to their ideas. Plato thought that concepts with universal validity were not merely subjective. Emphasizing the concept of the beautiful, Plato was creating a single universal concept from the beautiful. “Thus, unlike sensory perception, the object of thought universals must have reality” (Copleston, 1985, p. 55). Plato, on the other hand, identified objects with numbers.

Formats are Numbers; (ii) Things exist by joining numbers; (iii) Numbers are made up of one and the great-and-small or "indeterminate duality" (aoristos duas), not (apeiron) and limit (peros), as the Pythagoreans thought; (iv) It fills mathematics with an intermediate position between Forms and things” (Copleston, 1985, pp. 92-93)

Plato recognized that form is numerical forms. Within the scope of these expressions, we can say that things have a mathematical expression by taking a share from numbers with the feature of joining numbers, and numbers from things. On the other hand, Copleston's interpretation of Plato's interpretation of the relationship between number and form, "the motive of the thinker to identify forms with numbers seems to be the motive to rationalize and make intelligible the mystical and transcendental world of Forms. To make it understandable is to find the order principle (Copleston, 1985, p. 93).

Plato, in the Theaitetus dialogue, expressed some impossibilities regarding the perception of things: (1) Something that is known without being perceived and has a memory in the soul; to be confused with something else known, also traced and undetected; (2) taking the unknown trace of something known as something not owned; (3) mixing the unknown with the unknown as well; (4) confusing the known with the unknown (5) confusing something perceived with something else perceived; (6) confusing something undetected with something else not perceived (7) confusing something undetected with something perceived; (8) confusing something perceived with something not perceived; [(9) further: it is perceived, and the perception is confused with something that has the trace of its counterpart] especially this is more impossible than any of the previous ones. (10) mixing something known, perceived and well traced with something else known, (11) and mixing something known, perceived under the same conditions with something else; (12) confusing something unknown and undetected with something unknown and unperceived; (13) and mixing something known, perceived under the same conditions, with something unknown; (14) or the confusion of something unknown and

unperceived with something not perceived. In all these cases, it is directly impossible to have a false assumption. There are only the following cases in which false assumptions are possible. (...) 1-If the known thing is confused with the known and perceived thing; (2) if something unknown but perceived is confused with something else known and perceived: (3) or if something known and perceived is taken as something else known and perceived (Plato. 1992).

Although Plato gives the subject the share of error of the perception of the given, his determination that the unknown but perceived object is confused with anything known and perceived before, is a warning that the unreality of the form of that object can be justified incorrectly by the subject. The judgment that the subject will make in the process of sensation and perception at the first encounter with the aesthetic object seems to be the same as the evaluation process of an object that has not been perceived before. Accordingly, Plato's explanation of the first perception of the unknown revealed the possibility of comparing and judging the work of the subject with the trace of another object that he knew and perceived before in his cognitive processes. This possibility is also factual in evaluating the valid form and content data of the aesthetic object: If an impression that has a perception is brought together with an impression that has no perception, the thinking soul naturally falls into error(Plato. 1992).

Plato put forward the idea that the universal must be found in realities of an order separate from sensuous things. For this reason, he argued that there can be no definition of a sensory thing. Because sensory things were constantly changing. So he called these other kinds of things Ideas. He said that sensory things are separate and get their name from them. After all these discussions, Aristotle reached striking conclusions by making a study on Pythagoreans and Plato in his *Metaphysics*:

“So he called this other sort of beings forms, and said the perceptible things were apart from these and all spoken of derivatively from these, for the many things with the same names as the forms were results of participation. He changed only the name participation, for the Pythagoreans said that beings are by way of imitation of the numbers, but Plato by of participation, having changed the name. What this participation or imitation of the forms might be, however, they were in unison in leaving behind to be sought. And since the forms are the causes of the others, he thought that the elements of the forms were the elements of all beings. As material, then, the great and the small were the sources, and as thinghood, the one, for out of the former, by participation in the one, the forms are composed as numbers. So in saying that the one was an independent thing, and not any other thing said to be one, he spoke in much the same way as the Pythagoreans, and in saying that numbers were the causes of thinghood for other things he spoke exactly as they did; but to have made a dyad in place of the infinite as one thing, and to have made the infinite out of the great and the small, was peculiar to him. It was also peculiar to him to set the numbers apart from the perceptible things, while they had said that the things themselves were numbers, and they did not set the mathematical things between them. Now his having made the one and the numbers be apart from the things we handle, and

not the same way the Pythagoreans had said, and his introduction of the forms came about because of his investigation in the realm of definitions (for the earlier thinkers had no part in dialectic), but his having made the other nature a dyad was so that the numbers, outside of the primes, might be generated out of it in a natural way; as though from some sort of modeling clay” (Aristotle 1991).

Plato, as Aristotle stated, kept mathematical objects out of the sensory field. However, Plato seems to have used mathematical objects as a tool between the world of ideas and the sensible, by mathematically proportioning a sensible beauty who had a share of his idea. Aristotle, on the other hand, examines the nature of substance and concludes that "Substance is form. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e. the essence (for the ‘why’ is referred finally to the formula, and the ultimate ‘why’ is a cause and principle); in another the matter or substratum, in a third the source of the change, and in a fourth the cause opposed to this, that for the sake of which and the good (for this is the end of all generation and change). The essence, i.e. the substance of things, no one has expressed distinctly. It is mentioned chiefly by those who believe in the Forms; "(Aristotle 1991). Aristotle describes the coexistence of substance and form with the following expressions:

Activity comes to sight first as motion, but Aristotle's central thought is that all being is being-at work, and that anything inert would cease to be. He describes the coexistence of substance and form with the following expressions: “We should say what, and what sort of thing, substance is, taking another starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause, let us attack it from this standpoint. The ‘why’ is always sought in this form—‘why does one thing attach to another?’ For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire—as we have said—why the man is musical, or it is something else. Now ‘why a thing is itself’ is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident (e.g. that the moon is eclipsed), but the fact that a thing is itself is the single formula and the single cause to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musical, unless one were to say that each thing is inseparable from itself; and its being one just meant this. This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question. But we can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature. Here, then, we are evidently not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something; that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing. E.g. why does it thunder?—why is sound produced in the clouds? Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. And why are certain things, i.e. stones and bricks, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is that for the sake of which, e.g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also” (Aristotle 1991).

Aristotle, the opposite of the sensible, that is, the subject, "what is?" He detached the reality relationship between the subject and sensible objects from the field of ideas, arguing that it is more appropriate to investigate its structure rather than researching it with the question. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle briefly describes matter as (i) something that is a certain being as a force, (ii) what is form and form (iii) a composite entity consisting of matter and form. Being subject to matter and form is also subject to formation and decay. In this state, the substance also has quantitative changes (Aristotle 1991).

Aristotle distinguished between quantity and quality; If the quantity is countable, it means the multiplicity; if it is measurable, it means the size. In the scope of size, it expresses height, width, narrowness and depth. Aristotle also characterizes some things as quantity by their essence; For example, according to him, truth is essentially a quantity. The thinker, who deals with quantities in an accidental sense, for example, whiteness, states that what whiteness belongs to is a quantity. On the other hand, motion and time are also quantities. This is because what they are attributes of is constantly divisible. With this expression, Aristotle does not mean the thing that moves, but that space is divisible, "because motion is a quantity, it is because space is a quantity, and because time is a quantity, motion is a quantity. (Aristotle, 1991, 1058/p. 148) *We call a quality* (1) the differentia of the substance, e.g. man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-footed; and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without angles,—which shows that the differentia with reference to substance is a quality.—This, then, is one meaning of quality—differentia of substance, but (2) there is another sense in which it applies to the unmovable objects of mathematics; i.e. the numbers have a certain quality, e.g. the composite numbers which are not in one dimension only, but of which the plane and the solid are copies (these are those which have two or three factors); and in general that which exists in the substance of numbers besides quantity is quality; for the substance of each is what it is once, e.g. that of 6 is not what it is twice or thrice, but what it is once; for 6 is once 6 (Aristotle 1991).

Aristotle mentioned a clear definition of quantity and quality in his book *Categories*: "Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. (Aristotle 1984: p.10) When we think of an object or an art object, besides its material structure, we also perceive the quantitative and qualitative features of its form as sensory. This shows that the form of the object is also measurable. Aristotle states the following about measure and measurables: *Knowledge also, and perception, we call the measure of things, for the same reason, because we know something by them,—while as a matter of fact they are measured rather than measure*

other things. But it is with us as if some one else measured us and we came to know how big we are by seeing that he applied the cubit-measure a certain number of times to us. But Protagoras says man is the measure of all things, meaning really the man who knows or the man who perceives, and these because they have respectively knowledge and perception, which we say are the measures of objects. They are saying nothing, then, while appearing to be saying something remarkable. Evidently, then, being one in the strictest sense, if we define it according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and especially of quantity, and secondly of quality. And some things will be one if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if they are indivisible in quality; therefore that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or qua one (Aristotle 1991). Aristotle seems to express here that science and perception are measurable. Subjective differences and evaluations are left to the measurable and objective in Aristotle's teaching. When we reevaluate the evaluation of quantity and quality and the relationship of the measurable with the object through the aesthetic object, it may be possible to see the signs that objective, objective and generally accepted evaluations can be made for the art object apart from the subject's liking.

The objective properties and quantitative values of art objects in various forms can be regulated in proportion to these quantitative values in the application of works such as architecture, music, sculpture, painting, dance and in various environments that support these forms. The fact that these environments can be created according to art objects is the result of having a mathematical form. For example, the performance of a piece of music can vary depending on whether it is performed acoustically, outdoors or in any hall, as well as the choice of instrument and its environment. When we examine the medieval period, Vitruvius (90-20 BC), a Roman writer, architect and engineer, who adapted the formal form of art to architecture in the most efficient way, explained the quantitative characteristics of art in his book *On Architecture*. Vitruvius made a connection between the mathematics of music and the mathematics of space by establishing a relationship between the knowledge of harmony and space. In his work, he first dealt with the knowledge of harmony: “The intervals of tones and semitones of the tetrachord are a division introduced by nature in the case of the voice, and she has defined their limits by measures according to the magnitude of the intervals, and determined their characteristics in certain different ways. These natural laws are followed by the skilled workmen who fashion musical instruments, in bringing them to the perfection of their proper concords”(Vitruvius Pollio 1960).

Vitruvius defines various maqams and connects them with the theater and sound he will design: “In accordance with the foregoing investigations on mathematical principles, let bronze vessels be made, proportionate to the size of the theatre, and let them be so fashioned that, when touched, they may produce with one another the notes of the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the double octave. Then, having constructed niches in between the seats of the theatre, let the vessels be arranged in them, in accordance with musical laws, in such a way that they nowhere touch the wall, but have a clear space all round them and room over their tops. They should be set upside down, and be supported on the

side facing the stage by wedges not less than half a foot high. Opposite each niche, apertures should be left in the surface of the seat next below, two feet long and half a foot deep” (Vitruvius Pollio 1960).

Vitruvius established a relationship between bowls and maqams and aimed to preserve and increase the resonance feature of the voice audible. On the basis of this system, the sound that spreads out from the stage in waves as if coming out of a center, hits the inner parts of the bowls one by one, increasing its clarity and creating a sound that is in harmony with itself. This information written by Vitruvius seems to be an application of the arguments of the Pythagoreans. The relationship of mathematical expressions with the art object is the only feature of the subject's ability to define it. The form of the art object can also be the subject of liking. Although the quantitative characteristics of the object maintain its general validity in the relationship it establishes with the sensations of different objects, differences in taste may occur. Finally, Vitruvius also connects painting and architecture (wall paintings) with regard to enjoyment and form.

“Hence, as I saw that such beginnings on their part formed an introduction suited to the nature of my own purpose, I set out to draw from them, and to go somewhat further. In the first place Agatharcus, in Athens, when Aeschylus was bringing out a tragedy, painted a scene, and left a commentary about it. This led Democritus and Anaxagoras to write on the same subject, showing how, given a centre in a definite place, the lines should naturally correspond with due regard to the point of sight and the divergence of the visual rays, so that by this deception a faithful representation of the appearance of buildings might be given in painted scenery, and so that, though all is drawn on a vertical flat facade, some parts may seem to be withdrawing into the background, and others to be standing out in front”(Vitruvius Pollio 1960). Here he made determinations about the form of Vitruvius' art object. First of all, he established the relationship between space and dimension in painting; He dealt with the narrative of the work as content and finally established the relationship between the desirability of the work and its value. The drawing of the picture on wide walls in terms of form also supports its narrative as content. This is an official expression of that work. As can be seen, the formal structure of the work is also related to its desirability, that is, its value. In Vitruvius' statements, form contained these relations together.

Until this stage, a different aspect of the subject's cognition conditions towards an object has been shown in form analysis. These conditions of knowing clearly involve the distinction between qualitative and quantitative. The object knowledge that the subject obtains through his senses and perceptions is clearly subject to distinction. The distinction between the objective and the subjective began to become clear. Another approach to this distinction belongs to Descartes. He explained the subject in detail in the twelfth rule of his book, Rules for the Direction of the Mind. According to him, subjective and objective conditions are different from each other in knowing.

In ourselves we notice that while it is the understanding alone which is capable of knowing, it yet is either helped or hindered by three other faculties, namely imagination,

sense and memory. We must therefore examine these faculties in order, with a view to finding out where each may prove to be an impediment, so that we may be on our guard; or where it may profit us, so that we may use to the full the resources of these powers” (and L. J. L. Descartes, René 1961).

The philosopher wants the subject to first obtain a distinct perception of the object with the help of cognitive processes. As we will remember the discourses of the subject regarding the subject's interpretation of the object in the face of the object, we see that in Plato's Theaitetus dialogue, we see that the definitions given by Descartes regarding the situations and illusions where the possibility of perception is not possible, are given by Descartes. “In the matter of cognition of facts two things alone have to be considered, ourselves who know and the objects themselves which are to be known. There are in the knowing subject four faculties: sense, imagination, memory and intellect, of which only the last can perceive truth, the other three playing subsidiary parts. What in us knows is purely spiritual, not a bodily function nor conditioned by the body. This power may cooperate with and apply itself to sense, imagination and memory : it may attend to them; but the activity of knowing is attributed to a single spiritual power only the *vis cognoscens*, by which in the true sense, (*proprie*) we know. When its activity is pure, then we are said *intellegere*, and the faculty concerned is intelligence. It is in consequence of this purely spiritual power alone that there is any knowledge (properly so-called) in human experience” (and L. J. L. Descartes, René 1961). After establishing the connection between the mind and the object, Descartes examines the knowledge of the quantitative and qualitative properties of the object. For example, whatever assumptions you make about what color is, you cannot deny that it is extended and therefore metaphorical. The philosopher does not agree with its space, although he entrusts the outcome of the subject's prediction with a color quality: “ We assert that relatively to our knowledge single things should be taken in an order different from that in which we should regard them when considered in their more real nature. Thus, for example, if we consider a body as having extension and figure, we shall indeed admit that from the point of view of the thing itself it is one and simple. For we cannot from that point of view regard it as compounded of corporeal nature, extension and figure, since these elements have never existed in isolation from each other. But relatively to our understanding we call it a compound constructed out of these three natures, because we have thought of them separately before we were able to judge that all three were found in one and the same subject. Hence here we shall treat of things only in relation to our understanding's awareness of them, and shall call those only simple, the cognition of which is so clear and so distinct that they cannot be analyzed by the mind into others more distinctly known. Such are figure, extension, motion, etc.; all others we conceive to be in some way compounded out of these. This principle must be taken so universally as not even to leave out those objects which we sometimes obtain by abstraction from the simple natures themselves” (and L. J. L. Descartes, René 1961).

Descartes defined what separate knowledge is and made measurability the separate determination of the object. On the other hand, the relationship of form knowledge with space and the subject's association of form with space are also effective in the evaluation of the object. When we look at the history of art philosophy, the artists of the formalism movement in the history of art in the 20th century avoided painting and created their canvases with non-representative shapes and color clusters. Their aim was not to capture perceptual views of the world but to highlight images through visual arrangement, form and expressive design. Regarding the beginning of formalism, we can think of it as an effort to reveal the objective aspect of interpretation that will reveal the art object, as opposed to the sharp and non-subjective aspect that the interpretation will bring to the fore, by bringing another understanding besides the works of art trying to describe the truth.

3.3 Analyze of conscious and unconscious in aesthetic experience

Investigating the functions and roles of the conscious and unconscious in aesthetic taste seems necessary in terms of investigating the determination of taste in the aesthetic subject. Apart from the conscious states of the subject, the states that affect the conscious but are not aware of are generally expressed as unconscious. First of all, the functioning of the consciousness, which is still the subject of research, and, accordingly, how the unconscious is formed should be examined. Philosophy activity, which has been the product of the mental life of the subject since the beginning of the history of thought, has again analyzed what consciousness is from his own eyes, and has also made his own behavior a subject of examination in the context of his relations with others. As psychology and medical science develop autonomous research in their respective fields, many researchers have benefited from and are still injured in the discussions of philosophy on consciousness and its contents. Consciousness of a person directs his body as well as his self. Decisions of the individual, acting in line with these decisions are a product of his holistic content of consciousness. In this case, it should be investigated how effective the consciousness and the unconscious that affects it are when evaluating an art object within the scope of aesthetic taste. The effects of conscious contents and experiences on the actions of the subject, how the unconscious processes occur, and its relation to perception in general, as well as its effect on consciousness and aesthetic taste, are subjects that need to be investigated. "A designation applied to conscious mind as opposed to a supposedly unconscious or subconscious mind (See Subconscious Mind; Unconscious Mind), and to the whole domain of the physical and non-mental. Consciousness is generally considered an indefinable term or rather a term definable only by direct introspective appeal to conscious experiences. The indefinability of consciousness is expressed by Sir William Hamilton. "Consciousness cannot be defined' we may be ourselves fully aware what consciousness is, but we cannot without confusion convey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge." (Runes 1964: p.64)

Plato was by no means a victim of the crude psychology of the old Cosmological Schools, in which the soul was reduced to air, fire, or atoms: he was neither a materialist nor an epiphenomenalist, but an uncompromising spiritist. The soul is clearly different from the body; it is man's most precious possession, and the true disposition of the soul should be his chief concern. The reality of the soul and its supremacy over the body finds its emphatic expression in Plato's psychological dualism, which corresponds to his metaphysical dualism. Again in these periods, various determinations were made about the soul and it was reduced to the substances present in nature. Spirit was based on substances such as fire, air, atoms. Plato argued with a new perspective to psychology with his thoughts, thus examining consciousness through social life. "Plato defines the soul as "self-initiated, motion" or "source of motion". This being so, the soul is prior to the body in the sense that it is superior to the body." "If Soul is the sum-total of existence, all that exists independently of finite soul is the universal soul. Therefore, so far as the object exists outside the subject, that object is the universal soul itself: that is, as said above, our sense-perceptions are perceptions of the universal under the condition of space" (Plato 1977).

Socrates explains how, under the stimulation of sensible knowledge, the soul manages to reappear equally within itself the memory of universal concepts. The relationship established in this section between perception and rational activity is remarkable. A reality must be collected by the senses so that it can then be thought and brought into the mental, intelligible and innate picture only, which takes the form of a memory in the embodied soul. The idea that the soul can use the senses to "back home" seems to presuppose the idea that there can be a viable epistemological dimension cooperative in mind and body. "Perception is not the whole of knowledge, for a great part of what is generally recognised to be knowledge consists of truths involving terms which are not objects of perception at all. There is much we know about sensible objects, which is known by intellectual reflection and not immediately by perception." (Copleston 1946: p.139)

In the ancient period, the idea of the immortality of the soul in terms of the inability to fully explain the structure of consciousness and the value of human life brought the idea that the soul is also a member of consciousness. "The terms in question are not the same in Plato and modern debate: mind indicates a narrower domain than psyche, to which belong not only intellective, cognitive, emotive and perceptive processes but, more generally, the vital processes; the psyche also being a principle of life(Carone 2005)

The idea that the soul once again finds contact with like realities through perceptive stimuli recalls the segment in the Phaedrus in which Socrates describes the extraordinary effect of the meeting between the most acute of the senses, sight, and the Form of beauty, the only Form to have the privilege of being visible. (Plato Phaedrus 250c) In Phædrus attention is turned to the perceptual process of seeing and visual beauty, but the idea in Timaeus that the rational soul comes into contact with the acoustic stimulus of music with an ideal structure matches the process applied to the perspective described in Phaedrus.

These explanations broadened the framework for our study of music on the soul that we needed to analyze. Understanding the effect of music on the soul points to the profound function of how it represents a process that is not physically visible to our eyes in physical terms. The following passage provides spectacles that we should consider reasons for Plato to mentioned the educational process as a material modification rather than an intellectual mechanism. Plato asserts an essential distinction between soul and body, he does not deny the influence that may be exercised on the soul by or through the body. In the Republic he describes physical training among the constituents of true education, and he rejects certain types of music because of the deleterious effect they have on the soul. In the Timaeus, again, he admits the evil influence that can be wrought by bad physical education and by bodily habits of vice, which may even bring about an irremediable state in which the soul is enslaved, (Timaeus, 86b) and in the Laws he stresses the influence of heredity. (Laws, 773 b) “and in all similar craftsmanship— weaving is full of them and embroidery and architecture and likewise the manufacture of household furnishings and thereto the natural bodies of animals and plants as well. For in all these there is grace or gracelessness. And gracelessness and evil rhythm and disharmony are akin to evil speaking and the evil temper but the opposites are the symbols and the kin of the opposites, the sober and good disposition.” “Entirely so,” he said. (Plato Laws 401a, 401b)

Within the framework of these determinations, it may be possible to discuss about the development and structural tendencies of the cognitive structure. Considering that the perception of various arts is different from each other, the structure of consciousness can also be shaped according to these arts. On the contrary, the perception of objects by a person engaged in reverse engineering may differ from the perception of a person dealing with social sciences. The doctrine of the triple nature of the soul, a doctrine said to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans, in the Republic studies; The doctrine is repeated in the Timaeus, so it would be wrong to assume that Plato abandoned these doctrines. As a matter of fact, Plato's tripartite theory of soul is a theory of psyche proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in his treatise the Republic, and also with the chariot allegory in Phaedrus. In Republic, Plato asserted that the ψυχή (psyche) is composed of three parts; the λογιστικόν (logistikon, logical), the θυμοειδές (thymoeides, spirited) and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (epithymetikon, appetitive). These three parts of the ψυχή also correspond to the three classes of a society. (Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic 2009) Whether in a city or an individual, δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosyne, justice) is declared to be the state of the whole in which each part fulfills its function without attempting to interfere in the functions of others. (Plato Republic IV 433a) The function of the ἐπιθυμητικόν is to produce and seek pleasure. The function of the λογιστικός is to gently rule through the love of learning. The function of the θυμοειδές is to obey the directions of the λογιστικός while ferociously defending the whole from external invasion and internal disorder. Whether in a city or an individual, ἀδικία (adikia, injustice) is the contrary state of the whole, often taking the specific form in which the spirited listens

instead to the appetitive, while they together either ignore the logical entirely or employ it in their pursuits of pleasure.

Reason (λογιστικόν); The logical or logistikon (from logos) is the thinking part of the soul which loves the truth and seeks to learn it. Plato originally identifies the soul dominated by this part with the Athenian temperament. (Republic IV 435 e8–9) The logistikon discerns what is the real and not merely apparent, judges what is true and what is false and wisely makes just decisions in accordance with its love for goodness. Plato makes the point that the logistikon would be the smallest part of the soul (as the rulers would be the smallest population within the Republic), but that, nevertheless, a soul can be declared just only if all three parts agree that the logistikon should rule. (Republic IV 442)

Spirit (θυμοειδής); According to Plato, the spirited or thymoeides (from thymos) is the part of the soul by which we are angry or get into a temper. (Republic IV 439 e3–4) He also calls this part 'high spirit' and initially identifies the soul dominated by this part with the Thracians, Scythians and the people of 'northern regions.' (Republic IV 435 e4–8) In the just soul, the spirited aligns with the logistikon and resists the desires of the appetitive, becoming manifested as 'indignation' and in general the courage to be good. In the unjust soul, the spirited ignores the logistikon and aligns with the desires of the appetitive, manifesting as the demand for the pleasures of the body.

Appetite (ἐπιθυμητικόν); The appetite or epithymetikon (from epithymia, translated to Latin as concupiscentiae or desideria) (Dixon, T. 2003, p.39) is the part of the soul by which we experience carnal erotic love, hunger, thirst and in general the desires opposed to the logistikon. (Republic 439 d5–7) (The appetitive is in fact labelled as being 'alogical'. (Republic 439 d7) Plato also identifies this part of the soul with the pleasure involved in human reproduction. He further relates this part to the love of money-making, which he mentions as being the particular mark of the Phoenicians and Egyptians. (Republic 436 a1–3)

When we return to the definitions of consciousness, the consciousness of analysts; His thinking as the sum of a structure consisting of perception, inclination and desire seems to be compatible with Plato's words about the parts of the soul. Plato, the soul has a triple structure consisting of thinking, affect and physical needs; In other words, he claims that the source of these three separate forms of action/function or movements in the three types of activity is the soul. The immortal part of the soul is only the logos or nous (intellectual, rational, knowing) part. Thus, when we consider the concept of consciousness again, it is certain that we are faced with a complex structure. "Consciousness is a phenomenon that is tried to be defined through our subjective experience. The flow of subjective experiences creates our conscious life as we know it (Revonsuo 2009).

In this respect, current research on consciousness is in collaboration with the analyzes of previous philosophical discussions on consciousness. Especially in philosophical discussions, the mind-body problem, the interaction of physical and

psychological phenomena are sources for discussions on consciousness. On the other hand, aesthetics, within the scope of philosophy of art, has been a suitable field for the study of the subject-object relationship consciousness. In the most general sense, we started the mind research of philosophy with Antiquity, not with Descartes in modern philosophy. Presenting the mind in a systematic way, Plato and his pioneering works point out the necessity of the analysis structure of the subject. The reference analyzes reveal that the beginnings and origins of the two main approaches in philosophy, namely dualism (dualism) and materialism/materialism (materialism) approaches, can actually be advanced by forming the basis of Ancient thought.

Knowledge of the soul, of course, greatly contributes to the advancement of truth in general, and above all to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in a sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand its essence first and then its features; While some of these are taught to be the emotions peculiar to the soul, some of them are thought to be connected to the animal due to the existence of the soul. (Aristotle, *De Anima* 1957)

Before Aristotle, Plato developed a theory of the soul by seeking answers to a series of interconnected questions such as the nature of the soul, its parts or functions, the relations between the soul and the body, and finally the fate of the soul. The question we must analyze first is whether 'mind' and 'soul' are synonymous, two words for the same thing, or whether minds and souls are really quite different. Although we use the words 'mind' and 'soul' more or less interchangeably in our times, what the Greeks mean by 'soul' is probably not what we mean by 'mind'.

His basic view of the soul is that the soul is a spiritual substance, a principle completely different from matter, which is the principle of the body; being with the substance or the body is contrary to its nature and should therefore be perceived as a fall; that the body is a hindrance rather than a necessary tool for the soul's natural activities; Since the body belongs to an order of existence completely different from the body, it is impossible for it to disappear with the disappearance of the body, that is, it is immortal and accordingly there is a destiny awaiting it in the future, and finally, since the body and the soul are completely different things, it is not possible to interact between them.

This understanding of Aristotle seems to have opened the door for the scientific research of the mind in *De Anima*. According to this; The soul, together with the body, is subject to research. He started to approach the concepts of soul, mind, consciousness. Aristotle makes the following determinations about the mind:

“There are two different characteristics by which the soul is principally defined; firstly, motion from place to place and, secondly, thinking and judging and perceiving. Both thought and intelligence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the soul in both of these judges and recognizes something existent. The ancients at any identify intelligence and perception: thus, in the words of Empedocles :” Wisdom of old for mankind is increased according to that which is present to them”: and again “Whence they have also continually a shifting succession of thoughts.” Homer's meaning, too, is the

same when he says: Such is the mind of men." In fact, all of them conceive thought to be corporeal like sensation and hold that we understand, as well as perceive, like by like as we explained at the outset of the discussion. They ought, however, at the same time to have discussed error, a state which is peculiarly characteristic of animal life and in which the soul continues the greater part of its time. It follows from their premises that either all presentations of the senses must be true, as some affirm, or contact with what is unlike must constitute error; this being the converse of the position that like is known by like. But, as the knowledge of contraries is one and the same, so, too, it would seem, is error with respect to contraries one and the same" (Aristotle, *De Anima* 1957).

Aristotle's important determination here is to reveal the difference between sensation and intelligence, that is, between two phenomena in the formation process of consciousness. Perception alone is not sufficient except as a cognitive process. In this case, interpretation and judgment processes in the content of cognitive processes seem to be different components of consciousness.

When we move forward with Descartes, who accepts the soul and the body as two separate substances, and when we re-examine Descartes' interaction between perception and physical objects in our determinations on aesthetic taste and perception, we encounter that physical objects activate the cognitive process. Descartes states the following about perceptions of objects in his study of Emotions or Moods: "Here it must be noted that no direct experience can ever deceive the understanding if it restrict its attention accurately to the object presented to it, just as it is given to it either at firsthand or by means of an image; and if it moreover refrain from judging that the imagination faithfully reports the objects of the senses, or that the senses take on the true/ forms of things, or in fine that external things always are as they appear to be ; for in all these judgments we are exposed to error.)" (and N. K. S. Descartes, René 1911).

In this analysis, with a similar method, this issue is brought to a more agreeable point, Gustav Fechner (1801–1887), "a scientist who played a decisive role in the early scientific study of consciousness was by his philosophical approach a panpsychist. In his view, the world is composed of a hierarchy of minds or souls." As Descartes defined, the beginning of the cognitive process with the effect of objects is now measurable (Revonsuo 2009).

Fechner was particularly interested in the intensity of stimulation and its relation to subsequent subjective sensations. Intensity is a feature that characterizes the physical stimulus: A tone can be physically louder (i.e. the signal has more physical energy) than another one and a weight physically heavier than another. The physical intensity can be exactly and objectively measured. Also the subjective experience generated by the stimulus varies along the dimension of intensity: Sounds are heard as louder or weaker and weights feel heavier or lighter (Revonsuo 2009).

In line with these statements, when we evaluate our subject on aesthetics and consciousness, it seems possible to say that the art object that stimulates the consciousness of the subject in front of an object is shaped in the face of its physical structure. As Fencher

states, the severity of the physical qualities and quantities of the object can change the cognitive state of the subject during his experience with the object.

Fechner “set out to study the relationship between the objective physical measure of intensity and the subjective phenomenal feel of intensity. He made several groundbreaking scientific observations. He realized that at very low physical stimulus intensities no subjective experience whatsoever was created in the mind. These he called negative sensations. At some point, when the physical stimulus is made stronger, it becomes just barely noticeable by the subject. This dimension, which he briefly described, was a logarithmic function of the intensity of the subjective experience physical stimulus” (Revonsuo 2009).

Afterwards, many consciousness theories such as structuralism, holistic theory, behaviorism were put forward and became the schools of psychology. However, it can be concluded that the data obtained by Fencher make the subject-object and consciousness relationship concrete.

Discussing the concept of beautiful since the discussions of ancient philosophy, especially examining whether taste is subjective or objective in philosophy of art, is aimed at investigating the objectivity of the concept of beautiful. The cognitive research of the concept of beauty also brings along a perception problem, and this problem seems to be related to the structure of consciousness and the contents of consciousness. Today, there are various studies on neuroscience and consciousness. This field is divided into sub-branches and conducts various researches in the field of neuroaesthetics. The subjective side of aesthetics is a problem worth investigating in the philosophical field, but it is also the problem of neuroaesthetics. He makes use of Fencher and others working in this direction in measuring the aesthetic activity of neuroaesthetic consciousness. The difficulties of empirical research and epistemological research in terms of neuroaesthetics are expressed by Roney as follows:

It is well known that neuroaesthetics still owes a great deal to the Experimental Psychophysics of Gustav Fencher, a 19th-century German psychologist who proposed an 'from below (an empirical) aesthetic'. According to Fencher, “If we characterize thinking, wanting, the finer aesthetic feelings as higher spiritual, sensual sensations and impulses as lower ones, then at any rate here the question of the hereafter we leave quite openly the higher mental activities just as little can take place as the lower, without to carry out physical activities or to be bound to psychophysical activities. No one can think with a frozen brains. Nor is there any doubt that a certain sensation of the face, hearing-sensation, can only take place according to certain activities of our nervous system; this, too, is not doubted; indeed, the concept of the sensual side of the soul is based on the fact that it stands and goes in exact conjunction with corporeality” (Fechner 1948).

Measurements of consciousness within the scope of neuroscience are about the subject. On the other hand, an aesthetic object is not just an object, but is seen by the artist as a fixed state of a conscious structure. In this case, the subject is not only alone with his own consciousness, but also interacts with another consciousness fixed on the object by

the artist, ontologically in the first person state. On the other hand, the general validity of some qualitative and quantitative features that we have distinguished over the aesthetic object throughout the thesis are those that can open the door to empirical experimentation as measurable. The interaction of the subjective consciousness with another consciousness (art object) can be considered as a dialectical process belonging to the subjective field.

It is our minds rather than things that deform, in other words, transform things. What empirical measurements do not take into account is that the consciousness of the subject is also culturally shaped differently. In this case, the emotions and thinking styles of consciousnesses coming from different cultures and whose cognitive processes are shaped differently may not be the same.

On the other hand, the pure features of the object, independent of beliefs and opinions, are in itself. In this case, the consciousness fixed by the artist on the object (the artist's own consciousness, all cognitive processes while creating the object, its contents such as perception and judgment) can be objectified with its quantitative and qualitative features. The dialectical processes of another subject's consciousness towards the object can transform that object.

Phenomenology has brought various explanations of consciousness structures. In this context, the following statements of Hegel on reality and subjective consciousness are remarkable.

“The vanity of everything factual, moral, and of intrinsic worth, the nullity of everything objective and absolutely valid. If the ego remains at this standpoint, everything appears to it as null and vain, except its own subjectivity which therefore becomes hollow and empty and itself mere vanity. But, on the other hand, the ego may, contrariwise, fail to find satisfaction in this self-enjoyment and instead become inadequate to itself, so that it now feels a craving for the solid and the substantial, for specific and essential interests. Out of this comes misfortune, and the contradiction that, on the one hand, the subject does want to penetrate into truth and longs for objectivity, but, on the other hand, cannot renounce his isolation and withdrawal into himself or tear himself free from this unsatisfied abstract inwardness. The dissatisfaction of this quiescence and impotence—which may not do or touch anything for fear of losing its inner harmony and which, even if pure in itself, is still unreal and empty despite its desire for reality and what is absolute—is the source of yearning and a morbid beautiful soul. For a truly beautiful soul acts and is actual. That longing, however, is only the empty vain subject's sense of nullity, and he lacks the strength to escape from this vanity and fill himself with a content of substance” (Hegel 1975).

This determination made by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that consciousness constitutes its own reality rather than the thing. Well, the consciousness in front of it will again form the knowledge of its own self as a result of the dialectical process. “In giving expression to this moment of its' self-conscious downfall as the result of its experience, it reveals itself to be this inner perversion of itself, to be a deranged consciousness which finds that its essential being is immediately non essential, its reality

immediately an unreality. The derangement cannot be taken to mean that in general something devoid of essence is regarded as essential, something unreal as real, so that what for one person is essential or real would not be so for another, and that the consciousness of reality and unreality, or of essentiality and unessentiality, would thus fall apart.” This determination made by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that consciousness constitutes its own reality rather than the thing. Well, the consciousness in front of it will again form the knowledge of its own self as a result of the dialectical process. This determination made by the thinker on consciousness seems to be important in terms of the activity of consciousness in the field of aesthetic taste and the possibility of aesthetic science. Consciousness is the source of distinguishing processes specific to consciousness such as illusions of perception and the unconscious (Hegel. G. W. F. 1979).

In addition to the conscious activity of an aesthetic object such as being sensed, perceived and analyzed by the subject, other factors affecting perception and meaning in this conscious activity process have also been investigated. Particularly, the unconscious discussions that started to become evident in the 19th and 20th centuries brought a new dimension to perception. The aesthetic debates in the early periods considered perception as a conscious activity. However, the effect of the unconscious of the human mind, which is still in the dark and studies on this subject, on perception and analysis should be investigated. “Wundt’s views are about focal selective attention and the process of binding elementary perceptual features to coherent perceptual objects cognitive processes that seem to be not so far from Wundt’s idea of apperception. Wundt furthermore held a rather holistic idea of consciousness, believing that the simple elements of consciousness are synthesized into holistic units by attention. The most important follower of Wundt, Edward Titchener (1867–1927), held a more atomistic view of consciousness” (Revonsuo 2009).

On the other hand, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) brings a new discussion to the field of psychology. To quote Revonsuo, Freud contributes to the depsychologization of consciousness: “Freud turned out to contribute greatly to the dismissal of consciousness from psychology. His influential theory of the mind gave consciousness only a minor role, and he openly opposed the introspectionists’ idea that the mind is to be equated with the conscious mind and the Wundtian idea that the notion of “unconscious mental life” involves a contradiction in terms. Instead, Freud was convinced that the explanation of abnormal mental states or psychopathology could never be done in terms of the purely conscious mind” (Revonsuo 2009).

Starting from the explanation of abnormal mental states, Freud did not define the concept of the unconscious only in terms of individuals with pathological disorders. Starting out from Aristotle in a striking way, Freud discussed about the psychopathological personalities in the scene:

“If, as has been assumed since the time of Aristotle, the purpose of drama is to arouse 'terror and pity' and so 'to purge the emotions', we can describe that purpose in rather more detail by saying that it is a question of opening up sources of pleasure or

enjoyment in our emotional life, just as, in the case of intellectual activity, joking or fun open up similar sources, many of which that activity had made inaccessible. In this connection the prime factor is unquestionably the process of getting rid of one's own emotions by 'blowing off steam'"(Freud 1997).

Freud, using Aristotle's concept of Catharsis under the title of Psychopathic Personalities on the Stage, defined the concept of unconscious through these personalities, as Revonsuo stated, and established its relationship with art. Aristotle uses the following expressions when describing Tragedy in Poetics: "Concerning Tragedy and imitation by means of action this may suffice. As to that poetic imitation which is narrative in form and employs a single meter, the plot manifestly ought, as in a tragedy, to be constructed on dramatic principles" (Aristotle, W. D. ; Ross 1908). This determination of Aristotle seems to be the basis of the unconscious concept discussed by Freud in the 19th and 20th centuries. When we make an evaluation on tragedy and other art branches, artistic contents can activate various emotions of art audiences. The contextual structure of the art object can be shaped by the subject according to its unconscious contents. By contrast, Freud proposed that "the unconscious mental life is the most important and the original form in which the mind exists – consciousness is pure icing on the cake" (Revonsuo 2009). Drawing attention to a concept that means only the opposite of unconscious with the term unconscious, Freud defined it with two level structure. This concept, which he has just identified in the analysis of psychopathological formations; The unconscious, and therefore everything psychic, emerges as a function of two separate systems, and as such occurs even in normal psychic life.

Consequently, he claims that there are two types of unconsciousness that have not yet been distinguished by psychologists:

"The fact that in order to attain consciousness the excitations must pass through an unalterable series, a succession of instances, as is betrayed by the changes produced in them by the censorship, has enabled us to describe them by analogy in spatial terms. We described the relations of the two systems to each other and to consciousness by saying that the system Pcs. is like a screen between the system unconscious. and consciousness. The system Preconscious. not only bars access to consciousness, but also controls the access to voluntary motility, and has control of the emission of a mobile cathectic energy, a portion of which is familiar to us as attention" (Freud 1913).

In this case, it served as a blind spot in the connection between Freud's preconscious unconscious and consciousness in the dual structure of the unconscious. However, when we try to evaluate the unconscious as a structure independent of consciousness, we may face the situation of losing the conscious structure that can create the contents of the unconscious. In order for the unconscious to emerge, it seems necessary for a conscious structure to register it. In this case, it may be possible to talk about the interactionist structure of the conscious and unconscious.

Freud discovered the personal unconscious and developed the psychoanalytic method to treat neurotic disorders; Jung discovered the collective unconscious. This is not

to say that neither Freud nor Jung was the first to grasp the existence of the unconscious, but they were undoubtedly the first western scientists to discover the value of the unconscious in terms of understanding and valuing it. Freud clings to the concept of the unconscious as a pathological or infantile activity of the mind, derived from his clinical observation. Jung's understanding separates the personal from the collective unconscious; and the key to this discovery is the discovery of the boundless landscape of the racial mind, and the impersonal content of unconscious events is key to this discovery and can never be understood when read with the key of a particular pathological point of view. In fact, he was in a position to explore the realm of the unconscious in all its horror, immensity, and splendour, only by detaching his mind from the particularly morbid concept of the unconscious that had prevailed hitherto. This does not mean that neither Freud nor Jung were the first to grasp the existence of the unconscious, but they were undoubtedly the first western scientists to discover the value of the unconscious in terms of understanding and valuing it. Freud clings to the concept of the unconscious as a pathological or infantile activity of the mind, derived from his clinical observation. Jung's understanding separates the personal from the collective unconscious, and exploration of the boundless landscape of the racial mind and the super-personal content of the world. In this context, Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) supports that conscious and unconscious can have an interactionist structure with the following statements: "All the illusory projections on the world and objects gradually return to the person as tiredness and weariness. The energy returned to him from these relationships falls into his unconscious and activates everything he has neglected to develop until now. "The process of coming to terms with the unconscious is a true labour, a work which involves both action and suffering. It has been named the "transcendent function"¹ because it represents a function based on real and "imaginary," or rational and irrational, data, thus bridging the yawning gulf between conscious and unconscious. It is a natural process, a manifestation of the energy that springs from the tension of opposites, and it consists in a series of fantasy-occurrences which appear spontaneously in dreams and visions' (Jung 2014).

It is still questioned how unconscious data are formed in 20th century psychology and 21 century neuroscience studies. The arguments about the unconscious showing itself in actions by separating from consciousness but being a blind spot whose source cannot be known, reminds us of the concept of Tabula Rasa in which Locke expressed his discourses on consciousness. At the beginning of the new age, the problem of perception arises when our world of experience is divided into 'inner' and 'external' in terms of the treatment of the 'real object'. Because, since Locke, the world of sensation and the world of reflection have been closed to each other with definite borders, and the 'external world' has begun to be seen as the root and condition of experience rather than being the product of it. "The simple ideas that ' come in by sensation, or reflection, and their being the foundation of ' our knowledge,' but that our notions things come in, either from our Senses or the exercise of our minds." Locke P.11 "One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds ; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience,

and the observation of things, that come in their way, furnish them with : which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not original characters stamped on the mind” p.55 Locke argued that ideas in the mind include cognitive processes such as experience. Again, if the thinker, who assigns a very important function to reason, is nothing but the ability to infer unknown truths from known principles or propositions, how come these people question the necessity of using reason to discover principles that are assumed to be innate. Although this questioning is about whether innate principles can be known or not, we can say that it is similar to the theory of the unconscious in that the condition for the emergence of these principles is unconscious. In this state, we can talk about the force of the unconscious to push the data of the unconscious. As Jung mentioned above, the energy value of the contents of consciousness seems to push them to the conscious level instead of losing them this time. “In the symptomatology of such states there are innumerable cases of this kind, where with the best will in the world one can only say that these people perceive, think, feel, remember, decide, and act unconsciously, doing unconsciously what others do consciously. These processes occur regardless of whether consciousness registers them or not. We can distinguish the personal unconscious, which includes everything that is achieved in personal life, everything that is forgotten, repressed, perceived, thought, felt, below the threshold of conscious perception.” (Jung 2014). In this case, it seems possible to trace how the personal unconscious life is formed. When we think of conscious experiences, it would be wrong to say that every perceived data is kept on the surface of consciousness without experiencing any forgetting process. We know that the forgetting phenomenon expressed by Jung is the cause of the unconscious elements. “By those denominations, I mean some object in the mind, and consequently determined, such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign or that very same object of the mind, or determinate idea.” (Locke: P.67) Accordingly, we can analyze how it creates subliminal data. In particular, the sensations and perceptions of different subjects against objects can be forgotten by recording many differentiating signification activities in the process of making sense of that object. The dialectical process that the subject experiences in order to make sense of the object may also lead to the formation of different judgments about the object.

“By determinate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say, should be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it

the sign of The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses" Locke P.69.

The subject's relationship with the one standing in front of him (object) seems to depend on his sense, perception and interpretation process. When we identify the object in front of us as an epistemological process governed by cognition, it may be useful to take a closer look at the activity of the conscious mind in this process in terms of reevaluating the concept of the unconscious. Especially in his work called Phenomenology of Spirit, Friedrich Hegel, who dealt with the subject of consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason in detail, closely examined the cognitive process of the subject with the object. "This contradiction and its removal will become more definite if we can mind the abstract determinations of truth and knowledge as they occur in consciousness. Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of the being of something for a consciousness, is knowing" (Hegel. G. W. F. 1979.) Accordingly, the activity of consciousness is the source of knowledge formation, and the existence of something turns into information for consciousness. After conscious determination, the thinker determines the object more closely and expresses the following: "Since our object is phenomenal knowledge, its determinations too will at first be taken directly as they present themselves; and they do present themselves very much as we have already apprehended them. Knowledge is our object, something that exists or us; and the in-itself that would supposedly result from it would rather be the being of knowledge or us. What we asserted to be its essence would be not so much its truth but rather just our knowledge of it. The essence or criterion would lie within ourselves, and that which was to be compared with it and about which a decision would be reached through this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize the validity of such a standard" (Hegel. G. W. F. 1979).

While the object manifests itself as many featured things, it will be sensed by the subject and mediated through perception. In this process, the direct object will be tried to be interpreted in the dialectical process with the mediation of the subject. However, at this stage, if we examine the cognitive process that the subject quickly performs by slowing down, we can conclude that the relation between the determinations and evaluations of the object and memory is important. the mind does not relate to the outside world only on the ground of theoretical objectification. The mind also grasps and understands the world as a whole of meaning of which it is an organic part.

Perception, like language, is an unconscious mental process. Just as the grammar of the language is unconsciously internalized, perception is a stage away from consciousness. Perception Grammar refers to the analysis of the perceptual sensory stage, in which the activity of perception is a mental act, not a conscious one. For example, in pure vision the object is perceived as the same object each time; While this perception of sameness is mentally possible, it is not yet a conscious act. Things are given to us as sense objects that exist outside of us; however, we do not know what they are by themselves,

we know only their appearance, that is, the designs that act upon us by stimulating our senses. The organism in question is the organism in which consciousness occurs; the object in question is any object recognized in the process of consciousness; and the relations between the organism and the object are the contents of the knowledge we call consciousness. From this perspective, consciousness consists in constructing knowledge about two facts: that the organism is in relation to an object and that the object in the relation causes a change in the organism. "The general problem of representing the object is not especially enigmatic. Extensive studies of perception, learning and memory, and language have given us a workable idea of how the brain processes an object, in sensory and motor terms, and an idea of how knowledge about an object can be stored in memory, categorized in conceptual or linguistic terms, and retrieved in recall or recognition modes. The neurophysiologic details of these processes have not been worked out, but the contours of these problems are understandable. From my perspective, neuroscience has been dedicating most of its efforts to understanding the neural basis of what I see as the "object proxy." In the relationship play of consciousness, the object is exhibited in the form of neural patterns in the sensory cortices appropriate to map its characteristics. For example, in the case of the visual aspects of an object, the neural patterns are constructed in a variety of regions of the visual cortices, not just one or two, but many, working in concerted fashion to map the varied aspects of the object in visual terms"(A. R. Damasio 1999).

In the stage of knowledge transfer from object to subject and from subject to object, the subject's perception and meaning differences may enter into an effort to identify with the object itself. Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience [Erfahrung]: "In this connection there is a moment in the process just mentioned which must be brought out more clearly, for through it a new light will be thrown on the exposition which follows. Consciousness knows something; this object is the essence or the in-itself; but it is also for consciousness the in-itself. This is where the ambiguity of this truth enters. We see that consciousness now has two objects: one is the first in-itself, the second is the being for consciousness of this in itself. The latter appears at first sight to be merely the reflection of consciousness into itself, i.e. what consciousness has in mind is not an object, but only its knowledge of that first object. But, as was shown previously, the first object, in being known, is altered for consciousness; it ceases to be the in itself and becomes something that is the in· itself only for consciousness. And this then is the True: the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. Or, in other words, this is the essence, or the object of consciousness. This new object contains the nothingness of the first, it is what experience has made of it" (Hegel. G. W. F. 1979).

Within the framework of this discourse, testing the consciousness by turning to itself in the stage of perceiving and interpreting the object may show that not only perceiving the object as it is and sending it to the memory, but also the person being

interpreted and evaluated is objective. images of the object can be saved in the memory during the testing phase. Another striking determination of Hegel on perception is; Consciousness itself can change reality with additions and subtractions against the object, and this determination can be the source of subconscious data. The evaluations made by the subject through the senses against the object can take place in the memory, as opposed to being erased and destroyed. Aristotle explained in detail that memory is only an ability to think indirectly, and that it is actually an ability of central perception power: “As regards the question, therefore, what memory or remembering is, it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation, related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function, (it has been shown) that it is a function of the primary faculty of sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time. All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember. As regards the question, therefore, what memory or remembering is, it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation, related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function, (it has been shown) that it is a function of the primary faculty of sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time. Again, see if he has placed what is a ‘state’ inside the genus ‘activity’, or an activity inside the genus ‘state’, e.g. by defining ‘sensation’ as ‘movement communicated through the body’: for sensation is a ‘state’, whereas movement is an ‘activity’. Likewise, also, if he has said that memory is a ‘state that is retentive of a conception’, for memory is never a state, but rather an activity”(Aristotle, De Anima 1957).

Changes over time can revive unconscious data that already exists outside of awareness. We can say that the perceptions obtained through consciousness of 'failing to understand the object' cause identity problems in terms of object and consciousness. However, this failure may We can mention that the perceptions obtained through consciousness of 'failing to understand the object' cause identity problems in terms of object and consciousness. However, this failure may appear as the only perception reflections that make up the unconscious. The identity that emerges with the object may cause the perceiver to produce new truth. This may lead to the establishment of a new truth in the unconscious of the other person or the object. Access to unconscious data in the artist may be related to the recording of the different appearances and perceptions acquired by the subject during the process of being identical with his/her knowledge, at the stage of defining the object. Accordingly, if the different identification and interpretation processes of objects or entities are noticed by the artist to be remembered later, they can easily use these data by carrying them back to consciousness during the creation of the work. The reason why I have included our extensive and detailed research on soul, consciousness and perception questions in this process is that the necessity and importance of reconsidering perception is revealed.

G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) indicates the following determinations about perception in his *Monadology*. Members of the Cartesian school held that all those organisms that cannot reason (plants and animals alike) are strictly mechanical contrivances or “living automata.” Excluded from the domain of the rational, thinking substances, subhuman animals thus fall into the realm of extended substances as strictly physical mechanisms. Leibniz strongly opposed this Cartesian idea that all mental life must be conscious. “Unconscious perceptions that lie beneath the threshold of conscious awareness (the so-called minute perceptions, *petites perceptions*) are a crucial instrumentality of his thought.” For Leibniz, perception is not the capacity of a specific kind of being but pervades nature throughout (Leibniz 1951).

The perception phase before the object is defined and interpreted can be an important source for unconscious data. Expressing that ignoring unrecognized perceptions is a mistake, the thinker stated that the transition from one perception to another is desire, which is the activity of the inner principle. The inability to fully reach the perception to which the desire is always directed may be related to memory. The fact that different perceptions obtained from beings cannot be fully remembered, but according to Leibniz, reaching new perceptions by always obtaining something from them, may be effective in the artist's process of creating a work. Accordingly, desire and fantasy differ from each other in that they are active and passive, as Jung mentioned.

“Thousands of such experiences justify us in speaking of the existence of unconscious psychic contents. As to the actual state an unconscious content is in when not attached to consciousness, this is something that eludes all possibility of cognition. It is therefore quite pointless to hazard conjectures about it. Conjectures linking up the unconscious state with cerebration and physiological processes belong equally to the realm of fantasy. It is also impossible to specify the range of the unconscious, i.e., what contents it embraces. Only experience can decide such questions” (Jung, Carl G. 2014).

In this context, it may be possible to mention that active fantasy is an activity to bring unconscious contents to consciousness. In this case, it can be said that unconscious data is brought to consciousness through active fantasy and actually created in the artwork. In this way, active fantasy can be thought of as a possibility of the unconscious in art. Thinking seems to be one of the most effective activities in transferring unconscious data to the art environment.

“If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the understanding. The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. But on this account, one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them.

Hence, we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic (Immanuel Kant 1998).

When we consider Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) determination about thinking and Jung's active fantasy act together, we can say that we are making judgments by carrying the data we have obtained as a result of different evaluations of objects or existing ones during conscious intellectual activity, while producing a work of art. Accordingly, active fantasy can have the opportunity to reflect different aspects of unconscious data to the work of art. According to Kant, thinking already accompanies all the designs of the subject, in this way, it may be possible to say that unconscious data has been thought before and contains judgment. If we take a closer look at how these judgments are formed, it may be possible to establish the relation between the system of categories created by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, in his determinations about the qualities of the mind and the structure of thinking, with the unconscious.

3.4 Hidden Emotion: Awareness of Synesthesia in Music Philosophy and Synesthetic Perception

A person's character is revealed by thought and action, and it is perception, as long as it belongs to the present, that conditions this thought and action. This chapter circumstances how perception is a robust enough capacity to conform to the task of an ethically appropriate understanding of current, concrete truthness. First of all, it is a part of the soul in the sense that the power of perception is the first principle of animal life and is basically a power of awareness. We aim to clarify the claim that what can be perceived as incidental is actually perceived and therefore is among the fundamental forces of perception. We also argue that the secondary power of the perceptual part of the soul, the power of fantasy, expands the temporal horizons of existing perceptions.

Coming now to intellect, the part of the soul concerned with knowledge and thought, we must consider how it differs from other faculties and how thinking comes about. Thought, assuming that it is analogous to perception, implies that mind is acted upon by the object of thought, or that something of the sort happens. If so, the mind must be impassive, receptive of form and potentially like its object, without actually being its object. Allow the mind to have any form of its own, and the intrusive presence of this form disqualifies the mind from receiving any form from an external object. Mind is thus a mere capacity. Before it thinks, it is in actuality nothing and, consistently with this, it must, further, be incorporeal. The soul has been described as a place of forms or ideas.

This is just what the thinking soul as potentially, not actually. Mind being independent of a bodily organ. (429a10b 9.)

Aristotle claims in Nicomachean Ethics 6.3 (1139b15–17) that nous is one of the five cognitive states in which the soul attains truth by affirmation or denial (the others being craft (*technē*), *epistēmē* (i.e., demonstrative *epistēmē*), practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), and wisdom (*sophia*).

This possibility appears to be forestalled later by Aristotle's insistence that mortal thinking requires the use of images (phantasmata) and imagination (phantasia) (De anima 431a16–17, 432a7–10). Imagination is a result of perception (428b30–429a2), and perception is a bodily process; imagination, then, is not without body, and by extension human thinking is not without body. The role of perception in acquiring knowledge does not, in itself, ensure the inseparability of the mind from the body, for it does not prove that the mind, once acquiring knowledge, remains dependent on perception. Indeed, universals, once learned, are somehow in the soul itself. Therefore, it is open to us to think whenever we want, but to perceive is also not up to us; because it must be the object of perception. Aristotle's more common description of practical wisdom (insight). Perception (aisthesis), That practical wisdom is not knowledge is evident; concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature.

Aristotle predicted to be two ways in which thinking depends on the perceptual part of the soul, called; perception itself, phantasia and memory. First, perception is the faculty that provides prior knowledge from which first principles are learned. Aristotle expresses a familiar enigma difficulty in acquiring first principles: We need to acquire them, but learning seems to require prior knowledge (99b26–28). He responds to this complexity by naming perception (aisthēsis) as the innate discriminating faculty (99b35) that offers the prior “knowledge” from which first principles are learned. Perception emerges memory (100a3), and a single experience emerges from many memories of the same thing (100a4–6). The emergence of a single experience, insofar as it is the emergence of one of many, constitutes a pacifying universal in the soul (100a6–7). This is the prior knowledge necessary to know the universal, first principles.

Since there is no actual thing which has separate existence, apart from, as it seems, magnitudes which are the objects of perception, the objects of thought are included among the forms which are objects of perception both those that are spoken of in abstraction and those which are dispositions and affections of objects of perception. And for this reason unless one perceived things one would not learn or understand anything. (De anima 432a3–8) Perception is necessary for learning about those things that are not separable from magnitude because the object of thought is in the objects of perception (De anima 430a6–7) Aristotle goes further than this. The passage above continues: “and when one contemplates [theōrein] one must simultaneously contemplate a an image; for images are like perceptions, except that they are without matter” (432a8–10). The phenomena (phainomena), or all things that appear (phainetai), result indistinguishably from sense, thought, and phantasia. Since phantasia has unevident operation and an object hardly distinguishable from that of sense or thought, it does not stand out as an obviously separate faculty from sense or thought. There are two textual justifications for pursuing the hypothesis that phronēsis is perceiving well. First, there is Aristotle's insertion of the phronimos into the definition of virtue as the arbiter of the mean (Nic. Eth. 1106b36–1107a2), understood as the appropriate respect, manner, time, and so on in feeling and action (1106b16–24) The idea that phronēsis guides virtue by identifying the particular

for the sake of which of action, and turn now to the thesis that phronēsis is good or true perception. There are two textual justifications for pursuing the hypothesis that phronēsis is perceiving well. First, there is Aristotle's insertion of the phronimos into the definition of virtue as the arbiter of the mean (Nic. Eth. 1106b36–1107a2), understood as the appropriate respect, manner, time, and so on in feeling and action (1106b16–24). Of particulars there is no definition; we apprehend (gnorizein) them by noesis and sensing. (Meta 1036a.6). The word gnorizein can be characterized in contrast to episteme: Aristotle says that although particulars “don't have definitions, we know them by understanding (noein) and sensing, Meta VII-10,1036a6). We know (gnorizein) each, but the word for “know” is not “episteme” which concerns only what cannot be otherwise. The “many differences” that vision makes “clear” emerge in their vividness and definiteness there where the perceptual availability of humans (a letting-in that is already a discerning) and the vibrant constancy of beings (a return that keeps taking place) touch.6 In this sense vision, or more generally sensation (aisthesis), “makes” (poiei) me “know” (gnorizein).

There are differentiae of hypolēpsis itself: knowledge [epistēmê], doxa, practical wisdom [phronēsis], and the opposites of these. (de Anima, 427b24–26) Aristotle characterizes other cognitive states as kinds of hypolēpsis. A discussion in the Prior Analytics of the impossibility (adunaton) of knowing some fact but not at all having a hypolēpsis of it (hypolambanein) (66b26–33), which strongly suggests that knowledge entails hypolēpsis. The first master begins the discussion by distinguishing perception (aisthēsis) from various forms of thought (to phronein, to noein) (427b8–14), and then abruptly introduces both imagination and hypolēpsis into the discussion with a cryptic remark: For imagination is different from both perception and thinking, and it does not come to be without perception, and without it there is no hypolēpsis. (de Anima 427b14–16).

However, musical synesthesia, understood more broadly, is a common phenomenon. The appreciation of music through multiple sensory modalities is indeed typical of the human species. The musical experience in general has a synesthetic dimension. We try to examine some details and the concepts in the philosophy of mind that can be associated so easily with non-musical phenomena up to ethical ideals. It is evident from the visual aspects of musical taste that we discussed earlier those other senses are involved in the musical experience besides hearing.

Music's inclination to present the listener's creative projection of a complete sensory "world" in relation to music is one of the common foundations of the human musical experience. Musical synesthesia is also an aspect of experiencing universal power. However, at the same time, cultural differences in the interpretation of the extra-auditory world with which music is associated make musical synesthesia interpretations culturally different. This synesthetic character of the musical experience is evident in the universal tendency to model non-musical phenomena through music. However, while synesthetic associations and their use in constructing musical symbolisms and models seem to work

across the human species, the cultural diversity of particular symbolisms and patterns limits the scope for musical synesthesia to serve as a basis for intercultural communication. What is fascinating for Cytowic, and not for him alone, is the manner in which experience is presented to our consciousness with an emotional valence. Sherrington, the founding father of hard empirical neurophysiology suggested in 1900 that “Mind rarely, probably never, perceives any object with absolute indifference, that is without ‘feeling.’ All are linked closely to emotion.” (Cytowic 2002: p.vii) Understanding ourselves, our mind and its functions, with antiquity. The interest, research, questioning, search for answers to big questions as much as the 20th century, and the efforts of great thinkers hundreds of years ago still continue to be a source for us. Today, unfortunately, we can see how limited and unproductive the way of thinking leads to a systematicity. A paradox arises when we try to get an overview of what is currently known about the way our brains work, as revealed by a veritable avalanche of new facts and ideas discovered by the neurosciences. Now, for example, we can trace the course of a visual event initiated in the retina of our eye with perfect precision along all the neural pathways in the brain and postulate mechanisms for generating a perception in the visual parts of the brain. We can manage this for hearing and to some extent for touch and other senses as well. As a matter of fact, Kant has presented this way of thinking with understandable sentences above.

The word anesthesia, meaning “no sensation,” shares the same root with synesthesia, meaning “joined sensation.” It comes from the Greek *syn*, union + *aesthesia*, sensation. It denotes the rare capacity to hear colors, taste shapes, or experience other equally strange sensory fusions whose quality seems difficult for the rest of us to imagine.” (Cytowic 2002: p.2) “Synaesthetic perception is the rule [la règle]” (Merleau-Ponty 1962).

“For to everyone who senses something there comes about, in addition to the apprehension of the thing that he is sensing, also a certain self-awareness [sunaisthēsis] of [the fact] that he is sensing.” – Alexander of Aphrodisias

In order to understand enforcedly the synesthetic nature of all perceptions, the question of what is the relationship, the existing connection, between Law and the senses must first be considered. The sense of law cannot be understood without recourse to the principle of synthesis, which governs sensation, since law itself is not something fully observable, but rather a principle that operates through an unconstrained matrix of material, imaginary, and intellectual forms. The answer presented by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BC) can be considered as a kind of proof that it was not only original at that time, but also preserved its validity until today. He hypothesized the existence of what is called *sensus communis* behind the external senses, which perceives common qualities (or *qualia*) in different external senses (Ferwerda & Struycken 2001). “Formed by the addition of the prefix ‘with’ (*sun-*) to the verb ‘to sense’ or ‘to perceive’ (*aisthanesthai*), the expression in all likelihood designated a ‘feeling in common,’ a perception shared by more than one” (Heller-Roazen, 2007: 81)

Aristotle's ideas had a great influence on medieval thought when a theory of the workings of human perception known as the "three-chamber theory" was established. In the Middle Ages, Italian Dominican priest, theologian Thomas, philosopher Aquinas (1225-1274), suggested the existence of three chambers in the human brain. In the first chamber, the sensory impressions, sent by the exterior senses, were perceived by the common sense (*sensus communis*), which stimulated imagination (*imaginativa* and *fantasia*). In the second chamber, cognition (*cogitativa*), reason (*ratio*), and judgment (*aestimativa*) determined value with the help of former perceptions from memories (*memorativa*), which were housed in the third chamber (Adler & Zeuch2002). Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages are perhaps the most illustrious cases, periods of the proliferation of glosses, expositions, and paraphrases (to say nothing of annotated editions and indexes) of all kinds. It is a truism that the thinkers of these epochs regularly departed from the theses of the tradition and, more precisely, from those stated in literally by the one who was for them the Philosopher par excellence. But such a claim means little as long as it leaves unspecified the role played by the encounter with "tradition" in such a setting. The commentators of late Antiquity, *the falasifa and filosefim of classical Arabic culture*, and the doctors of the Latin Middle Ages may well all have conjoined their inquiries, in differing ways, to those of the authorities of Antiquity. The fact remains: more than once, they received from the classics some-thing other than what had been transmitted to them. It followed from the nature of their craft. Glossators and their kind are incessantly in search of the animating element in their textual objects that bears no name: the dimension in them that, remaining unsaid, demands in time to be exposed. Thinkers trained as readers, the philosophers of the tradition were no exception. They knew how to find the secret source of incompleteness sealed in every work of thought, and they knew, too, how to draw from it the matter of their art. (Heller-Roazen, 2007: 81) In order to understand better the mystery of synesthesia, I would suggest not isolating synesthesia by demarcating it sharply from other perceptual phenomena, but relating it to them. Maybe perceiving music in colors is a particular type of a more common ability to match colors and sounds(Campen 2008). Aristotle has already considered with the subject of 'Presentation' in his 'On the Soul' *De Anima*. The First Master indicated that intellectual activity is impossible without a presentation. Aristotle argues as his first point of departure that in such an activity, there is an accidental affect identical with the accidental in geometric representations. Aristotle argues in *De Anima* III 1 (*DA*) that one kind of special perceptible is related to the corresponding individual sense, e.g. color to sight, sound to hearing, whereas we have a "common sense (*koinê aisthêsis*)" that perceives the common perceptibles, i.e. something common to various senses, e.g. movement, form, or size.⁴ This is the only definition of "common sense" in *DA*, leaving undetermined how each sense is related to common sense.

Why we cannot use reason on any object absolutely separate from the continuous, or even apply it to non-temporal things unless they are connected with time, is another question. Now one has to grasp greatness and movement through the same faculty used to

recognize time, that is, through the faculty which is also the faculty of memory, and the presentation involved in such cognition is an affect of the *sensus communis*; From this it follows that the size of these objects, the knowledge of the duration of their movement, are influenced by the aforementioned *sensus communis*, that is, the primary perceptive faculty. Accordingly, even the memory of (not only sensible but) intellectual objects contains a representation: we can therefore conclude that it belongs to the intellectual faculty only incidentally, while it directly and essentially belongs to the primary sense-perception faculty. “One must cognize magnitude and motion by means of the same faculty by which one cognizes time (i.e. by that which is also the faculty of memory), and the presentation (involved in such cognition) is an affection of the *sensus communis*; whence this follows, viz. that the cognition of these objects (magnitude, motion time) is effected by the (said *sensus communis*, i.e. the) primary faculty of perception. Accordingly, memory (not merely of sensible, but) even of intellectual objects involves a presentation: hence we may conclude that it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only incidentally, while directly and essentially it belongs to the primary faculty of sense-perception.” (Aristotle, p.1299)

Aristotle defines perception (*aisthesis*) as practical wisdom (insight). This is perception rather than practical wisdom, obviously is not scientific knowledge is evident. (NE 6.8 1142a26–27) Here is the passage that Aristotle directly refers to in *De Somno*, where he relates awareness studies to the issue of distinguishing perceptible:

“Now every sense has both something special [*ti idion*] and something common [*ti koina*]. The special function, e.g., of the sight is seeing, that of the auditory, hearing, and similarly with all the rest; but there is also a common faculty [*koinē dunamis*] associated with them all, whereby one perceives that one sees and hears, for it is not by sight that one sees that one sees; and one discerns [*krinein*] and is capable of discerning [*dunatai krinein*] that sweet is different from white not by taste nor by sight, nor by a combination of the two, but by some part [*morion*] which is common [*koinē*] to all the sense organs; for there is one sense faculty [*mia aisthēsis*], and one paramount sense organ [*to kurion aisthētērion hen*], but the being of its sensitivity varies with each class of sensible object, e.g., sound and color. (*De Somno* 455a12–22)

The Aristotelian faculty can be assumed to be "common" in a new sense. On of the earliest surviving discussions of the common sense in the Arabic tradition confirms such an impression. It is the brief consideration accorded the faculty in the book of *Elements* (*Kitab al-Ustuqsat*) the tenth century Egyptian philosopher and physician Isaac ben Solomon Israeli. If one turns to the surviving works of Isaac's great Arabo-Persian contemporary Abu Nasr al-Farabi, the position of the common sense seems no less exceptional. (Heller-Roazen, 2007: 147) In Middle Eastern philosophical literature, however, with one possible exception in the Arabic literature case, which we will discuss later, the term inner senses appears from the very beginning as a general term that includes various post sensory faculties. In its simplest form, it is used to include three faculties: imagination, cogitation and memory. The second master (*al-mu'allim al-thani*) after

Aristotle, al-Farabi bequeathed two classifications of the internal senses to the tradition. The first can be found in the Enumeration of the Sciences. When the first philosophers in the Middle Eastern tradition did seek to classify these powers, Aristotelian origin, between "imagination" (phantastikon), "cogitation" (dianoetikon), and "memory" (mnemoneutikon). To these three faculties, al-Farabi would later add a fourth: "estimation" (wahm), a sense that would play a prominent role in the psychology of the Latin Schoolmen, to whom it would be known as aestimatio. Al-Farabi counted them in his other classification as two faculties, then however the term mutahayyilah is taken in this classification, whether in the sense of retentive imagination or in the sense of compositive animal imagination, there will be no adequate explanation for Al-Farabi's omission here of one of the five faculties enumerated in the other list. Despite these fourfold classifications, however, Al-Farabi sometimes uses the general term imagination to include both retentive and compositive imagination as well as estimation (Wolfson 1935).

Other philosophers who adopted Aristotle's way of thinking in history also considered the senses as active and creative organs of human perception. And it was recognized that people differ in their ability to use common sense. Some people argued that they were more gifted, more creative, and more sensitive to the qualities of nature than others. The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who laid out the profound details of this concept and wrote extensively on the subject.

'Critique,' in Kant's sense of the term, consists in examining the scope and limits of our cognitive powers ('reason,' in the broadest sense in which Kant uses this term) in order to decide to what extent, if any, metaphysics is possible for us human beings. Metaphysics consists in the discovery of truths (true propositions) about the world that are not empirical (dependent on experience), in which case they would be contingent, but are necessary and hence a priori (knowable independently of experience).

If there is such an a priori element, we also need some sort of inference from the Kantian view. We have to point out how it is possible to make a judgment based exclusively on the individual's sense of pleasure in an object, but which also necessarily entails attribution to every possible observer of the object. Kant states that this necessity can only be based on an objective factor, which we must posit as the condition of possible experience in every human being in general. This is also found in the transmittance of all sensations, hence in the *sensus communis*.

Kant's conceptual distinction is pointed out as synchronicity and synesthetic perceptions. *Sensus communis* is a common acquisition for perceiving matching qualities in common synchrony in different sensory areas. *Sensus communis* aesthetics is a personal trait to perceive special aesthetic qualities in multi-sensory spaces, as in personally colored vocal synesthesia.

These theories were developed in the field of aesthetics. Synesthetic perceptions are not always beautiful or aesthetic according to numerous reports by synesthetes. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the aesthetic theory of gestalt perception was

reformulated as a more general theory of human perception. In this view, not the idea of universal beauty was considered central to gestalt perception but rather the inner necessity of the perception. For instance, the perception of a melody is a fundamental component of anyone's perception, whether you like the melody or not (Campen 2008). Experience is nothing but a continual joining together (synthesis) of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetic propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than that of contradiction.

“We are talking here not about the power of cognition, but about the way of thinking I that involves putting this power to a purposive use; and this, no matter how slight may be the range and the degree of a person's natural endowments, still indicates a man with a broadened way of thinking if he overrides the private subjective conditions of his judgment into which so many others are locked as it were and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint which he can determine only by transferring himself to the standpoint of others.” (Kant 1987: p. 161)

Music can also be visual as a result of synesthesia, as synesthesia occurs when stimulation of one sensory mode causes stimulation of another. However, musical synesthesia, understood more broadly, is a common phenomenon. The appreciation of music through multiple sensory modalities is indeed typical of the human species. In general, we defend the claim that there is a synesthetic dimension to the musical experience. The synesthetic intermingling of sensory qualities in the phenomenology of experiencing objects is a result of the way our senses operate in recognizing objects. Immanuel Kant observed that our various sensory imprints are mentally consolidated into a general representation of the outside world. We acquire data from sight, hearing and touch to inform about the same world, and all of this data contributes to our mental representation of reality. In most cases, our senses perceive objects simultaneously through more than one channel.

The play of tones requires merely a change of sensations each of which relates to affect. But without having the strength Grad of an affect, and arouses aesthetic ideas. The play of thought arises merely from the change of presentations in judgment; although it produces no thought that carries any interest with it, it does quicken the mind. (Kant 1987: p. 193)

3.5 Aesthetic Appreciation in Terms of Aesthetic Theories

As we mentioned in the previous section, since aesthetics is a concept related to sensations, it is also closely related to the subject's taste. The concept of taste is the whole factor that creates the structure of perception and is effective in the subject's sensation. The state of consciousness, the effect of the subconscious, biological structure, physical needs constitute the building blocks of the concept we call pleasure. Aesthetic taste opens the doors of the perception world of the subject not only in the individual sense, but also in the socio-cultural and socio-psychological sense. The identity of the perception, analysis and judgment processes of the art object with the artist is also important today in terms of multidisciplinary fields, technology and art, artificial intelligence and the

interaction of two different art objects. In the history of philosophy, many ideas have emerged regarding the analysis of aesthetic objects.

Time and space become correlative and even continuous, so that the space of every aesthetic object is temporalized and its time spatialized. The direct consequence of this spatializing of time and temporalizing of space is to turn the aesthetic object into a "quasi subject," that is, a being capable of harboring internal spatiotemporal relationships within itself. These relationships constitute in turn the world of the aesthetic object a world which is more like an atmosphere than an objective cosmos filled with discrete entities and events. This expressed world, whose description in constitutes one of Dufrenne's most original contributions, is characterized less by its specific contents than by the singular affective quality which permeates it. This affective quality makes the world of the aesthetic object expressive and endows the aesthetic object with the inner complexity and coherence of a quasi subject. Dufrenne analyzes music in terms of various formal schemata(Dufrenne 1973).

These statements require phenomenological analysis. As it is known, Husserl's expression of "the transform of things to themselves" and his phenomenological approach have brought us back to objects. As Dufrenne has already stated, trying to perceive the reflection carried by the object is a way of returning to the things themselves. The phenomenological approach seems to be a philosophical intellectual system that needs to be studied again in terms of perception and taste problems. In his Five Lectures on Phenomenology, Husserl states:

“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity”(Moran 2016).

When you imagine a writer who brings to the phenomenological scheme of action, of the object, and the interchange between them, a lifetime of ontology-heavy research, and a willingness to address questions about the metaphysical horizons of aesthetics, then you will most likely come across Nicolai Hartmann's (1882-1950) work on Aesthetics. Obviously, this approach aims to exclude doubt and allows science to be done in this state of things. On this path lie the methodological forms that are decisive for all sciences and constitutive for all scientific givens; that is, the clarification of the theory of science and with it the implicit clarification of all sciences; but only implicitly, that is, when this huge illuminating work has been accomplished, does the critique of knowledge become capable of criticizing individual sciences and thus making a metaphysical evaluation of them. To be expressed ontologically; It is a system of thought that examines the aesthetic existence of an aesthetic object created by the artist, together with its inclusion in the field of existence.

This analysis makes visible a curious conflict that Hartmann attempts to overcome, as he does for many such conflicts. Music stands over against us as an object, yet the soul

apprehends it reverentially and is absorbed by it; how can we be absorbed by it and yet maintain the aesthetic distance required to understand it? This might be called the antinomy of the listener and the critic. The antinomy is real, yet further study resolves it, Hartmann believes:

“The internal strata of music have the means to grip the entire person and, in this state, he becomes one with it; the external strata have the means to focus his attention and even to form the object of his attention itself. The structural elements of the tonal composition are what hold [the hearer] firmly at a distance from and in a state of contemplation of what is objectively present” (Hartmann 2014).

We cannot, while listening, stand in disinterested contemplation and ignore the external forms of the music. The lover of music, becoming one with it, is led ever more deeply into its beauty as he remains attentive to the formal composition. The critic simply remains coolly at the doorstep of the third stratum while he analyzes the structure of the external strata.

Music is a revelation, its miracle is that it awakens inner moods perhaps unfamiliar to us, and gets us to “enter a great inward vital life, to give [ourselves] over to feelings that cannot be put under categories. And in this way the miracle of a community of listeners in the emotional experience of music takes place”

The appearance-relation, in which an ideal content appears to a mind, governs the transformation of content to ever-higher degrees of ideality as we pass from stratum to stratum, that is, as the mind penetrates ever more deeply into the work. Genius consists precisely in the creator’s skill in bestowing form so as to allow the deeper ideal elements to appear through the less deep elements, until the foreground elements – which are entirely “matter” are understood in terms of the ideal elements they allow to appear. We understand the work as a lawfully structured individual order, but we cannot grasp how it achieved those ends. Uniqueness. But there is a greater mystery that limits a philosophy that seeks to understand beauty and ugliness, though it does not impede the aesthetically beholding mind from responding to the work. After some reflections upon laws of great generality that govern aesthetics and can be formulated by a philosophical aesthetics, Hartmann notes:

“The nature of beauty in its uniqueness, as the specific aesthetic value-content, does not lie in these general laws, but in the particular lawfulness of the unique object. This particular lawfulness is fundamentally unavailable to all philosophical analysis. It cannot be grasped by any epistemic technique. Its nature is to be hidden, and to be felt only as present and as coercive, but never capable of becoming an object of thought” (Hartmann 2014).

Within the framework of this basic problematic, various answers have been developed in the context of Marxist, informational, structuralist and aesthetics of reception approaches, apart from phenomenological aesthetics. As for Marxist Aesthetics and object thought; Since the object is the product of labor, it is a production activity.

Aesthetic problems occupied a conspicuous place in Marx's early intellectual life. In his university days (1835-41) he studied in addition to law and philosophy, the history of literature chiefly ancient literature as well as the classical German aestheticians. At the University of Bonn, which he entered in the autumn of 1835 as a student of criminal law, Marx devoted as much attention to the history of art and literature as to jurisprudence. He attended Schlegel's lectures on ancient literature; he delved into ancient mythology, a subject lectured upon at that time by the famous Welcker; he studied modern art. At the University of Berlin, Marx attended only one course in the history of literature (Geppert's lectures on Euripides, 1840-41), but his independent work in connection with creative art is of particular interest to us: among the books which he read in 1837 were Lessing's *Laocoon*, Winckelmann's *History of Ancient Art* and Reimarus' *Allgemeine Betrachtungen uber die Triebe der Thiere*. In the course of his transition to Hegelianism, Marx made a thorough study of Hegel's *Aesthetik*, read, no doubt, during the summer of 1837 (Lifshitz 1973).

Thus, Marx brings a new perspective to the concept of the beautiful. Unlike the natural object, the aesthetic object is a product of human activity. Marx's philosophy of economy does not go beyond its borders and considers the aesthetic object to be the subject of consumption as stated. The information aesthetics initially developed by Max Bense and Abraham A. Moles between 1956 and 1958 tried to bridge philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, social sciences, and art theory. The goal was to develop a theory that would allow one to measure the amount and quality of information in aesthetic objects, thus enabling an evaluation of art that goes beyond "art historian chatter." Information aesthetics investigated the numerical value of "the aesthetic object" itself. Based on David Birkhoff's experiments on aesthetic measurements around 1928, the theoretical mathematician Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics: or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine* from 1948, Claude Shannon's information theory from 1948, and Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotic theory, Bense focused on physical concepts such as entropy, process, and co-reality, while Abraham Moles, similar to Daniel Berlyne, accentuated aspects of perception theory and psychology. Bense says, "Any generative aesthetics, which leads to an aesthetic synthesis, must be preceded by analytical aesthetics."

Information Aesthetics has attracted musicians, artists, designers, architects, writers, composers, philosophers, teachers, mathematicians, psychologists, critics and generally young intellectuals. It has taken its place in the threatening field of fully objectified methods of evaluating aesthetic objects. This initiative was exciting and provocative. A new discipline, a whole perspective. However, it remains silent for now, as it has not been widely recognized and studies have not been carried out and new seminal theories have not been developed, but its disappearance is only a matter of time. The term information aesthetics also applies to related terms such as generative aesthetics, art, design, music, and more. Today "information aesthetics" is about viewing large amounts of data (a common misuse is to call it "information"), and "generative design" is now

about running a program on a computer with complex parameter settings. Aesthetic information is the equivalent of semantic information in theory. Semantic information is what appears in a message. Aesthetic information is how the information to be conveyed in a composition is revealed and seen. Semantic information is embedded in a universal logic, can be articulated and translated, and serves to prepare the universal information operation for action. Aesthetic information can only be expressed as it is expressed, that is, it cannot be translated. It creates certain mental states and depends on the actual sender and receiver. Semantic information depends on external function, purpose, action. Aesthetic information is the functionality of inner information, it is necessary to work multidisciplinary in the field of philosophy of mind while expressing it here. Semantic information depends on the traditional signs, aesthetic information depends on the individual signs.

“When we have an information source which is producing a message by successively selecting discrete symbols (letters, words, musical notes, spots of a certain size, etc.), the probability of choice of the various symbols at one stage of the process being dependent on the previous choices. The quantity which uniquely meets the natural requirements that one sets up for "information" turns out to be exactly that which is known in thermodynamics as entropy. It is expressed in terms of the various probabilities involved - those of getting to certain stages in the process of forming messages, and the probabilities that, when in those stages, certain symbols be chosen next. The formula, moreover, involves the logarithm of probabilities, so that it is a natural generalization of the logarithmic measure spoken of above in connection with simple cases.” (Shannon, C. E., & Weaver 1949).

The Structuralist Aesthetics (structuralist) approach is the theory put forward by Professor of Czech aesthetics Jan Mukařovský (1891-1975). Mukařovský identifies poetic language as an entity separate and distinct from the standard language. In his view, the standard provides the background against which various distortions are produced with the aim of creating aesthetic effects. The notions of automatization and foregrounding are then introduced: the former refers to production of an utterance in an automatic manner, the latter is associated with a more conscious execution of the utterance that arises when the appropriate norms are violated. In a work of art, we may find the foregrounding of various components that are mutually hierarchically organized in terms of domination and subordination. (Mukařovský, 2014, p. 42). It coincides with the ideas of the thinker who uses semiology in his work on art. For him, art is like language. If language is thought to be a system of signs, it will be understood that art similar to language will also be a system of signs. Still, one must face here some objections that may be heard from time to time against the application of the principle of dynamism of language systems in an effort to throw new light on some of the problems of such systems, both from the synchronistic and from the diachronist viewpoint. First of all, we want to point out here, as briefly as possible, wherein lies, in our opinion, the importance of the study of the dynamism in language and of the peripheral phenomena ascertainable in its system. It will be seen that

such study is of paramount importance both for general linguistic theory and for the practical sphere of linguistic usage. (Mukorowsky, 1978, p. 58). So what does the art object show? According to the thinker, the work of art is existence as an aesthetic object, and the aesthetic object exhibited is the consciousness of the society.

This determination indicates that there is a collective consciousness on the aesthetic object. When we consider the intersubjective equivalence of language, concepts and words, it is possible to easily understand the thinker's evaluation of an art object. It is stated that the art object should cease to be the individual or the consciousness of the buyer and should be understood just like a common language. Again, this theory seems to be based on the fact that it points to the collective consciousness and that the aesthetic object actually belongs to a common language, such as language.

Reception theory examines reception in art by emphasizing how it will be effective in analyzing the object in terms of the sense organs and differentiating features of the subjects. The collective name for receptive or sensory functions of the mind in contrast to its active or motor functions. In the Kantian terminology, receptivity is defined as the faculty of receiving representations in contrast to spontaneity, the faculty of knowing an object by means of concepts. (Runes, 1942, s. 265)

It is a mere passive reception of the text, a pure transcription of its mental essences. Here, the subject receiving the aesthetic object is sensory and cognitively active. Rhetoric, or discourse theory, shares with Formalism, structuralism and semiotics an interest in the formal devices of language, but like reception theory is also concerned with how these devices are actually effective at the point of consumption; its preoccupation with discourse as a form of power and desire can learn much from deconstruction and psychoanalytical theory, and its belief that discourse can be a humanly transformative affair shares a good deal with liberal humanism (Eagleton 1996).

It is certain that there is a conceptual relationship between the subject and the object in the aesthetics of reception. On the other hand, it is certain that the subject, who plays an active role in the reception process, is effective in the judgment processes of the human, who are accepted as a whole with their physiological and biological processes leading to the act of comprehension.

We can repeat that the subject, who tries to analyze the art object with the act of comprehension, goes to the path of subjective perception by subtracting and subtracting from it, as Deleuze mentioned. These approaches and discussions that we have mentioned also suggest ideas about how the communication between the aesthetic object and the subject takes place while trying to determine what it is.

Attending to the aesthetic properties of the work, discriminating their variable intensities, is an aesthetic experience of the work. Theoretical sense, the two terms, at least in principle, signal a different primary focus: the philosophy of art is object-oriented; aesthetics is reception-oriented. One can at least imagine a philosophy of art that renders questions of aesthetics peripheral, particularly in terms of the definition of art.

It is an experience of the qualitative dimension of the work as it offers itself in appearance. And since these qualities will always appear with some degree of intensity—whether high, low or somewhere in between experiences of the aesthetic qualities of a work will always be experiences of the intensity of the work (Carroll 2010). In this state, the perception of an art object is exempt from being a simple object. Examining the subject-object (indirectly considering the problem of reciprocity between the aesthetic subject and the artist who realizes the aesthetic object) processes is necessary in order to answer this question, in terms of perceiving and making sense of the art object, which is the whole of the formal, spiritual, qualitative-quantitative elements in Carroll's words. In particular, within the scope of the phenomenological approach and informative theory, how it occurs between aesthetic subject-aesthetic object, intersubjectivity (artist-aesthetic subject, artist-artist) will be examined separately.

3.6 Aesthetic Experience as an Aspect of Interpretive Activities

The aesthetic subject is the person who will make the judgment on the aesthetic object and who will make the judgment with his idea about what it is, and who will perform the act of appreciation as a result. This attitude of course results in a judgment. However, what we will examine in this chapter is not the result of the attitude, but the processes of the attitude. As a conscious being, human interacts with the objects around him. During this interaction, the brain acquires many perceptions, with or without awareness. However, the aesthetic attitude differs from the ordinary attitude. Aesthetic subject means 'I', consciousness being that perceives an aesthetic object, grasps it, enjoys it aesthetically, and feels aesthetic pleasure from it. The existence of consciousness should be examined before the attitude of the ego towards the aesthetic object, what the readiness means. Consciousness can be thought of as a waking state, experience or mind, as well as aspects of self-consciousness such as self-knowledge and self-knowledge. According to this definition, the ego is not only an aesthetic object but also a being that is directed towards itself. This phenomenon brings with it the understanding of consciousness.

“Phenomenal consciousness as a whole contains all the subjective experiences or the “feels” we have at any given moment. Phenomenal consciousness is, at least metaphorically, like a wide field or sphere of experiences that are simultaneously present in the same person’s subjective stream of consciousness. It includes sensations of light and darkness, of colours and sounds, of bodily feelings, emotions, desires and volitions, of internal mental images and inner speech passing through our minds. All this taken together delivers to us, at least in our normal waking state, an entire dynamic sensory-perceptual world in the centre of which we find our own selves, anchored to our body image. The typical global content of phenomenal consciousness thus takes the form of an embodied self in a world, with thoughts and images inside its head and with a first-person’s perspective to the surrounding world” (Revonsuo 2009).

The formation of this dynamic perceptual-world is the result of encountering qualities. The formation of this dynamic perceptual-world is the result of encountering qualities. With these clarifications of the 'what it's like' locution in place, I hope to have

provided a helpful pointer towards the specific notion of consciousness that is the subject of this investigation. It is this notion of qualitative consciousness (or consciousness, for short) that I propose to analyze as the having of qualia (Stubenberg 1998).

“Consciousness” is defined as the ability to respond to external stimuli. According to this definition, being conscious is being able to respond appropriately when presented with certain stimuli. “Consciousness” is anchored to its core meaning as subjective phenomenal experience, or as the presence of qualitative “feels” for a subject. The other central notions, such as “reflective consciousness” and “self-awareness”, have been built on the ground provided by the notion of “phenomenal consciousness”. The absence of consciousness and its metaphoric image, is defined by the absence of subjective experience”(Revonsuo 2009).

In this case, the effect of the qualifiers we mentioned before on the consciousness of the subject who encounters the aesthetic object over the aesthetic object seems to be necessary for the explanation of the phenomenal consciousness. Since the structure of the attributes interacts with the subject, the effects of these structures are another problem that needs to be resolved. The judgment that Revonsuo mentions that the mental system can consist of attributes is closely related to the subject's readiness in the face of the aesthetic object. The subject's world, which consists of a qualitative and quantitative whole regarding objects, can change his judgment against the aesthetic object according to its physical and biological differences. In short, we can say that the world of qualifications is related to experience in the light of this determination. Subject-specific experiential differences may enable him to grasp objects and aesthetic objects from a different perspective. The ability to think about one's own cognition includes logical dialectical processes, unlike the normal thinking structure.

The world full of qualifications also forms the basis of human knowledge. In this way, the subject engages in logical inference, thinking, art and science activities.

We can mention that Descartes attempted to make experiments by abstracting from thought. First of all, the person trying to reach his own consciousness (myself), as it is known, started the knowledge of his own self by doubting everything, as is known and often repeated in the thinker's cogito. Descartes began by removing the quantitative from Stubenberg's quantitative brain. The Philosopher, IV. and in Meditation V refers to the following statements:

“I have been well accustomed these past days to detach my mind from my senses, and I have accurately observed that there are very few things that one knows with certainty respecting corporeal objects, that there are many more which are known to us respecting the human mind, and yet more still regarding God Himself; so that I shall now without any difficulty abstract my thoughts from the consideration of [sensible or] imaginable objects, and carry them to those which, being withdrawn from all contact with matter, are purely intelligible. And certainly the idea which I possess of the human mind inasmuch as it is a thinking thing, and not extended in length, width and depth, nor participating in anything pertaining to body, is incomparably more distinct than is the idea of any

corporeal thing. Now after first noting what must be done or avoided, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth my principal task is to endeavour to emerge from the state of doubt into which I have these last days fallen, and to see whether nothing certain can be known regarding material things.” P.171

After reaching the core of the thinking self, Descartes actually left behind important clues before coming to the conclusion of these two meditations. In conclusion, we can say that the debate has developed on two main axes. First of all, trying to get the thinking mind away from its (instantaneous) senses, that is, trying to reach an intellectual structure other than the external objects perceived by the senses, this structure, which Descartes refers to as the knowledge of God, requires a thought system that is far from imagination and not perceptible by the senses. In this respect, the thinker who wants to reach abstract thought, in a way, seems to have reached the knowledge of abstraction by falsifying and ignoring the existing ones, that is, abstraction based on the existing.

“But before examining whether any such objects as I conceive exist outside of me, I must consider the ideas of them in so far as they are in my thought, and see which of them are distinct and which confused. In the first place, I am able distinctly to imagine that quantity which philosophers commonly call continuous, or the extension in length, breadth, or depth, that is in this quantity, or rather in the object to which it is attributed. And not only do I know these things with distinctness when I consider them in general, but, likewise [however little I apply my attention to the matter], I discover an infinitude of particulars respecting numbers, figures, movements, and other such things, whose truth is so manifest, and so well accords with my nature, that when I begin to discover them, it seems to me that I learn nothing new, or recollect what I formerly knew that is to say, that I for the first time perceive things which were already present to my mind, although I had not as yet applied my mind to them.” P.179

Reaching those who are immaterial and qualified as sacred is to strive to reach Plato's world of ideas with a mentality beyond things. Secondly, Descartes seems to offer a different perspective on 'experience'. According to this; It speaks of the openness of the plurality of particulars and its conformity to the nature of the subject. It is that he already knows the quantitative properties that he has discussed distinctly before and mentally deals with additions and subtractions, when he compares them with other appropriate things in nature. It's as if he's facing them for the first time, just because it's the first time he's turned his attention to those things. These statements attract us to another dimension of experience. The spatial, dynamic, etc., which the person encounters with particular objects for the first time has encountered before. He states that he realizes comprehension by forgetting the contents and experiencing that object again and again.

This information is substantial in the context of the subject's readiness for the composition of art. What kind of experience is the subject's experience can play an important role in encountering the art object. In the first item, again, it is the subject's approach towards the art object by falsifying or ignoring the information he receives from his senses when he encounters the composition of art. This approach can be called as an

enthusiasm to search for the idea of an ontological art object. In terms of phenomenological approach, the examination we accomplished together with Descartes theory is significant in terms of how the subject, who turns to the thing itself, grasps that thing. As we have mentioned above, when Husserl's statement of the real immanent, that he does not show anything other than himself, that he does not "mean" anything "outside" of himself, when put together with the subject's readiness for the thing, Descartes' openness when encountering things, the relation of the openness of things with experience should also be afficleted into account.

After all these determinations, Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) speaks of possible perception with the statement that "every perception or something that is deemed to exist, or the essence of a mere thing takes itself as an object" (de Spinoza 1901)(Spinoza, 2017, p. 56).

Spinoza; The less the mind understands while perceiving more, the greater its capacity to form dreams. and the more he understands, the less the capacity to create dreams, with his expression, he draws attention to the subject's ability to understand, apart from perception. Additions and deletions against things are related to how much the subject understands that thing. Apart from the perception of the subject standing in front of an art object and the world of experience associated with that object, the problem of understanding is also effective in the subject's analysis of that object. As Descartes stated before, at the point of grasping the only intelligible things that get rid of the existing objects and get rid of the matter, Spinoza examines the thought that has no equivalent in nature but has an object in our minds:

"For instance, I know that the earth is round, but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. However, examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. We can, I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility. Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, etc. , I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I might have fallen into and afterward I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it is still or may still fall under the same mistake. It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems, which sometimes involve impossibilities. Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with es- sences only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously. Of these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas, as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less" (de Spinoza 1901).

Spinoza made an analysis of how simple thoughts belonging to the subject are formed, and stated that thoughts that cannot extend beyond the concept can be produced without the risk of error. The idea that the thought produced under the concept we

discussed in favor of Descartes can be considered real for the subject if it does not exceed the concept, continues in Spinoza's teaching. In the field of artistic creativity, mental action, which the thinker calls simple thoughts, is necessary for the subject. Again, knowing this intellectual action by the subject is important in terms of understanding the object created as a result of artistic creativity. However, when this mindset is considered intersubjectively, it seems risky in terms of different perception, meaning and judgment within the framework of our subject. As Spinoza states, simple thought that does not extend beyond the concept may not fully meet its object, although it may meet the concept. In the third chapter of Spinoza's *Ethics*, in his examination of the human mind and emotions, he examined the mind-body interaction and stated the following:

“Many persons, nevertheless, will perhaps not be able easily to see the force of this demonstration, because they have been accustomed to contemplate those things alone which flow from external causes, and they see also that those things which are quickly produced from these causes, that is to say, which easily exist easily perish, whilst, on the other hand, they adjudge those things to be more difficult to produce, that is to say, not so easy to bring into existence, to which they conceive more properties pertain. In order that these prejudices may be removed I do not need here to show in what respect this saying, looking at the whole of Nature, all things are or are not equally easy. But this only it will be sufficient for me to observe: that I do not speak of things which are produced by external causes, but that I speak of substances alone which can be produced by external cause.” (de Spinoza 1901).

Spinoza succinctly defines the mind. In the second chapter, fourteenth proposition of the *Philosopher's Ethics*; “The human mind is adapted' to the perception of many things, and its aptitude increases in proportion to the number of ways in which its body can be disposed. The human body is affected in manyways by external bodies, and is so disposed as to affect external bodies in many ways. But the human mind must perceive everything which happens in the human body. The human mind is therefore adapted, etc”(de Spinoza 1901). By using this expression, human should not be evaluated only as a mind. He also drew attention to the unity of the mind with the body. Within the framework of perception, the contribution of the subject's body to perception, apart from the mind, is clearly revealed by Spinoza. “The idea of every way in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body, the same time the nature of the external body. If the human body be affected in a way which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will contemplate that external body as actually existing or as -present, until the human body be affected by a modification which excludes the existence or presence of the external body. The human mind not only perceives the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of these modifications”(de Spinoza 1901). With this approach, Spinoza clarifies Descartes' mind-body problem. “Spinoza seems to have had the right idea when he said that an emotion with negative consequences could be countered only by another, more powerful emotion. What this possibly means is that merely training the nonconscious process to politely decline is hardly a solution. The

nonconscious device must be trained by the conscious mind to deliver an emotional counterpunch”(A. R. Damasio 1999).

Spinoza states that while man perceives the nature of objects, he interacts with his own nature. This interaction and the emotions it contains will certainly become a part of the experience. After that, the subject who encounters an object will have an idea about how that object makes him/her feel while trying to make sense of the object. In this case, the mind is confronted not only with the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the object, but also with what it reminds and feels. Thus, when we return to the third chapter of the Ethics, we encounter the following statements about emotion.

“It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labor and industry we confess ourselves muchindebted, who have written many excellent things about the right conduct of life, and who have given to mortals counsels full of prudence, but no one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and strength of the emotions, and what the mind is able to do toward controlling them.” (de Spinoza 1901.)

This determination of Spinoza also emphasizes the adequacy of the idea about both the object and the subject itself. The fact that the emotions reflected by the objects are one-to-one or not with the object brings along the concept of doubt about that object. In his Treatise on the Correction of Understanding, Spinoza states the following:

“As the truth needs no sign it was being sufficient to possess the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them, so that all doubts may be removed, it follows that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth itself, or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, for all these expressions, are synonymous. Again, the method must necessarily be concerned with reasoning or understanding. The method is not identical to reasoning in the search for causes. Still, less is it the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other perceptions and by investigating its nature so that we may thus know our power of understanding and may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down certain rules as aids and by avoiding useless mental exertion” (de Spinoza 1901).

This determination made by Spinoza is essential in terms of containing the knowledge of how the subject should behave towards objects to correct the understanding. As for our subject, as a result of the interaction of the subject against the art object with the object, it is crucial to identify the object and the interaction of the object with its feelings and the subject's judgment of these feelings. In addition to analytically comprehending the quantity and qualities of the art object, how exactly the artist perceives the emotion he has already buried in his object is also necessary for the correct evaluation of that object. Spinoza pointed out that for a definition to be complete, the definition must be pure, explaining the innermost essence of the thing and being careful not to substitute any other feature for it. “It is perfect, complete, infinite, with infinite attributes. Its essence, existence, idea, and power are all identical. Because of it, whatever is, follows. Whatever

is, is in it, and without it, nothing can be or be conceived. This is what philosophers say the substance is. It is also what they say nature is” (de Spinoza 1901).

According to the philosopher, ideas should be compatible with the object. On the other hand, in the last pages of his work, he expresses that feelings about objects cannot be understood without a complete understanding of the ability to understand. According to the philosopher, ideas should be compatible with the object. On the other hand, in the last pages of his work, he expresses that feelings about objects cannot be understood without a complete understanding of the ability to understand.

“The ideas which the understanding forms express, infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other ideas. Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived employing a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a point. All these are perceptions that do not serve to understand quantity but only determine it. This is proved by the fact that we conceive them as formed as they were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived unless the quantity is also perceived; we can even prolong the motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do unless we had an idea of infinite quantity” (de Spinoza 1901). He reveals the relationship between the subject's grasp of the object and the emotions with these words. Grasping an art object by the subject can bring out the appropriate emotion reflected by the object.

Coming back to Descartes from Spinoza's idea of emotions, “All the objects of our perceptions are to be considered either as things or the affections of things or else as eternal truths; and the enumeration of things” (Descartes, René, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane 1911). In Emotions or soul the mode in which the impressions of the objects unite in the gland which is in the middle of the brain. Example of the movements of the body which accompany the passions and do not depend on the soul (Descartes, René, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane 1911). (Descartes 1911: p.347, 348). The object seen will undoubtedly cause an emotion. The structure of the figure seen will create a different feeling depending on the subject's experience. If this shape is extraordinary and frightening... If it bears a great resemblance to things that have previously harmed the body, it will cause a feeling of Emotion in the soul. A human being is an entity that already has various emotions and can remember them even in the absence of a stimulus. Descartes considers six basic emotions; Amazed, Love, Hate, Desire, Joy and Grief think that other emotions are derived from these primary emotions.

“And this surprise has so much power in causing the spirits which are in the cavities of the brain to make their way from thence to the place where is the impression of the object which we wonder at, that it sometimes thrusts them all there, and causes them to be so much occupied in preserving this impression that there are none which pass from thence into the muscles, nor even which in any way turn themselves away from the tracks which they originally pursued in the brain: and this causes the whole body to remain as immobile as a statue, and prevents our perceiving more of the object than the first face which is presented, or consequently of acquiring a more particular knowledge of it. We commonly

call being astonished, and astonishment is an excess of wonder which can never be otherwise than bad” (Descartes, René, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane 1911).

Regarding the sense of curiosity in these expressions, it can be said that according to Descartes, we are dealing with a subject who tries to make sense of the object's knowledge. Feelings of Love and Hate are emotions that can be caused by objects and cause movement in the body. Love is a spiritual excitement; it arises from particles' movements that allow the soul to participate voluntarily in what it sees. Hate is also an excitement born of particles and causes the soul to get rid of what seems harmful to it. These two movements are different and cause the perceived object to be attracted or repulsed by the subject. This feeling, which causes bodily movement, suggests having an idea in the perception of the object. However, the movement revealed by the emotion can prevent the whole meaning of the object, as Spinoza points out.

Descartes defines the movement that the emotion caused by desire will create in the body as agitation rather than movement. Thanks to this turmoil, the soul begins to want what it sees fit for itself in the future. Desire seems different for the subject from other feelings. The subject can potentially objectify the object for himself through desire. According to him, the feeling of joy is a sweet excitement of the soul and arises from the goodness shown by the brain particles as the soul's own. In his explanation of the feeling of joy, Descartes draws attention to the fact that the soul is as if it were itself. It is also essential in terms of the kinetic difference of the body in the classification of these emotions. He argues that the feeling of grief arises from the soul's discomfort due to an evil it encounters or from a defect presented to it as its own by the particles in the brain. Here, the thinker presents the dual nature of the feeling of grief by talking about a stimulus or an illusion that the mind presents as one's own. Descartes' definition of emotions in *Emotions and Moods*, especially his analysis of the particles in the brain and their relationship with the body, provided the key to the structure of emotion long before today's neuroscience studies. Antonio Damasio, who continues his interdisciplinary studies in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, reveals the distinction between emotions and feelings in his work *Self Comes to Mind*:

“Often, the imagination is so beset by these impressions that it is unable at the same time to receive ideas from common sense or to transfer them to the motor mechanism in the way befitting its purely human character. In all these operations, this cognitive power is passive, at another active, and resembles now the seal and now the wax. But the resemblance on this occasion is only one of analogy, for among material things there is nothing wholly similar to this faculty” (Descartes, René, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane 1911).

How emotions are triggered by non-verbal music and melody. Quite simply, images of objects or events happening at the moment or that have happened in the past are now being recalled. The situation you are in makes a difference for the emotional apparatus. “You may be inhabiting a scene of your life and responding to a musical performance or the presence of a friend, or you may be alone and remembering a conversation that upset

you the day before. Whether “live,” reconstructed from memory, or created from scratch in one’s imagination, the images initiate a chain of events. Signals from the processed images are made available to several brain regions. Some of those regions are involved in language, others in movement, and others in manipulations that constitute reasoning. Activity in any of those regions leads to various responses: words with which you can label a certain object; rapid evocations of other images that allow you to conclude something about an object; and so forth. Importantly, signals from the images representing a certain object also land in regions capable of triggering specific emotional chain reaction” (A. R. D. Damasio 1994).

It is crucial to explain the relation of body and emotions from Descartes to Damasio and to define them correctly by the subject. Objects, art objects, convey their knowledge to the subject. In particular, art objects can convey the emotional state of the artist and the emotion that he attributes to the object as information. The subject, who is present in front of the aesthetic object, is not only faced with the quantitative and qualitative features of that object but also with the information of the emotion. The subject, who is present in front of the art object, is not entirely neutral towards the object due to the presence of emotion. It is also the carrier of self-directed feelings, which will soon enter an emotional-information exchange.

Based on the source of knowledge, the philosophy of mind and consciousness, among the suggestions for solutions to the problem of effect in the philosophy of music, some emphasize intuition, which is one of the abilities of the human, and those who emphasize the human senses. This study aims to approach the source of knowledge within the framework of both rationalists, who explain by emphasizing the reasoning ability, and empiricists, who try to describe it by pointing out the sense faculties. In the second part of our book, we analyzed the perspectives of rationalists such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who are the source of knowledge, to understand the philosophy of music of Al-Farabi.

The changes of the Monad are entirely from within so that when the man or animal awakes out of a sleep or trance, his conscious perceptions must have unfolded themselves out of immediately preceding perceptions of an unconscious kind. Again, men share sense-perception and the empirical sequence of memory and imagination with the animals, which resembles the concatenation of rational thought but may be sufficiently distinguished from it. Indeed, in most of our actions and beliefs, we are empirics. For instance, when we expect the dawn, not because we know its cause, but because it has happened regularly in the past (Leibniz 1951).

The memory's structuring of the event or object also brings its judgment. As Damasio puts it, it can be a remembrance of a shape, and it can be a feeling. Thus, an object can be constructed about what the thing is, and it is feeling. For example, cognitive processes perception, memory, imagery, language, thinking, and problem-solving are all based on underlying neurological structures and processes. Indeed, the study of the development of cognition would be incomplete without some understanding of the

fundamental nature of developmental neuropsychology. This section aims to understand better the function of the nervous system throughout the life span of humans” (Solso R.L., MacLin O.H. 2013).

Again, when we examine Leibniz's view that the soul is a perceptual subject in terms of structural perception theory, “Memory provides the soul with a kind of consciousness which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led, employing representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in this previous perception. They come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former occasion” (Leibniz 1951).

Leibniz drew attention to another important concept in the statements above that we identify with the structural perception. This concept is intuition. Based on the statements of the thinker, it is possible to say that he associates the concept of intuition with memory. When we examine the Structuralist theory, we see that the act of intuition is not in the definition. However, suppose intuition is a function of memory. We can examine its connection with remembering and experience by opening a parenthesis again: “I would like to explain briefly what I think can be established about the distinctions and criteria that relate to ideas and knowledge [cognitio]. Thus, knowledge is either obscure or clear and again, clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. Specific knowledge is either inadequate or adequate, and adequate knowledge is either symbolic or intuitive: and. Indeed, if knowledge were, at the same time, both adequate and intuitive, it would be perfect. And indeed, when a notion is very complex, we cannot consider all of its component notions simultaneously. When we can, or insofar as we can, I call knowledge intuitive. There is no knowledge of a distinct primitive notion except intuitive, just as our thinking about composites is for the most part symbolic” (Leibniz 1951).

Leibniz concludes that unless we use intuitive thinking, we do not perceive the ideas of even what we know. And indeed, the philosopher makes us realize that we are often mistaken when we falsely assume that we have already explained some of the terms we use, believing that we have ideas about what we have in mind. Also, what some argue that we can't say anything about something and understand what we're saying unless we have an idea about it, indicates that it's either false or at least vague. Although intuition is an epistemological problem, thinkers have interpreted it with various ideas. The subject, who encounters an aesthetic object, can cognitively process the data of his intuition while defining it. Intuition is the mind's direct grasp of the object or the subject itself, immediately and without reasoning. “Intuition is the mind's direct grasp of the object or the subject itself, immediately and without reasoning. Capable of being known synoptically or as it is in itself or in essence capable of being known through itself as against by agency of something else graspable by intuition self-explanatory. Capable of being appreciated or sympathized with. Supersensible of the nature of mind, reason, or their higher powers.” Rune: p.147

Here we are talking about a direct, unmediated understanding. Intuitionism The doctrine that intuition provides us with absolute knowledge of reality. According to this idea, the non-experimental result can be reached with the mind. Intuition, which seems to be mysterious teaching in this state, is like a faculty that performs the act of grasping at a glance, free from experimental and inferential processes. So, can we consider intuition in the category of reasoning?

There are serious questions about knowing how the brain works when reasoning and thinking and how today's psychology deals with these age-old problems of philosophy. "The human nervous system is capable of handling endless streams of information. The senses serve as the interface between the mind and the external environment, receiving stimuli and translating them into nervous impulses transmitted to the brain. The brain then processes this information and uses the relevant pieces to create thoughts, which can then be expressed through language or stored in memory for future use. The brain does not gather information from external environments only to make this process more complex. The brain also pulls information from emotions and memories when thoughts are formed. Emotion and memory are powerful influences on both our thoughts and behaviors. There are several types of network models in memory research. Some define the fundamental network unit as a piece of information. Network models are not the only models of memory storage, but they do have a great deal of power when it comes to explaining how learning and memory work in the brain, so they are significant to understand" (Solso R.L., MacLin O.H. 2013).

"There are two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact .! The former is the eternal and necessary truths. The latter is contingent. And the difference between them is that the truths of reasoning are either ultimate self-evident principles or truths reducible to such first principles by rigorous logical analysis. In contrast, any attempt to analyze truths of fact into their ultimate grounds leads to an infinite process. I think I have delivered this subject, which conflicts with a particular principle of the general order that I have observed. I hope, therefore, that he will kindly allow me to take this opportunity of explaining this principle, which is of great use in reasoning, and which does not yet appear to be sufficiently employed nor known in all its scope. It has its origin in the conception of the infinite: it is necessary for Geometry, and it also holds good in Physics since the Supreme Wisdom, which is the source of all things, acts as a perfect geometrician, and according to a harmony which. It cannot be bettered. The principal may be stated thus: When the difference between two cases can be diminished below any given magnitude in datis or the antecedents (ce qui est pose), it will necessarily aim he diminished below every given magnitude in quaesitis or the consequences [ce qui en resulte]. Or, to put it more simply: when the rases {or icluit is given) continually approach and are finally lost in one another, the consequences or results {or what is required) must do the same. This again depends upon a more general principle, to wit : (datis ordinations etiam quaesita sunt ordinata)" (Leibniz 1951).

Researchers in the arts and philosophy have conducted experiments to explain errors in using such information, such as knowing by intuition or intuiting a person's life by looking at their appearance. One of them is the "availability hypothesis."

Benedetto Croce (1866 - 1952) is another thinker who includes intuition in the theory of knowledge, especially in aesthetics. Croce deals with the theoretical and practical aspects of the spirit. Theoretically, the spirit is an activity for knowing. Practically it is about willingness. It is primarily the theoretical spirit that we shall deal with here. "Knowledge has two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained through the imagination or knowledge obtained through the intellect; knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the universal; of individual things or the relations between them: it is, in fact, productive either of images or of concepts" (Croce 1922).

In that case, it is possible to talk about the experiential correlation of the relation of intuitive knowledge with the concept. Except that the subject is in memory of the experience and the results of this experience, as in the last example, if he has never seen water, he will not be able to put forward the intuitive way of knowing about the concept. However, he will be able to communicate intuitively with another object that does not have this concept (e.g., water) but looks the same. Croce similarly expresses that perception merges with intuition through experience: Croce brought a new perspective to aesthetics with the concept of intuition and examined it literally as a part of human cognitive characteristics. In intuition, we do not oppose ourselves as an empirical beings to external reality but rather unconditionally objectify our impressions, whatever they may be. Objectification of impressions is an expression. This expression is realized not only with language but also with art objects. As it is understood from here, in intuition, the spirit gives form to impressions, sensations, and emotions, thus freeing them from matter and inertia. Spirit, in this sense, is a forming being and principle. In this case, we cannot separate the memory-experience feature, which we mentioned above, from this process, with the expression that cognitive processing, which is described as the spirit in intuition, shapes sensations and emotions. The complex structure of my brain is exempt from a single element in terms of speed and backward-forward orientation on memory, as we explained in the first chapter during inferential processes. Indeed, Croce does not distinguish between everyday intuition and artistic intuition. Likewise, there is no science of minor intuitions next to a great science of intuition. Next to the science of art intuition, there is no everyday science of intuition; on the contrary, there is only one aesthetic, the science of intuition or expressive knowledge in which the aesthetic and artistic phenomenon occurs. This aesthetic is similar to logic, which deals with forming the most straightforward and most ordinary concepts and constructing the most complex scientific and philosophical systems since both are of the same essence.

"Independent and autonomous in respect to intellectual function; indifferent to later empirical discriminations, to reality and unreality, to formations and apperceptions of space and time, which are also later: intuition or representation is distinguished as form

from what is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or psychic matter; and this form, this taking possession, is expression. To intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than express.” (Croce 1922).

Croce examined aesthetics following the doctrine of sensory science, emphasizing the unity of everyday intuition and artistic intuition, pointing to its importance in terms of cognition. In light of these data, it is clear that we will not evaluate the 'intuition' activity of the subject, who will evaluate an aesthetic object, apart from making sense and inferences. However, it is possible to say that intuition, the subject's first encounter with the aesthetic object, and the identification of that object interact with their memory. It is a process in which the brain performs both the external image of the object and the closest probabilities and predictions in meaning. In this case, the thought that one can jump off a high wall and nothing will happen to them is intuition. It is about experiencing similar activities and processes in the past, even if not one-on-one. When we consider the definition of structural perception theory, including our explanations of intuition, we can see the importance of the mental stance and processes of the subject before structuring the object in front of him in structuring that object. Again, Direct Perception, which we mentioned about the subject's readiness, is the subject of experience in terms of the object showing itself directly.

“The occipital lobe contains most of the visual cortex and is the brain's visual processing center. Cells on the posterior side of the occipital lobe are arranged as a spatial map of the retinal field. The visual cortex receives raw sensory information through sensors in the retina of the eyes, which is then conveyed through the optic tracts to the visual cortex. Other areas of the occipital lobe are specialized for different visual tasks, such as visuospatial processing, color discrimination, and motion perception” (Solso R.L., MacLin O.H. 2013).

In the theory of direct perception, things already offer efficiency to the subject. James Gibson (1966, 1979) gives an audio example on the subject. When we consider the theory of direct perception from a philosophical point of view, it is possible to follow its indirect relationship with the phenomenological approach. In this way, it is possible to rethink the relationship between both approaches (structural and direct).

Husserl envisaged phenomenology as the descriptive, non-reductive science of whatever appears, in the manner of its appearing, in the subjective and intersubjective life of consciousness. He was fascinated by what he regarded as the 'mystery of mysteries': namely, the life of consciousness (*Bewusstseinsleben*), with its unique, inner temporal flow and ability to gain objective knowledge of what transcends it. His account of the necessary forms, structures, and complex interlacings and layerings of this stream of consciousness (*Bewusstseinsstrom*) is considerably more prosperous and more subtle than his contemporaries. His recognition drives Husserl's critique of knowledge that the genuinely human dimension, the dimension of knowing subjectivity (*erkennende Subjektivität*), had been excluded for reasons of the method by the positive sciences. In the interconnecting web of human cognitive performances, the whole architecture of

cognizing subjectivity depends on the essential correlation between a knowing subjectivity and an object known.

“Rather than a method, formal logic and formal noetic provide only the form of a possible method; and useful as a knowledge of form may be methodological, a determinate method — determined not concerning its technical particularity but concerning the universal type of method <to which it belongs> — is a norm which arises from the fundamental regional specificity and the universal structures of the province in question, so that a cognitive seizing upon such a method depends essentially on knowledge of these structures”(Husserl 2014).

Whether the intuition of perception or imagination brings the object to mind, whether the meaningful reference directs itself towards it, or any thought conceived by thought, an introspection must cheerfully and cheerfully raise the object into consciousness. In immanent analysis, the “object,” the joyful or desired state of affairs, is, naturally, not something for its own sake, and the being directed toward it a second thing added on to it. Instead, we have just one thing. Just as in perception, the perceptual apperception and the heeding or observing reference residing in it make up the having-objectively (the phenomenon of an object of one kind or another figuring before the perceiving glance), so, lying in every act is also some apperception with which the figuring-before-the inner-gaze, or the being-directed-toward-it, is constituted. So it is in joy, in desire, etc. An apperception underlies it and is not something apart from the wish, but something interfused with it—is so, though, in such a way that the wish itself, the wish intention, is then directed toward the apperceived object.

“By acts directed to something immanent, more generally formulated, by intensive mental processes related to something imminent, we understand those to which it is essential that their intentional objects, if they exist, belong to the same stream of mental processes to which they belong. For example, that is the case wherever an act is related to an act (wherever a cogitatio relates to a cogitatio) of the same Ego, or where an action relates to a sensuous feeling-Datum belonging to the same Ego, etc. The consciousness and its Object form an individual unity made up purely of mental processes” (Husserl 2014).

In terms of knowledge, not all essences are on the same level. Essences are divided into Immanent essences and Transcendent essences: The essences that phenomenology deals with are immanent. Because phenomenology aims to obtain direct, clear, and precise information, Husserl points out that such knowledge can only be obtained from Immanent essences. The existence spheres of the Transcendent essence and the Immanent essence are separate. Immanent essences are the essences of the sphere of absolute being (pure self). They are won this time. The realm of transcendent essences, on the other hand, is the realm of real beings and things, which is a relative realm of being; and they are derived from this field. There are Immanent and transcendent essences, so there are Immanent and transcendent phenomena. On the other hand, Phenomenological phenomena are Immanent phenomena, as can be easily understood from what has been said above.

Husserl calls the “transcendental person” (or “personality” of the transcendental self) (Person, Persönlichkeit) the gestalt that is formed in the establishment and habituation of egoic acts in internal time (1960, 67, see also 28; see Moran 2014a: p.231) Thus conceived, the self is not merely the node that ties together simultaneous acts. Instead, it is a stratified whole with an immanent genesis and “history” of intentional acting, formed in internal time (Husserl 1960, 66–67, 108; 1993, 120–127).

There is a parallelism between self-perception and perception based on the senses (empirical perception). Every science has a research area, an object area. Every science turns the objects it will investigate into data with a particular perception. It is perception and experience that provides information to the natural attitude. This perception is based on the senses. However, this perception based on the senses can be translated into self-perception by taking reality, object uniqueness, and reality into brackets. This self-perception is the 'pure self,' the equivalent of sense-based perception, no longer empirical. The pure essence here is also an object. Just as the data of sense-based perception is a single object, so the data of self-perception is pure essence. The similarity between these two data is not just an external similarity. There is a genuine devotion between them! As the eidetic object (self) is an object, self-perception is also a perception. Perception-based on the senses provides knowledge of individual objects. This perception grasps the object as it is. Self-perception is also the knowledge of something, an object. The object, which this perception is directed, is also given to this perception. Now self-perception is also a perception. As a perception with content, it fully grasps the essence. But self-perception and empirical perception are also fundamentally different from each other. Self-perception has its characteristics.

The fact that phenomenology is the basis of philosophy, psychology, and logic directly and indirectly of other sciences means that it is a neutral field against all these fields of science. In perceiving something transcendent, that thing must appear. However, life is invisible. Appearance requires a commitment to the place, and life is placeless. In the absence of a spatial entity, it is impossible to appear. This is not a feature of human nature but rather the essence of space.

The transcendent being, of any kind, can only be given to us by its appearance. Otherwise, such a being would also have to be an immanent being. Something that is perceived as immanent can only be perceived as immanent. For example, an emotion may be experienced, but it does not seem like any "thing." If I turn my gaze on myself, what I perceive is something absolute. I can think both right and wrong about him. But what a "seeing" perception sees in it exists and has been given to it absolutely with all its qualities. This cannot be applied to the sound of a lute. The reason is the sound also does not appear. Some of the appearances and styles of this sound change according to the location of the perceiver; It depends on where the person is. If this person approaches, he perceives the sound differently, and if he moves away, he perceives it differently. No view mode can give something absolute.

In daily life, it is said that it is normative to hear a sound or see something as normative. However, this sound can only be called a secondary objectification, since what is seen is partially perceived. Now the following point should be clarified: Husserl states that the data obtained by appearance gives us something absolutely. Because not being able to reveal something absolutely is due to the nature of appearance. Only immanent data can give something absolute. Absolute giving is also a requirement of the immanent perception structure. The perception of the thing and the perception of experience are fundamentally different from each other. That perception is itself a non-random continuum of perception, always the same object always presenting itself with other symptoms, this too is a matter of pure essence.

In short, there is a vast but unexplored field of "consciousness analysis". The source problems, which escaped the distorted stance of naturalism, which they have been chattering for centuries, are now the problems of phenomenology. The problems of space conception, time-, object-, number conceptions, source of cause-effect conceptions are also phenomenological problems. Only if these pure problems are meaningfully identified, formulated, and resolved, then the experience problem of these conceptions as events of human consciousness, scientifically intelligible and reach meaningful solutions. Just like hearing a voice directly, an essence, the essence of the sound, the essence of the image of things, the essence of the visual object, the essence of image representation, the essence of judgment or the essence of will can be seen directly, and judgments can be made about the essence through intuition. If pure phenomenology as science remains pure and does not assert or use the existence of nature, only self-study, but never the study of being, any judgment based on self-observation and any experience falls outside its framework. The only one is in the immanent area but as something like that! Flowing perceptions occur as reminiscences and can become precise self-concepts to which their self-analysis is owed. Though the individuum is not the essence, it "has" an essence; this can be expressed in unambiguous validity.

This retention structure of present consciousness extends beyond the immediate sensory impression to what has just passed before it. It holds onto contents that have just passed so that we can experience such things as change, duration, and temporal unities. Concerning our musical example, retention makes possible our ability to hear melodies as melodies rather than as individual, distinct notes.

Sonata is expressive music as an expression of emotions and moods. "Music itself became a picture of things. Even flute playing or dancing are, after all, nothing but imitations; for the flute player or the dancer represents' by his rhythms men's characters as well as what they do and suffer. And the whole history of poetics was influenced by the device of Horace, "ut pictura poesis," and by the saying of Simonides, "painting is mute poetry and poetry a speaking picture." Poetry is differentiated from painting by the mode and means, but not by the general function of imitation." (Cassirer 1944). "In memory, there is at first, perhaps, the consciousness of, e.g., the course of a piece of music unmodified reflectionally in the mode of the 'past.' But there belongs to the essence of

the object of such consciousness the possibility of reflecting on the having-been-perceived of that object. There likewise exists for expectation, for consciousness foreseeing ‘what is coming,’ the eidetic possibility of turning one’s regard away from what is coming to its having-become-perceived. Inherent in these eidetic connections is the fact that the statements, I remember A and ‘I have perceived A, ‘I foresee A, and ‘I will perceive A, are a priori and immediately equivalent — but they are only equivalent since the sense is different in each case”(Husserl 2014)

In a general sense, this means that corporeality, sensation, and the possibilities of physical movement are considered necessary conditions for perception. One can argue that the physical makeup of organisms and, more specifically, human organisms, although factually contingent, has a transcendental status. Our physical makeup is thus the presupposition for the possibility of the experience of a concordant (temporally and spatially ordered) “world” (Ainbinder 2020). Husserl will later observe that the situation is similar to that of the identity maintained by a piece of music when performed on many occasions or an engraving when reproduced in manifold copies. The same word and the same sentence can be reiterated indefinitely as identical in its singularizations giving the linguistic embodiment of meaning a “spiritual corporeality.” In a general sense, this means that corporeality, sensation as well as the possibilities of physical movement are considered necessary conditions for perception.

As such, one can argue that the physical makeup of organisms and, more specifically, of human organisms, although factually contingent, has a transcendental status. Our physical makeup is thus the presupposition for the possibility of the experience of a concordant (temporally and spatially ordered) “world” (Ainbinder 2020). Furthermore, books are perceived, music is perceived, and buildings are perceived. Everything we say about the perception of inanimate things would also apply to these objects (Carr 2021: p.48).

When we consider the theory of direct perception and intuition, the fact that the object opens itself to us and the subject can perceive it as appropriate is in line with the idea that Croce also defined with the experience-concept relationship. However, the fact that the same piece of music played in two different tones is different but still sounds the same according to the theory of direct perception is the contingent result of the subject regarding intuition. The readiness of the aesthetic subject against the aesthetic object and its relationship with the object is a very dynamic structure. As we mentioned in the evaluation of an aesthetic object, many factors should be considered together with the cognitive processes of the subject. The physiological characteristics of each subject and the world of experience differ.

In this case, we can consider the theory of direct perception as the first step in the subjects’ perception of an aesthetic object. The structural perception theory includes components such as emotion-experience and object-experience, including intuitive properties, as the second step. In connection with the theory of direct perception, we

examine the readiness of the aesthetic object, the effect of the properties of the object on the subject's readiness, and finally, the dialectical process between them.

3.7 Availability of the Aesthetic Object

The aesthetic object that the aesthetic subject is confronted with is there to be defined independently of all minds in the field of existence, again by a mind. We can say that an aesthetic object has the physical characteristics of an ordinary object but contains its subject because an artist created it. It is possible to call it a "living object" in this state. The classical aesthetic tradition has examined the aesthetic object with an objectivist and subjectivist attitude. Then the modern tradition has gone to the evaluation of aesthetic objects by combining these two approaches. What interests us here is what a work of art is. Although it is about the attitude of the aesthetic subject, it requires the work to be handled on its own. As we have mentioned before, the aesthetic object differs from each other in terms of its existential properties. As an object, qualitative and quantitative designs, such as sound, sculpture, painting, poetry, and dance, will finally meet with a perception. However, perception may not always make a reasonable judgment about the object's certainty with its object. In this case, it would be incomplete to examine the aesthetic object without evaluating it together with a perception.

Accordingly, we can access a method similar to Descartes' doubt method for our perceptions. When the subject in front of the aesthetic object first separates his perception about the object with the method of doubt, he can examine the object independently of judgments. First of all, what the subject encounters is a matter: "That the defining characteristic of which is extension, occupancy of space, mass, weight, motion, movability, inertia, resistance, impenetrability, attraction and repulsion, or their combinations, these characteristics or powers themselves, the extra-mental cause of sense experience, what composes the "sensible world", the manipulable, the permanent (or relatively so); the public (accessible to more than one knower, non-private); (2) the physical or nonmental, (3) the physical, bodily, or nonspiritual, the relatively worthless or base; (4) the inanimate; (5) the worldly or natural (non supernatural); (6) the wholly or relatively indeterminate potentiality for receiving form or what has that potentiality; that which in union with form constitutes an individual; differentiating content as against form; the particular as against the universal, (7) the manifold of sensation, the given element in experience as against that supplied by mind; (8) that of which something consists, that from which a thing develops or is made, (9) the first existent or primordial stuff, (10) what is under consideration. (Runes, 1942, p. 191)

The motion of the matter can create a change in perception with the area it occupies and its displacement feature. Examining the subject of matter with his metaphysical work, Aristotle states the following:

Since the expression 'that whereby we live and perceive' has two meanings, just like the expression 'that whereby we know'—that may mean either (a) knowledge or the soul, for we can speak of knowing by or with either, and similarly that whereby we are in health may be either (a) health or (b) the body or some part of the body; and since of the

two terms thus contrasted knowledge or health is the name of a form, essence, or ratio, or if we so express it an actuality of a recipient matter—knowledge of what is capable of knowing, the health of what is capable of being made healthy (for the operation of that which is capable of originating change terminates and has its seat in what is changed or altered); further since it is the soul by or with which primarily we live, perceive, and think;—it follows that the soul must be a ratio or formulable essence, not a matter or subject. For, as we said, three the word substance has. Three meanings—form, matter, and the complex of both—and of these three, what is called matter is potentiality, what is called form actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the Tightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body and a body of a definite kind. Therefore, it was a mistake to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body. Reflection confirms the observed fact; the actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a matter of its own appropriate to it. From all this it follows that soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled. (Aristoteles, 414a- 415).

Aristotle examined the concept of matter without leaving any doubt in perception, and realized a meta-physical view with the idea of the object and the substance. The difference of art objects from each other is also related to their items. For example, the quality of sound is different from the quality of sculpture. As can be understood from the definition, an object is that which occupies space in space and is related to time. The aesthetic object that exists with the burden of quantity and quality is the one that is about to be perceived.

Henri Bergson examined the relationship of the subject to matter in his work called *Matter and Memory*. “Now the essence of every form of materialism is to maintain the contrary, since it holds that consciousness, with all its functions, is born of the mere interplay of material elements. Hence it is led to consider even the perceived qualities of matter, sensible, and consequently felt, qualities, as so many phosphorescences which follow the track of the cerebral phenomena in the act of perception. Matter, thus supposed capable of creating elementary facts of consciousness, might therefore just as well engender intellectual facts of the highest order. It is, then, of the essence of materialism to assert the perfect relativity of sensible qualities, and it is not without good reason that this thesis, which Democritus has formulated in precise terms, is as old as materialism.” (Bergson 1998). The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely that which it appears to be. Thereby we eliminate all virtuality, all hidden power, from matter and establish the phenomena of spirit as an independent reality. But to do this, we must consider those qualities which materialists and spiritualists alike strip from it: the latter that they may make of the representations of the spirit, the former that they may regard them only as of the accidental garb of space. Matter, consciousness, and time concepts may also differ according to the

presence of aesthetic objects concerning their mode of existence. In this respect, it seems appropriate to consider the arts separately. This, indeed, is the attitude of common sense concerning the matter, and for this reason, common sense believes in spirit. It seems that philosophy should here adopt the attitude of common sense, although correcting it in one respect. Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration. Thus, by a twofold operation compels us, de facto, to perceive matter in ourselves. In contrast, de jure perceive matter within matter(Bergson 1998).

What is the aesthetic significance of the musical arousal of emotions by the emotional qualities of music? Admittedly, this may constitute evidence that a listener has perceived the music's emotional qualities (Davies 1994: 314–15), but that does not endow them with aesthetic significance. A somewhat different idea is that the arousal of emotion may help a listener understand and appreciate the musical work, alerting the listener to what the music is expressing (Robinson 2005: 348–78, forthcoming b).

3.8 The Presence of Music: The motion of Sounds to Emotions in the Philosophy of Music

A visual dream; is a different visual experience without seeing anything rather than an actual visual experience with a real presence in the visual field. With this overview of imagination at hand, I now inquire about the connections between imagination and music, from our basic perception of music to its philosophical nature. Some research in the philosophy of music takes an analytical or linguistic approach, always focusing on terms such as meaning, metaphor, emotion, and expression from the perspective of the individual listener or composer. Our research revolves around ethical values as the primary basis of mediation between production and reception based on musical time, the multiple levels of matter, and its internal dialectic. The fact that matter and energy form the basis of objects and take place opposite the subject as phenomena has led to the question of what kind of matter they are or what they are physical. In particular, it is essential to perceive what kind of object the music and the sound that creates it is. The sound seems different from other objects in terms of mobility (physics). "Physics is a postulate-based enterprise. This means that the assumptions of the foundations of things make sense as postulates. "Physics is a hypothetical enterprise. This means that assumptions of the foundations of things make sense as assumptions. Or it's up to us to understand (given) correctly and (assume), build a model and understand how the world works"(Rogers 2013).

First of all, to investigate and understand the physical characteristics of the music we listen to, it is necessary to deal with it philosophically. The result is to be reached in understanding physics and music; Music as a physical phenomenon can be understood under the principle of physics. Understanding and evaluating how music works behind physics principles leads to a richer understanding of music(Rogers 2013).

Utilizing the mathematical formula of physics, Pythagoras was a philosopher interested in physical objects and numbers and brought this interest to his philosophy,

especially music, to philosophical thought. Pythagoras discovered the sound scheme and found the chord scheme. The problem, however, was where to divide the tones on the instrument. While Pythagoras taught his students, he also defined their wisdom. We must not forget that he also discovered harmonic science and proportions. But to explain this, we need to go back a bit in time. Once, as he carefully studied music and his sense of sight was finalized by the compass rule, telescope or touch was balanced, and Pythagoras was walking past a shop, he heard hammers hammering a piece of iron on the anvil and making harmonious sounds, and except one. But in these voices, the philosopher recognized the harmony of the octave, the fifth, and the fourth. He found that the sound between the fourth and the fifth was a dissonance when taken by itself and still complemented the giant sound between them. (K. S. Guthrie 1987).

About the vernal season, he used a melody in this manner. In the middle was placed a person who played on the lyre, and seated around him in a circle were those able to sing. Then the lyrist in the center struck up, and the singers raised certain paeans, through which they were evidently so overjoyed that their manners became elegant and orderly. This music instead of medicines was also used at certain other times. Certain melodies were devised as remedies against the passions of the soul, as also against despondency and lamentation, which were invented by Pythagoras specifically for this. Further, he employed other melodies against anger and rage, and all other aberrations of the soul. Another kind of modulation was invented against desires. He likewise used dancing, which was accompanied by the lyre, instead of the pipe, which he conceived to have an influence towards insolence, being theatrical, and by no means liberal (K. S. Guthrie 1987).

This invention can be compared to the transformation of matter into form. Sound ceases to be the thing that resonates in the vast void, and turns into a harmonic structure with mathematical formulas. When we analyze the ontological structure of sound as a whole, we encounter its dimensional features. All physical quantities have 'dimensions'. Simply length, mass and time. When solving dimensions, it's substantial to treat them as algebraic variables exclusively (K. S. Guthrie 1987).

It shows that where the subject has no perception of time, this feature of sound and time exists without being perceived. This finding, which is suitable for the physical object of the sound, also reveals its difference in terms of its readiness as an object. Particularly, the cooperation of the object with time makes the functioning of its perception obvious. If the beginning or next notes of the melody meet with a subject in a period of time, the subject encounters the structure that the harmonic structure tries to convey to the listener after encountering the quantitative features of that melody, such as tonal structure, beat over time, loudness, from any time of the melody. In this case, the encounter of music with an ear and consciousness will be understood when we examine it from the perspective of Husserl's phenomenology. Clearly this first concept of consciousness can be 'phenomenologically purified' to yield the deeper notion Husserl wants to work with.

The most important question waiting to be answered here should be: ‘What makes something appear in this system, which is life, that is, connective holistic? And what is the visibility of the object?’

These were questions of a phenomenology of perception; These are also questions that manage the Visible and the Invisible through dimensions devoted first to the critical examination of philosophy intertwined with scientific inquiry, then transcendental philosophy, dialectical philosophy, and intuitive philosophy. Trying to renew these questions once again, instead of questioning the visibility itself, that is, the clarity of reality, is a questioning towards the functioning of the system, the reality of what is functional within a connected totality. If the philosopher questions the world and world view that is constantly shaped, functioning and shaped within himself, and therefore acts as if he has no knowledge, it is precisely in order to activate the system's knowledge of truth. Because revealing science, knowledge and truth requires metaphysical functionality. A real conversation is to question the unknown and its purpose. to provide access to ideas. The universe of truth and thought is established by borrowing from the world structure. When we try to express consciousness of a truth, we find nothing better than to appeal to what is common to minds or humans, just as the sensible world is common to sensory bodies. Only by triggering this methodological system of analysis can sensory data announce or manifest something, or at least the inner principle that it is something and through it is recognizable. At the center of sensory experience is the intuition of essence, meaning, meaning. The logical is where the invisible is captured in the visible. “The perceived world is not only my world, but the one in which I see the behaviour of other people take shape for their behaviour equally aims at this world which is the counterpart not only of my consciousness but of any consciousness which I can possibly encounter” (Merleau-Ponty 1962).

Husserl exemplified the physics of sound in his lecture on phenomenology, which set off from its relationship with time, with this example Husserl aims to distinguish between the *appearances* (*Erscheinungen*) and what appears (*das erscheinende Objekt*). The sound continues a little; we too have the clearly given unity of the sound and its duration with its present and past tense phases. As a result, the concept of the phenomenological reduction acquires a more precise and deeper determination, and a clearer sense: it is not the exclusion of the really [reel] transcendent (say, in the psychological-empirical sense), rather it is the exclusion of the transcendent as such, as an existence to be assumed, that is, everything that is not absolute givenness in the genuine sense the absolute givenness of pure seeing. But of course everything else we said remains the same: validities, actualities, etc., that have been scientifically induced or deduced, or derived from hypotheses, facts, or axioms, remain excluded and are permitted only as "phenomena"; and, of course, the same holds for all recourse to any "knowing" [Wissen, Erkenntnis]: research must restrict itself to pure seeing - but not, therefore to the really [reel] immanent. For it is research in the sphere of pure evidence, and, moreover, it is

research into essences. We also said that its field is the a priori within absolute self-givenness. (Husserl 2014).

Husserl defines perception thus: Perception in itself (Wahrnehmung in sich) is perception of a perceived (eines Wahrgenommenen); its essence is to bring some object to appearance (Gegenständliches zur Erscheinung) and to posit what appears as something believed (glaubensmassig): as an existing actuality (Moran 2016).

Husserl indicates how this requirement will be satisfied by making the familiar Cartesian move in Lecture II: while the knowledge of external objects is problematic, the knowledge of internal objects is not. Not all knowledge is saddled with the problem of transcendence. For in the direct reflective apprehension of its own acts, consciousness does not move beyond itself. It remains within the sphere of immanence. While it is possible to doubt the validity of our knowledge of objects transcendent to consciousness it makes no sense to doubt our claims about what is given within the very midst of consciousness itself. In the former case we can always doubt whether we have it right; in the latter case, Husserl claims, doubt makes no sense. For here we have a sphere of absolute givenness where what we claim can be directly measured by what we see, without remainder. Here consciousness does not go beyond what is immediately given to it (Husserl 2014).

When there is a musical object in front of the subject, we mention that the note perceived by the subject anywhere in time has an incomplete structure because it does not include the next ones. When the piece of music appears, it is not whole in front of the subject as it has not completed all its time. A musical composition that completes its time can only manifest itself as a whole and is not perceived by the subject when it expires. The work of Gestalt psychologists has shown beyond a doubt that understanding is not a matter of perceiving single stimuli or simple sound combinations in isolation. Gestalt concepts of the laws of continuity and completion recognize a similar tendency in the habits of the mind. The question that might be raised, and one that we will not attempt to answer, is this: To what extent the laws of continuity and completion themselves a product of the tendency of voluntary motor behavior to perpetuate itself and follow the least resistance are? In other words, is the tendency of the eye to continue its motion in each way or the "mental ear" to continue its motions to some extent a product of the natural tendencies of motor behavior? (Meyer 1956).

Gestaltists believe that the organism rearranges experience by adding something of itself to sensations coming from the outside. Gestalt psychologists opposed behavioral and structural psychologists. Structuralists the chemistry of the mind; They sought to understand their structure and processes by analyzing their organization and composition down to the minor units. They used the "introspection" method for this purpose.

Gestaltists stated that any analysis that reduces the mind to its elements would give a wrong idea, and they objected to examining the structure of the mind with such a fundamental approach. Although Gestaltists see the "introspection" method as a suitable method for psychology, They argued that it should not be used to divide experiences but

examine meaningful and integrated experiences. The organ that receives the sense of hearing is the ear, and the energy that creates the sensation is sound. Sound waves collected by the outer ear are transmitted to the nerve endings in the inner ear via the middle ear. Stimulants are received by sensitive cells; they are sensitive to sound effects and transmit them to the brain by converting them into electrical and chemical signals. Stimuli transmitted to the brain are perceived as various sounds. Hearing experience is a necessary action; It is impossible to turn off the senses at unwanted times. Man has limited control over what he hears. Sound adds dimension to urban spaces. Urban open spaces have natural and manufactured sounds. The sounds that can be considered of natural origin are wind breeze, bird sounds, and the sounds created by the water element.

The change in the states of objects relative to each other creates the perception of motion in humans. When going to a place, depending on the movement and direction, the more possibilities there are, the greater the wealth of movement. Accordingly, the duration of being in the place also differs. Depending on the speed, the information received from the environment and perceptions differ. Stimuli that are close to each other are grouped in a pattern like parts of the same object, and their proximity perceives the grouping of auditory stimuli to each other over time. Conversation with pauses between words and sentences; We make sense of reading and writing according to the distinction between words and punctuation marks.

Aristotle states the following about 'Change and Motion' in his *Metaphysics*: The motion which is due to the activity of sense in these three modes of its exercise will differ from the activity of sense; the first kind of derived motion is free from error while the sensation is present; and the others may be erroneous whether it is present or absent, especially when the object of perception is far off. Suppose then imagination presents no other features than those enumerated and is what we have described. In that case, imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense.

Since when one thing has been set in motion, another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself this movement must be necessary. Incapable of existing apart from sensation, incapable of existing except when we perceive such that in virtue of its possession, that in which it is found may present various phenomena both active and passive, and such that it may be either true or false. (Aristoteles, 428b)

So it will become necessary to take refuge in the metaphysical sense of the word and attribute the motion we perceive in space to profound causes, analogous to those our consciousness believes it discovers within the feeling of effort. But is the feeling of effort the sense of a profound cause? Have not decisive analyses shown that there is nothing in this feeling other than the consciousness of movements already effected or begun at the body's periphery? In vain, then, we seek to find the reality of motion on a cause that is distinct from it: analysis always brings us back to the motion itself (Bergson 1998).

The spatial place (topos) where the audience and artists come together is the only area they communicate with and again constitutes a unity with the artist. There are many different opinions about the place. According to this view, it is expressed as the presentation of the staged music performance and the conditions of the place to the perception. Although the geometric structure of the space is striking at first, the internal time of movement and rhythm is limited to that space. Internal time can be regarded as the rhythm of the staged performance. Performance pre-configures its movements on the axis of space width and the establishment of objects.

Yet something emanates from them which is distinct from the visual or aural perceptions of a person, which can nevertheless be physically experienced when seeing or hearing that thing; something which pours itself out into the performative space between the thing and the perceiving subject, a specific atmosphere. Something similar happens to space. When the architectural-geometric turns into the performative space, its so-called primary qualities, i.e., its dimension and volume can be sensed and affect the perceiving subject (Fischer-Lichte 2008.) Space is not the setting (accurate or logical) in which things are arranged but the means whereby the positing of things become possible. Instead of imagining it as a sort of ether in which all things float or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic that they have in common, we must think of it as the universal power enabling them to be connected. Therefore, either I do not reflect but live among things and vaguely regard space at one moment as the setting for things, at another as their moment of the relationships which underlie this word, realizing then that they live only through the medium of a subject who shall describe and sustain them, and passing from spatialized to spatializing space (Merleau-Ponty 1962). In many ways, sound represents such remarkable material that all semiotic principles are strange. It only comes out when it makes a sound. It cannot survive the breath that created it but must be reborn with each new breath; It is a material that exists only in ecstasy. Not only does sound combine tonality, corporeality, and spatiality, so that the materiality of the performance constantly renews itself within it. In this way, the articulated subject's being-in-the-bodily-world expresses itself and addresses those who hear it within their own-in-the-bodily world. Sound builds a bridge and establishes a relationship between two subjects. It fills the gap between them. People reach out to touch those who hear, making their voices audible.

Unlike corporeality, spatiality, and tonality, temporality cannot be subsumed in the performance's materiality. Yet it constitutes the condition of possibility for their appearance in space. As we have seen, the performance's materiality is not simply given; it instead appears and disappears in the course of the performance. Materiality represents an emergent phenomenon: it emerges, is stabilized for varying periods, and vanishes again. Individual subjects contribute to its generation without being able to determine or control it. On the contrary, they must be willing to submit to it to a certain degree (Fischer-Lichte 2008).

Merleau-Ponty has made a phenomenological analysis of the subject's view of space. Thus, it may be possible to bring an interpretation to the view and perception of the

watching subject. Determinations about perceiving the space without performing the act of reflection, recapturing the space by performing the act of reflection. The stage can also clarify the perception of the space at the first encounter. As the place where the watching subject first encounters and the place where a performance work is first present, the place can be evaluated as to its quantitative feature in terms of giving an idea about what it is. The stage (source) constantly sends a verbal or nonverbal message to the audience (receiver). Without going into content analysis of aesthetic objects, we touched on the differences in their encounter with the subject. When we consider various art objects in terms of existence, time and space, and their relationship with the subject, we see that an art object cannot be evaluated independently of the subject. The subject's presence in the face of an art object and the presence of an art object in the face of the subject require each other.

On the other hand, the various art fields that we have examined show the sameness and separation from each other from time to time in terms of readiness. After the music we discussed first, we saw that dance and theater meet the subject again in time since time is the subject and involves a process. This encounter also brings about being ready again.

4. RECIPROCITY IN TERMS OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTION

In general, one of the most essential elements of the presence of aesthetic objects to meet their audience is that another subject is the artist (creator) of that aesthetic object. The subject who makes sense of an aesthetic object is not only confronted with the object but also with another subject. In particular, studies on objects and perceptions contribute to cognitive studies. From a philosophical point of view, the problem of intersubjectivity and discussions are precious in terms of understanding the consciousness of the other. The language-thought-world axis has left its place to the aesthetic object-thought-world in the problem of aesthetic intersubjectivity. The artist paints the world with relic objects, and the viewer must analyze the objects to understand this depiction.

4.1 Reciprocity in Art in the Context of Intersubjectivity

When the historical development process of the problem of the other is analyzed, it is pointed out that the roots of the problem are mostly and intensely based on subjective idealism. Before, doubting the natural world should be considered up to Plato's distinction between the world of ideas and the visible world, episteme, and doxa. The subject, who could not see the ideal structure of the universal in the phenomenal world, started to doubt all the objects it came into contact with. Method of Doubt Wanting to avoid what he considered the faulty rationalism of the Medieval philosophers (he thought their conclusions dubious), Descartes subjected every idea to doubt. Before he would accept any idea as accurate, it had to meet his certainty test. He began by trying to doubt everything: (1) the reality of the physical world (the senses), (2) the validity of mathematics (universals), and (3) God (transcendence). (Price 2000: p. 194) This

determination, which took place in the history of philosophy, later became evident in Berkeley's philosophy and became visible based on his philosophy.

As it is known, George Berkeley claimed that all that conscious beings can ever experience is the contents of their consciousness. Nothing else can be known to exist. "everything that conscious beings can experience consists of their consciousness. It was impossible to know that there was anything other than that. We know, said Berkeley, that experiences inhere in a subject because each one of us has immediate awareness of being such a subject and a subject having experiences. But we could never possess corresponding grounds for believing that these experiences are attached to objects that are not us. Therefore, said Berkeley, consistent empiricism leads us to conclude that what exists are minds and their contents, subjects, and experiences. There are no grounds for believing in the existence of anything else (Magee 2000: p. 110, 111). It can only exist as the mental or perceived thing which Berkeley defines it to be, nay even as the thing of which we are conscious when we perceive it; but it does not require for its existence that anyone should be conscious of it. When we think from the Berkeley perspective, we conclude that the qualities of an object vary from person to person. Berkeley specifically mentioned qualifications. In that case, the remaining quantities of the object, such as space, size, etc. Can we be sure of the certainty of the knowledge of such perceptions?

"We thus see that the Essence of a thing is merely its nature (its constituent parts, as it were) and that its Existence is, in each case, merely the localized condition of this essence or nature among the permanent acts of the universe, without reference to what its essence or nature may be the combination, that is, of the mental essence in question and its laws with the other similar essences about which it stands a state of things which neither requires nor admits of any intermission. Thus we see at once that a thing's being a perception something that could not exist without the aid of mind does not imply that it exists; but merely that since there is a percipient nature, the perceptual or perceived nature can be constituted, i.e. can exist, and as far as very Essence therefore or Nature is concerned, can continue unintermittingly to do so. We can perceive it under the prescribed condition of an organ of sense: but this adds nothing to its existence" (Berkeley, G., & Simon 1907).

George Berkeley summarizes from his Principles of Human Knowledge, giving an example of how subjective ideas generalize. Anyone who has proven and thought that qualities such as unique, color, and taste are only in mind points out that not being out of mind exists equally strongly in form and motion. It is clear that in a thoughtless mind, the qualities of external objects cannot be known (Berkeley, G., & Simon 1907). Is the knowledge acquired by sensation specific? Most of the ancients believe that the testimony of the senses must be ignored. The sceptics sum up their doubts in the following argument: The object perceived by the senses is nothing but a modification of the subject, and the facts which, the senses tell us, are taking place outside of us, are in reality merely taking place in us. The senses are my senses; they are a part of myself; the sensation is a fact produced in me, which I explain by an external cause; whereas the thinking subject might

be it is determining but unconscious cause as quickly as any object. How can we reach a certain knowledge of the existence and nature of external things in that event? If the object I perceive is merely my sensation, how can I prove that it exists outside of me? (Weber 1927). Pleasure is a quality typical to the rose sensation, the violet sensation, and the jasmine sensation; pain is a quality common to the odor of afoetida, decaying matter, etc. These common characteristics are distinguished, separated, and abstracted, from the particular sensations with which they are associated, and thus arise the abstract notions of pleasure, pain, number, duration, etc.

These are general ideas, being common to several states or modes of being of the statute. We do not need an extraordinary faculty to explain them. Abstraction itself, the highest function of the understanding, is a modification of sensation, which, consequently, embraces all the faculties of the soul. The inner perception, or me, is merely the sum of the sensations we now have and those we have had. Condillac endows his statue with a single sense, the sense of smell, and then evolves all mental faculties out of sensation. Any one of the five senses would have served his purpose equally well (Weber 1927).

However, these studies helped investigate the cognitive characteristics of the subject and helped gather information about the cognitive characteristics. Condillac drew attention to the importance of memory by saying that inner perception or the self is nothing but the sum of what the memory reminds us of with our current sensations. All these discussions also left us with questions about the brain's complex structure. The problem of representation of the external world in the mind, perception, memory, thinking, and how a subject perceives the objects of the external world (phenomena) and other subjects as they are has begun to be examined by thinkers. In particular, the ongoing research of the "I" by the representatives of the German idealism movement since Descartes has brought different approaches to the problem of intersubjectivity.

We indeed, when, as is reasonable, we consider objects of sense as mere appearances, as a result of this confess that they are based upon a thing in itself. However, we know not this thing as to its internal constitution, but only know its phenomena, viz. : the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming phenomena, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such beings as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere beings of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. Our critical deduction by no means excludes beings of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be turned into mere phenomenon, but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception : that we neither know nor can know anything at all determinate of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as

soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever.' (Kant, I. 2001 p. 73,74)

In the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to possible experience, the employment of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the intuition alone, partly on the existence of a phenomenon. But the a priori conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible experience absolutely necessary, those of the existence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves contingent. Hence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of absolute necessity, that is, will be apodictic; those, on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the character of an a priori necessity indeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in an experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. Consequently they will not possess that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former, although their application to experience does not, for that reason, lose its truth and certitude. But of this point we shall be better able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles. The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of principles, because these are nothing else than rules for the objective employment of the former. Accordingly, all principles of the pure understanding are: 1. Axioms of Intuition. 2. Anticipations of Perception 3. Analogies of Experience Postulates of Empirical Thought in general (Kant 1998: p.174).

When we consider the role of memory here, it is possible to justify the mental relation of the external subject about objects and other subjects. Kant mentions that the cat of time and space cannot be known in itself, Objects are in relation to this time and space. "Since time itself cannot be perceived, the existence of objects in time can only be known through their connection in time, and can only be known a priori by relating concepts. In that case, objects are in a relationship with time, and we can't seem to know this, but we can know through related concepts that these concepts have elements that they necessarily carry. These; "The three modes of time are continuity, succession and simultaneity, so there will be three rules of temporal relations of phenomena, each phenomenon can be determined according to this phenomenon in terms of the unity of time. These rules precede all experience and make it possible. These will precede the subject's experience. The fact that these rules precede experience and are rules does not seem to leave knowledge about phenomena to chance. The perception that we obtain from the phenomena, our knowledge and our experience with them in this way, does not seem to be swaying. Because in the past tense we perceive situations where events follow each other and things are opposite. Then we actually connect the two perceptions.

The subject here actively establishes a synthetic unity of perception with the help of memory while perceiving things. We will then derive the subjective succession of distinction from the objective succession of phenomena, because the former will be completely indeterminate and we will not be able to distinguish phenomena from one another (Immanuel Kant 1998). . It is evidently repeated by Kant that subjective distinctions are based on phenomena. All experience and possibility requires a power of

understanding, and the first thing this understanding does is not to make the designs of objects clear, but to make the design of an object in general possible (Immanuel Kant 1998).

Postulates of empirical thought in general: 1. Formal conditions of experience (in terms of concepts and intuitions) are possible. 2- The material conditions of experience, the one connected with sensation, is actual. 3. It must be determined according to the universal conditions of the experience and the Actual (Immanuel Kant 1998). The fact that experience is possible in terms of concepts and intuitions, especially that it is necessary under the universal conditions of experience, made it possible. For the determination of things entails the relation of things to the formal conditions of an experience in general (...) the objective form of experience in general includes the whole synthesis for knowledge of objects. If a concept is not related to the object, in other words, if it is not related to the synthesis of the object, it is considered empty and is not related to any object (Immanuel Kant 1998).

It could be argued that we are under the reflexive motion that drives our behavior. If it were not for these dialectical processes, it would not be possible for us to bring the objects I experience under the concept. Another question here is to investigate what other mechanisms are that vary within the dialectical processes. Revonsuo separated pure phenomenal consciousness from reflective consciousness. These observations suggest that the total contents of iconic memory match the contents of momentary phenomenal consciousness in vision: both consist of a wide field rather than a narrow spotlight. Furthermore, the contents of the reportable part of iconic memory match the contents of selective attention or the centre of consciousness, and thus also the contents of the ensuing reflective consciousness. Most importantly, the experiments establish that there is more in the phenomenal visual field at any moment than what can be reported or attended to. The nonreportable contents in the phenomenal background form, nonetheless, a significant portion of the total contents of consciousness as they are phenomenally present for the subject, at least briefly. (As a self-awareness: Reflective consciousness that combines current self-related experience (e.g. self-image seen in the mirror) with the self-representation in long-term memory) (Revonsuo 2009).

According to Revonsuo, pure phenomenal consciousness includes sense, perception, emotional experiences and feelings. Reflective consciousness may or may not be dependent on a phenomenon. However, pure phenomenal consciousness appears to be the source of reflexive consciousness. Accordingly, we can say that there is an interaction between them. On the other hand, we made the distinction between the art object, its dialectical processes, between symbolic language and non-symbolic language. If we accept the dialectical processes as reflective processes, in the use of non-symbolic language, that is, in the case of making judgments with semantic content, it may be appropriate for an art object dialectic to evaluate feelings and emotional experiences under the reflective experiences, which Revonsuo evaluated under the title of phenomenal

consciousness. In this case, it can be stated that reflective consciousness (dialectical process) also works with emotions through memory and association.

It has been argued that introspection can be realized in different ways, that the dialectical act can have different aspects in terms of our subject, and that there are three forms. These are analytic introspection, interpretative introspection, and descriptive introspection. Analytical introspection is the type of introspection used by Edward Titchener's school of so-called structuralism. (...) The aim is to analyze an experience down to its simplest phenomenal elements, pure, isolated senses and attributes (Revonsuo 2009). This view was rejected as different results were obtained. But painters may be using something like analytical introspection to capture similarity to the visual experience, decomposing patterns of light and color in a landscape and transforming them into watercolor or oil painting patterns on canvas (Revonsuo 2009). This interpretation in parentheses by Revonsuo seems to support our answer that we have discussed throughout this study, that quantitative and qualitative values are the help of subjective dialectical processes. The reflection of the dialectical processes of the symbolic expressions of quantity and some qualities on the canvas by the painter is a proof of the real image and the image on the canvas. In the analytical consciousness, experience seems to be reducible to the simplest phenomenal structure.

For the mind must be acquainted with the possibilities of action. Such acquaintance can explain the existence of an impulse in the ego, prior to all actions, precisely because it is an impulse, in which the inner activity of the Ego is limited. (Fichte 2006: p. 216) In this case, the artist's ability to capture a visual experience, essentially distinguishing patterns of light and color, may be due to the mind's familiarity with the possibilities of action. Another perspective, interpretive introspection, includes knowledge of everyday life. We naturally use this type of introspection when we try to interpret or explain our feelings and other experiences (Revonsuo 2009). In our daily experiences, we also experience emotions in this introspection method. This type of introspection method can also bring about illusions. However, empirical observations from both normal healthy subjects and from certain neuropsychological syndromes have made it clear that our plausible-sounding stories are often mere post hoc rationalizations that keep up the appearance, for ourselves as well as for others, that we are in charge and we always know what we are doing and why we are doing it. In reality, our choices may be determined by factors we are completely unaware of, yet, we believe we know why we acted or felt in a certain way (Revonsuo 2009).

Another consequence of this is that the illusory inference is the wrong grounding of the first cause of the dialectic. In the presence of an aesthetic subject, it shows us that when he tries to analyze the aesthetic object with the interpretive introspection (dialectical) method, he may experience possible illusions about that object. In the readiness of an aesthetic subject against an aesthetic object, the 'illusion' is important in terms of the meaning and analysis of that work.

“The mind, having received of sense a small beginning of remembrance, runneth on infinitely, remembering all what is to be remembered. Our senses therefore, which stand as it were at the entry of the mind, having received the beginning of anything, and having proffered it to the mind; the mind likewise receiveth this beginning, and goeth over all what followeth: the lower part of a long and slender pike being but slightly shaken, the motion runneth thorough the whole length of the pike, even to the speares-head ... so does our mind need but a small beginning to the remembrance of the whole matter” (Gombrich 1969).

This quotation by Francis Junius in *Painting of Ancients*, referring to Maximus Tyrius by Gombrich, shows us that association and memory are effective in the process of making sense in the face of phenomena. However, as Revonsuo states, such post hoc approaches, reaching a whole point from one point to the whole can sometimes cause an illusion.

4.2 The form of music: Reciprocity in Art in the Context of Interobjectivity

The only art that expresses Aesthetic Existence in the most competent form is music. The actual subject of music is sensuality. The relationship between existence and art forms is the relationship that leads us directly to a philosophy of art. By determining that the forms of Art should be absolute or that the forms of things should be in themselves, Schelling essentially established the relationship between existence and art through form.

Schelling thus presents us with a philosophical analysis pitched principally at the level of the ideal, but obligated to include much empirical detail. Not only is there no contradiction between the ideal and the real; the very existence of art expresses the necessity whereby the two are synthesized. This, Schelling asserted, is the true object of the philosophy of art: not art to the extent that it is a particular, but rather as it is absolutely, ideally, or essentially; not those aspects of art that might change in time, giving us what we know as the history of art, but rather those unchangeable, immutable features of art necessarily present in all ages, art as such or art taken from its "mystical side." "Music, the verbal arts, painting- all arts possess, just as does art as such, an essential nature within the absolute." It is this essential nature to which Schelling is referring in the phrase "higher forms." "The same can be seen from another perspective. We say that a thing endures, since its existence or its particular is incommensurate with its essence or its universal. This longevity is nothing other than a perpetual positing of its universal into its concrete manifestation. By virtue of the limitation of the latter, it is not everything here and now and at once what it could be according to its essence or its universal. This is inconceivable within the absolute. Since the particular within it is absolutely equal to the universal, it is everything it can be, and is so in reality and, simultaneously, without any temporal mediation. It is thus void of time and is eternal in itself" (Schelling 2008).

Schelling's determination of time, the formation of sounds with time is a determination that should be taken into account. Not only musical formations, but also the sounds produced by objects in nature are formed in a unity subject to time. For example, the sound of a train running on the rail has a temporal character. A rhythm consisting of

hexadecimal notes to a quatrain measure can evoke the sound of a train. In terms of perception, the interpretation and analysis of this formal structure seems clear in terms of perception and is open to connotation. “Within music itself, that particular informing of unity into multiplicity, an informing that is itself encompassed as a particular unity-in this case the real unity-is rhythm.” Schelling p.109

Expressing that rhythm determines the characteristic feature of music in particular, the philosopher gives an example that ensures our determinations regarding rhythm: For example, the feeling of a piece of music as a whole is completely homogeneous and uniform. For example, it is either happy or sad. “Through the various rhythmic subdivisions, however, this single feeling that alone would have been completely homogeneous acquires variety and diversity. Rhythm is one of the most wonderful mysteries of nature and art, and no human invention appears to be more immediately or directly inspired by nature” (Schelling 2008).

The mystery of rhythm, as we have mentioned before, is an expression of the movements of things and objects in nature. For example, the sound of trees due to the force of the wind, the sound of the sea, the sounds of animals, the squeak of doors, the sounds of wood burning in the fireplace are not alien to the human ear. Musical rhythms are inspired by nature. “The predominating element in contemporary music is harmony, which is precisely the opposite of the rhythmic melody of antiquity, as I will show more specifically”(Schelling 2008).

Although the ideal of melody and harmony form unity, they are as separate as they are in unity. What Schelling states here is the identity of rhythm, harmony and melody, hence the ideal unity of these three unions. Schelling's conclusion about the musical form is that music is a form of the universe. Therefore, music is nothing but the harmony of the heard rhythm and the visible universe itself. In line with Schelling's statements, it seems to clarify how the sound of nature can be transformed into rhythm and music and its place in human perception. A conscious action does not take place without thought. The end of conscious actions also takes place in terms of evaluation in thought. While thought is intertwined with thought, action shows succession.

Since the work of art arises from the spirit, it needs a subjective productive activity as its cause, and as a product of this activity the work of art exists for others, that is, for the viewing and feeling of others. This activity is imagination. So, finally, we have to deal with the third side of the ideal again, that is, to discuss how the work of art belongs to the subjective inner consciousness (Hegel 1975).

Since it would be incomplete to deal with the structural features of the aesthetic object only in terms of the subject's perception, interpretation and analysis processes, as Hegel stated, the analysis of the subjective interior structure of the artist and even how he turned the real world into an ideal world should be investigated. We have stated that this ideal world can be structured like a language through art objects. If this ideal world is structured like a language oughts to art objects, it can be transferred and can be expressed in another art object from one art object to another, and it must be idealized again. If we

need to exemplify this statement, it is necessary to consider how the color red can be objectified in various branches of art. Goethe, in his *Theory of Colors* (1810), determined that there is a relationship between music and colors.

“If the word "tone," or rather "tune," is to be still borrowed in future from music, and applied to coloring, it might be used in a better sense than heretofore. For it would not be unreasonable to compare a painting of powerful effect, with a piece of music in a sharp key; a painting of soft effect with a piece of music in a flat key, while other equivalents might be found for the modifications of these two leading modes” (Goethe 1971: p. 190).

Synesthesia is not random but occurs in a rule-based manner. For example, there is a positive relationship between increasing the brightness and increasing the pitch of the sound. Hegel sought this relationship with the world of philosophy in the intellectual structure of the artist. The artist memorizes what interests people, and a deep soul spreads his interest to countless topics, drawing attention to the cognitive connection between memory and interests. In the scientific experiment; (1974) gave participants a series of voices in different tones. Participants were asked to match each tone with colors of different brightness. “A creative thinking mind is capable of transforming the qualities, quantities, of things. Scientifically, our thesis of reciprocity in perception and signification between artists and subjects is based on the following argument: “The senses have their own history. Neither the object of art nor the subject capable of aesthetic experience comes of itself—these arise out of the process of man's creative activity. 'Only music awakens the musical sensibility of man . . . for the unmusical ear the most beautiful music means nothing . . . and so the sensibilities of the social man are different from those of the non-social man. Only through the objective development of the richness of human nature is the richness of subjective human sensibility—the ear for music, the eye for beauty of form. in short, sensibilities capable of human enjoyment, sensibilities which manifest themselves as human powers—in part evolved, in part created. The objectification of human nature both in theory and in practice was necessary. therefore. both in order to humanize man's sensibility and to create for all the richness of human and natural existence a corresponding human sensibility” (Lifshits 1938).

Scientifically, it confirms the starting point of this experiment, as well as what Goethe said. Hegel's philosophy is a form of idealism. (Terms often used in the translation are italicized here.) In his view, what is ultimately real (or, in his terminology, what is actual) is the self-knowing spirit. This is not to deny reality to the world in which we live or to ourselves as sensuous beings, but, although these are real, they are not, taken in and by themselves, actual. What is actual is not the real, but the ideal, and Hegel's point might be put, in his own paradoxical manner, by saying that the ideal is more really real than the real. The ideal is the synthesis of concept and reality, or, in art, of meaning and shape. This synthesis is what Hegel calls the Idea. "The Idea existent in sensible form is the Ideal, i.e. beauty, which itself is truth implicit (Hegel 1975). emphasizing the importance of the artist's perception of the real world and his relationship with this world, believes that he can integrate the knowledge of things in the real world with the objects he creates in his

ideal world. In a way, this belief seems to form the basis of the idea of synesthesia. To repeat the concept of synesthesia, multisensory is a multisensory state in which a stimulus causes cognition. Many artists who state that they have synesthesia experience a state of multiple perception. For example, when he hears music, he can sense colors and transfer them to his canvas, or vice versa, when he sees a painting, he can match colors with notes. In this regard, synesthesia can affect many people differently.

This evaluation of Panofsky is important for us to look at the concept of synesthesia from a different perspective. In particular, the effect of actual experiences on sensation and meaning cannot be ignored. At the same time, this experience of things can also apply to emotions. “Granted, this looks more like a mathematical than an artistic matter, for one might with justice point out that the relative imperfection, indeed even the total absence, of a perspectival construction has nothing to do with artistic value (just as, conversely, the strict observance of perspectival laws need in no wise encroach upon artistic “freedom”). But if perspective is not a factor of value, it is surely a factor of style. Indeed, it may even be characterized as (to extend Ernst Cassirer’s felicitous term to the history of art) one of those “symbolic forms” in which meaning is attached to a concrete, material sign and intrinsically given to this sign” (Panofsky 2020).

When subjects convey their feelings to another subject, they become grasped by the other. In this state, emotions are a form of communication and are perceived by the other subject by comparing them with the similarity of their own emotions. The feelings of the artist subjects are reflected on the art objects formally. Expressive meaning differs from factual meaning in that it is grasped through 'empathy' rather than by simple deviation. I must have a certain sensitivity to understand it, but this sensitivity is also part of my practical experience, that is, of my everyday familiarity with objects and events (Panofsky 2020). Understanding the emotion of a work of art then falls within the adequacy of practical experience. While examining the Readiness of the Aesthetic Subject, Spinoza stated that ideas should be compatible with the object, while Descartes stated that emotions are perceptions. When we evaluate an object iconologically, we can consider emotion as an integral part of perception, as the visible side of object perception, along with Panofsky's discourses. Panofsky also says that we need to distinguish three layers of subject or meaning.

The multiple perception theory of synesthesia (synesthesia) is still being researched today. This type of perception manifests itself especially in various ways. Multiperception seems to be combining the non-object attributes of the sense data with the object. Hume, the representative of empiricist epistemology, thinks that we create awareness thanks to the impressions of things, as we have stated before, and that we get an idea about that thing, in this way, judgments are subjective. In terms of synesthetic mentality, the subject is able to establish the mental identity of an object, while establishing its identity with features other than its own unity. But is this fiction a figment of imagination? Or does it depend on physical realities? After Hume's empiricist epistemology and theory of mind,

which forms the roots of the idealist approach, it may be possible to search for the answer to this question in analytical philosophy and phenomenology.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) approached the language of physics with the idea that events exist in space and time and therefore occupy a place in these fields. We can experience things physically and mentally. About physical things we can say this is hard or this is a gas. But some things do not allow us to touch, for example the rainbow, the reflection behind the glass. (Russell 2019). Russell accepts that percepts are mental, but makes an explanation about the nature of perception. Whatever the perceptions are, they are ultimately events. In Russell's view, what is really perceived or perceived directly is the sound, color, shape and size that we attribute to the object. Russell calls these contents of perception sensory data.

“We agreed provisionally that physical objects cannot be quite like our sense-data, but may be regarded as causing our sensations. These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call " physical " space. It is important to notice that, if our sensations are to be caused by physical objects, there must be a physical space containing these objects and our sense- organs and nerves and brain. We get a sensation of touch from an object when we are in contact with it ; that is to say, when some part of our body occupies a place in physical space quite close to the space occupied by the object.” (Russell 1959).

Russell formed his thoughts on perception by considering the ambiguity of the qualities. In this context, when we evaluate the synesthetic perception as a result, we can think of it as a mental phenomenon, but it should not be forgotten that physical data about things will encounter psychological and physical data, as Russell stated. As a matter of fact, since the first part of our thesis, we have mentioned that the quantitative and even some qualitative features of things can be perceived in the same way by the subjects, and in this way, the artists can transfer them to art objects. It may be useful to look at the multi-perception theory (synesthesia) from the perspective of Russell in the light of psychology, physics and even mathematics teachings in order to clarify the subject.

Synesthesia phenomenon can be useful in terms of examining the subject with the perspective of phenomenology pioneered by Franz Brentanon (1838-1917). Brentano states that the phenomena of our inner world can be known by our mind (Brentano, 1995, p. 22) Brentano, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1974), distinguishes between mental and physical phenomena. Accordingly, our knowledge of sounds, colors, and other qualities is thought to be mental phenomena, and judgments can be made on these phenomena.

In the first place, the possibility of measuring intensities according to their method is restricted entirely to those phenomena which are produced by external stimulation of the sense organs. We still lack, therefore, a measure of intensity for all mental phenomena which have their foundation in physical processes within the organism or which are caused by other mental phenomena. But the majority of mental phenomena including the most important ones belong in this category: the whole class of desires and actions of the will,

as well as convictions and opinions of all kinds, and a wide range of presentations which have their origin in the imagination. Of all mental phenomena, sensations alone, and not even all of them, remain measurable. (Brentano, 1995, P.52)

Although it is open to discussion, the meaning of the sensory data by the mental processes of the subject, the transformation of physical phenomena into mental phenomena and finding their place in the field of reality make this mental phenomenon valid in the field of reality. Artist intersubjective reciprocity brings along a kind of multi-perception. The mental creation process is an effort to create an object that does not already exist, unlike the process of thinking about the sense data obtained from any physical object. This effort to bring into being is the design of acquired perceptions of things in mental time, independent of real time. The aesthetic object exists in mental time and space before it is reflected in any time period from the reality field. When another artist encounters an object in the realm of reality, the object artist can carry information about the mental time and space. Especially Brentano's philosophy is important in this regard. He takes a step towards asserting that mental phenomena are the only ones that can be perceived in the full sense of the word. It shows no evidence to reach this conclusion. Perhaps Brentano's proof is hidden in the theory of multiple perceptions discussed today and in the mental processes of the art object. Artists operating in different art fields objectify the perceptions they have acquired during the design processes of their own art objects differently from each other. Accordingly, the type and number of use of quantity and quality may also differ between branches of art. When we consider the problem of reciprocity between artists, one will become the aesthetic subject of the other. However, this aesthetic subject, unlike an ordinary subject, is a creative aesthetic subject who can design. Accordingly, we can call it the "high aesthetic subject" to indicate the difference. Since the perception, interpretation and interpretation processes of the upper aesthetic subject are the creative subject, they are different from the non-creating subjects.

The very few spatial recognition possibilities that can be formed purely from our occasional perception of polysemy are often nonexistent. It is true that artists and critics are rarely aware of what is at stake. It is so easy to talk at cross-purposes about these matters. Our inability to see ambiguity often protects us from the knowledge that pure shapes allow of an infinity of spatial readings. For though the simplicity criterion certainly guides our reading in certain cases that happen to be simple, it is easy to show that its application is limited(Gombrich 1969).

We argue that by creating awareness of these pure forms, you can be understood to some extent in terms of perception, interpretation and analysis of the art object. On the occasion of the awareness of these pure forms, we expressed that when artistic subjects come across an object, it is possible for them to create a new object related to that object, that is, bearing the characteristics of that object.

With the question of personal style we have reached the frontier of what is usually called representation. For in these ultimate constituents the artist is said to express himself. But is there really such a sharp division between representation and expression ? For

language, like the visual image, functions not only in the service of actual description and subjective emotion, but also in that wide area between these extremes where everyday language conveys both the facts and the emotive tone of an experience. This is dangerous ground, a favourite haunt of cranks and even of madmen, and yet I think it is ground which will have to be traversed. For we all feel that sounds can indeed imitate or match visual impressions—that words like ‘flicker’, ‘blinking’, ‘scintillating’ are at least as good approximations in the language to the visual impression were to the auditory ones. What is called ‘synesthesia’, the splashing over of impressions from one sense modality to another, is a fact to which all languages testify. They work both ways—from sight to sound and from sound to sight. We speak of loud colours or of bright sounds, and everyone knows what we mean. Nor are the ear and the eye the only senses that are thus converging to a common centre. (Gombrich 1969).

As Aristotle stated, the aesthetic subject against the aesthetic object; The existence of potential sensing and actual sensing shows the active structure of mental movements such as dissolving and recombining with the effect of the opposite while performing this act, in terms of object and subject. In reply we must recall that we use the word 'perceive' in two ways, for we say (a) that what has the power to hear or see, 'sees' or 'hears', even though it is at the moment asleep, and also (d) that what is actually seeing or hearing, 'sees' or 'hears'. Hence 'sense' too must have two meanings, sense potential, and sense actual. Similarly to be a sentient' means either (a) to have a certain power or to manifest a certain activity. To begin with, for a time, let us speak as if there were no difference between (i) being moved or affected, and (ii) being active, for movement is a kind of activity an imperfect kind, as has elsewhere been explained. Everything that is acted upon or moved is acted upon by an agent which is actually at work. Hence it is that in one sense, as has already been stated, what acts and what is acted upon are like, in another unlike, i. e. prior to and during the change the two factors are unlike, after it like. But we must now distinguish not only between what is potential and what is actual but also different senses in which things can be said to be potential or actual; up to now we have been speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. (Aristotle 417a)

The philosophical examination of the processes of this active structure with or without awareness by the subjects sheds light on the subject of perception. In particular, it is necessary for the objectivity of the judgment to learn what the aesthetic subject, who is confronted with the aesthetic object and who will make a judgment by making sense of it, can and cannot make sense of that object objectively. Since the past, there was a general opinion by theorists and society that some qualitative and quantitative characteristics of tastes can differ from person to person. However, in terms of our study, just as Kant stated in the Critique of Pure Reason; it is important to determine and research the characteristics of the understanding ability to draw the boundaries of what the aesthetic subject understands through the aesthetic object, just as he states that the limits of the mind should know its limits in terms of understanding.

In his treatise *Prolegomena*, Kant's statement that the human mind is so eager to build that after he took the floors of the tower, he demolished it again to see how the foundation was laid. The effort to deal with Kant's determination through the aesthetic object is an effort to objectively justify the tendency of the understanding to construct with Kant's expression. The question of whether the interpretation and judgment of an aesthetic object, which differs from person to person, is based on a subjective fiction or whether it is based on the criteria of objectivity, the determination of the processes of judgment and the limit on this issue, first of all, the view of aesthetic objects, and even the ability to make judgments in a philosophical sense can be based on objective criteria. So far, we have made many determinations regarding the aesthetic object and aesthetic subject. Since it is expressed as aesthetic objects in conventional approaches, it carries the qualities of the object. In this way, objects or objects can be thought of as inanimate concepts. By examining the material form of painting, sculpture and music, we have shown that it is materially separate from the live performative arts. In terms of art philosophy, we called the products of the performative art branches as objects. However, when we reconsider music, painting, sculpture, dance, literary art, and performative arts, it would be unfair to claim that they are inanimate, no matter how different their substance is. Regardless of the artwork, the cognitive characteristics of a subject; the skill of using the world of sensation, perception, interpretation, emotion, memory, quantity and quality, etc. The art object that he transfers his abilities such as is alive and waiting to meet with another mind; It comes back to life every time they meet. These meetings take us back to the research of the problem of intersubjectivity and dialectical processes.

5. UNDERSTANDING AL-FARABI'S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

5.1 Introduction to Al-Farabi's philosophy of music

Abu Nasr Al-Farabi is undoubtedly the instituting philosopher of Islamic philosophy. There are tens or even hundreds of philosophers in the Islamic logic and philosophy tradition, and each of these philosophers has made significant contributions to the history of thought. However, the philosophizing abilities and performances of each of the philosophers mentioned in the history books of philosophy are not the same.

A culture devoid of originality and innovation cannot be more affected by developments. The originality of the Arabic-speaking culture is evidenced by the works of Central Asian scientists such as Farabi, Biruni, and Ibn-Sina, who contributed significantly to the culture and science of world civilization. "Medical writings and mathematical treatises, astronomical tables, and Arabic translations from various languages permeated the West and became the most authoritative guides for centuries.

Being able to recognize and evaluate the position of the read and studied philosophy and logic text in the general structure requires having a certain understanding of what logic and philosophy are. If we do not have a philosophy master with the universal mind feature, we may not be able to understand the place of the philosopher we are working on or working on in the universal existence of philosophy. Writing a history of philosophy is

a very valuable service in terms of meeting our social needs. But philosophizing is a stagnant, clear, cold and difficult mental activity that we can try a little more on our own, and moreover, if this is our nature, we cannot help but agree with the universal existence of such natures. It is very important to make a history of philosophy in terms of being the basis for being able to philosophize as an activity on its own. While making the history of philosophy, the names that can activate our ability to philosophize are the great names that can create the universal existence of philosophy. From this perspective, it is necessary to express the existence of Farabi in Islamic philosophy in terms of the history of philosophy. Because Farabi is not an object of philosophy that can be called large just because we are examining it, moreover, he is an active subject with a spirit that can force himself to understand. We know that there are people in history who have voiced this, whether for or against it. For example, Beyhâkî is right in his treatise *Târîhu Hukemâ'l-Islâm*, saying that among the Islamic philosophers there was no one greater than him, that is, Farabi was the first great philosopher in Islam. Moreover, Beyhâkî thinks that this is also valid for the next process. As a matter of fact, he says in his related treatise: "It is stated as follows. There are four philosophers (*al-hukemâ erba'a*); two of them pre-Islamic, Aristotle and Hippocrates; two of them are in Islam, Abu Nasr Al-Farabi and Abu Ali Ibn Sina." Abu Ali Ibn Sînâ is the disciple of his classifications/treatises. (*ve kâne Ebû 'Alî tilmîzen litesânîfihî*). (Beyhakî, Beyhakî,1994: p.41)

The Aristotle of Islamic philosophy is Farabi. Farabi both philosophized and taught philosophy and applied logic. As the philosopher who attaches the most importance to logic and the art of proof, Mu'allim-i Sînî received the title of Second Teacher. He has taught many people directly or indirectly through his treatises. Although its influence is very widespread, who the followers of the philosophical point of view are and how they do it are among the topics that philosophy historians should investigate. As will be discussed below, the first person to draw attention to this concept with a conceptual claim by putting forward the concept of "Farabi" in the modern period was İbrahim Madkûr (d. 1995) (Madkur, 1983: p. i). Farabi devoted his whole life to dealing with Science, Wisdom and the Love of Art and raising students. Farabi devoted his whole life to dealing with Science, Wisdom and the Love of Art and raising students. He is a wise man who has dealt with art subjects, he is a scholar artist who is famous for his deep knowledge of music. He is the first of the three great wisdom lovers of the Islamic Culture and Civilization Environment who established a consistent structure.

Al-Farabi's apprehension of world aesthetics is reflected in various forms of medieval Islamic art such as architecture, jewellery, textiles, literature, poetry, music, dance and beauty. However, a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of music by a medieval thinker and subsequent scholars' assessment of these works as the most complete and rich in content became the main features of Farabi's aesthetic vision. Farabi's legacy also illuminates about the rich content of medieval Islamic culture, which is reflected in the music and its various theoretical and practical, performance and instrumental aspects. Abu Nasser Al-Farabi's great book on music has only become a major landmark in Islamic

medieval culture as a major phenomenon in the world of philosophy and science, from Cordoba to all of Europe. At least two historical facts are clearly stated in its content.

Music is an art that harmonizes with the human voice and music. Quantity and quality are the link and regulator between categories and maintain their compatibility. The foundations of this art, which nature has instilled in man, create a desire and a hidden need to produce sounds worthy of the various desires born around him.

These sounds are enjoyable regardless of whether the passion of the soul is dormant or growing, or whether they correspond to the semantic images of the poetic words they put together. In addition to this metaphysical extension of the problem of knowledge in Farabi, it is seen that there are two more basic dimensions, one of which is psychology, and the other is logic. Farabi assumes knowledge as a part of psychology and evaluates knowledge as a phenomenon that takes place in various psychological and physiological processes in the human mind. In this context, he discusses the problem of knowledge in connection with the concepts of psyche and mind. All Islamic philosophers draw attention to various theories of perception, assuming that perception takes place in the senses, dreams and mind.

Farabi argues that the thing that puts thinking and being in a relationship and ensures the harmony between being and thinking is the form. That is, we can describe the object by acting on its image. The Second Master points to the counterpart of the existent in thinking as a form, and the corporeal existence of the form indicates its presence in the outer world. The presence of the image in the mind takes place through perception, in other words, through abstraction. Farabi considers knowledge as the subject of logic. The philosopher states that logic protects the human mind from making mistakes and provides it with methods to reach the truth. He thinks that man owes his understanding of the world of existence in accordance with the real structure of this world to the science of logic. Measure is an indispensable element in both poetry and music. Farabi is the first philosopher who applied measure and rhythm to music in a complete system and wrote two comprehensive labor on this subject. Before Al-Farabi, Ishaq al-Mawsili and Kindi, who were zealous in laying the foundations of Music, also focused on the theory of music. Ishak al-Mawsîlî and Kindî, who were diligent in laying the foundations of music before Farabi, also focused on the theory of music.

However, Farabi criticized them for writing in the philosophy of music, the cosmological basis of knowledge, and scientific theories. The essence of this discussion is that the concepts in the works they examine are translated as they were written in ancient Greece, without knowing whether they make sense in practice. Farabi negotiated about tunes and rhythms that are suitable for human nature in his works on music, as if reversing the claims of some ethnomusicologists who saw early Islamic Music as consisting only of theory; He focused on the applicability of these not only in theory but also in practice.

5.2 Structure formation, development and methods in Farabi's System: A Philosophical Paradigm in the Art of Music.

Many of the factors that have fascinated philosophers and scientists about music for the last two millennia have been described in our review of the references to authorities on this subject. Cognition, imagination, sensation, and affect must be involved in any explanation of the existence of music. This notion appears to be a natural consequence of the emotional mechanisms provided by musical and non-musical stimuli. Another common effect of listening to emotionally stimulating music is the weakening or disappearance of control over or regulation of emotional expression. Because of sociocultural exposure and the rules of emotion or strategic concerns, emotional responses are often highly controlled or regulated in terms of subjective feelings. The fact that interplay between expectations and voiced events plays a central role in creating musical tension and relaxation provides a clear framework for this claim.

The research summarized here is intended to produce the most structural, basic information on the ways that musical emotion and its dynamic aspects are related to the cognition of musical structure. Musical emotions change over time, and the reason for these emotional changes must be sought in psycho-physiological dimensions. Our purpose in this scientific investigation was guided by our inclination toward the method of investigating philosophical phenomena across cultures. One of the main dynamics here is constructing a bridge that guides the transition from one activity to another, that is, reflections on human behaviour in proportion to the cultural context.

The fundamental question of our research is as follows: Purpose in perception in relation to the musical field is defined as musical perception. Musical perception is related to meaningful frequencies coming to the brain, related to search, filtering, and interpretation within previously learned meaningful patterns, that is, their transformation into music. In fact, in this case, we must address our question with a broader explanation. Thus, musical perception is the creation of musical sensations, that is, sound frequencies, made meaningful because of their processing and interpretation by the brain. Sound is a physical phenomenon that occurs with fluctuations in the air pressure of a vibrating source and stimulates the human sense of hearing. Musical talent is one of humanity's most bizarre, complex, and mysterious achievements.

The following is an arrangement of the successive relationships between music and the listener: A thinking process underlies the ability to coordinate mental, emotional, and simultaneous sensations and to select and execute appropriate bodily movements. The idea of experiencing music in the body as a concrete form of perception is predominantly examined by studies in the cognitive field of kinesthetics.

This scope allows us to make sense of timbre and sound; we have come to realize that the first principle, including the movement of matter and the existence and variability of matter in a vacuum, should be questioned in a manner that relates to information about substance. The balance between differentiation and synthesis is essential for developing cultures and the emergence of human consciousness. As cognitive science evolves, it

provides increasingly complex and plausible explanations for the phenomena of mental life. Cognitive science offers existing frameworks of understanding and forms of research with a neutral cultural perspective. The *Kitab al Musiqā* is the only work that has deep and unbiased musical knowledge, and we discuss this knowledge here. The cognitive function, origin, and evolution of music were a mystery until recently. Here, we discuss a theory of the fundamental processes of music in cognition and culture. It is particularly difficult to examine complex interconnected patterns. While examining the roots of knowledge, it is necessary to deal philosophically and historically with questions such as what, why, the reasons for need at that time, under what conditions, from what point of view, educational conditions, and cultural texture.

Music is a theoretical art that reveals true knowledge through the bodies of nature and their coincidences. Each of these methods is based on general and individual rules known as factual knowledge and the observance of certain information conditions of the substance and the reasons for its existence. Wisdom is the recognition of reality, and the truth is necessary and meaning itself. We believe that a researcher can investigate historical, philosophical, science, and artistic disciplines to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of the need itself. Therefore, in relation to this question of the *Kitab al Musiqā*, we can point identify the first mover as a metaphor.

Consequently, when we say that modularization is a process that joins music to mental structures and combines it with human values, we are not referring to semantic content that can be added to music at multiple levels. The symbolic and referential dimension of sound lies outside of this modularization. Although both are morally linked to other semiotic mechanisms, music also describes non-musical events, personalities, and actions.

Hence, the creation of music can be described as reaching the level of moods of desire, knowledge, ability, and obligation, which concentrate on different emotions. Musicology studies genres. The roots of melodies explore the form at each stage, the causality of formation, and the effect of perceiving them as more meaningful and perfect. Two classes of science comprehend music: applied music science and theoretical musicology. Applied music explores the types that the ear perceives as arising from natural or constructed instruments. We discuss the scientific scope, concept, and contents of the art of sound.

The art of music has had an important place in human life since early times. Man perceives music across time, so music is a temporal art. However, it is also spatial because a medium of transmission is required for sound to be heard. Finally, music is not only temporal and spatial but also formal. The importance of music for rational and vital perception in human life is indisputable. Philosophy has examined causality in music perception and values on a multidisciplinary basis. Music is at the basis of universal existence and helps to illustrate the harmony, rhythm, and aesthetics required for the formation of order.

Philosophy uses methods developed by the sciences. Art likewise determines its concepts through science and philosophy. Science is a group of methods used for analyzing reality in terms of human perception and understanding of the world. Knowledge is a process in which a subject is directed toward an object (Davidson 1992). Societies that have developed with the advancement of scientific research and philosophical thought have an important place in the history of the philosophy of science. Science seeks facts. Beginning with the work of Aristotle, the First Master, science has been considered not just a separate branch of philosophy but as its own system within the framework of valid philosophical thinking and understanding, according to the age of each society, carrying it forward as a holistic system.

The classification of the sciences has essentially arisen to provide precise and comprehensive information on entities. Al-Farabi, the Second Master, who got his basic orientation from Aristotle, created a deep and original structure in the philosophy of science thanks to his syncretic understanding. With the development of knowledge, its division into autonomous branches, and the need for much greater specialization in each discipline, the sciences began in time to separate themselves from philosophy. First the natural sciences and then the social sciences gradually began to be seen as separate. Al-Farabi systematized science and philosophy in terms of methods, terminology, and problems and classification of sciences.

Historical research goes to the root of accepted thought from different time periods by examining documents and works that are directly or indirectly related. The concept of truth and the process of reaching truth have changed over time, reflecting changes in philosophical views and paradigms. The historical process of reaching truth takes the natural sciences as its model. This process led to a new era in epistemology and methodology of the social sciences. Al-Farabi, who lived between 870 and 950 A.D., defines a theoretical art as the result of a deductive method that examines a relationship from cause to effect, from the foundations of existence to the foundations of cognition. This paradigm was emphasized in his work *Kitab al Musiqa* in relation to the science and philosophy of music.

Understanding the auditory processes that occur while listening to music can assist in inferences about the causality of music and may even provide some clues to its origin. Music provides a powerful stimulus to explore interesting auditory phenomena. Al-Farabi mentions knowledge and the recognition of primary meaning through the power and foresight of science and philosophy. *Kitab al Musiqa* focuses on the true nature of music in terms of content and structure. The order of evaluation is based on the hierarchy of sciences, from established knowledge to logic, mathematics, physical socio-ethics, and metaphysics to knowledge. Al-Farabi points out that deduction and experiment are complementary, as are history and logic.

5.3 Life and Works

Since very few facts are known with certainty about Farabi's life, in the next section we will cover a few details about the city and region of his birth, in addition to his

biography. Because while establishing the world of science and philosophy, it is necessary to know the journey he cultered on his education. During our research, al-Farabi's birthplace, which we find extremely interesting, has never been properly discussed in scholarly studies of this thinker. For this reason, we wanted to draw attention to some information that we think may contribute to the biography of the philosopher. The vast areas of Khorasan and Transoxiana have for centuries been a site of exchange and interaction between peoples of diverse linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds, including pagans, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and later Christians and Muslims. As a result of the eastern expeditions of Alexander The Great and the establishment of Hellenistic kingdoms in Asia, Hellenistic influences reached these regions. In addition, this vast geographical area established commercial and cultural contacts with the Turkic peoples and eventually with China via the land routes to the north. The life journey and the birth of the individual in the mind world, which is structured as language, religion, culture, are fundamental. For this reason, Farabi, the region where Farabi was born, should not be ignored in any way For those wondering where this mysterious place is; It is the center of civilization that has trained countless philosophers, scholars, scientists and thinkers, the fountain of knowledge, and the garden of philosophy and science paradise. Many of the world's greatest talents and heroes are born in the Turan region. Among the broad points of the Amu-darya, the least important part was the part of the present railway. By the middle of the century there were the cities of Amul on the left bank of the river and Ferebr or Farab on the right. There were pomegranate orchards around it. Farab, on the other hand, has preserved its medieval name until now. Farab has managed to perpetuate its medieval name until today. (Barthold 1962: p. 378) Being on the main road from Khorasan to Transoxiana was so important that the whole region was named after him. Again, 5 km from the river, there was the city of Farabr or Farab. (Barthold 2010). It is not mentioned by Arab geographers, but in the anonymous geography book of the 10th century (ie in the Tumansky copy), it was very rich in the Farab (Otrar) region, from where they exported quality bows to other places (Barthold 1990).

After the Muslim colonies were established in Syr derya (Jaxartes), where the Oghuz chiefs' headquarters was located, Islamic civilization had to prevail over other civilizations in this region, as in other places. In addition, some of the Turkmens entered the service of the Samanoğulları, and they took it upon themselves to protect the borders of the Samanoğulları colonies against their non-Muslim urukdash (cognates) by buying pastures from them. At that time, among the Turks living in the border provinces of the Samanoğulları State, there were also those who were acquainted with the Muslim civilization. One of them is Farabi, the famous Islamic philosopher of the 10th century, who is of Turkish descent (Barthold 2010). The great philosopher of Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir, whose translation we aim to write, was also raised in that blessed place after the Islamic conquest, it was used in the Arabic sources for Central Asia, referring to the Jeyhun river (Amuderya/ Oxus or Greek Ὠξοῦς), in the sense of "the region on the other side of the river". It is recorded that the ancient Turks gave the name Oguz (Oxus) to the

Jeyhun river, which is reported to be accepted as the border between the Turanian and Iranian tribes in Iranian, Chinese, Greek and Arab sources “Transoxiana”, which means “beyond the river” in Arabic, is located in this valley between Amuderya (Ceyhun) and Syr Darya (Jaxartes), and it has been the ground for many civilizations. It has an important place in science, culture and the scientists it has trained. Transoxiana showed a great development in the field of Islamic Civilization in the Middle Ages. This river is two thousand five hundred kilometers long. Its source and place of collection is the Pamir plateau (Günaltay 1922: IV p.36) Al-Farabi's works, however, do not add any new facts of the circumstances of his life, since he never talks about himself; his day-to-day activities, his position in society, and his involvement in the events of his day emerge little clearer from a reading of his works than they appear in the brief account of the later bibliographical tradition (Walzer 1985).

Al-Farabi, in full Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭark ibn Awzalagh (or Uzlugh) al-Farabi, also called Abū Naṣr al-Farabi, Latin name Alfarabius (also spelled Alfarabius) or Avennasar, Muslim philosopher, one of the preeminent thinkers of medieval Islam. It is known from the traces of history that he was born in Vesic near Farab city of Turkestan in 259/870 and died in 339/950 at the age of 80. Many archival studies show that his father was also a commander in the army of the Caliph.

This city was a prosperous town on the banks of the Seyhun river, whose name and condition we have written above. Ebi'l Fida reports in his history that he later took the name Otrar. Farab town is now desolate. There is a town of Turkestan with a population of three thousand today. Tarkhan's grandson was born in such a festive and beautiful town. Tarkhan is a name unique to the Turkestan sultans in the coral counter. It is a term unique to the Tarkhan king. They call such people Tarkhan 'genius' among themselves. (Ayni 2020: p.15)

Farabi means belonging to Farab, the modern Utrar (راتوأ); this city lies beyond al-Shash and its inhabitants follow the doctrines of the Imam al-Shafi'i. It is one of the capital cities of the Turkish nation, and Inner Farab (Farab al-Dakhilah) to distinguish it from the Outer Farab (Farab al-Kharjah) which is situated on the border of the province of Fars. Balasaghun is a town on the Turkish frontier, beyond the river Sayhun and lying Kashghar is a large city, situated, it is said, within the limits of the a near the city of Balasaghun. All was called the near Kashghar Chinese empire (al-Sin) (Ibn Khalikan 1961: p.198)

After spending his childhood in the shady and emerald gardens of the Seyhun River and completing his primary education, he went to Baghdad, which was the brightest centre of world civilization at that time. That period was a time of how far Muslims had gone in civilization. Both the elder and the small (of the society) were ardent supporters of him for spreading and teaching the sciences. We cannot finish counting the names of the Morphology, Grammar and Logic Masters, lexicographers, poets and literati who grew up one after another and to surpass each other in that period. The Kufa school was far away, and the Basra school was discussing the laws of the language. What would be their difference from the current Academies of current age? The caliphs and viziers were

scattering gold in order to provide fast good education in a short time, to train scientists and scholars. Books Greek, Persian, Sanskrit, Astronomy, Medicine, Mathematics have been translated many times.

Farabi's father was one of the commanders of the Caliph's guard army. Kitab al Musiqā, which supports that Farabi came to Baghdad with his father at an early age because his father was an army commander, and that he gained his education and philosophy in Baghdad, is the word of Farabi's own statements. Kitab al Musiqā is the proof of Farabi's rise with philosophy, science and music art in Baghdad. There are many sensitive details, from the analysis of the Baghdad tanbur in Kitab Al Musiqā to the musical ties and traditions of the people. There are many fine details, from the analysis of the Baghdad tanbur in Kitab Al Musiqā to the musical ties and traditions of the people. Al-Farabi also travelled to Damascus, Egypt, Harran and Aleppo.

Abu Nasr Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Tarkhan Ibn Awzalagh Al-Farabi the Turk, a celebrated physician and author of various works on logic, music, and other sciences, was the greatest philosopher among the Muslims. Al-Farabi passed his youth in Farab, the place of his birth, and then set out to travel. After various peregrinations, he visited Baghdad, where he arrived well acquainted with Turkish and some other languages, but wholly ignorant of Arabic. Having then commenced learning the latter language, he mastered it completely and devoted his mind to the philosophical sciences, arriving at Baghdad, he found the celebrated philosopher Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus, who teaching logic in that city and possessing the very highest reputation: everyday crowds of pupils attended the lectures in which he explained Aristotle's treatise filled seventy volumes with the observations which he wrote down from the lips of so able a master. Matta stood unrivalled in that art; in his writings, he shone by precision of style and subtlety of elucidation, and he aimed at simplifying his meaning by developments and annotations. It was therefore said by an able logician that the abilities which Abu Nasr Al-Farabi displayed in rendering the most abstract ideas intelligible and expressing them in the simplest words, could only be attributed to the tuition of Abu Bishr Matta. (Ibn Khalikan 1961: p.200)

According to Ibn abi Uṣaybi'ah and al-Qifti, al-Farābi studied philosophy in Baghdad with Yuhanna ibn Haylan, whom Al-Farabi himself related to the Greek philosophical school of Alexandria. Al-Farabi was a contemporary of the logician Abu Bishr Mattā ibn Yunus (d. 328/940), but the relation of the two scholars in Baghdad is not entirely clear." Ibn abi Uṣaybi'ah and al-Qifti only say that Al-Farabi was younger but more learned than Abu Bishr. Both were certainly very active in the Baghdadi school of logicians. The relation of Al-Farabi with Ibn al-Sarraj, the grammarian, is much clearer, for we know that Al-Farabi studied grammar with Ibn al-Sarraj (d. 316/929) and in return Al-Farabi taught him logic and music. From this fruitful exchange, Al-Farabi made the first significant attempt to interrelate logic and grammar in the history of Islamic philosophy, unlike his elder, the logician Abu Bishr, who disregarded grammar. Al-Farabi attended his lessons, and always took his station among the crowd of students who

surrounded the learned professor. Having thus passed a considerable time, removed to Harran, where he met Yuhanna Ibn Khaylan, a Christian and an able philosopher, from whom he learned some applications of the art of logic. He then returned to Baghdad and studied the philosophical sciences. Having mastered all Aristotle's works, he acquired a great facility in comprehending the ideas and the scope of that author's writings. It is related that the following note Farabi's handwriting, on a copy of Aristotle's treatise on the soul "I have read over this book two hundred times. It is related also that lie said; "I read over the philosopher Aristotle's Physics forty times, and I feel that I ought to read it over again." It is stated that, having been asked whether he or Aristotle was the more learned in this branch of science, he replied: "Had I lived in his time, I should have been the chief of his disciples." (Kitab al Musiqā Foreword by Dr. Mahmud Ahmad al-Hifnī)

In general, his philosophical thinking was nourished in the heritage of Aristotelian teachings, and he wrote most of his books in the Islamic environment of tenth-century Baghdad. Later in Halab (modern Aleppo) Al-Farabi met the Hamdanid prince Sayf al-Dawla, who became his patron, and he took up residence at the court of the latter in 329/942 and remained mostly in this city until his death.

Al-Farabi spent most of his time reading, teaching and writing. He led a solitary life with little regard for material things. He left Baghdad for Damascus in 330/941-2 and went to Damascus in 331/942-3. Later he settled in Aleppo and lived as a *wi* under the patronage of Seyfū'd-Dawla (d. 356/967). He went to Egypt in 338/949-50, then returned to Damascus and died in 339/950. Al-Farabi made a great impact on other important philosophical figures, one of whom was the Christian monophysite Yahya b. 'Adi whom he taught in Baghdad. Yahya, following his master's path, gave a great impetus to the study of logic. Hence, one of his students, Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani, the author of *al-Sijistani al-Mantiqi* (The Logician), was also a follower of Al-Farabi. Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi, a pupil of both Yahya and Abu Sulayman, Abu al-Hasan Muhammad b. Yusuf al-'Amiri, Abu Bakr al-Adami, Ibn Zur'a, Ibn al-Samh, and Ibn al-Hammar were to a great extent influenced by the thought of Al-Farabi. In Western Christendom, he exerted considerable influence on "Latin Averroists" like Thomas Aquinas. His ideas were also very effective in reconstructing the cosmology of Isma'ili theology during the time of the Fatimids of Egypt (358–565/969–1171), which had been highly revolutionary, antinomian, and prousiaoriented (*qa'im*, "the imam of the resurrection"). With this reconstruction Isma'ili theology became more in line with his principle that the community should live under divine law (Leaman 2006: p.93).

With Al-Farabi, the intellect takes on an ontological and cosmological significance in that it functions as a causal agent between the individual soul and the cosmos. This makes both ontology and cosmology part and parcel of Farabian epistemology. Al-Farabi restates Aristotelian noetic within the framework of Plotinian emanationist, and assigns to the intellect the cosmological function of connecting the transcendent to the corporeal (Kalin 2014). Though little is known about his life for certain, his unsurpassable imprint on philosophy is remarkable. Al-Farabi was the first known philosopher who made the

paradigms of Hellenic philosophy, especially those of metaphysics, communicable with the epistemic categories of the Muslim philosophical tradition. He held that though religious truth is important, it provides truth in a symbolic form to non-philosophers, who were not able to apprehend it in its more pure forms. He was one of the most significant philosophers of the Muslim world and was regarded as the “Magister Secundus, Second Master” (al-mu‘allim al-thani) next to Aristotle, who was esteemed as the “Magister Primus, First Master” (al-mu‘allim al-awwal) in the Muslim intellectual milieu.

After completing his education in Baghdad, Farabi went to the palace of Aleppo Caliph Sayf al-Dawla. He was in the flamboyant palace of Sayf al-Dawla, who was also a poet with a clean nature, in the campaigns that took place one after another against the Byzantine Emperors. At the same time, the odes of poets who were rarely trained by the time, such as Mutanabbi and Sariyur Refa, were sung, and every class of scholars, scientists and thinkers gathered and had scientific conversations in the presence of the Caliph. As a tip to the poets, Seyfüddevle had his name and picture written on gold coins to honor them. Most of the eulogies composed by Ebu Tayyib-el Mutanabbi are about the praise of the aforementioned Caliph. (Ibn Khallikan 1961: p. 153)

Abu'l -Qasim Said Ibn Ahmad Ibn ‘Abel al-Rahman Ibn Sa'id al-Qurtubi mentions him in his *Tabaqat* or classified philosophers, and says: Al-Farabi, the philosopher of the Muslims in reality, learned the art of logic from Yuhanna Ibn Khaylan, who died at Madinat al-Salam (Baghdad) in the reign of al-Muqtadir; he then excelled all the people of Islamism and surpassed them by his real acquirements in that science; he explained its obscurities, revealed its mysteries, facilitated its comprehension and furnished every requisite for its intelligence, in works remarkable for precision of style and subtlety of elucidation; noticing in them what al-Kindi, and others had neglected, such modes of conveying instruction. In these treatises he elucidated in plain terms the five main principles of logic, indicating the manner of employing them with advantage and the operation of reasoning (*surat al-qiyas*) to each of them. His writings on this subject are therefore highly satisfactory and possess the utmost merit. He afterwards composed enumerated the sciences and indicated the object of each; this treatise, the like of which had never before been composed and the plan of which had never been adopted by any other author, is indispensable guide to students in the sciences.” Ibn Said then proceeds to mention some of his works and the subjects of which they treat.

Abu Nasr continued, at Baghdad, to labour in the acquisition of this science till he attained in it a conspicuous rank and surpassed all his contemporaries. It forms the subject of most of his work. He then set out for Damascus, but did not stop there, having turned his steps towards Egypt. He mentions in his work, entitled *al-Siyasat al-Madaniyah* (administration of the city i. e., political economy) that he commenced it at Baghdad and finished it in Egypt. (Ibn Khallikan 1961: p. 209)

Having then returned to Damascus, he settled there and met with a kind reception from the reigning sultan, Sayf al-Dawlah Ibn Hamdan. I read in a miscellany that, when Abu Nasr went to Sayf' al Dawlah, which was a point of union for all persons distinguished

by their acquirements in any of the sciences, he appeared in his usual attire, which Sayf al-Dawlah having invited him to sit down, he said ; (Shall I sit down) where [am, or where thou art ? Sayf al-Dawlah replied: Where thou art; on which Abu Nasr stepped over the should of the persons (seated on the floor), till he reached the prince's throne and sat down so close to him that he forced him out of mamluks standing behind him, with whom he was accustomed to hold private communications in a particular language known to very few persons.

On this occasion, he said to them: "This shaykh has grossly offended against politeness; I shall now propose him some questions, and, if he does not reply to them in a satisfactory manner, turn him into ridicule." Abu Nasr immediately answered, in the same language: "Consider of it, O Amir! for every proceeding is appreciated according to its result." These words filled Sayf al-Dawlah with astonishment: "How!" said he, "you know this language?" "Yes," replied Abu Nasr, I know upwards of seventy" From that moment, the prince conceived a high opinion of him.

Abu Nasr then began to converse with the learned men of the council on all the different sciences, and he continued to harangue till he reduced them to silence and had the whole discourse to himself. They had even commenced writing down his (learned) observations when Sayf al-Dawlah dismissed them and remained alone with the philosopher.

"Would you like to eat anything?" said he. "No." "Or to drink?" "No." "Or to hear (music)?" "Yes". The prince then ordered some of the most eminent performers of instrumental music to be brought in, but not instrument without exciting Abu Nasr's disapprobation.

"Have you any skill in this art?" said Sayf al-Dawlah.

"I have," replied the other and drawing a case from beneath his waistband, he opened it and produced a lute. Having turned it, he began to play and cast all the council in a fit of laughter.

He then undid the strings and, having tuned it in another manner, he played again and drew tears from their eyes. Mounting it a third time, in a different key, he played and set them all asleep, even the doorkeepers, on which he took the opportunity of retiring and left them in that state. It is stated that instrument called the qanun of his invention and that he was the first who mounted it in its present form.

Al-Farabi led a solitary life and never went into council; during his residence at Damascus, he passed the greater part of his time near the borders of some rivulet or in a shady garden; there he composed his works and received the visits of his pupils. He wrote most of his works on loose leaves and very few in quires, for which reason nearly all his productions assume the form of detached chapters and notes; some of them exist only in fragments or unfinished. He was the most indifferent of men for the things of this world; he never gave himself the least trouble to acquire a livelihood or possess a habitation.

Sayf al-Dawlah settled on him a daily pension of four dirhams out of the public treasury; this moderate amount to which Al-Farabi had limited his demand. He continued

to live with the same frugality up to the moment of his death. He died at Damascus, A.H. 339 (A.C. 950-1), aged upwards of eighty years, and the funeral service was said over his body by Sayf al-Dawlah accompanied by four officers of the court. He was interred in the cemetery outside the gate called Bab alSaghr.1 Matta Ibn Yunus died at Baghdad under the khalifate of al-Radi; so, at least, it is stated by Ibn Said al-Qurtubi, in his classified list (tabaqat) of physicians. I found in a miscellany the following verses attributed to Al-Farabi, but have no proof of their authenticity:

“Quit, O brother! the place of the frivolous and frequent the place of heavenly truths. This (earthly) dwelling is not for us a lasting abode; no human being on earth can avert (the stroke of fate). This man envies that one, even for (things which endure) less than (the time for uttering) the shortest words. What are we but a drop of sperm on which various fortunes have descended? fortunes always ready to depart ! The circuit of the heavens is our fittest place; why therefore point (the earth)?” (Hardie 1932).

The caliph’s assembly indicates that Farabi had professional practical and theoretical knowledge of his expertise in music. Therefore, we anticipate that this may be a prime example of practical and theoretical knowledge. It can be said that the anonymous ‘Kitâbü Keşfü’l-Hüm Kümve’l Kürab fi Şerhi Âleti’t-Tarab’ is the most comprehensive study of the science and philosophy of music in the Farabi corpus. The only copy of this work is in the third Ahmed Library Manuscript Section of the Topkapı Palace Museum. This work has still been reviewed by the British musicologist and Arabist Henry George Farmer and J. B. Hardie in 1932. The inspirational experience of the second master Al-Farabi, which led to the discovery of many different new opportunities in science, will perhaps be read for the first time in this article with the details below.

Farabi, one of the greatest Islamic philosophers and thinkers, started to be known in the West despite many valuable works given by him in the 19th century. In the first half of the century, two researches published by Schmölders about Farabi, followed by Steinschneider's collection and publication of information about Farabi's works in many languages. After all these, after Dieterici's published works with what he could obtain from Farabi's manuscripts, the number of studies on Farabi's works increased considerably. Unfortunately, there were not many comprehensive studies on Farabi and his works before the mentioned dates in our country.

The number of works that Farabi gave throughout his life on subjects such as philosophy, logic, morality, politics, metaphysics, mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, language and music varies in the sources. For dgeexample, while Ibn Abu Usaybia mentioned 113 works by Farabi, Ahmet Ateş increased this number to 160.

It is also a fact that some of the works in the books describing the life of Farabi have not survived, and that some of these books are called by different names even though they are the same book. As a result, we should state that both the number of these works and the information that they belong to Farabi are not certain. More than once it was noted that the philosopher Al-Farabi, who fully believed that it was possible to change other metals into gold and wrote a treatise on how it might be done, himself lived and died in

great poverty, whilst Ibn Sina, who did not believe in alchemy, enjoyed modest comfort and could have commanded wealth had he been willing to accept it.

He also wrote an "Introduction to Logic" and an "Abridgment of Logic"; indeed, as we have already noted, his main work lay in the exposition of logic. He took some interest in political science and edited a summary of the laws of Plato, which very often replaces the Politics in the Arabic Aristotelian canon. In Ethics he wrote a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, but ethical theory did not, as a rule, appeal greatly to Arabic students. In natural science he was the author of commentaries on the Physics, Meteorology, *de coelo et de mundo* of Aristotle, as well as of an essay "On the movement of the heavenly spheres." His work in psychology is represented by a commentary on Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the *De Anima*, and by treatises "On the soul," "On the power of the soul," "On the unity and the one," and "On the intelligence and the intelligible," some of which afterwards circulated in mediaeval Latin translations, which continued to be reprinted well into the 17th century (e.g., *De intelligentia et de intelligibili*. Paris, 1638). In metaphysics he wrote essays on "Substance," "Time," "Space and Measure," and "Vacuum." In mathematics he wrote a commentary on the *Almagest* of Ptolemy, and a treatise on various problems in Euclid. He was a staunch upholder of the neo-Platonic theory that the teaching of Aristotle and that of Plato are essentially in accord and differ only in superficial details and modes of expression; he wrote treatises "On the agreement between Plato and Aristotle" and on "The object before Plato and Aristotle." In essays "Against Galen" and "Against John Philoponus" he criticised the views of those commentators, and endeavoured to defend the orthodoxy of Aristotle by making them responsible for apparent discrepancies with the teaching of revelation. He was interested also in the occult sciences, as appears from his treatises "On geomancy," "On the Jinn," and "On dreams." His chemical treatise called *Kimiya t-Tabish*, "the chemistry of things heated," has been classed as a work on natural science and also as a treatise on magic; this was the unfortunate direction which Arabic chemistry was taking. He also wrote several works on music. (Cf. Schmolders: *Documenta P. J. J. Arab.* Bonn., 1836, for Latin versions of select treatises) (O'Leary 1963).

Enumeration of the Sciences

Al-Farabi: *The Political Writings*. Trans. Charles Butterworth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Excerpt:

"1. Political science investigates the sorts of voluntary actions and ways of life; the dispositions, moral habits, inclination, and states of character from which those actions and ways of life come about; the goals for the sake of which they are performed; how they ought to exist in a human being; how to order them in him according to the manner they ought to exist in him; and the way to preserve them for him.

It distinguishes the goals for the sake of which the actions are performed and the ways of life practiced. It explains that some of them are truly happiness and that some are presumed to be happiness without being so and that it is not possible for the one which is

truly happiness to come to be in this life, but rather in a life after this one, which is the next life, whereas what is presumed to be happiness – life affluence, honor, and pleasures – is what is set down as goals only for this life.”

Political Regime

Part one found in: *Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources*. Trans. Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Inc., 2007.

Part two found in: *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*. 2nd. Edition. Eds. Joshua Parens and Joseph C. MacFarland. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Excerpt:

“1. The principles by which the six types of bodies and accidents subsist are divided into six major levels, each one comprising a single kind. The First Cause is in the first level. The secondary causes are in the second. The active intellect is in the third. The soul is in the fourth. Form is in the fifth. Matter is in the sixth. In the first level, there cannot be many but rather only a single one. In each of the other grades, there is many. The first three levels (namely, the First Cause, the secondary causes, and the active intellect) are neither bodies nor are they in bodies. The second three levels (namely, soul, form, and matter) are in bodies, although they themselves are not bodies. There are six genera of bodies: celestial bodies, rational animals, non-rational animals, plants, minerals, and the four elements. The composite whole of these six genera of bodies is the universe.”

Selected Aphorisms

AlFarabi: *The Political Writings*. Trans. Charles Butterworth. Contains Selected Aphorisms. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Introduction by Translator:

“In the Selected Aphorisms, Al-Farabi begins with, then develops, a comparison between the health of the soul and that of the body. That is, somewhat abruptly, he starts his exposition by defining the health of each and then explains how the health of the more important of the two – that of the soul – may be obtained and its sickness repulsed. The first word of the Selected Aphorisms is simply “soul,” while the last is “virtue.” In the 96 aphorisms occurring between these two words, Al-Farabi first enters upon a detailed examination of the soul, then provides an account and justification of the well-ordered political regime that the soul needs in order to attain its perfection. At no point in the treatise or epistle does he speak of prophecy or of the prophet or legislator. The terms are not even invoked. He is equally silent with respect to the philosopher and mentions “philosophy” only twice, both in the antepenultimate aphorism 95 – the same aphorism in which he mentions, for the only time, the word “revelation.” On the other hand, Al-Farabi speaks constantly throughout these aphorisms of the statesman (madani) and of the king.”

The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle

Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Trans. Muhsin Mahdi. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Excerpt:

“1. First he investigated the human things that make man enviable as to which of them constitutes the perfection of man as man, for every being has a perfection. Thus he investigated whether man’s perfection consists only in his having his bodily organs unimpaired, a beautiful face, and soft skin; or whether it consists also in his having a distinguished ancestry and tribe, or having a large tribe and many friends and lovers; or whether it consists also in his being prosperous; or being glorified and exalted, ruling over a group or a city in which his command is enforced and which submits to his wish. In order to attain the happiness that gives him his ultimate perfection, is it sufficient for man to have some or all of these? It became evident to him as he investigated these things that either they are themselves not happiness at all but are only believed to be happiness, or they are not themselves sufficient for man to attain happiness without having something else in addition to them or to some of them.

2. Then he investigated what this other thing must be. It became evident to him that this other thing, whose attainment is the attainment of happiness, is a certain knowledge and a certain way of life.”

Book of Religion

AlFarabi: The Political Writings. Trans. Charles Butterworth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Excerpt:

“1. Religion is opinions and actions, determined and restricted with stipulations and prescribed for a community by their first ruler, who seeks to obtain through their practicing it a specific purpose with respect to them or by means of them.

The community may be a tribe, a city or district, a great nation, or many nations.

If the first ruler is virtuous and his rulership truly virtuous, then in what he prescribes he seeks only to obtain, for himself and for everyone under his rulership, the ultimate happiness that is truly happiness; and that religion will be virtuous religion. If his rulership is ignorant, then in what he prescribes he seeks only to obtain, for himself by means of them, one of the ignorant goods – either necessary good, that is, health and bodily well being; or wealth; or honor and glory; or conquest – to win that good, be happy with it to the exclusion of them, and make those under his rulership tools he uses to arrive at his purpose and to retain them in his possession. Or he seeks to obtain this good for them to the exclusion of himself, or both for himself and them; these two are the most virtuous of the ignorant rulers. ...

... Now the craft of the virtuous first ruler is kingly and joined with revelation from God. Indeed, he determines the actions and opinions in the virtuous religion by means of revelation. This occurs in one or both of two ways: one is that they are all revealed to him as determined; the second is that he determines them by means of the faculty he acquires from revelation and from the Revealer, may He be exalted, so that the stipulations with which he determines the virtuous opinions and actions are disclosed to him by means of it.”

The Book of Letters

Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings. Ed. Muhammad Ali Khalidi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Excerpt:

“The capacities for dialectic, sophistry, and for the uncertain or dubious philosophy must precede the capacity for the certain philosophy, which is demonstrative philosophy, since one becomes aware of demonstrations after these others (i.e. dialectic and sophistry). Religion, if rendered human, comes after philosophy, in general, since it aims simply to instruct the multitude in theoretical and practical matters that have been inferred in philosophy, in such a way as to enable the multitude to understand them by persuasion or imaginative representation or both.

The arts of theology and jurisprudence come after philosophy in time and are dependent upon it. If a religion is dependent upon an uncertain or dubious ancient philosophy, the theology and jurisprudence that are dependent upon it will be in accordance with it. Or rather, they will be of a lower (standard), especially if the religion had corrupted the things it took from either or both of these philosophies, substituting images and similes for them. In this case, the art of theology takes these similes and images for certain truth and seeks to verify them with arguments. It sometimes happens that in the legislating theoretical matters, a more recent (religious) lawgiver has imitated one who preceded him, who took these theoretical matters from an uncertain or dubious philosophy. If the more recent lawgiver takes the similes and images imaginatively represented by the first lawgiver, which were in turn taken from that philosophy, to be truth rather than similes, he will seek to represent them imaginatively using similes. Then, the theologian in his religion will take these similes for the truth. Thus, what is studied by the art of theology in this religion is further from the truth than the first religion, since it seeks merely to verify each simile of a thing that it assumes to be the truth, or that is falsely represented as the truth.”

Aims of Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources. Trans. Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Inc., 2007.

Excerpt:

“1. Our intention in this treatise is to point out the aim and primary divisions of the book by Aristotle known as the Metaphysics, since many people have the preconceived notion that the point and purpose of this book is to discuss the Creator (may He be glorified and exalted!), the intellect, the soul, and other related topics, and that the science of metaphysics and the science of theology are one and the same thing. Consequently, we find that most people who study it are perplexed and misguided by it, since we find that most of the talk in it is devoid of any such aim, or rather, we find that the only talk specifically related to this aim is that in the eleventh chapter, that is, the one designated by the letter Lambda. Moreover, none of the ancient philosophers has commented on this book in the correct manner, as they have for the rest of his books. To be more specific, there is an incomplete commentary on Lambda by Alexander of Aphrodisias and a

complete commentary by Themistius, but for the rest of the chapters, either there was no commentary, or none has survived to our time — since upon examining the books of the later Peripatetics, it may be assumed that Alexander did in fact comment on the entire book. For our part, we want to point out the aim of the book and the contents of each chapter.”

Book of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City

Recommended edition: Al-Farabi. *AlFarabi on the Perfect State*. Trans. Walzer, Richard. New York, NY. Oxford University Press, 1985.

From Book Review:

“Farabi is Islam’s first and, pace Ibn Sina, perhaps greatest Islamic Neoplatonist. He is certainly more original than his successor who leaned heavily upon him. Farabi in *The Virtuous City* produced a work “written by a philosophy qua philosopher”. His intention, again to use Walzer’s introductory words, was “to naturalize the material” which he brought to the attention of the Muslim world of his day, “and by doing this to give a new – and i suppose, in his view, the best – answer to the intellectual as well as the religious and political questions of his century” (p. 6). The work has a special and honored place in the histories of both Islamic philosophy and medieval Islamic political theory. However, although it is often thought to provide Islam’s counterpart to Plato’s *Republic*, the two are, in fact, very different works. Farabi’s volume begins with a lengthy discussion of the Neoplatonic One and does not deal with matters political until Chapter 15 in Section 5.”

Book of Demonstration

Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources. Trans. Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Inc., 2007.

Excerpt:

“1. Perfect assent is certainty. Perfect conceptualization is to conceptualize something by means of a concise account of what it is in a manner proper to it, because conceptualizing something by means of what signifies it is to define the thing. We will begin (discussing) these two (activities) with a precise account of what is proper to perfect assent. By way of summary, assent is for someone to have a conviction about something to which a judgement can apply, by judging that what the thing is outside the mind accords with the object of conviction in one’s mind, where the truth is that the thing outside the mind does in fact accord with the object of conviction in the mind. Assent may apply both to what is true as well as to what is false. Assent may be certain, it may be approximately certain, it may be the assent that is called “the acquiescence of the soul” with respect to something (which is the one most removed from certainty), and (finally), there is nothing certain whatsoever in false assent. In fact, only the assent to something that is true can be certain.”

Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*

Al Frabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Trans. F.W. Zimmerman. London: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Book Review:

“This book represents a comprehensive study of Al Farabi’s expositions of Aristotle’s logical treatise, the *De Interpretatione*. It includes a substantial Introduction, a translation of AlFarabi’s lengthy commentary and his much shorter treatise on the *De Interpretatione*, extensive notes and pertinent appendices and indices. The main text studied and translated, the Commentary, is one of AlFarabi’s very important works. It is also a difficult text, not without its share of the problematic. The Short Treatise is also important, particularly as it complements and sheds light on the former.

Al-Farabi wrote different kinds of commentaries on Aristotle, including several of the type sometimes referred to as “large” or “great,” in which the translated text is quoted and commented on section by section. The Commentary on *De Interpretatione* is the only one of Farabi’s works of this type that is known to have survived. The translation of Aristotle’s text it includes is that of Ishaq Ibn Hunayn and in its comments it offers expansions that go considerably beyond Aristotle. This is seen, for example, in AlFarabi’s pursuance of the view that logic is concerned with the form of propositions, not their content, and that logical and linguistic forms are not identical. It is also seen in his comments on the notorious Chapter 19 of the *De Interpretatione* where he gives expression to one tradition of interpreting Aristotle on the truth status of statements about future contingents. According to this interpretation, a pair of contradictory statements about a future possible event must be exclusively either false or true. This, however, does not mean that one of the statements rather than the other is true. Their division of truth and falsity remains indefinite. Thus their truth value remains unknowable – unknowable to man, that is, not to God, AlFarabi maintains. He then offers a discussion in which he argues that God’s knowledge of future possible events deprives neither the events of their intrinsic contingency nor man of his freedom of the will.”

Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle

Al-Farabi *The Political Writings*. Trans. Charles Butterworth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Philosophy of Aristotle

Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Trans. Muhsin Mahdi. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Excerpt:

“1. Aristotle sees the perfection of man as Plato sees it and more. However, because man’s perfection is not self-evident or easy to explain by a demonstration leading to certainty, he saw fit to start from a position anterior to that from which Plato had started. He saw four things that everyone pursues from the outset and considers desirable and good – they are desired and pursued by nature, as it were, from the beginning, and no other pursuit precedes them in time: (1) the soundness of the human body, (2) the soundness of the senses, (3) the soundness of the capacity for knowing how to discern what leads to the soundness of the body and the senses, and (4) the soundness of the power to labor at what leads to their soundness. This (3) is the kind of knowledge that is useful and necessary.

And this (4) is the kind of labor that is useful, necessary, and preferred to everything else, be it the labor of a man by himself, or accompanied by the labor of others for him, or accompanied by his labor for others, and whether he performs it by deed or speech. The deed by which this labor is performed is the useful and necessary deed that has priority, and the speech by which this labor is performed is the useful and necessary speech. Beyond this, one may prefer also that these four things exist in the most excellent state of their soundness.”

Plato's Laws

Parens, Joshua and Joseph Macfarland, "Plato's Laws," in *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*. Cornell University Press, Ithica, NY, 2011.

Excerpt from AlFarabi's introduction:

“Our purpose in making this introduction is this: the wise Plato did not feel free to reveal and uncover every kind of knowledge for all people. Therefore he followed the practice of using symbols, riddles, obscurity, and difficulty, so that knowledge would not fall into the hands of those who do not deserve it and be deformed, or fall into the hands of someone who does not know its worth or who uses it improperly. In this he was right. Once he knew and became certain that he had become famous for this practice, and that it was widespread among people that he expresses everything he intends to say through symbols, he would sometimes turn to the subject he intended to discuss and state it openly and literally; but whoever reads or hears this discussion supposes that it is symbolic and that he intends something different from what he stated openly. This notion is one of the secrets of his books. Moreover, no one is able to understand what he states openly and what he states symbolically or in riddles unless trained in that art itself, and no one will be able to distinguish the two unless skilled in the discipline being discussed. This is how his discussion proceeds in the Laws. In this present book we have resolved upon extracting the notions to which he alluded in that book and grouping them together, following the order of the Discourses it contains, so that the present book may become an aid to whoever wants to know that book and sufficient for whoever cannot bear the hardship of study and reflection. God accommodates to what is right.”

Considering the subject of our dissertation, we found it appropriate to examine Farabi's treatises under two headings. (*Kitab al Musiqā Al Kabir*, foreword by Hafni)

1- His Treatises Except for Music

There are many issues that Farabi mentioned among his more than one hundred works. It would go beyond the purpose of our thesis if we categorize them. Al-Farabi was the author of a series of commentaries on the logical *Organon*, which contained nine books according to the Arabic reckoning, namely :For this reason, we have considered it appropriate to present some of Farabi's non-musical works here, taking into account the bibliographic studies prepared on this subject:

The *Isagoge* of Porphyry.

The *Categories* or *al-Maqulat*.

The *Hermeneutica* or *al-'Ibara* or *al-Tafsir*.

The Analytica Priora or al-Qiyas I.
 The Analytica Posteriora or al-Burhan.
 The Topica or al-Jadl.
 The Sophistica Elenchi or al-Maghalit.
 The Rhetoric or al-Khataba.
 The Poetics or ash-Shi'r.
 Cem' beyne Re'yeyi'l-Hakimeyn
 De'ava'l-Kalbiyye
 Elfâzü'l-Müsta'mele fi'l-Logic
 The Philosophy of Plato
 The Philosophy of Aristotle
 Fusulu'l-Hamsa
 Fususu'l-Hikam
 Fusul al-Madani
 İbane 'an Garazi Aristotâlîs fi Kitâbi mâ ba'de't-Tabî'a
 Ihsa'u'l- 'Ulûm
 Îsagûcî
 İsbâtü'l-Mufarakât
 Kitâbü'l-Burhan
 Kitâbü'l-Jadel
 Kitâbü'l-Emkineti'l-Muğalata
 Kitâbü'l-Hatâbe
 Kitâbu'l-Hurûf
 Kitâbü'l-İbâre
 Kitâbü'l-kıyâs
 Kitâbü'l-Kıyâsu's-Sağır
 Kitâbü'l-Makûlât
 Kitâbu'l-Mille ve Nusûsun Uhrâ
 Kitâbü Şerâ 'iti'l-Yakîn
 Kitâbü't-Tahlîl
 Ma'âni'l-'Aql
 Medînetü'l-Fâdıla
 Mesâilü'l-Felsefiyye ve'l-Ecvibetü 'anhâ
 Nüket fimâ Yesıhhu ve mâ la Yesıhhu min Ahkâmi'n-Nücûm
 Risale fi'l-Halâ'
 Risale fimâ Yenbağî en Highaddem kable Te'allümi'l-Felsefe
 Risale fi Kavânini's-Şi'r
 Siyâsetü'l-Medeniyye
 Sharh li-Kitâbi Aristotâlîs fi'l-İbâre
 Tahsîlü's-Sa'âde
 Ta'likât

Telhisu Nevâmî Eflâtûn
Tenbîh 'ala Sabil's-Sa'ade
To Tevti
'Uyûni'l-Masâ'il
Vahid wa'l-Vahde
Vücübü Sına'ati'l-Kimya
2- His Treatises on Music

Almost all of Farabi's works on music mentioned in the sources have survived to the present day. Because it has been determined that some of the works mentioned in the sources are the same work, but are called by different names. After presenting a short bibliography of these works, we would like to introduce and summarize the surviving ones one by one.

Introduction and Bibliography of Works Concerning Music
Kitâbu'l-Musîkâ'l-Kebir

And finally, we reach Farabi's great treatise on the Art of Music and other documents of Arabic literature related to this art. Today there is a growing interest in culture, music, philosophy of mind for Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. While it previously attracted the attention of Eastern and African Muslims, now the number of art lovers and philosophical truth seekers from all cultures is increasing. In their melodies, they examine, apply and seek the voice and spirit of different societies. Between the tenth and sixteenth centuries, the writers who dealt with the art of music theoretically were, above all, philosophers. They belonged to the great Neoplatonic school, a synthetic and encyclopaedic school that sought to reconcile Plato and Aristotle and adapt them to dogma that claimed to develop all the sciences and establish close links and a logical hierarchy between them. All of the sciences grouped in this way formed the general philosophy. Music was also there and took its place alongside mathematics; therefore he himself was a part of philosophy. Incidentally, these scholars, unfortunately, did not agree with the architectural and decorative arts, on which we have no study. Thus the ancient Gerasius in the Greek world, Ptolemy and geometry, Euclid, Nicomachus on music in the Latin world, Saint Augustine and Boethius on music in the Latin world, and even more recently philosophers like Kepler or Jean Jacques Rousseau on music. Today, we are still doing research on comparisons by examining these works in our age. Today, the philosophy of Islamic Geography is studied extensively; After all, everyone knows the names of the great scholastics of the East who had such a strong influence on our Latin Middle Ages: Al-Kindi (801-873) Al-Farabi Avennasar (870-950) Ibn Sina Avicenna (890-1037) Ibn Bajja Avempace (1085 – 1138) Ibn Rushd Averroes (1126-1198) The reason for this is basically to understand Plato and Aristotle and to move forward with analysis.

This music theory, in principle, came from the Greeks; Arab scholars knew several Greek musicologists; In particular, Ptolemy's treatise was translated into their language; but Farabi put a very personal stamp on the cry; made it clear and deep; with it, it became more didactic in some parts and more analytical in others. The scope of the composition,

the penetration of analysis, the philosophical and subtle turn of thought tied to a great practical experience make this work one of the most remarkable works of the Middle Ages. The music taught in this wonderful work may seem very weak to some readers: it is purely melodic. By harmony, I mean the harmony between notes played at the same time, there is never a question mark. Everything revolves around a rather modest instrument, in short, the lute (al-ud), an instrument with four or five strings, barely crossing the two-octave range. The theorist draws on all the resources of his science, all the sharpness of his analysis, in this simple instrument and the more primitive two-stringed tunburs. In reality, we have to admit that the music of this age is poorer compared to the music of nations and earlier times. All this musical emanation was not designed for mere enjoyment; it was also used to warn people to stand aside or to prostrate themselves at the passage of his royal majesty, and to recall parts of the escort that dispersed during attack or hunting pursuit. Is it possible that there is no harmony with such a variety of instruments and such a large number of actors and singers? But Islam was not well suited to music, a tradition for weddings and family celebrations that required few instruments; it excludes it from the cult and accepts only the adhan prayer, the light nasal vibrations blend into the dawn that dominates the noise of the cities, stretching to the horizons and shimmering in the morning, or you lose yourself in the depths of the unique peaceful valleys in the evenings. Adhan, according to tradition, belongs to an Abyssinian Bilal.

All the creativity of the theorist, all the sensitivity of the artist, all his concern is about the melodic. We manage to use extremely fine pitches, even smaller than a quarter tone; a range of types can be distinguished, strong, weak, colorful and more than twenty modes, twelve of which are frequently used; we change; we nuance; certain keys are moved by the minimum amount; additional notes are added to base notes, embellishments, accents; we reach a wonderful thinness. Music had a tremendous impact on Easterners with very few means. A simple couplet accompanied by the oud, a few notes from a prelude sung by a beautiful voice, maybe a somewhat muffled and guttural sound as we love in the East, the effect of ecstasy created the following mood in the listener: they trembled, cried, fainted, thought they were going to die, fainted. The secret of these melodies, their composition, is the formation of an inner composition! The sensitivity of the listener is striking. Today, when good amateurs go to listen to gigantic operas or monumental trilogies performed by powerful orchestras using all the resources of harmony, the magic of the sets, the electric stages, the magic of the fires, augmented by the splendor of the costumes, does not move the listener much. . In connection with science, music is of scientific interest. In Farabi and other treatises you will find several pages on mathematics or physics.

Logarithms are power-intensive. In fact, tone, semitone, etc. we can add or subtract these intervals like any other arithmetic quantity when we consider their intervals in themselves; but if we consider the ratios of the string lengths that define them, we need to multiply their ratios to sum the intervals; To cut them, you have to split them. Multiplication corresponds to addition, and division corresponds to subtraction. This is

the property of logarithms; This is why the keys of a stringed instrument follow an exponential law in their progressive approach. The experience for numbers dates back to the time of Pythagoras. This idea was also that of Plato, for whom the number presided over everything, and who proposed the enigma of a nuptial number symbol and guarantee of human happiness. This conception, moreover, has persisted down to us: for modern scholars any scientific theory is always an effort to express bodies and phenomena by numbers and algebraic functions. The Pythagorean and Neoplatonic school therefore wanted to put music into numbers. Not having means to measure the vibrations, she used lengths of cords; but, still clumsy in the management of fractions, it committed some abuses in its system. Music theory has given these relationships a truly abusive significance. In physics, some attempts to create a theory of vibration and precise analyzes of air passage in chutes will be noticed, postulating the idea of fluid dynamics. We pointed to the beautiful passages in Farabi's treatise and Shafi al-Din's commentary on the anatomy of the vocal organs.

After reading these pages of philosophy, numbers, analytical and often abstract, you will no doubt ask the following question:

If you're not a musician, what might all this be telling us? Is it about medieval music or Islamic Geography that we want to know today? Or is it our aim to learn how our minds are manipulated by going down to scientific foundations with its philosophical aspect? Thousands of information with the sounds we hear every day input our minds without questioning and is processed. Did Farabi make people laugh and cry in this way in the council of the caliph, or is he explaining how the voices create an ecstatic effect?

Farabi, great philosopher, very high spirit, Sufi scholar, spent his last years at the court of a prince who is one of the strongest personalities of the Middle Ages, Sayf-Dawlah. This sultan belonged to the Hamdani family, which, thanks to the collapse of the caliphate, had almost ruled for a while in the regions of Aleppo, Damascus and Mosul. The philosopher was an enlightened prince surrounded by scholars and scholars, himself a very fine poet; He was also a brave and stubborn warrior, who during his long reign led campaigns against the Byzantine Empire almost every year.

The Arab musicians of the first two centuries of the Hijra could not write theories and above all play, as they do today, according to direct transmission. Therefore, it is possible that in the time of Al-Farabi, scientific music received the Hellenistic stamp and at the same time, a purely Arabic music continued to exist among the people in the midst of various influences. Today, in the Eastern world, which is forbidden by religion and weakly supported by the princes, music is scarce except in cafes. This is the popular aspect we see in art; very interesting; however, he may not always agree with the Hellenizing theory; It is a question that needs to be examined.

The introduction to Farabi's Kitab al-Musiqi is a valuable document. This is an example of the method of the philosophers of that time. This method seems entirely inspired by that of Greek scientists. Muslim scholars also sought a way to express themselves like them in order not to stray from the path of their Masters, from whom they

learned the knowledge of truth. Farabi's superiority over those who wrote works on music in Arabic language after him is remarkable.

Al-Farabi's most important music treatise is *Kitab al-Musiqā al-Kabir*, which he wrote at the request of the caliph al-Radi's vizir Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn al-Qasim al-Karkhi. (Sawa 1947: p.14) We are quoting the first sentences written by Al-Farabi in *Kitab Al Musiqā* with our own translation. Here he explains why he wrote *The Second Master Musiqā*.

“You have expressed the desire to know the art of Music as conceived by the ancient philosophers (Qudema). You have invited me to write an easy-to-understand and accessible book on this topic. I have postponed the execution of your orders before I have carefully studied the works of the ancient scholars, their successors and contemporaries who have come to us and have completed the analysis and comparison studies. First of all, I kept myself away from making quick decisions and writing a book right away. I aimed to discover what you wanted to know in all the treatises written before in the history of philosophy. Thus, I thought that I would be exempt from writing a work on a previously treated subject. Indeed, it would be superfluous to write a book on the subject if it were a thorough and complete study of all parts of this science. It would be the work of an ignorant, malicious man to adopt the words of others. If a book contains incomprehensible passages, unused expressions, or any other flaw, someone else can explain it, perfect it, only by reproducing the author's thought. But merit belongs to the latter; the other may claim that he merely conveys an idea, interprets it, explains it. In the works I read, I saw that some parts of this art were set aside, and the words of the authors lacked coherence and clarity, especially in matters related to theory. We cannot attribute these defects to the inadequacy of the ancient writers, nor can it be assumed that they could not give this science its perfection. These scholars were numerous, full of talent; They had no other ideal but the advancement of science. These shrewd people became interchangeable; each studied the statements of his predecessors to increase the knowledge he received. Only his writings on Music have been lost or poorly translated into Arabic; That's the only explanation I can give for its flaws. I explain what seems ambiguous to me and, as far as I know, carefully analyze the opinions of everyone who writes about it; In this science I reconcile everyone with their own thinking of science and then I correct the errors. That's why I thought I should respond to your request by composing this piece. Whatever the science in question, three conditions are necessary to be an excellent theorist:

- Know all the principles well.
- To have the ability to draw the necessary conclusions of these principles in the items (data) belonging to this science.
- Know how to respond to false theories and analyze the views expressed by other authors to distinguish right from wrong and correct errors. With this in mind, I divided my work into two treatises: In the first, I showed everything that allowed us to reach the first principles of music science, and then everything and nothing that came out of these principles, without neglecting anything.

- I use a method that is private to me without involving others. In the second, I remind you of the views of the most famous theorists dealing with the science of music and whose writings have reached us.

The first treatise is divided into two parts. The first is an introduction, the second deals with musical science itself. The introduction comprises two speeches, the second part three books. In the first, we study the principles of music and everything related to this art in general. Most of the ancient authors whose works have come down to us, as also those of our contemporaries who were content to follow in their footsteps, have limited their study of music to this single book. In the second book we speak of the musical instruments in use among us and we show how one applies, by means of these instruments, what has been laid down in principle in the preceding book. We clearly explain the use to be made of each of these instruments, and we suggest how one could derive other effects from them which one does not have the usual experience. In the third book, different types of certain melodies are mentioned. Each of these three books has two speeches; therefore the first covenant is eight. The second treatise consists of four discussions. All of these twelve discussions constitute our study. Here the first treatise opens. All theoretical science consists of fundamental principles and other things derived from them. The basic principles of certain sciences, certain arts are immediately known to us (axioms). In other sciences we need to find all or some of these principles. In the science that preoccupies us, not only are the principles clear, but also what we learn from principles remains obscure; even the path to some does not appear immediately, and the method of finding that path does not appear immediately. The ancients well established certain principles which we find in their works; but they did not explicitly demonstrate them; those of our contemporaries who followed in their footsteps did not specify them further. So before approaching the study of music, I think it is better to show in a few words what it is best to start with to discover its principles, to give the method to follow in our research as well as the way to apply this method. Only then will we be permitted to study the science of music, to speak of what comes after the principles, and even to expound the latter. We therefore discuss in a few words of the first principles of musical science and this will be, in a way, an introduction to a more complete study.

We will give detailed information about the content of the first book below. Farabi gives the following information about the second book, which has not survived: "In the second book, we talked about the ideas of the famous scholars who dealt with this art that have reached us, we have explained the ambiguous parts of their views and thoughts, and we have compared the views of every person who has expressed his thoughts in his books, and each of them has the following information: We determined the point he reached in this science and corrected the thoughts we saw as wrong." (Al-Farabi Kitab Al Musiqqa 2021: p. 21)

Kitab al Musiqqa Al Kabir has been accepted as the most comprehensive work written on music theory and philosophy in the West and the Islamic world. Baron Cara de

Vaux accepts *Kitab al-Musiqa al Kabir* as a masterpiece of oriental music theory. (Erlanger 1935: p.19)

Henry George Farmer begins his book *Arabic-Latin writings on music* with these words: "The Muslims of Spain already had a wide reputation for learning that Western Europe was eager to acquire. As Al-Farabi tells us, on the subject of music theory, the Arabs had most of the writings of the Greeks in their own language. He himself wrote a *Kitab al musiqa*. Probably the greatest piece of music ever written. It is not surprising that students from other countries flock to Cordova. The rise and growth of science was largely spurred by Muslim examples." (Farmer 1965: p.19)

The value of this source for our purposes lies in the fact that, unlike previous works, it systemized theories which reflected actual musical practices. As Al-Farabi states, *Kitab Musiqa al-Kabir* was intended for those who practise the art of music and those who want to verify theory by practice Al-Farabi based his investigation on the premise that music performance was prior in time to theory. (Sawa 1947: p.16)

The first or general kind of melody is dealt with in the first of the final pair of essays in the *Grand Book*, and it is in this essay that the subject of rhythm is also treated, as we have already seen. The fourth and fifth parts of theoretical music, therefore, share an essay in the *Grand Book* to some extent. But the "perfect" melodies, which seem clearly to constitute the principal object of the fifth part of theoretical music, are the sole subject of the final essay of the *Grand Book*.

In music, the work that must have had far greater influence was Al-Farabi's *Kitab al-musiqa*, and, indeed, the actual copy of this work made for Ibn Bajja (Avenpace) is still preserved at Madrid. Yet the fact remains that we have no trace of the *Kitab al-Musiqi* in Latin. Fetis, the musical historian, says that a portion of it was translated into Latin by the famous Jerome of Prague, and that it appears in Schmoelders' *Documenta Arabum Philosophiae* (Bonn, 1836) a statement which has been repeated by Rafael Mitjana in *Le Monde Oriental* (1906) and in the recent *Encyclopedia de la Musique* (Tome V), edited by Lavignac. (Farmer 1925: p.73)

In the sources, 8 copies of *Kitâba al-Mûsîqâ al-Kabir* are mentioned as manuscripts. There are some confusions in the bibliography of these works. We can list the bibliography of the manuscripts of the work, which we had the chance to observe on site, the copy in the Köprülü Library: 1) Köprülü Library, No: 953, 236 Leaflet, Date of Copy: 11 Cemaziye'l-ahir h. 654/m. 1257 (Istanbul / Turkey). It was copied by Ali b. Rüstem el-Kîsî. The fact that it is mentioned as *Kitâbu'l-Medhal ila sinâ'ati'l-Musîqâ* in the Köprülüzeade catalog may mislead researchers. We have stated above that this name is the first part of *Kitâba al-Musîqa al Kabir*.

Ragıp Paşa Ktp., No: 876, 185 Leaflet, Copy Date: (İstanbul/ Turkey). It was copied by Muhammed Tâceddin El-Katip. It is also misleadingly referred to as *al-Medhal* in catalogues.

Biblioteca Nacional., No: 241, 91 Foil. 169 sec. (incomplete), Date of Copy: h. 6th century / m. 12 years (Madrid/Spain).47 Brockelmann earned his work *Kitâbu*

Ustukisât as 'Ilme'l-Musîqa. However, it is known that the first part of this title-Musîqâ'al Kabir is the second.

University Library, No: 1984, 129 Varak (incomplete copy, 102 leaves available), Copy Date: 14 Rebi'ul-Evvel, h. 866/ 1461 (Princeton/ England). The work is thought to be one of the Beirut manuscripts said to belong to the Murat Bey el-Bârûdî library. It was purchased by Princeton University in 1925. It is referred to as Kitâbu'l- Medhal in the catalogue.

Biblioteca Ambrosiana, No: 289, 195 Leaflet, Date of Copy: 5 Rebiu'l-ahir, h. 748/m. 1346 (Milan / Italy)

Universiteits Bibliotheek. No: 651, 123 Folio, Copy Date: h. 943/m. 1536-37 (Leiden/ Netherlands). This copy h. 482/m. Copied from the copy dated 1089.

Beirut Ktp., No:?(incomplete copy) It is stated that this work once belonged to the Murâd Bey el-Bârûdî Library, and D'erlanger made use of this manuscript in its French translation. However, this work has not been found yet. Also, Brockelmann, Farmer or Shiloah do not mention this copy.

Oskoryal Ktp., No: 906, 183 Foil (incomplete copy), (Madrid / Spain)

Al-Farabi also wrote a second volume to this Kitab al-musîqa al-kabir, which has not come down to us. It comprised four chapters (maqalat), in which he says he examined and commented on the theories of the Greeks. 6 It was suggested by Kosegarten, Land, and Tripodo, that the manuscript alluded to by Toderini, entitled the Majal al-musiqi (Arena of Music), preserved in the 'Abd al-Hamid Library at Constantinople, was perhaps, the lost second volume of the Kitab al-musîqa al kabir But the title given by these writers was clearly an error for Madkhal al-musîqa of which copies exist in the 'Abd al-Hamid Library, as well as in other collections in Constantinople, and elsewhere. Munk, too, was of opinion that the lost work was the one referred to by Andres in his Dell' origine,progressi . . . d'ogni Letteratura. This was also incorrect, since Andres says that his information was based on particulars obtained from Casiri concerning a MS. in the Escorial, from which we know that it was the first volume of the Kitab al-musîqa al kabir that was under discussion. (Farmer 1929: p.176,177)

In 1934, some parts of Kitâba al-Mûsîkâ al-Kabîr were translated into English in the work called Collection of Arab Writers on Music by Farmer. Between 1930 and 1935, the full translation of the work was done by D'erlanger. The first Arabic edition was made in 1967 by Ğattâs Abdûlmelik Haşebe and Mahmud Ahmed el-Hefny. Sawa states that there are more footnotes in this editorial publication than the work itself; however, he states that the vast majority of these footnotes are worthless, especially in terms of explaining ambiguous topics. The sources related to the bibliography of the work are as follows:

Shiloah, The Theory of Music in Arabic Writings, pp.104-107.

Ateş, Bibliography of Farabi's Works, Belleten, c. 15, p. 187, art. 95.

Brockelmann, GAL I, p. 234, GAL Suppl. Business. 376.

İbnu'l-Kıfî, İhbaru'l-Ulema, p. 184 Baron Rodolphe D'erlanger, La Musique Arabe, c. 1 second. xxi

Ghattas 'Abd-al-Malik Khashaba Kitâb al-Mûsîqa al-Ksbir, p. 29-32.

Although the book appears as an independent work in some sources, it is thought to be confused with Farabi's "Sınâ'atu'l-mûsîkâ" First Science, which is one of the two parts of Kitâbu'l-Mûsîkâ'l-Kebir.

The sources related to the bibliography of the work are as follows:

Ateş, Bibliography of Farabi's Works, Belleten, c. 15, p. 192, art. 155

Kitabu Ihsa al-Ulum

This work is not entirely about music, but includes a small section under the title of "Science of Music" that talks about the parts of the science of music. The sources related to the bibliography of the work, which has many translations into Turkish and other world languages, are as follows:

Ibn-i Abu Usaybi'a, 'Uyûnu'l-Enbâ fî Tabakâti'l-Etibbâ, 608.

İbnu'l-Kıfî, İhbaru'l-Ulema, p. 183.

Shiloah, The Theory of Music in Arabic Writings, pp.102-103.

Ateş, Bibliography of Farabi's Works, Belleten, c. 15, p. 183, art. 38.

Farmer, The Sources of Arabian Music, 167

Content of the Treatises on Music "Kitâb al-Musiqa al-Kabir"

Expressing that he handled Kitâbu'l-Mûsîqa al- al Kabîr in two big sections, Farabi explains these sections in the introduction part of the work as follows: I. Section: El-Medhal ila Sına'ati'l-Mûsîkâ (Introduction to the Art of Music), II. Chapter: Sına'âtu'l-Musîqâ (Music Art). Apart from these, we have deemed it appropriate to present the content of the book in a comprehensive way, and for this reason, we give the topics in the book under general headings:

5.4 Content of Kitab al Musiqa al Kabir

5.4.1 First Part

Introduction to Musical Art: This section has been analyzed in two main articles.

1. Article:

a) The general and special meaning of the concept of melody (lahn). (What is Lahn?)

b) Types of musical art: Ameli and Nazari Music.

c) Elements of melody interpretation. (Relation of the sarcophagi)

d) Composing melody. (Moulds of sarcophagi)

e) The distance between the composition (patterns) of the melody and its performance.

f) Melody types and their functions.

g) The birth of taganni melodies. (The emergence of the sarcophagi)

h) The birth of musical instruments.

i) Theoretical and practical studies. (Theory and Practice)

j) The meaning of the science of music.

- k) Theoretical information. (Theoretical teachings)
- l) Experiment and proof rules. (Principles)
- m) The scholars of theology. (Position of theorists)

2. Article:

- a) Natural melodies for man.
- b) The places of the notes in the melody.
- c) Natural degrees of high and low pitch.
- d) Natural tunes in oud.
- e) Similar strength in melodic principles (interval).
- f) Equity-based range theory.
- g) Interval rates.
- h) Strong and soft intervals.
- i) Difference between Half Tanini and Fadla.
- j) Fundamentals of Music Theory.
- k) 10 principles of perfection in Ameli Music.
- l) Harmony of the 10 principles of excellence.
- m) Introduction to first principles.
- n) Simple numerical relationships between vowel intervals.
- o) Formation (occurrence) of rates.
- p) Comparing one ratio with another ratio.
- q) The difference between one rate and another.

5.4.2 Second Part

The Art of Music: This section has been analyzed in 3 parts and 6 articles.

A) Science I: Basic Principles of Music Art

1. Article:

- c) Creation of sounds and melodies in objects.
- d) Causes of high pitch and low pitch in sounds.
- e) The difference in pitch and lowness of sounds.
- f) The interval between two tones.
- g) Intervals formed by dividing the string: Octave, Quadruple etc.
- h) Revealing congruent and discordant intervals (test).
- i) Interval measures emerged through terkîb and tafsîl.
- j) Measures of successive pest tunes.
- k) Quadruple melodic intervals.
- l) Genera and their classes (Quartet and Pentet intervals = Genus).
- m) Soft breeds.
- n) Kavi (strong) breeds.
- o) Harmony and incompatibility of the composed genera.
- p) Numerical tables showing the genus tunes.

2. Article:

- a) Quad intervals.
- b) The full array.
- c) Arrangement of quadrilateral intervals in the complete sequence.
- d) The full sequence that changes and does not change.
- e) The names of the tunes in the full scale (octave or two octaves).
- f) Tunes that can and do not change into full scales.
- g) Kinds of genera and ranges repeated in complete sequences.
- h) Similar intervals.
- i) The intonations and their degrees in similar quadrilateral intervals.
- j) Natural high and low intonations.
- k) Principles of intonation.
- l) Fifteen intervals and principles of intonation.
- m) A mixture of intervals of different tones with each other.
- n) Tunes formed by a mixture of genders.
- o) Mixture between array types.
- p) The principles of progression.
- q) Varieties of iqa'.
- r) Detailed types of iqa.
- s) Summary information about Iqa.
- t) An ancient instrument for vocalizing scales, genres and notes.
- u) The last word on theoretical art.

B) Science II: El-Âlâtü'l-meşhura ve'n-neğamu'l-mahsûsa fihâ (The famous instruments and tunes obtained from them)

1. Article:

- a) The style of obtaining tunes from famous instruments.
- b) Oud: In this section, the scale used in the four-string oud, the intervals in the ud and the relations between them, the harmony between notes in the ud, some forms of note harmony (chord) in the ud, obtaining a complete scale in the ud strings, simple chord shapes and complex chords in the ud, common (famous) the ratio between the oud strings according to the chord, etc. information on topics

2. Article:

- a) Bagdad Tanbur: In this section, the frets, intervals, chords, notes derived from it, the way new players use the Baghdad tanbur, revealing the types of intervals etc. information about.
- b) Khorasan Tanbur: In this section, the regular and variable pitches in this drum, the types obtained with different patterns of variable pitches, etc. information on the topics.
- c) Wind instruments: In this section, the reasons for high pitched and roughness in wind instruments; the sounds obtained depending on the length, dryness and cleanliness of these reeds; Information is given about double wind instruments, the most famous wind instruments and Sür Na'y (Zurna).

d) Rebab: In this section, information is given about the note places in the rebab, the common tuning form, the comparison of rebab-ud and rebab-tanbur.

e) Mi'zefs (Kanun, santur, etc. instruments): In this section, information is given about the sounds obtained from the empty strings in the mi'zef and the genus in the mi'zef.

f) Final words about instruments.

C) Science III: Elhânü'l-Cüz'iyye (Juz'î Tunes) (Maqams, melodies, savt, scales etc.)

1. Article:

a) Rulers of consonant and discordant notes in immutable discrete whole scales.

b) Navigation (intikāl) principles and basic principles of melodies.

c) Full (9/8), quintet (5/4) and quartet (4/3) spacing types.

d) Minor cruise types,

e) Partial types of iqā',

f) The formation of mufassal ikās by the combination of muvassal iqās.

g) Famous Arab iqā's.

h) Mixture of Iqās.

2. Article:

a) Full and empty notes (the distribution of notes on the lyrics).

b) Decoration of melodies.

c) The ultimate goals of the melodies.

Al-Farabi is known to be the author of many works on logic and theoretical sciences, especially the science of logic. He commented on almost all of Aristotle's books:

I. Works on Logic (known collectively as the Organon or "tool" because they deal with methodology, the tool of research)

1. The Categories, a treatise on the fundamental classification of ideas, particularly isolated and uncombined terms.

2. On Interpretation, a treatise on philosophical terminology in general, with emphasis on the theory and analysis of propositions used to show relations between concepts.

3. Prior Analytics, 2 books on the laws of syllogistic reasoning and the proper use of the syllogism.

4. Posterior Analytics, 2 books on methods of demonstration and definition.

5. The Topics, 8 books on dialectical inferences, probability, and the use of the syllogism.

6. On Sophistical Refutations, a treatise on the solution of Sophist fallacies and the refutation of false syllogisms.

II. Works on Natural Science

1. Physics, 8 books on the general bases and relations of nature as a whole, containing discussions of movement and change, place, time, motion, the transformation of potentiality into actuality, etc.

2. On the Heavens, 2 books on the heavenly and sublunary bodies.

3. On Generation and Decay, 2 books on the cyclical sequence of transformations.
4. On Meteorology, 4 books on the phenomena of the air, with some discussion of chemistry and physics.

III. Works on Biology

1. History of Animals, 10 books containing a classified collection of facts pertaining to the anatomy of organisms, with particular emphasis on morphology (the branch of biological science concerning form and structure without regard for function).
2. On the Parts of Animals, 4 books on physiology.
3. On the Motion of Animals.
4. On the Progression of Animals, 1 book on the mechanical aspects of physiology.
5. On the Generation of Animals, 5 books on embryology and reproduction.

IV. Works on Psychology

1. On the Soul, 3 books on the nature, functions, and elements of the soul, considered to be the foundation of all modern psychological studies.
2. A collection of 9 treatises on specific areas of psychological investigation, collectively known as the Parva Naturalia, and including such works as: On Sense Perception, On Memory and Recollection, On Sleep, On Dreams.

V. Works on Metaphysics

1. Metaphysics, 14 books on what Aristotle called "first philosophy," the study of absolute being, dealing with such things as being in itself and the ultimate grounds of being, the relation of matter and form, causation (material, formal, efficient, and final causes), and the Prime Mover.

VI. Works on Ethics

1. Nicomachean Ethics.
2. Eudemian Ethics, 7 books, 3 of which are almost identical with books of the Nicomachean Ethics, and which is evidently an earlier and less comprehensive treatment of the same subject.
3. Magna Moralia, an abstract in 2 books of the other works on ethics, which contains some Stoic elements and is therefore thought to be at least partly spurious.

VII. Works on Political Science

1. Politics, 8 books on the origins, purpose, and elements of the state, the various kinds of constitutions, ideal education, and related topics.
2. The Constitution of Athens, a treatise covering the history and political development of the Athenian state to about 328 B.C. This is the only surviving work from a collection of 158 Greek and non-Greek constitutions made at the Lyceum during Aristotle's lifetime, discovered by chance in Egypt in 1890, and is the only known text actually prepared by him for publication.

VIII. Works on Aesthetics

1. On Rhetoric, a treatise on public speaking and means of persuasion, with emphasis on logic, psychology, and ethics.

2. The Poetics, a treatise on the art of poetry which does not survive in full, but contains a valuable and comprehensive discussion of Greek tragedy.

Farabi wrote commentaries on Ptolemy's *Almagest* and Porphyry's *Eisagoge*. He studied Euclid's geometry books in depth and completed his analysis studies on all Plato's books. Ibn Ali Usabi mentions, "Al-Farabi began writing 'Madinatu'l Fadilah' 'The Virtuous City' in Baghdad, continued it in Iran in 900, and finished and published it in Damascus in 943. Al-Farabi made rearrangements in terms of proofreading, narration, and content, along with the original textual control. Then some people asked him to record some parts explaining the content of the words, the origin of the words, and the meaning of the definitions. After the treatise was completed, the philosopher decided to divide the book into chapters. He developed *The Virtuous City* in Egypt and republished it in 949 in six chapters.

5.5 Summary of Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir

Al-Farabi suggests that the theoretical art of music should be learned in all areas of philosophy as multidisciplinary, such as mathematics, physics and science of mind, in order to reveal the ability to love researching truth and discover. Because, first of all, people should learn to hear, sense, feel, think, reason, and learn to reveal the ability to understand. He conveys the philosophy of music as a universal form of expression: Theoretical music art is a form of expression that contains theoretical information about the melody and its derivatives that emerge from the right thoughts and dreams in the heart. By derivative we mean secondary issues here, we didn't need to explain the melody and tuning issues. The object of the real imagination in question is the primary knowledge from which this science is collected. Because this knowledge can only be obtained by knowing these subjects. As a matter of fact, this science also explains the meaning of "form of expression". Moreover, this form itself is an "existing" "de facto" utterance; otherwise it's not just imagining what you're thinking while doing a job. Farabi defines this form itself as an "existing" de facto expression, utterance. Otherwise, he emphasizes that it is not just imagining what you are thinking while doing something.

The philosopher elucidate that the subject of similar arts is like arithmetic: Because in arithmetic, both odd and even numbers are respected regardless of the difference between the numbers. If this situation is adapted to the art of music, it is seen that it is the absolute audible sound that can be human voices as well as non-human sounds. According to the first, there are only natural human voices, and according to the second, there are unnatural sounds as in natural sciences. Because, in this regard, according to the meaning in the first part, beings and natural objects are looked at, and in the second part, non-natural beings are looked at. The beings that are the subject of this art can have tunes by nature, as well as these tunes can be made with art. However, the performer of this musical art does not care whether he makes this music naturally or with art. As a matter of fact, the science of mathematics and engineering is like that. Because in these sciences, beings can exist naturally as well as with the art of learning. However, those who have the knowledge of music by nature pay attention to the fact that this knowledge is natural rather

than having it through arts. But engineers are not like that; because they do not pay attention to this matter no matter where their knowledge comes from.

Likewise, many things that the natural scientist inspects at are present in nature; sometimes these things can be seen in art. But the naturalist does not look at whether an object is in art; as in health and disease. Because the doctor observes at health and illness (as in medical science) from the point of view of his profession and treats his patients accordingly. The naturalist, on the other hand, deals with health and disease according to whether they are found in nature or not.

The righteous thoughts mentioned by the Second Master are the first methods of revealing this science, which can only be obtained by these principles. Because without these principles this science cannot be learned. This science also explains what we mean. Because we call this information word form. This form is actually the words themselves; But the meaning of this science is true in the first sense; Otherwise, it does not mean that the person applies this science or thinks while applying it.

Mu'allim al-Sani defines it with the expression "Scholar" (Scientific-Master). The expansion of the expression he uses here refers to a person who has knowledge about a subject. Farabi is a talented person who reveals his knowledge spontaneously without getting information from anyone; so much so that this talented person draws attention to the fact that he can learn this science later. He expresses that here it contains both meanings (knowledge and ability) with the knowledge it has here. Al-Farabi states that the person who creates this musical form should have the right knowledge and the ability to reveal what he knows. Because here The Second Master underlines the necessity of learning these theoretical sciences for the person who wants to be a master of art. In addition, these things that need to be known are not necessarily present in the person, but it is also certain that the person must have the ability to perform the music they want. As for the effect this musical form has on the person who has knowledge in himself, he can visualize these forms, repeat them, and remember exceptions. However, when it comes to things that no one knows, composing on this subject is not a task beyond the owner of this form. When it comes to matters that transcend oneself, one must have the ability to teach others the knowledge on their part. As a matter of fact, with this ability, a person should have the opportunity and ability to correct the mistakes that occur in others. If a person still has knowledge of this musical form, he explains the effect of music on that person as follows. If the person already has this knowledge, it is simply that this person can visualize these forms in his mind, repeat them and remember the exceptions.

Al-Farabi mentions that when a person does not have the knowledge of this work, composing on this subject is not a matter beyond the owner of this form. He draws attention to the fact that when it comes to matters that transcend one person, one must have the skills to teach others the information on their part. As a matter of fact, with this ability, the person should have the opportunity and ability to correct the mistakes that occur in others. The tune, song and its derivatives are acquired unprepared, open to emotional perception. Sometimes it is obtained ready-made depending on emotional

perception. Farabi, who proved his mastery as much as his philosophy in the performance of music, says that the person who is a master in the knowledge of this art only performs this art to reach people's emotional worlds.

There are natural intuitions as well as unnatural intuitions in human-induced intuitions. Natural intuitions are those in which a feeling of complete pleasure is formed in their perception. Muallim al Thani states that there are natural intuitions as well as unnatural intuitions in human-based intuitions. Here we understand that there are natural intuitions, intuitions in the perception of which a feeling of complete pleasure occurs. Here we gain that this intuition is followed by taste, and unnatural intuitions are intuitions created by a feeling of torment in their perceptions. Therefore, when the sense of taste is lost or the perfection of the feeling is lacking, we also get the knowledge that the torment is manifested in the person. Farabi mentions that the naturalness of these feelings is the best of the emerging feelings. He underlines that these natural emotions are also evaluated in terms of being open to human perception, ready and natural. The subject of similar arts is like arithmetic. Because in arithmetic, both odd and even numbers are respected regardless of the difference between the numbers. If this situation is adapted to the art of music, it is seen that it is the absolute audible sound that can be human voices as well as non-human sounds.

Music is an art that combines melodies and sounds, their occasions and rhythms, their genres in terms of quantity and quality, according to tone and timbre. The basic principle is that man has an instinct created for himself, and when emotions arise in the soul, there is an inner desire to make sounds in different ways while trying to rest or for pleasure. However, emotions calm or improve, or it helps to imagine the meanings in the words associated with them. Art carries us into the emotions. "Music doesn't bring emotions into us; rather it puts us in those feelings." As mentioned here, people's emotional states become clearer with art. Different branches of art affect our emotional states and make us deeply it shakes.

There is a circle in society. A privileged spirit expands the social spirit and breaks the circle. A work of art is actually a breakthrough in the work that belongs to the artist. The artist is superior to other people in revealing emotions. Subjectivity and a creation in art subject. At this point, human emancipation can take place. Since there are many reliefs and paintings in Egypt, it is possible to obtain information about music from these places. The Egyptians made music with both human voices and various musical instruments. In addition, choirs were formed by combining human voices with the sounds of instruments.

Musicology is a discipline that studies music with logical methods. And in addition, he interprets musicology as a branch of music, a field of knowledge. The root of the word "logi" comes from the Greek word "lexicon"; This word also means to speak. Musicology can be interpreted as speaking about music, and musicologist as giving news from music. Another definition of musicology is; It can refer to the field of science that aims to investigate the art of music as a physical, psychological, aesthetic and cultural phenomenon.

It is a known fact of human history that the cultural heritages that societies left to the next ages in the evolution process that lasted for centuries were evaluated and developed by the continuation societies. The periods, cultural and social events that the science of history collects under certain definitions and headings are of course not phenomena that are limited to very sharp lines. The science of history stated that the event in question constituted the beginning of new and great social movements in the world and interpreted it as the beginning of an era. It would be correct to examine the evolution of societies in parallel with this interpretation. History of Religions and History of Music are intertwined as two separate disciplines. The plot of events in history reveals that the two branches left significant effects on each other with their own dynamics. The History of Music and Religions has certain dynamics and they are the same in terms of historical science. The triangle of time, space and events are dynamics that progress in parallel with each other. It has been possible to trace the roots of Ancient Egypt, Ancient Greece, Ancient Mesopotamia, Eastern Rome, Islam, and Hebrew cultures in the Pre-Asian geography, where the oldest traces of the Civilized are clearly found and supported by sources until today. It has created a necessity to conduct a research that starts before and goes to the roots of the concept of music.

It is a fact that the basis of Ancient Greek Music is vocal music rather than instruments. This sound music is a kind of melody and rhythm. Talking about polyphony cannot go beyond a great delusion for the age. It is possible to find traces of today's recitative in theatrical works. The reason for not making great progress in instruments is the excessive value given to sound music. Compositions without notes on poetry patterns were also reflected in music in accordance with the emphasis of the Greek language.

Kitab al Musiqā indicates that timbres and melodies are more pleasing to the ear when heard and interpreted with another tune with the help of other instruments. It reminds that the instruments that give the tune are sought more in order to be heard in the ears, when they have a more memorable order and order. As a result, the researchers looked to find the positions in which instruments produce melodic sounds, give them a name, and further refine it. They then continued to work on researching the natural and artificial instruments that sounded best, based on the abilities involved. When they found any (correct way) in this regard, they sought a way to compensate for the defects that emerged over time and to get rid of these defects. Thus, the oud and other musical instruments appeared. Composition and lyrics work was completed with the applied art of music. In the meantime, it was understood which melodies and sounds were natural and how many were artificial, in other words, they were positive and negative. In this way, the same things were done for the instruments.

As a result, it has been revealed which timbres and melodies are better, which musical instruments are better and which are not. Among the melodies and melodies that fit the human nature, there are some that do not fit the others, but give more or less pleasure and sadness.

The music of the Jews in Edessa is Jewish music based on Egypt and Mesopotamia. Music in Judaism, which was accepted as a religion with the Prophet Moses, contains unique features that are formed by blending the melodies from the Hebrew traditions with Egyptian melodies and musical knowledge. In the Jewish community, who used music mostly in temples, wars and funerals, the Torah recitation was read in a way, and this was the case with the Prophet himself. It was recommended by Moses. Religious music performed in synagogues is at the heart of Jewish music. "His uncle Laban, who chased after Jacob who had secretly escaped from Harran and caught him seven days later, asked Jacob: Why did you sneak away? Why did you cheat on me Why didn't you tell me? I send you with joy, with tunes, tambourines, lyres. From this event in the Torah, BC. It is understood that the percussion instrument tambourine and the string lyre had an important place in the music festivals in Harran in the first quarter of the 2000s. The lyre first appeared in Neasia, and the round tambourine in Mesopotamia III. It is stated that it has been known since the Ur period." (Torah (Old Testament), Gen. 31:27.) The word ud is linked to lute as a root structure. In Arabic, Al-Oud is linguistically ud. If L is added in front of the word oud, it becomes L'oud. Similarly, they have an elliptical body, a short neck, and tuning pegs mounted at an acute angle to the neck. Lute has frets, dividers on the keyboard. However, this detail is not available in Oud. Other related instruments that diversify this classic design are also examined in the string instruments section. In the introduction to Kitab al Musiqā, Al-Farabi shares information about the invention of the oud. The oud was invented by Adam's sixth grandson, Lamec. According to the legend; While Lamech was grieving, he hung the body of his deceased son on a tree. He invents the first lute, inspired by the shape of his son's bleached skeleton. It is known in history that the ancient Egyptians were the oldest nations in terms of music, and it is mentioned in the Torah that the first person to adopt musical instruments and singing on drums and percussion instruments was a Lamec descendant of Kabul. It is said that the first of the sons of those who invented the oud was "Tubal son of Lamec", and that the ancient Greeks were the first to set the rules of science and the knowledge of this industry as a necessity, and they took into account the musical knowledge of their scholars.

First comes "the wise and learned shaikh Taqi al-Din Muhammad Abu' Abdallah b. Al-Hasan Al-Farabi, the master of this art, and the leader in this science; and [my material is taken] from what he related from other learned and excellent authorities of the past, who explained in their books, and proved their explanations by practical experience. Also on Al-Farabi we have the story of his building of the musiqā' for the Caliph Al-Ma'mun and his invention of the ten stringed lute, by reason of having seen a decomposing foot protruding from a grave. The first man to make it, was Al-Farabi, and the reason was as follows. In the town in which he was living a man died who was one of the leading inhabitants, and all who were in the town went to his funeral, Al-Farabi among them. They said the prayers over the body and witnessed its interment, then returned, each going his separate way. Farabi left the others and returned alone; but while he was walking through the cemetery, he passed by a grave on which the wind had blown so that the earth was

stripped away from the body in that grave; the body lay on its back with the foot sticking up out of the grave so that all its veins and members were visible. Al-Farabi counted the veins in the foot of the corpse and found that they numbered 10 divided among the 5 toes so that each toe had two veins, one stationary and one moving. So he made the lute according; to the likeness which he saw of mankind, its belly like the human belly, its back like the human back and its peg box like the human foot. So too the 10 strings of it correspond to the 10 veins which he saw in the leg of the corpse. He arranged it according to the principle of the 360 veins; when the lute has 10 strings, each string has 36 particular divisions: the principle also with regard to the stationary and moving [veins] depends on the primary principle, but differs from it in number and reckoning. It is that, if you will, you divide the 36 into three parts, each part thus having 12 each of 3 lines plur so the principle devolves upon that of the 12 Signs of the Zodiac, and the reckoning comes under that of the 12 modes.

Or, if you wish, divide them (i.e. the 36) into one and a half parts; the one part will consist of 24 qirat corresponding to the original division each string having two parts. Then you are left with 12 which gives no derivation for the 6 Awazat unless they are connected with the 24 divided into 12 - each Awaz having two parts for the khafif and thaqil rhythms - which is the law connecting the 12 with the 6. Or, if you wish, take the 12 which were left over from the circle of the 12(inodes] and multiply them by 30; the total is 360 and each string has one thread to correspond to that vein [of the 360 on which the division depends. So the multiplication is complete, and nothing is lost from, the number. Such is the rule for the 10 stringed lute. When [the lute) is 8 stringed, take away one for every string [from the 360) so that the 8 strings [make] eight in number; thus you, are left with 352 out of the circle of 360. Then take for each string that part of the number (i.e. 352) which applies to it particularly, and its share will come to 44. Then the 4fold principle is added to [each] fone of the eight parts so that the total is 48 for each part. Divide them reading for for over 24 qirat and each qirat has it wo parts. To these two parts belongs the distinctive playing of the lute (darb al-rud) which corresponds to the beat of the veins (garb al-furuq); when the vein is stationary there is a thaqil rhythm which makes it move (pointing to agree with)and when the vein is moving, there is a khafif rhythm which makes it still. So it makes one yearn for the rhythm [which suits him] and in that he seeks help from all the Instruments according to the number of their strings. Such is the rule for the 8 stringed lute, and that is the third stage in the rule of the lute. But there must needs be a fourth stage so that the matter may be symmetrical, and the division connected within itself, nothing going beyond its own stage. This[fourth stage] is that people, agreeing that the root principle is fourfold as we said, being blood, bile, spleen and phlegm, made the number of the strings (of the lute) four, in accordance with the nature of this four fold principle; with the provision that they should only be arranged in four in order to strengthen and help one another. We asked "How could this be done?" And they said: "Every string is helped by another string so that when one of these strings breaks we find another to supply its place, thanks to the small number of strings on the

lute. And they made it so. But this explanation is not permissible in our opinion, for every string has a division, (i.e. vibrating length ?) every division has a movement, every movement has a rhythm, and every rhythm has a law in the division of the modes. And it is not laid down that any string can take the place of another unless it is in the same category. But this is a difficult matter for anyone who is not conversant with musical theory; and the soundest [opinion] about the rule of the eightstringed lute is that given by the authorities: "nothing can be taken away from the eight strings because they are founded on the law of the constitutions [of mankind] (imtizajat); for the natural elements (taba'i) are four and the humours are eight. The four composite ones are: Hot, dry; cold, dry; hot, moist; cold, moist. And the other four are: Hot, cold, moist, and dry! Such is a description of the eight constitutions, and this science is not difficult for him who has a knowledge of first principles; and the playing of the lute) is easy to cultured men, but difficult to fools. Now suppose that one of the people takes the lute and plays it with his fingers, tunes it properly, (lit. rules it in its place) and plays it in the well 'known way in the divided manner, (see Commentary.) so that its rhythm corresponds to the beat of the veins in the human body, stationary and moving; then those veins resound to that sweet note, and all the limbs are drawn to it so that there is no vein nor member, nor joint which is not affected by the music. For the lute is nearer to music than all the instruments, and it is the Prince of Music; The meaning of the name *cud* is derived from *al-awda*, i.e. the return, as one is accustomed [to say] "Perhaps the days of joy will return". Connected with it is a small lute with six strings called the *Shashta* (*shashta*.) or *Tarab* whose law depends on that of the 6 *Awazat* "distributive"; that is that the rule of one *Awaz* is not the rule of one string, but that each string has several *Awazat*, the distribution depending on the twelve modes which are the parents of the 8 *Awazat*. The rule depends on the four-fold principle, and works thus:- 6 times 4 = 24 which equals 24 *qirat* or 12 modes, each mode having 2 *qirat* according to the law of the two rhythms which divide the modes. Such is the rule of the playing of the 6 strings in the *Shashta* (Note difference of form from previous col.) as against the lute. Some have gone to excess in the lute and have increased its strings to the number of eighteen and more; but for that there is no foundation, because the eighteen are arranged according to the law of the twelve and the six, a fundamental arrangement and not merely an analogy. And if anything be added to these twelve and six, the playing cannot include it, and the music is wasted. We have already mentioned that (when there are few strings the music is gentle and sweet and fine made it for kings because of its lightness when they were on a journey. So, going and coming, they carried it with them divided into separate parts, and when camp was made in any place, it was assembled for them without difficulty and became a perfect lute with nothing lacking, and it was played in their presence and pleasant: but when there are many strings the sound is great, and they strike the instrument too violently. And if we were to explain detail) the playing according to the rule of the 18 strings, the explanation would take too long; so it is best to shorten it, since the meanings involved in the rules of the lute are many. The best lute is the "firm lute" (*ud muhkam*), but great difference of opinion exists about it. Some say that

it is a lute made in individual parts, and subsequently joined together; they make it in separate pieces, then it is brought together and assembled, one piece to another so that it becomes a sound perfect lute with nothing lacking and with no flaw. The strings are mounted on its face (wajh) equally [spaced] with no weakness. It was an accomplishment of the experts who made it for kings because of its lightness when they were on a journey. So, going and coming, they carried it with them divided into separate parts, and when camp was made in any place, it was assembled for them without difficulty and became a perfect lute with nothing lacking, and it was played in their presence. (Hardie 1932: p.23)

It was the ancient Greek art educators who proved or wanted to count the numbers of forces and sounds in the book. Some are also new art educators in Arab countries recently. Some followed the Greek scholars. Some of them did not go to the scholars, they just listened to the tunes as they heard them.

Most of them were skilled people who practiced this art. They proved what they had found with their innate talents or by taking what was right for them, and tried to achieve the three goals we mentioned earlier on issues that compelled them to produce. For example, there are reports that the ancient Egyptians were one of the first peoples to become acquainted with the art of music. The ancient Greeks also said that they laid the foundation of knowledge in the art of music. Their musical knowledge was subject to the requirements of practical and philosophical teachings and was associated with knowledge of natural sciences and logic. In fact, the work of laying the foundations of this science belongs to the Greeks. It is known that music and poetry are homogeneous phenomena with compositional forms inherent in rest and movement characteristics. Music and poetry have dimensional and tactile features. The difference between them is the sequential arrangement of the semantic content of the words in poetry according to the principles of a particular language, and the feature in music is the qualitative integration of parts of rhythmic words and their quantitative accompaniment, sound accompaniment. If the beautiful content of the poem is combined with a perfect performance and a melodious voice with the right rhythm and wonderful movements, the soul will be ecstatic when listening to them, and sometimes there are other reasons as well. Similarly, poetry and the art of rhythmic rhetoric precede the art of singing over time. The peculiarity of human nature as a disposition came with a combination of singing, verbal expressions, with which it is possible to quickly achieve the desired goal. The art of singing preceded the art of composing music with musical instruments. The music from the instrument resonated with the human voice and created a great atmosphere to listen to. The basis of music knowledge is different from other science and art knowledge because matter has no form; Sounds are invisible and cannot be felt. For example, in the art of painting or sculpture, there are great opportunities to acquire the visual and tactile fundamentals. Therefore, it is natural for the ear and eye to participate in the analysis of sound composition together with other sense organs. Here all the senses, from ear to mind, perceive different qualitative parameters of sounds. Sometimes the mind is sure that it has good composition or that the music is not pleasant, so the soul does not accept it.

Just as the ability to hear is a direct link between the voice that comes out and the centre that perceives it, so the eye, along with other hidden senses, seems to have perceptions of the properties of the voice. Together, they seem to recognize his ghost through the mind, and then create action images with different shapes that can be stored in the soul. As for their reliable and correct cognition, it requires a strong emotional and imaginary power. This is because human cognition is more diverse than this force. As for the spheres of perfect melodies combined with music and poetic phrases in general, they are in the first place in terms of influencing the feeling of being considered natural in the absolute sense. Oriental peoples attach great importance to music as a natural human need. Thus, information about music and its branches and the necessary parts of the primary and secondary are preserved in their small theoretical explanations.

Al-Farabi expresses the necessity of starting with the known foundations and proven conditions of this art in science if we had the opportunity to fully enrich and combine the themes of science and art. If we made an applied scientific definition of Arabic music, we would be able to bring the younger generation to the basic knowledge of the art of music, and thus provide a great service to the people in the field of music. Thus, it is known that the collectors of information are not very stable in the art of music, but are likely to become in-depth research disciplines, focusing only on secondary disciplines. As for the ancient authors, Al-Farabi states that the vast majority of their books are difficult to understand, although their interpretations are far from perfect and their meanings are complex, they are much more than a collector in their desire to master the basics of science in this field. Moreover, it is difficult to determine which of the musical disciplines is the most perfect and most described in the encyclopaedia compiled by the philosopher Abu Nasir Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhan Al-Farabi. Al-Farabi's encyclopaedia is the greatest work in the field of music, under the title of the great music book we discussed about in this preface. We have not simply returned to this book: a study of it will help to explain the obscure issues hidden in it. However, this work covers the fundamentals of music, theoretical and practical information, and many related topics. This book, which has a life span of nearly eleven centuries, has become a historical musical monument. From the author's introduction to the book, we know that it is the second volume of the work, it includes issues such as the correction of the views of previous experts on art, and that the book consists of four parts that have not survived. Its Name is *The Word of Music: Lost or forgotten in a special library*. As for the first book, it consists of two parts: The first is an introduction to the art of music, the second is dedicated to art itself. The introduction to the art of music consists of two parts, and the part of the art of music consists of three parts: First part: About the fundamentals of music and related subjects. Second instruction: about well-known musical instruments, their composition and the basics of accommodation and perception. Third instruction: About individual melody types. In reviewing Al-Farabi's great book on music, we encountered many difficulties that even a patient and diligent researcher could not handle.

The Dof is about eleven inches in diameter, and is played and held similarly to the Taar. It has snares" stretched across the inside of the head, which give the instrument a sharp crisp tone. It is mentioned among the instruments of the Arabs of Spain by Al-Farabi (tenth century), and still in use by them to-day as the Aduf. The Dof of Persia given by Ouseley ("Travels," 1815) is more like a huge tambourine without the metal plates. The Tof of the Hebrews, according to Kircher (" Musurgia Universalis") appears to be like a kettledrum. The "Raita" Or " Saika": Among the instruments of the Arabs of Spain, as given by Al-Farabi (tenth century) are Azahika (Saika) and Almeya (Me'ia). In Spain to-day there are dances by these names, which are of Arab origin (Fuertes, "Historia de la Musica Espanola"). not used in Mauretania for kettledrums. It is, however, the common appellation for them with the Eastern Arabs, and in Egypt, Persia and India. In his "Essai sur l'origine de quelques Instruments," Salvador points out that Naeguaires (Nakdkeer) was the general term used by the ancient Arabs for their warlike chansons, and as the kettledrums were, with them oboes, the warlike instrumeiits, the word Naeguaires became transferred to the kettledrums, just as the military oboes became known under the name of the I mode in which the war-songs were sung, viz., Saika] or Raita. The word Nagmires (known to the I French as Nacaires and the English as Nakere doubtless came into Europe at the time of the Eastern Crusades (Michaud, "Histoire des Croisades")- I With the Arabs of Spain, kettledrums were Atabal as with the Mauretanian Arabs. It is the name for kettledrums with the Spaniards to-day. Here again we see the independence of the Mauretanian from the Eastern Arabs. (The question of its introduction into Europe is dealt with fully by Kastner, "Manuel Generale de la Musique Militaire," and also in the present writer's "Rise and Development of I Military Music".

Al-Farabi is usually referred to as the first to men tion the Rebab. But it is mentioned by Ali of Ispahan as being used by the musicians at the court at Bagdad two centuries and a half before this. Al- Farabi speaks of Arrabil. This is none other than the Rebab. Heron-Allen, the diligent historian of the violin, mentions having seen in the Basque provinces the Rebab under the name of Rabel; whilst our own Chaucer speaks of the Ribible. This instrument, shown above as the Eastern Rebab, was, no doubt, used by the Arabs and Moors at the time of their conquest of Spain, and may be counted as one of the precursors of our violin. Kathleen Schlesinger (" Precursors of the Violin Family "), one of the most careful and diligent of musical antiquaries, has not accepted this flat-chested Eastern Rebab in the ancestry of the violin, for these reasons : Because : (i) it is entirely different to the European Rebec; (2) it is held like the violoncello; (3) there are no proofs of its antiquity. The Kouitra, which seems to belong specially to the Mauretanian Arabs, is a derivation of L'Otid, an instrument common to Eastern Arabs. But the former is smaller, has no frets, and the head, instead of being turned at a right angle, is almost straight. In Persia it is called Sitar, which means literally " four strings." It is mentioned in two sizes by Al-Farabi with the Arabs of Spain in the tenth century, and also by Ali of Ispahan. Addison in his " West Barbary" (1671), speaks of Fez possessing good teachers of the Kouitra. Shaw ("Travels in Barbary," 1757), who visited Mauretania in the early years of

the eighteenth century, and speaks of the music of the Moors as "more artful and melodious" than that of the Arabs and Bedouins, says also that they had a greater variety of instruments, and among them Quetaras (Kouitras) of different sizes. (Salvador-Daniel, F., & Farmer, H. G. (2013: p.222-239)

The founders of the theory of music are the highest authorities constantly claimed and revered in writings throughout the centuries. The celebrated Nasreddin Farabi, frequently spelled Zahir Farabi, is recognized for instituting the traditional categories of basic maqams and his theory of rhythm. His postulates on the formation of melodic compounds constitute the fundamental axioms of the theory of music. The introduction praises the science of music and the ordinate practice tracing its origin to Prophet Hermes and Al-Farabi. The science of music constitutes a branch of mathematical sciences, and the melodic modes are figured in a hierarchic taxonomy, namely 12 basic maqams related to the zodiacal signs, seven awazes affiliated with the wandering stars and four shubes determined by the four elements. The succeeding masters have further invented and combined the melodic compounds *terakib* by mixing two or more modal constructs and have attributed astrological meanings to all melodic modes. The mystical ideas expounded in the introductory section emphasize a profound Sufi orientation. The seeker pursuing the mysteries of the science of mathematics and the spiritual origin of music has to engage in the experience of spiritual and ascetic exercises of initiation. There are guideposts set on the way of mastering the knowledge of music. The science of music is the legacy of Nasreddin Farabi who discovered the melodies produced by the movement of the celestial spheres. Shayh Safiyyüddin scrutinized the harmony of the celestial sounds by reaching the beatific shores of ecstatic revelation and codified them into 12 principal modes correlated to the zodiacal signs, seven secondary modes affiliated to the planets, four natural elements placed at the foundation of the four branch modes, and the nine basic rhythmic patterns related to the moving action of the celestial spheres; he deduced this noble science (*ilm-i şerif*) as part of the quadrivium, defined his book as the discloser of secrets and revealer of mysteries, and named his study 'the book of the cycles of modes.' (Popescu-Judetz, 2010: p.21-34)

The state of this art is like the situation in astronomy, optics and medicine, which is obtained by the experience of perception. Because the science of medicine takes many principles from the natural sciences. They obtain these principles from perception experiences such as anatomy and pharmacy science. At the same time, researchers obtain many of the principles of astronomy by observing with their instruments. Anyone who does research on astronomy and medicine does not need to make anatomy and observe with their own hands. On the contrary, anatomy is done before his eyes, and that person watches it. On the other hand, surveillance is done in front of him and he records the results. Likewise, a person who deals with the art of music does not need to play a musical instrument with his own hands. On the contrary, it is enough for someone else to play a musical instrument, just listen or distinguish good from bad. It is better this way. Because it is this way either because it needs someone who does this job or because its perception

is weak. The situation is similar to the situation in medicine and astronomy, in which the researcher takes some notes whenever the (patient) is operated in front of his eyes or the stars are observed. This was either out of the need for knowledge, or lack of tools, or poor perception. Because here the need is felt, the choice is made for the supply of what is important. This situation is similar to what Aristotle did in the natural sciences.

Since it is known that all arts exist not with talent but with science, it is thought that the art of music is one of the theoretical and practical arts because it participates in the art of music as a concept. However, this situation is only considered for engineering science. As a matter of fact, it was pointed out that engineering science "has both theory and practice" in this regard. By the way, the aim of engineering science does not only include engineering knowledge, but also those who have this knowledge can practice in other sciences.

Al-Farabi points to two kinds of melodies. This science includes both types: The first one is a type of someone else or a similar material or compositions that adapt to it. These melodies have first, second, third. He indicates that the composition can go as far as the first sentence in which it appeared. Muallim al Thani likens melodies to eulogy and poetry. As a matter of fact, the letters in the eulogy and poetry indicate that this is the first thing that creates harmony. Then two letters followed by three letters indicate that they came together. Finally, he explains that words, compositions and verses are formed from these letters, and finally couplets are formed from these letters and compositions are formed in the same way. Because it draws attention to the combination of letters in the compositions. It means that compositions as well as couplets are obtained in the first, second and last ghazal. The letters are in the composition, the letters are in the poem. Here are the melodies. What the philosopher means by tunes is to expand the letters in a sense of sharpness and weight. Other matters between tunes and compositions are not clear here. In addition, each of these points reveals that they were put for this art. Of course, after looking at the derivatives of the melodies for these elements, the secondary subjects and then the results were examined, and finally it points out that the composition and its derivatives were looked at as in the art of poetry. Farabi mentioned that melodies, songs and their derivatives were obtained unprepared for emotional perception. Sometimes He indicates that it is obtained ready-made depending on emotional perception. The Second Master draws attention to the fact that this art is made only to reach people's emotional worlds.

As for the reasons for the existence of these arts; these arts are only one of the 4 reasons Aristotle mentioned in his work called "Analytica", "What is this thing?" It is based on the issues that point to the question. Descriptions and proofs reveal the subjects whose existence is desired here in terms of being in every field. Examples also deal with some theoretical sciences from two perspectives. It teaches the person who signifies art with the first one, and the thing signified with the second one. The Kitab Al Musiqah specifies that if theoretical sciences do not need practical knowledge and are not used with one of the effective reasons, there will be no effective reasons in this science. As for the

so-called indispensable reasons, he underlines the necessity of considering this substance to be found in the art of music in terms of its presence in engineering and geometry. Because, just as an object with a square or 12 bases comes together in a circle, the science of music is like the art of engineering; reminds those various substances come together. The grand book of music lays out parts of the question "What is this thing?" This question states that substances with matter are obtained by dividing them into various substances. As with geometry and calculus, it clarifies that the art of music has goals and effective causes. When dealing with other arts, it is important that all the issue discussed here should be studied in depth.

Al-Farabi reminds us that it is a well-known fact that values and judgments are not enough to lead to feelings and emotions. If it were enough, it would never be certain. Because emotions cannot give any judgment on a subject or on the whole of the definitive judgment defined in Analytics. On the contrary, certainty is an actual state obtained with the mind, which manifests itself in the works achieved by the emotions. For this reason, when some objects are first felt, the mind becomes capable of perceiving those objects. In fact, these feelings repeat themselves in other issues and gain superiority in terms of belief. On the subject, the mind may not reveal this belief all the time and in everything. But this leads to natural power for the mind. At a certain point of knowledge, a certain conviction is formed when emotions are strengthened.

The lowest level of these thoughts is that they do not correspond to the amount of trust that occurs with the mind's evaluation of the emotion. For this reason, some people's feelings reach a certain level from birth or youth. For this reason, feelings show how much the mind exists, and synchronicity is that these feelings are strengthened without the human being noticing them with their special actions. In this way, the power and energy of human beings increase in parallel with the development of the mind. After that, human beings try to feel and visualize the things that will occur in their minds and reach certain information there. People can sometimes find things obvious without understanding how or when. After all, these are considered inspiration and instinct from the beginning.

After this first thought; When certain things are fully enlivened in thought, one consciously turns to emotions. Therefore, it may not be enough for the mind to think once or twice. On the contrary, he has to think over and over the same thing or different things. Meanwhile, the mind more or less makes certain vanguard forces or perfect senses work. Because in absolute situations, in certain arts, the first principles are with the sharpness of the mind and these principles are loaded and determined according to the conditions specified as "Posterior Analytics". The principles that the mind uses closely in the situations that occur can be applied to every subject, and this application cannot be done with strong suspicion. Because a strong belief is the belief that other things can come to mind. This opinion on existing issues is for those who are not considered for anything else.

As a result of many things being perceived over and over again according to what the mind does, those things become certain according to one of two things; This is called

experience. This experience is similar to detailed research; but not entirely at one with it. Because when detailed research reaches the mind with perception, it is not a special operation of the mind. Trying and experiencing is an action that the mind does in a way that carries the perception to the mind. Things that come from experience, on the other hand, are the first principles of evidence. Al-Farabi states that the first principles of evidence are not found in those that consist of detailed research, and he points out this reason with the following explanation, as Aristotle says in many places: Intuition is used in evidential principles. With this he drew attention to the evidential side of intuition. Among the arts and sciences, although a person does not turn to intuition from his birth until he grows up, there are first principles that arise from perception. These principles are called natural knowledge or known sciences. Some of them are also some principles between science and art, and some of them are dependent on other sciences. Another part was some of the principles of the first case, the essays on the method we outlined above. The principles of theoretical musical art are also relevant to this feature. As a matter of fact, some of this art is known by its nature, some of it is proven by other arts, and some of it is specific to experience. The Second Master mentions that he moves from the known arts, not to write books about every art, but because many of the known sciences are needed. As for the principles related to other unknown arts, it deals with this subject in detail since it is not known how many of them are and how to learn them.

The philosopher makes clear that some of the assets are learned naturally, some by art, and some for other reasons. The art of music can be learned naturally, as well as through science and art. However, the number of those learned naturally is small or the amount of what is known by experience is as much as the unknown. As for what is learned through art, it is seen that these arts are not less than what people learn naturally. It is possible to know this or to research it; But it is impossible to learn without research.

In the art of music, the situation is the opposite of what the public thinks of the ensemble that is pointed out. People who have no experience and experience see sciences as things to be bought and given. The reason for this thought is the belief in the science and wisdom attributed to him in a way that includes everything and knows everything. But those who acquired this art learned everything about the subject. Therefore, it is understood that the philosophers were the first to reveal these practical arts and the people were the first to learn this art from them. This thought is not because they do their job well and apply it; on the contrary, it stems from their strong understanding and understanding. But this thought is absolutely not true. Al-Farabi mentions that in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics work, those who deal with the corpus of this art cannot perceive its greatness. Because in this science, he expresses that besides knowing the corpus, you also need the theorists of this art. Maybe the theorist is adept in this science, but he adds that he does not have enough perception about it. Farabi also conveys that for those who cannot feel this art, the only thing is to imagine them without perceiving them in the mind, just like spirit, mind, ghost (first item) and all other beings. Because The Second Master somehow draws attention to the fact that these elements cannot be used and handled without being

imagined. However, imagining these elements indicates that they cannot be perceived without finding a different suitable method.

Unnatural melodies are terrible sounds that one cannot stand. However, these sounds that people use are used like medicine. As a matter of fact, drugs are used to treat or destroy the human body. Indeed, some musical instruments are used in wars. In the past, there were instruments that Egyptian or Roman kings used as musical instruments in wars. As a matter of fact, it is said that the tools used by the Persian kings during the escalation of the war were of this type.

Some melodies are not pleasant. But they can be nice when combined with another melody. For this reason, some musicians, as we have mentioned more briefly, revealed the art of applied music. When some musical instruments are examined, it is seen that there are some tunes, melody and melodies that are not found in human voices. Among these melodies, there is music that gives pleasure to those who hear, that people cannot let go of the pleasure of this music. They tried to develop this music together with musical instruments as much as possible. When they could not develop it, they found it appropriate to perform it with the human voice as in the old Khorasan and Persian instruments. For this purpose, they made songs with musical instruments that people use.

We can add other musical instruments to the musical instruments we mentioned. Among these, all musical arts performed with dances such as tambourine, drum, organ, clap and dance, halay and horon accompany the songs. Because these tools are like any other; Despite their differences, they deliver the timbre and melody on a regular basis. At the bottom of this musical movement is the horon/halay. Because shoulder, eyebrow, head etc. Moving organs counts as synchronized movement only. This is done with tempo (moving hands and feet by striking). Because these beats occur at the end of the movements, and all these movements make a melody sound. However, the amount of movement is until the completion of the movement is complete. In this way, the tune ends and at the end of the game the tempo is not resumed and the beats are interrupted. Here the strokes are for the end of the movement. However, there is an equal interval between strokes between the movement after the start and the final movement. However, attention is paid to the time scale. Because tempo is like beats. Therefore the tempo begins with hitting something, and movements are possible only when they end with singing in rhythmic times. Clapping, dancing, and bells encourage play. Because these tools are very similar to each other. With such sounds the tempo can be increased or decreased so that a melody is formed. As for the oud, tanbur, piano, rebab, kawal and other genres, the sounds of such musical instruments increase the tempo. Also clap etc. The tempo increases the fun of the sounds, as is the case with the melodies made with melody. However, this tempo increases with the tunes coming out of the throat.

There is nothing more beautiful than the sounds that come out of one's mouth. Because this tempo includes all human sounds. Other tunes from instruments reduce the tempo completely. For this reason, tunes were made to increase the tempo of people, to expand, to decorate, to imitate and to memorize. One of the musical instruments closest

to the human voice is the rebab, (kemenche), kawal, oud and other musical instruments and tempos. Of course, tempos are melodies with the least lyrics. What is done with this tempo is a kind of movement. The end of the movement (hand and foot) is with the beat or sound. When hitting def and similar musical instruments, there is a harmony of beats and sounds. The oud sound is synchronized with the tunes coming out of the throat. As for the kaval, rebab and similar instruments, these instruments are fully synchronized with the tunes coming out of the throat. There are some emotional sounds in this tempo, which is in harmony with them. One of the places where this harmony is experienced most is the zurna, rebab and other musical instruments. We explained how this art emerged in its natural environment and how it developed perfectly. When it comes to teaching people this art; The first rule of learning this art practically should be to teach the movement similarity of human organs with the limbs of emotions and thoughts (voice training), with which compositions are made and songs are sung. In this way, the form that a person made before comes out in the best way. Thus, the person tries to transfer the songs he/she hears to the world of imagination. At the same time, talent occurs in one's limbs. Because this thought awakens the feeling of realizing what you dream of. After that it doesn't need to listen to other things (to play music). If a person sees in himself sufficient strength and ability to perform this art, the musical form will be formed more or less, and if this does not occur, the person must continue to exercise until his talent develops. The imagination of that person in acquiring this art is only possible with the continuity of these studies. Therefore, such practices are an integral part of the preparation stage in learning this art.

If a person attains a certain skill and the ability to apply it quickly, it attains a high status of consolidation only as a result of continual improvement, then he masters this form completely or within the limits set by nature. During a musician's performance, he presents his moves (talent) through continuous experience. Therefore, this type of performance becomes an integral part of (hands-on) training. If the song comes in the form of composition, this form is formed by the habit of listening to various songs, comparing them, carefully analyzing the features of the position of sounds in each song and paying close attention to certain moments of the composition. In this situation, the musician continues the exercises until he produces melodies similar to the models in the applied arts such as the arts of speech and writing. Regarding this subject, he says that every art is a form (shape) corresponding to one of the aspects it was stated before. This art of music has forms that emerge with actual practice. Apart from practice, he also draws attention to the theory part and indicates that this form can be obtained with knowledge. These shapes created are impractical or practical. The art of music without practice is called theoretical knowledge. In this way, every art has a theory. Because in theory, knowledge speaks. The concept of "science" has different meanings. This concept of science has been used with different meanings in different places before. As a matter of fact, this name expresses its unique meaning everywhere. However, in order not to prolong the conversation, he does not prefer to discuss other meanings at length here. Indicates that it only overwrites what is useful for this book. However, after explaining what should be

understood from science, Farabi briefly draws attention to other meanings. Kitab al Musiqqa mentions that the concept of knowledge has different meanings. Farabi applies all these meanings to other arts as well. Farabi gives useful information for kitab al musiqqa. However, after explaining what he means by science, it is worth briefly other meanings. According to The Second Master, it is the actual occurrence of the existence and reason of existence of something, not different from ours. Then the other conditions and the conditions that are subject to it occur. In this sense, these conditions and other subjects that are subject to this subject are briefly explained in the book "al-Burhan" (demonstration) written on the science of logic. All the topics that indicate this meaning are included in this book.

These topics can only be learned from this book. All meanings related to understanding the meaning of this science are included in this subject. In addition, the meaning of science is revealed only through definitions, explanations and proofs. In summary, the issues covered throughout this book should be consulted. By this, Farabi means to be aware of the views of all scholars in this sense. From this feature, it becomes apparent that Farabi assigns a critical role to abstraction, understanding it as a universal abstraction that helps to emphasize the essential essence and relations of the object and also determines the apodictic properties of the object under study. Abu Nasr al-Farabi used the method of Islamic rationality in mathematics as well as in other sciences. As a scientific and philosophical type of knowledge, Islamic rationality was based on the methods of logic and dialectics. Relying on reason becomes the most reliable source of paradigms in Muslim philosophy and science. (Nysanbaev A., Kurmangaliyeva G., Shayakhmetova N. 2007: p. 177)

5.6 Cross-cultural Heritage of the Silk Road: The Philosophy of Al-Farabi

In the modern world, which has long shifted from industrialism to post-industrialism and from modern to postmodern discourse, our cultural heritage still occupies very important place. Outstanding medieval philosopher Abu Nasr Al-Farabi has made significant contribution to the formation of the scientific picture of the world. He set the framework for the development of sciences and this rationalist approach has been since continuously elaborated by Islamic as well as European philosophers. Al-Farabi's teachings and writings remain highly relevant to current philosophical and multidisciplinary discussions. The Kazakh school of Farabi studies originated back in the 1960s. The scholars that had contributed to the origin of the Kazakh school of Farabi studies represent various areas of theoretical research. Akin to the Second Teacher's universalism a cohort of multidifield studies conducted by Kazakhstani philosophers and theologians, geologists and translators, diplomats and orientologists, writers and poets – A. Mashani, A. Kasymzhanov, A. Alimzhanov, A. Derbisali and many others – have facilitated the development of a coherent multidisciplinary approach. As a result, over the past several decades a holistic vision of the role and place of Farabi's heritage as well as fundamental principles of research, systematization and interpretation of his teachings

were formed in Kazakhstani science. (Nurysheva G., Khasanov M., Petrova V., Khasanova A., 2020: p.46)

The 9th and 10th centuries remain memorable as a period of remarkable intellectual activity in the natural and physical sciences. Seldom in the history of philosophy has so much been accomplished in one period. The lifestyles of the distant past of the East and West were revealed and attained their place in the cognitive scheme. We continue our analysis with the impressive section of the significant corpus covering a period. It is a treatise that reflects intellectual activity and retains scientific validity throughout the ages. Al-Farabi detailed the science of music in *K. Mūsīqá*. Al-Farabi demonstrates that the utility of knowledge gained from the senses, significant as it may be, is limited, and stresses the essential of sciences such as mathematics, geometry and physics for the music theorist. (d'Erlanger, 1930 p.28)

Al-Farabi discuss of four faculties or parts of the soul: the potential or latent intelligence, intelligence in action, acquired intelligence, and the agent intelligence. The first is the 'aql hayyulani, the passive intelligence, the capacity which man has for understanding the essence of material things by abstracting mentally that essence from the various accidents with which it is associated in perception, more or less equivalent to the " common sense " of Aristotle. The intelligence in action or 'aql bi-l-fil' is the potential faculty aroused to activity and making this abstraction. The agent intelligence or 'aql faal' is the external power, the emanation from God which is able to awaken the latent power in man and arouse it to activity, and the acquired intelligence or 'aql mustafad' is the intelligence aroused to activity and developed under the inspiration of the agent intelligence. Thus the intelligence in action is related to the potential intellect as form is to matter, but the agent intelligence enters from outside, and by its operation the intelligence receives new powers, so that its highest activity is 'acquired.' (O'Leary,1963: p.149)

As a musician and performer of musical pieces, Al-Farabi instead placed it under the heading "science of ingenious procedures" and connected it with physical bodies, because it was precisely the means through which the notions of geometry and numbers could successfully be applied to matter and the world of the senses. As Al-Farabi said: Music art should be understood not only as "an object recognized by the vision of the mind" but also as a "visionary" substance. Combining scientific structuring and the rationality of evidence, theoretical research seeks to identify the causal links between the aspects nature of musical art. (Al-Farabi, 2007b, p. 28)

Al-Farabi drew attention to the problem noted at the beginning of the treatise, the need for a classification, systemic structuring, and method by reconsidering scientific concepts and making definitions as being among the primary foundations of musical art. The Second Master claims that defining the essence of this science and the chosen methodology within the framework of the system is to achieve the research objectives in the most accurate way.

5.7 Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir: A Profound Treatise on Music

We found it appropriate to start with our own translation of the original Kitab al Musiqā al Kābir, which we obtained from the State Library of the Turkish Historical Society, documented as a B 7440 file with the registration number 11625. The examination of Kitab al Musiqā al-Kabir was completed by using document analysis and translation techniques from qualitative research methods, together with the shape aspect. With this analyse, Farabi's musician and musicologist aspect, which is overshadowed by his philosopher personality, is to reveal the knowledge of mind science in the centre of our age, as well as the theoretical and applied music studies that he brought to the Turkish-Islamic art.

“Information on the cover of Kitab al Musiqā al Kābir: Cultural Heritage is written as the Treatise of the "Grand Music Book". The treatise was written by the philosopher Abu Nasr bin Mohammed bin Tarkhan Al-Fārābi, who died in 394 A.H.

Editor: Ghattas ‘Abd-al-Malik Khashaba

Revised and published (Rev. with introduction) by Dr. Mahmud Ahmad al-Hifnī

Published by Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-‘Arabi”

Kitab al Musiqā begins with a foreword by Dr. Mahmud Ahmad al-Hifnī. Known as Aristotle the Second, he was a strong-minded, determined mathematician, fluent in many languages other than Arabic. Farabi, the greatest known Islamic philosopher, whose name spread from Cordoba to Europe and all over the world, also proved his reputation as the greatest theorists of the art of music with his treatises and musical instrument. He used to play the oud and sing when he was little. When his beard started to grow, he broke away from music and devoted himself to philosophy, logic and theoretical sciences in the process after his witty expression "Every song is sung between the beard and moustache, which is not nice". Farabi, who is said to have the task of reading everything and following the knowledge, is not only a great genius of the Turkish-Islamic world, but also reaches the next generations of the 21st century as a universal genius with his contributions to world science and philosophy.

However, Abu Nasr Al-Farabi was the first scholar of similar tendencies that benefited from these and other tracts of classical and later Greek music literature. The surviving section of his work is still a mine of knowledge to be mined and will be of great importance for future research on the music theory of late antiquity and early Islamic Geography. Al-Farabi's Kitab al-musiqā al-kabir "The Great Book on Music" is not only the most comprehensive but also the most important book written in Arabic on this subject.

In this dissertation research, it is aimed to examine the importance of Farabi in the history of music, apart from his contributions known as a philosopher while examining his life. His book, Kitab Musiqā al-Kabir, which has not yet been translated into Turkish and English, has been dealt with as a multi-discipline in philosophy of mind with its scientific aspects.

Some of the works written by Farabi on music that have reached us are as follows: Kitab Musika'l-Kebir, Kitābu'l-Īka'at, Kitabu Īhsa'el-Ika'at. However, there is a section on music in the Book Īhsa'ul Ulum, and the subject of the book covers all the sciences of its time. Al-Fârâbl conceives the attack as hitting a large, solid object with a very thin object. The thinner the strike body, the more appropriate the term "attack" to describe contact. Farabi who was both a logician and a performer in the tenth century, made great contributions to the theory of Arabic music, although only eight of his 160 works were involved in music and only four of them have survived. In three of his treatises that have survived to the present day, he dealt with the subject of rhythm comprehensively:

Kitāb al-musīqa al-kabīr ‘Grand Book of Music’

Kitāb al-īqā’āt ‘Book of Rhythms’

Kitāb ihsā’ al-īqā’āt ‘Book for the Basic Comprehension of Rhythms’

In his Great Music Book, Farabi dealt with the subject of īqa “rhythm” in two parts and modelled his theory on ancient Greek music theory and mathematics, Arabic grammar, phonetics, prosody and Qur'anic sciences.

Farabi is a representative scholar with his extensive knowledge, comprehensive method and critical respect for his predecessors. Trained in the tradition of Greek philosophy and science, he identifies the musical reality of his time (tonal system, measures, composition, and instruments) in order to identify its constructive elements and establish a systematic theory of music with general validity. He was the first to identify the neutral or middle triad, which is the founding element of the raast scale, the basic scale of Arabic music. Among the "ancient" music writers known to the Middle East and Mesopotamians were Euclid, Pythagoras, Ptolemy, Nicomachos of Geras, and Aristoxenos. Names among the most prominent, apart from Plato and Aristotle. Al-Farabi quotes Ptolemy, Themistios, and Aristotle when discussing the delicate question of how a musicologist should be.

The basis of Al-Farabi’s musical aspects is the comprehensive theoretical foundation of ancient music researchers as well as the advanced musical practice of the Middle Ages characterised by an extraordinary masterpiece, emotional mood and openness of unique feelings. Al-Farabi was a celebrated philosopher and mathematician as well as a skilled musician. Known as the ‘Second Teacher’ (al-Mou’allim al-Tani) for studying and explaining the books of Aristotle (the ‘First Teacher’), Al-Farabi held a distinguished position among scientists, men of letters and philosophers. After a rich life, he died as an 80-year-old bachelor in Damascus. With his scientific contributions, Al-Farabi was regarded as the greatest philosopher. (El Ghrari and Haouaria Architects of the scientific thought in Islamic civilization 2003: p.28)

All aspects of music research in the context of the sciences contained in Kitab al Musiqa al Kabir indicate the musical tradition of the common culture as its encyclopaedic legacy of music. In his works, Al-Farabi argues that nations and ethnic groups can unite through a musical culture and that the interaction of these civilizations succeeds through intercultural communication. The peculiarity of the Kitab al Musiqa al Kabir and the

reason for the claim that a similar work has never been written may explain the method that Al-Farabi points at the beginning of the book. This treatise moves within the framework of a system of philosophical knowledge to establish the foundations and parts of musicology in a hierarchical arrangement. The aspects of musicology that deal with multidisciplinary problems are precisely defined and organized in this work. (Al-Farabi *Kitab al-Musiqā al-Kabir* 2007c, 55) Al-Farabi expresses his views on the nature of musical art, incorporating in his interpretation the ambiguity of sound, which is the first element of music. This interpretation is also presented in his treatise entitled *Classification of Sciences*. On this basis, the Second Master conducted research that went to the root essence of science and art as a physical substance, a geometric volume, and an arithmetic number as the second stage of knowledge. Al-Farabi *Metaphysics: Volume I*. (2007a, 189) He wrote his treatise to prove that music is not only an art but also a science. Among his various treatises on the subject, the *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir* (Great Book of Music) stands out. Here, he contained his melodies within a double octave, divided in accordance with the numerical ratios of the Greek tradition and that of Ptolemy in particular, where the notes were represented by letters of the alphabet. Rhythms, too, were given ‘a classification inspired by Geometry and Arithmetic’. Tonietti *And yet it is heard: Musical, multilingual and multicultural history* (2014, 221)

Al-Farabi believed that sounds with arithmetical relationships and any movement produced by these sounds had a powerful and special effect on the human mind and argued that appropriate music had moral value. The power of musical philosophy and art lies in their ability to sense the universal in the particular, whether or not that the particular really exists. ‘Art gives us the motions of the human soul in all their depth and variety. But the form, the measure and rhythm, of these motions is not comparable of any single state of emotion. What we feel in art is not a simple or single emotion quality. It is the dynamic process of life itself’. Meyer *Emotion and meaning in music* (1956, 32) If the purpose of a musical composition is to be the carrier of an emotion, the value of the work is in proportion to its revealed effect. ‘There exist two routes by which inanimate nature can come to symbolise human nature: either as a representation of emotions, or as a representation of ideas: Emotions, of course, are by their very nature impossible to represent directly; but they can be represented with respect to their form, and indeed there already exists a much beloved and effective type of art, which derives its thematic material from just such forms of emotion’. Schiller F. (1988, 85) *On Mathison’s Poems* (1794). In: Schiller—*Poet of Freedom, Vol. II*. This art is called music; it is a representation of our emotional faculties and thus an imitation of human nature. The plausibility of the art-as-expression thesis is particularly strong in arts based on imitation, where words and images express such features.

Plato was one of the first to study oral music. Even if the philosopher only uses the word music, he refers to songs, which consist of elements of poetry, musical mood and rhythm. He is sometimes understood to be proposing that the soul, like a scale, may contain several more parts than these three. However, he may instead be conceding that a

musical scale—unlike the soul— does, as it happens, contain more than three elements. He noted that a just man tunes the three parts of his soul as a musician tunes a set of three notes of the scale ‘and any others that as a matter of fact lie in between’. Ferrari G. (2007, 189) Plato’s Republic: The three-part soul.

Music is an art that harmonizes music with the human voice. Quantity and quality ensure its compatibility and connect and order categories. The origin of music is an instinct that exists in the human nature of creation. The fundamentals of this art, naturally instilled in man, awaken the desire and hidden need to produce sounds that satisfy the various desires associated with them. These sounds delight the soul, whether the passion is stagnant or growing, or whether they correspond to the content images of the poetic words that connect them.

The emotions that arise in the soul, consolation or reassurance or sorrow, in order to be able to enjoy, the necessity and the inner desire in it to make sounds according to the emotion, comes from the creation of nature. Or it helps us to imagine the meanings in idioms that have to do with the feelings in the soul. The song may have originated, but it has been proven that the baby cradle exists. We cannot say exactly when the foundations of the art of music originated in man, but we can say that singing was in human nature from the beginning, and the discovery of musical instruments came later.

There is no doubt that man first made instruments and then gradually developed his skill in the art of making instruments, that is, he made the instruments more and more comfortable as he went along, while he produced sounds and harmonized them with natural sounds as he sang. In this field they achieved beauty and success.

Historical sources indicate, for example, that the ancient Egyptians were among the first peoples to master the art of music. The ancient Greeks are also said to have laid the foundations of musical education. Musical knowledge was subject to the requirements of practical and philosophical teachings and was combined with scientific and logical knowledge. In fact, it was the Greeks who laid the foundations of this science. The Greeks refer to theoretical and philosophical doctrines associated with the natural sciences and logic. At the end of the second century, after Greek compositions and music had passed to the Persians with the migration of the peoples, music entered the cultural life of the Arabs.

The most famous work on the art of music in the East is the "Great Book of Music" by the philosopher Abu Nasir Muhammad ibn Tarhan Al-Farabi. This book, for which we have written the preface, is one of the most complete treatises on music ever written by scholars from this historical period to the present. We have taken this book as a source of support when discussing the fundamentals of musical art. It is well known that music and poetry are homogeneous phenomena whose forms of composition are distinguished by their relaxing and stimulating properties. Music and poetry have dimensions and subtleties. The difference between them is that the semantic content of the words in the poem is ordered according to the principles of a particular language. The peculiarity of

music lies in its quantitative and qualitative integration, accompanied by rhythmic parts of speech.

As we consider the origins, principles, and sciences of music in this introduction, we should keep this commentary in mind to guide us in defining what is mentioned in this book, as music and poetry reappear as a single discipline. When the beautiful content of the poem, the perfect execution, the right rhythm and the wonderful movements combine with the melodic sound, the soul will go into a trance while listening, and sometimes there are other reasons.

The meaning of the word is based on balanced systems that take into account the grammatical rules of language and music, and in music it is related to the exclusion of calculated parts of speech and the transmission of sounds by quantitative and qualitative kinaesthetic methods. The soul is instinctively drawn to the balanced systems that control style and composition, the sublimity of knowledge. This is due to a beautiful, gentle sound that the soul listens to and is then influenced by change agents.

Poetry and rhyme are somewhat older than melodic production. A song is formed by the combination of words. For this reason, song as a form of life developed more rapidly and fulfilled its purpose in a shorter time. The art of singing preceded the art of making musical instruments. Poetry and rhyme are older, better and more real than singing. The principle of musicology differs from other sciences and arts in that sound contains no material image. Just as in painting and sculpture the sounds cannot be seen or touched, so in other arts the sense of sight or touch plays an important part. The origin of matter, however, is more easily and naturally perceived and assimilated by hearing, and various emotions occur after consciousness has reached awareness.

With a more detailed explanation; As in painting and sculpture, sounds are neither visible nor tangible, so that sight or the sense of touch plays an important part in producing their perceptibility. Vision is awakened by the sensation of will in the brain and interrupts the sound structures. The music emanating from the instrument resonates with the human voice and creates a wonderful atmosphere for the ear. The basis of music education differs from other sciences and arts in that matter has no form; sounds are invisible, they cannot be felt. In painting or sculpture, for example, there are many opportunities to acquire visual and tactile foundations. It is therefore only natural that the ear and the eye, along with other sense organs, are involved in the analysis of sound composition. In this process, all senses, from the ear to the mind, perceive different qualitative parameters of sounds.

Perception involves the interpretation of sensory information. People perceive objects, not groups of stimuli. Object perception is determined in part by innate organizational tendencies.

These include the tendency to perceive a shape on a background, the tendency to group objects, and the tendency to completion, which involves creating a whole by filling in missing elements. Sound vibrations entering the ear pass through certain nerve tracts and reach the brain, completing the hearing process. This process is the physiological side of perception, which is the simplest element of psychological formations. At the end of

this physiological process, there is also perception. The process of perception takes place in the brain. In perception, the stimuli that reach the brain are organized into clusters and are simultaneously given meaning. Even a simple stimulus that does not require organization is interpreted in the brain. The listening and perceptual processes that build on this, which will be described briefly, undoubtedly take on a more complex quality and become the musical listening and music perception process of an individual living in a network of musical stimuli. Over time, people's perceptions of music began to differ and their expectations of music began to differentiate. At the same time, music perception was not limited to the interpretation of the music heard. Perception also manifested itself in composing, playing an instrument, and interpreting.

Musical talent can be defined as the innate abilities of the individual in areas such as hearing, perception, and memory, which are the cornerstones of music. Since natural talents and innate instincts are naturally strong to achieve this end, it is not surprising that they acquire great skill in composing melodies or performing instrumental tunes without training.

Studies in the philosophy of music are mainly concerned with the nature and meaning of music, the understanding of beauty, and emotional responses to music.

The researcher of musical art also studies other related scientific disciplines of music in a multidisciplinary manner because of his deep-rooted scientific knowledge of music philosophy.

The philosophy of music is a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary study of the phenomenon of music. The multidisciplinary nature of the discipline is found in research in music anthropology, sociology of music, music biology, medicine, music physics, mathematics, geometry, and music psychology. Interdisciplinary aspects are found in unifying studies such as psychoacoustics, music perception, psychobiology, the effects of music on the immune system, or the role of music in social relationships, such as social psychology.

The ability to perceive and distinguish musical forms, tones, and rhythms, to compose and express oneself through music, is one of the characteristics of the type of intelligence that depends on the presence of a natural musical talent. Individuals with verbal-linguistic intelligence succeed by using words in different ways in creative thinking. Individuals with visual-spatial intelligence who can produce creative solutions from cause-and-effect relationships in logical-mathematical intelligence are also creative in tasks based on movement and the use of the body, especially those with bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence in artistic creativity.

The basic dimensions of musical creativity are composition and improvisation. Setting and translation are processes that need to be handled with a creative approach. Musical creativity can be developed by music educators by providing creative learning-teaching environments and using appropriate strategies that foster creativity.

The creation of music is the basis of human musical activity. In the process of creating music, there are two types in which creation is paramount; these are composition

and improvisation. Composing is the process of creating a whole by bringing together and working on sounds one after another and/or one on top of the other, according to a certain understanding of beauty, with a certain purpose and method.

Improvisation, on the other hand, is the shaping of music or of a musical design, the course of which is not fixed in detail, by vocalizing or vocalizing it at that moment, by shaping it. Another kind of music creation process is singing and interpreting. Singing/interpretation is the process of reproducing a musical work as faithfully as possible, with the necessary care, meticulousness and sensitivity. This process takes place in the way of singing, playing, leading communities that sing or play.

To convey, perceive, and portray emotion through music is a skill. People with this kind of intelligence have very strong emotions and are able to communicate with people, understand them and interpret their behaviour. People with high musical intelligence think in terms of rhythms, melodies and sounds. Their mind is calm, engaged in reflection and philosophical knowledge. Musical/rhythmic intelligence is the ability to enjoy music, produce melodies, remember melodies, notice patterns of sound, recognize sounds, and respond emotionally to them. Those who have musical-artistic aptitude are sensitive to rhythm, acoustic order, melody, the highs and lows of a piece of music, musical instruments, and the sounds around a person. Those with high intelligence learn best and most effectively with rhythm, melody, and music. musical/rhythmic intelligence; He is creative in work that uses music, such as composing, singing, playing an instrument, and making musical instruments.

Implied in this type of intelligence is sensitivity to facial expressions, sounds, and mimics of other people and recognition of the various characteristics of people and the ability to analyse, interpret, and evaluate them. They have the ability to communicate with people, understand them and interpret their behaviour.

Interaction with music plays an important role in the development of perceptual systems that facilitate the coding and identification of speech sounds and patterns. The art and philosophy of music strengthens the ability to distinguish between sounds and enables more accurate processing of narratives and sounds.

The process of knowing, understanding, and making sense through the organization of sensory impressions reaching the brain is called perception. The process of knowing, understanding, and making sense through the organization of sensory impressions reaching the brain is called perception.

Perception is the organization and interpretation of sensory impressions in different ways. Just as stimuli are interpreted differently in different people, the same person may interpret the same stimuli in different ways depending on their perspective.

We organize things into shape, form, sound, or image so that they become a meaningful whole in our minds.

Everything that a person can see, hear, smell, and touch with his or her sensory organs at any given time forms that person's perceptual field. All prior learning and experiences that influence our perceptions are called the basis of perception.

Organization in perception is the phenomenon that stimuli are not perceived individually, but as a set of organized, meaningful relations. In contrast to cognitive and behavioural approaches, the humanistic approach relates human behaviour not to biological factors, mental processes, and what is learned from the environment, but to the unique way each person perceives the world.

Auditory and visual perception recognizes visions formed in the mind and creates images of actions in various forms that can then be stored in the mind. It requires strong emotions and imagination when it comes to reliable and accurate information. Because human cognition is more diverse than this force. Cognitive science's view of the mind is called the information processing process. Cognitive scientists view the human mind as an information processing system that receives, stores, transforms, and retrieves information. The general function of this complex system is expressed by the term "cognition". According to the information processing approach, it is a processor with limited capacity in terms of mind, structure, and resources and unlimited capacity in terms of processing power.

When it comes to the formation of perfect melodies in connection with music and verse in general, they are considered absolutely natural, and stand foremost in influencing the imagination. They are distinguished by the parts of sound formed from them, and their pronunciation by means of the mouth and throat.

The source of the impulse to produce the sounds of which the word is composed is the human desire to understand. In other words: When the air flowing from the chest meets the larynx, mouth, tongue and pharynx, various sounds are formed as an expression of the meanings of the phrases. Eastern peoples attach great importance to music as a natural human need.

Thus, the information about music and its branches, as well as the necessary primary and secondary sections, are preserved in their small theoretical definitions. If we had the opportunity of fully enriching and connecting the subjects of science and art, we should have to begin with the known foundations and established conditions of this art in science.

If a scientific definition of applied Arabic music were made, the basic knowledge of the art of music would have been passed on to the younger generations and would thus serve the people in the field of music. For this reason, collectors in the art of music are not known to be very stable, but they are likely to be the subject of in-depth studies focusing on secondary disciplines.

As for the early authors, most of their books are far from perfect, difficult to understand with complex interpretations and intricate meanings, but they are much more eager than collectors to learn the basics of science in the field.

It is also difficult to determine which of the musical disciplines described in the philosopher's encyclopaedia Abu Nasir Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarhan Al-Farabi is more perfect. Al-Farabi 's encyclopaedia is known as the "Great Book of Music"

mentioned in this preface. It is the greatest Arabic musical work since the founding of Islam.

Not only have we returned to this book, but we have uncovered the problems hidden within it as we have examined it. However, this work deals with many topics related to the fundamentals of music, theoretical and practical knowledge, and related subjects. This book, which is almost ten centuries old, has become a monument of music history.

We know that the author's introduction is the second volume of the work, containing such topics as the correction of the views of earlier experts, and that the book consists of four chapters which have not yet reached us. The title of the book is *The Word of Music: Lost or Forgotten in a Private Library*.

As for the first book, it consists of two parts: the first - "Introduction to the Art of Music", the second is devoted to the art itself. The introduction to the art of music consists of two parts, and the part of the art of music consists of three parts:

First Knowledge: Fundamentals of music and related subjects. Secondary knowledge: about known musical instruments, their tunings and the basics of harmony and sensory perception. Third information: about individual melody types. While reading Al-Farabi's Great Music Book, we faced many difficulties that no patient and diligent researcher could overcome. As a result, we spent a lot of time reviewing the book and were able to provide a little commentary that can be used. This view was supported by the Ministry of Culture and National Administration, which is committed to reviving the ancient Arabic heritage in various fields of science and art and contributed to the publication of this valuable work.

We examined three historically important manuscripts. We also had the opportunity to research in the direction we wanted. Taking into account the correct connection of letters and vowels, it was our responsibility to correctly convey the meaning to the researcher.

In preparing the article for publication, we started from the above points and worked hard to bring the difficult parts closer to the meaning of the article. And we had to add a few words to some sentences to determine the meaning. We showed the headings in each word according to the content of the sentence and the problem solved on that subject. We also approached the problem of representing numbers on this principle, since some of them were ancient Indian numbers and others were used by the Arabs in the sixth century. We tried to represent all these in the image of our age. In interpreting the sentences and words, our aim was to show the differences between the three copies by semantic comparison.

The manuscript we have examined is known as the 21427 photocopied manuscript of 123 pages preserved in the Leiden Library. We refer to it by the letter m [mim]. The manuscript begins with these words, "In the name of Allah, the Gracious and Merciful. May Allah's peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family and all his companions. Sheikh Abu Nasir Muhammad ibn Mohammed Al-Farabi said, " You told me that you really wanted to know about the art of music. You explained it to the reader

and asked me to write a book for you. I have postponed your request until we have familiarized ourselves with the books on this art handed down to us by the ancients and written by our ancestors ...

Manuscript: "...May Allah fulfill your hope in this world and the hereafter. All praise belongs to Allah. With his help, the book has been perfected. May Allah's peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family and all his companions. A copy of the pamphlet with the commentary of Khalil ibn Ahmad ibn Khalil, completed Muharram Thursday, 943 AH. (The book) was copied from a copy written in the middle of the blessed month of Ramadan in H. 482.

Images taken in sunlight from a manuscript written in clear copy 'Naskh' script on 464 leaves, preserved in Astana Library No. 22, and eventually reprinted with a poem and the seal of the book. The manuscript begins as follows: "In the name of Allah, the Gracious and Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the Prophet of the Worlds. May Allah's peace and blessings be upon Muhammad, his family and his companions. This book on the art of music was written by Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tarkhani for Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn al-Qasim al-Qarji.

The book begins with the words, "You told me you were eager to learn about the ancient art of music ...".

Manuscript: "... May Allah fulfil your hope in this world and the hereafter. Ali ibn Rustam al-Kabshi completed the book on Friday, the eleventh day of al-Ahir, in H. 654. Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. Peace and blessings be upon Muhammad, the Messenger of the Prophets and his noble family. The comparison of the copy with the original text was completed on the eighteenth day of the month of Jumadi al-Awwal, 655 AH.

(3) This is a 129-page photocopy with seal N9052 of the manuscript we symbolise by the letter (S) and whose first article is missing in the second type, kept in the US Library at Princeton University Library in America. We have added the missing part of the oud instrument with the section on instruments of Timurid Library in the Egyptian Bookstore. In this copy, there is a difference in the order on some pages at the beginning and on some pages at the end of the book, causing a change in the content of the words and written in the usual Naskh 'copy' script. In this copy, the number of pages and the content of the text are different from the first two. The manuscript is written in simple copy 'naskh', the numbers in the tables resemble ancient Indian numbers. The numbers have a strange shape and are close to the old master numbers in some tables. This manuscript is probably the copy found in the treasury of old Murad al-Baroudi and transported to America. It is given in the index of Dar al-Qutb.

The manuscript begins: "Introduction to the book. In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and Merciful. Rabbi, make my job easy and help me. You told me you really wanted to know something about the ancient art of music

The book ends with the sentence: "... Allah knows best, and we shall return to Him and take refuge in Him". This book was completed with the help of Allah. Praise be to Him, and peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family and friends.

On the fourteenth of Rabi-ul-Awwal in 899 H., Ahmed Muhammad Raj wrote the following information. May Allah make his end auspicious.

We also have a work on Al-Farabi's French music by Baron Rudolf d'Erlange, published in Paris in 1930-1935. Translated from four manuscripts.

1. A complete copy of 133 pages has been preserved. It is registered in the Leiden Library with the number 1427, written in the year 943 H, which we symbolize with the letter (m).

2. A complete manuscript of 9289 of 195 pages, preserved in the library of Milan, was copied in 784 H.

3. Incomplete manuscript preserved in the library of Beirut.

4. The missing 183-page manuscript, №906, is kept in the Escorial Library in Madrid. No date of copying given. The copyist is Abu'l-Hasan ibn Abu Kamal al-Kurdi.

It was not easy to obtain original copies of this book. For this reason it was also difficult to explain and set the margins, and we had to resort to some works and many texts whose subjects do not fall within the scope of musical art. Therefore, we present to you this book on the art of music by the philosopher Abu Nasir Muhammad ibn Muhammad Al-Farabi. Indeed, we hope that this book will be a great help for scholars and researchers on the foundations of modern music and a source of inspiration for universities.

The scholar describes his observation of how these melodies interact with each other. He then analyzes the way idioms and melodies are separated from each other and how the sound is in harmony or dissonance with the melody. The scholar also examines the origin and slowness of sounds, how sound is divided into parts. Al-Farabi discusses the sounds of imagination and emotion, analyzes the evocative state of melodies and the types of perfect melodies. Al-Farabi also says that some musicians use music to entertain with expressions, including obscene language.

As a result, this situation affected the art of music so negatively that conservatives considered the art of music as an unnecessary art of gossip. The useful aspects of this art are almost forgotten. The Great Book of Music is a source of detailed information about the art of music. The reader will find useful information about the practical and theoretical aspects of music in this book. And I present this book in the hope that it will be the best reference work for those engaged in the composition of our national language and the study of the elements of musicology.

5.8 Philosophy of Music and Related Disciplines

The purpose of this article is to provide a method of exploring the fundamental knowledge of general scientific concepts in the history of philosophy, and the symbiosis of music, magic, and science is at its most convincing as it draws considerable evidence together to impressive effect. How did past intellectuals think about the defining features

and functions of music in general, and how did they explain its effects in particular? The breadth of these questions naturally encourages an interdisciplinary approach to the problem on both the first and second levels. The evidence required by research is found in extensive knowledge of mathematics, physics, music theory, science, and natural philosophy. It is essential for historians of science to acknowledge such important trends in musical practice because of the long-term impact that they had on ideas on the nature of music and the laws governing its composition. Indeed, these new musical theories eventually produced an impact on scientific theory generally, not least because music was part of the university curriculum as a branch of mathematics and was also defined as one of the seven liberal arts (Gouk, 1999a). *Musica humana* (meaning human music or, more particularly, the harmony between the body and soul) and *musica mundana* or *musica universalis* (the music of the world or universe music) are concepts that go back at least to the sixth century AD—to the works of the philosopher and music theorist Boethius—and were still in use in the early seventeenth century (Moyer, 1992).

Viewing music among other disciplines, such as mathematics, chemistry, and biology, as a discipline closely related with physics, the common subject in phonology and acoustics is vibration and waves. Music is both an art and a science (Karolyi, 1965). Al-Farabi analyzes these disciplines using a detailed classification. He divides philosophy into four parts: mathematics, physics, theology, and the social sciences. He then divides mathematics into four disciplines, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and musicology. Physics and the natural sciences deal with the study of bodies and everything that naturally exists in bodies—that is, outside of the human will (Al-Farabi, 2018). Noting that mathematical knowledge was securely grasped by Descartes, Heidegger states that it is accepted as the only reliable way to understand entities (Heidegger, 1962). In mathematics we see the conscious, logical activity of our mind in its purest and most complete form; we can here appreciate its travail as a whole—the precaution with which it must advance, the accuracy that is necessary to determine the exact import of the acquired general propositions, the difficulty of forming and understanding abstract concepts—while simultaneously learning to put confidence in the certainty, scope, and profit of such intellectual labour (Koenigsberger, 1965).

In the quadrivium—which comprises the mathematical arts—arithmetic is the knowledge of numbers, geometry is the knowledge of space, music is the knowledge of proportions, and astronomy is the knowledge of movement. These four stages of spiritual perfection were called *quadruplex ad sapientiam* in the Middle Ages. The quadrivium was considered the only way to reach the hidden realm of physical and spiritual realities and knowledge of the supreme spirit or the truth beyond. The information presented on this plane is information folded in on itself—that is, information that stimulates thought. The main interest of the quadrivium is numbers and their relation to physical space and time; further, it focuses on the relationship of numbers to physical space and time. The quadrivium, in the simplest sense of mathematics, should not be understood merely as measuring or calculating (Cicero & Pohlenz, 1965). Music (*musica disciplina*) as part of

the quadrivium, which is about music in relation to numbers, is the embodiment of harmony (Plato, 2013). Boethius divides *musica disciplina* into three areas: the music of the universe (*musica mundana*), the music of the human body and soul (*musica humana*), and the music produced by instruments and the human voice (*musica instrumentalis*). He draws particular attention to the flexible structure of music (Boethius, 1983).

A somewhat different perspective on music's relationship to philosophical thought is offered in Kassler's research, which like Wardhaugh's and also my own work, has concentrated on English sources. One important theme that Kassler first identified is the role played by musical models in developing an understanding of the mind-body relationship and of an inner sense of self, most notably in the works of Thomas Hobbes, Robert Hooke, and Francis North (Gouk, 2012).

Roberts Hooke suggested that a vibrating spring is dynamically equivalent to a pendulum and that vibrating bodies such as strings follow demonstrable musical laws, leading to the argument that the same laws are followed by much smaller, invisible bodies that constitute the basic building blocks of nature. The differences in their frequency provided Hooke with a basis for explaining variety in fluids and solids, along with phenomena such as gravitational attraction. Just as the three factors that determine pitch are length, tension, and size (cross-sectional area), the analogous properties of matter or substance, figure or shape, and body or bulk are those that determine frequency in particles of matter (Cohen, 1984; Gouk, 1999a).

A pragmatic approach to music cognition is useful for examining musical possibilities and serves research into the musical experience and listeners' cognition. In taking a pragmatic approach, Al-Farabi studied experience with its aesthetic definition within an interdisciplinary framework. As Deacon (2012, p. 392) explained, "Being able to trace the thread of causality that links these domains avails us of the ability to discern whether methods and concepts developed in different scientific contexts are transferable in more than merely analogous forms. It also makes it possible to begin the task of formalizing the relationships that link energetic processes, form generation processes, and social-cognitive processes. Most important, it shows us that what emerges in new levels of dynamics is not any new fundamental law of physics or any singularity in the causal connectedness of physical phenomena, but rather the possibility of new forms of work, and thus new ways to achieve what would not otherwise occur spontaneously.

In other words, with the emergence of new forms of work, the causal organization of the world changes fundamentally, even though the basic laws of nature remain the same. Causal linkages that were previously cosmically improbable such as the special juxtapositions of highly purified metals and semiconductors constituting the computer that is recording this text become highly predictable."

Introspection by musicians, aestheticians, and listeners as well as physiological responses to musical stimuli present complex cases of emotional behaviour. Moreover, much seemingly spontaneous and natural emotional behaviour is learned determinative behaviour. As Al-Farabi explained: Presence of musical sounds and melodies in physical

embodies: The way to get to the basics of music is followed by repetition [recognition]. These are the elements that have been used in physics since ancient times. Several elements derived from geometry and arithmetic are followed by. Therefore, our research should begin with the first principles derived from the natural sciences. Because it is impossible to know arithmetic without studying the basics of geometry. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 133)

Additionally, Al-Farabi established a comprehensive system: Anyone desirous of studying one of these sciences will find the content of this book useful, as he will learn from it which science he should pursue, what he ought to study and what he can learn through his study, what use it has and what advantage he may derive from it. (Rosenthal, 1992, p. 55)

As Farmer (1965, p. 49) further explained:

To this science are three roots: meter, melody, and gesture. Meter was devised to regulate a rational

comprehension of diction. Melody was devised to regulate the parts of acuteness and gravity [in sound], and to it two roots have been included in the sense of hearing. Gesture has been included in the sense of seeing which, by coincident motions and corresponding proportions, has been arranged to agree with meter and sound. This art, therefore, is included in two particular senses: hearing and seeing.

The perception of music provides an efficient subject area for presenting an overview of cognitive

processes. As Al-Farabi suggests, music can contribute to paradigm shifts. By its very nature, and because of its social functions and impact on cognitive and physiological relationships, music presents a phenomenon so complex that no scientific method can undertake to explain what music is and what it does. This complexity and the internal demand for an interdisciplinary understanding may provoke a reassessment of the general paradigm in philosophy.

However, it would certainly be extremely interesting to map out the possible rules and cognitive parameters that lie behind musical expressions. Al-Farabi, as a philosopher, scientist, and musician, takes into account the subject responsible for the expression—the agent who deliberately plays, performs, and thinks musically. In the current state of theoretical thought, perspectives on sound and art should be open to other sciences in the light of philosophy and should include a cognitive coordinate system. A cognitive-scientific understanding of the nature of perception and performance can help shape new instruments for composers and performers and provide new tools for controlling complex musical systems and structures. Potential conflicts or cross-interactions between philosophical and scientific approaches are part of the natural functioning of the system. In this treatise, we focus on an area where the conclusions of cognitive scientists and philosophers overlap, namely, the relationship between music and emotions. Our interest in this relationship is expressed in two fundamental questions: 1) how music manages to

express emotional states and 2) how music can evoke emotional states in listeners. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 76)

The source of conceptual and abstract information is vision/perception. Perception refers to mutually informative and conceptual systems that define “perceptually regulated movement” in which sensory and motor processes are inseparable. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 78) In short, the function of the active intellect as a principle of metaphysics and a condition of knowledge provides a basis for making a cogent case for intuitive knowledge. (Kalin 2014: p. 204) This perspective advocates a biological interpretation of experience in which participants explore their environment bodily and sensorially. Therefore, the mind is not seen as a reflection of the external world but as an active function of its own reality through cognition and bodily activity. The meaning of epistemological claims about experiential and active cognition rests in human signification.

The meaning and understanding depend on imaginative structures embodied as dynamic and interactive characters. As such, typical examples of “non-objective semantics” do not take the nature naively—that is, objectively—but grasp it through understanding, imagination, and embodiment. As Al-Farabi put it: Also, the nature of sounds includes things or emotions that contribute to the manifestation of spiritual stress, such as cruelty, grief and fear, pleasure, stress, and so on. This is because a person in a state of spiritual distress is characterized by emotions that reflect his or her state. If it is used in music, the listener imagines it according to their references. (Al-Farabi, 2008, pp. 267–268)

However, in this method, according to Hooke, everything can be “recorded very precisely, and everything can be described and determined according to its proportions in Number, Weight, Measure, Time, Place, and Situation.” From this reduction it is clear that Hooke was convinced of the effectiveness of reducing the “Facts of Sense” to number, weight, measure, and proportion. “For the sense receives only the impression left by the means of transmission. Once insight has supplied the basic principles of thought, it produces both the middle terms of syllogisms and the conclusions, undoubtedly by enabling the soul to conjoin effortlessly with the active intellect. And tis in this operation of the mind wherein the use and benefit of geometrical knowledge doth most eminently shows itself” (Kassler & Oldroyd, 1983, p. 588).

It is possible to apprehend music with the five practical possibilities. These possibilities are intertwined concepts, such as actions that produce appropriate sound, the effects of these actions, and the possibility of imagining resonance as a movement in time. Conversely, these concepts are physical experiences before the motion, or bodily based visual images and the causes that generate sounds, and the sounds create the mental stimulation by revealing the movements. As Al-Farabi explained: Many features of sounds are specially named. Most do not have names but have names of detectable objects that look similar to them. Various sound features indicated with a name are combinations of phenomenon. Others are not named at all and do not want to be systematized. For this reason, we briefly discuss about the sounds we know and need for the harmony of

melodies and some of their features that do not have specific names. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 267)

As Aristotle mentioned in his book *On The Soul*: “Sound may mean either of two things (a) actual, and (b) potential, sound. There are certain things which, as we say, ‘have no sound,’ e.g., sponges or wool, and others which have, e.g., bronze and in general all things which are smooth and solid—the latter is said to have a sound because they can make a sound, i.e., can generate actual sound between themselves and the organ of hearing. It is rightly said that an empty space plays the chief part in the production of hearing, for what people mean by ‘the vacuum’ is the air, which is what causes hearing, when that air is set in movement as one continuous mass; but owing to its friability it emits no sound, being dissipated by impinging upon any surface which is not smooth” (2018, p. 41).

Substances in motion have sounds that can be characterized as high, low, and medium. From this tripartite division arises a science that requires recognizing those three characterizations. There is no definition of “movement” because the term is ambiguous. Motion can be defined as a rotation in the emergence and disappearance, but it can also be defined as a transition from potential to actuality (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 223).

Physics originates in natural philosophy. In investigating causes and natural formations, it examines the structure and elements of the universe. As Al-Farabi indicated:

The concept of ‘music’ extends to both the original and the subsequent content, that is, if this concept means one of the two, it will apply to the other. Thus, one of the contents, that is, the former is preceded by the superiority of one thing over the latter, and the other is preceded by the superiority of the causal effect of the consequences. However, as it is said in many places, the content of the second content is superior to the first, because the state of the second content is in fact ahead of the previous one. Each of the contents of the music will be relevant and perfect, depending on its harmony and the way it is formed. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 59)

A scale so delicately balanced in its structure, and so well adapted for variety of mental effect—a scale to which the human ear and mind is so generally attuned—must be a natural and not an artificial one. 39. Effects of Rhythm. -It is difficult to separate the mental effect of a rhythm from that of the tune which accompanies it, but it is worthy of notice that certain rhythms associate themselves with certain states of mind, and that, as with the mental effects of the tones of the Scale, the effects of rhythms are greatly modified by the rates of movement. (Curwen 1879: p. 21, 36)

That Emotional Effects arise principally from the felt relations of the tones of the scale, modified by height of Pitch and rate of Speed and that the character of a tune may be largely judged by the "mental effect" of the tone which predominates in it. That the manner in which the "finer" rhythms are introduced helps to promote or modify the mental effect—the introduction of more rapid motion generally adding liveliness to the feeling. That the tendency of a quick rate of movement is to make a tune Lively, and that of a slow rate of movement to make it more Serious. Poems which are of a Didactic character,

expressing no particular emotion, should be sung neither very Slowly nor very Quickly, neither Loudly nor Softly, but with medium force and speed. Those which are Variable in their emotional character will vary greatly in speed and force and style according to the emotion, because, as we cannot alter the tune itself, there is nothing but this wherewith to change the emotion. Descriptive passages should in the main be sung softly, because the mental attitude of listening and observing is one of subdued emotion. The same may be said of those which express Meditation or Repose. The unexpected is always impressive. The movement which is expected to accompany soft singing is slow. If, therefore, the music is suddenly made both soft and quick, the sentiments of light gaiety or inuendo find a natural expression. For the purposes of comic poetry an exaggerated solemnity is often employed. (Curwen 1879: p. 236, 267).

5.9 Causality, Matter, and Consciousness from One Source

Al-Farabi expresses his theory of causality in the treatise called " the gems of wisdom." Everything which exists after having not existed, he says, must be brought into being by a cause which itself may be the result of some preceding cause, and so on, until we reach a First Cause, which is and always has been, its eternity being necessary because there is no other cause to precede it, and Aristotle has shown that the chain of causes cannot be infinite. The First Cause is one and eternal, and is God (cf. Aristoteles *Metaphysic*: 12. 7, and similarly Plato, *Timaeus* 28). Being unchanged this First Cause is perfect, and to know it is the aim of all philosophy, for obviously everything would be intelligible if the cause of all were known. This First Cause is the " necessary being " whose existence is necessary to account for all other existence it has neither genus, species, nor differentia ; it is both external and internal, at once apparent and concealed ; it cannot be perceived by any faculty but is knowable by its attributes, and the best approach to knowledge is to know that it is inaccessible.

It can be assumed that there was silence at the beginning of the formation of the world or the universe. There was silence because there was no movement. Therefore, there was no vibration that could set the air in motion. The creation of the world, however it came about, must have been accompanied by motion and, therefore, sound. There was silence because there was no motion, and therefore, no vibration could move the air—a phenomenon of fundamental importance in producing sound (Karolyi, 1965, p. 13). Sound is the product of movement. Every moving object vibrates and creates sound waves. Sound is created and propagated by the vibration of particles in the environment and the transmission of these vibrations to neighbouring particles. Waves created by the vibration of particles in the environment create pressure changes in the air. The magnitude of the change in air pressure is referred to as sound pressure. Moving sound activates the air molecules with the waves it creates. This motion takes the form of compression and expansion in the medium. Sound, created by the transfer of energy between air molecules, propagates in waves in the air, transporting energy. The waves stimulate our hearing organ, and the sound is perceived in the brain (Say, 2002, p. 101).

Humans can see sounds, as they see colours, as frequencies created by vibrating objects, and in that sense, objects have sounds. Put another way, sounds can be the vibrations of objects or bundles of perceived frequencies. This physicalist explanation of sound leaves room for dispositional attribution. Al-Farabi examined the structures of numerous materials to discern what they bring to the human ear as music: However, if you hit the air with a whip, the air may make a noise. A part of the whip air does not disintegrate against its impact. If he moves around without resisting, he will not make any noise. Let's take a brief look at how sound is formed. Let's see how the sound reaches our ears. The sound is transmitted to the air by a shock wave generated by the impact of the body. Blowing air gives the appearance of falling into the next layer of self-contained air: this layer of air, in turn, transmits the state to the next layer, and so on. (Al-Farabi 2008, p. 134–135)

He further specified the outcome of playing an instrument: When one hard object touches another hard object, it moves it. Known objects move toward another object in the air, in water, or when they resemble one of those objects that are easy to conform to. Due to the pressure between the two objects, the parts of the air are compressed with great force and they make a sound when they come close to each other. (Al-Farabi, 2008, pp. 133–134)

Sound conveyed by air can be identified as periodic vibrations caused by colliding atoms or molecules. This phenomenon typically emanates bubble-shaped from the epicentre of the sound event. As the diameter of the sound bubble increases, its surface oscillates radially. These periodic movements follow the expansion and contraction as the air bubble that initiated the sound. When audible sound propagates through air, every atom or molecule along its path of propagation transmits “data” from its source. Each atom and molecule in a pure-tone sound bubble carries only one sinusoidal periodicity. When a sound is complex, like human speech, each atom and molecule transfers all periodicity. As Al-Farabi explained: The vibrations of the pressure between the two make a sound when the parts of the flight layer are compressed with great force and come close to each other. The stronger the pressure, the better. The softer the friction of the two bodies, the colder the contact between their parts, and the stronger the jerk in the air between them. The friction of iron is similar. On the contrary, the more the friction of the other body is embossed, the more freedom there is in the parts between them, and the possibility of sound is not lost. For example, however, if you hit the air with a whip, the air may make a noise. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 134)

Frequencies slightly below the range of human hearing are called low frequencies and provide an atypical situation of sound propagation. As frequencies rise, diffraction decreases rapidly—the shape of the sound changes from a sphere to a beam. As with high-frequency audible sound, this tendency is attributable to the smaller range of motion within each atom or molecule, producing energy insufficient to cause diffraction. However, in low-frequency ultrasound, sphericity returns at high sound pressure levels

because sufficient energy becomes available to cause a gradual spin into polyatomic and molecular collisions.

The question is, what stage have we reached in the evolution of understanding since the Second Master sought to define sounds scientifically? While explaining the instruments that produce sound, including simple acts of blowing and complex or compound actions, Al-Farabi explained the concepts of physics and structures shared with other disciplines.

Other pipes can also be arranged in twisted cavities. On top of that, other pipes can be placed. It makes a lot of noise. These types of blowing instruments can be made in various shapes. However, in each of the twisted cavities, the air passing through the wind instruments, located on the straight lines, dissipates in the convoluted holes. What's more, the part that is most tangled toward the one closest to the repulsive force, and the part left behind, will disperse in the air if it is directed to the twists. These are the blowing instruments that the air passes from one to the other. In the end, they make a lot of sounds. It is also possible to make different types of pipes from this type of pipe. The blown air moves to each bend in a specially designed straight path and is distributed in all directions. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 147)

Sound, rhythm, and harmony were originally defined as the perception of vibration of the human ear. Gradually, the definitions of sound, rhythm, and harmony gained dimensions through the work of philosophy and its imaginative orientation. When the surrounding air interacts with an instrument, vibration is created. The sensation produced in the auditory organs, in the perceptual senses, also requires a definition regarding what is heard or can be heard. Concepts relating to vibration, oscillation, and sensibility indicate the physical or rational principles of nature, as well as feeling, found within the universe of consciousness.

Modern science attempts to reduce the infinity of natural phenomena to matter and aether, but researchers differ in their understanding of those basic units. The tone that begins with life continues from beginning to end and is heard thereafter. It is not a separate element but an ever-present guide. In music, it expresses the timeless, eternal, unchanging background of all things, their origins, supporters, and goals. Mystics regarded it as a divine eternal principle, the foundation of the universal structure, and the note of a specific pitch in music.

The central claim of subjective idealism as a generator of knowledge is the reality of the subject, which eludes conditioning by time and space. The intuition underlying this claim is that consciousness extends, and the resulting knowledge has no social existence. An individual's database is fragmented, static, and composed of much information, with relative morality and intelligence. The source of knowledge is existence itself, and the inside is obtained from the reflected image of matter through empirical experiments.

This study recapitulates the problem in modern philosophy that Berkeley raises in *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. In the dialogue between Philonous—whose name suggests the Greek for “lover of reason”—and Hylas—whose

name echoes hyle, Greek for “substance”—Hylas defines sound as movement. If it is movement, however, it will be seen and felt but not heard. That creates an apparent contradiction by suggesting sound occurs only in a mind as a subjective sensation. Applying this reasoning to the sensation of color, he reached the same conclusion.

Phil.: Then as to sounds, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?

Hyl.: That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.

Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas?

Hyl.: Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air’s motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all. (Berkeley, 2012, p. 20)

Walzer (1985, pp. 375–376) mentions that Al-Farabi developed a concept of intelligible matter derived from neo-Platonic sources:

Al-Farabi is quite aware that Aristotle had introduced a fifth element, aether, being the element from which the stars are made, but he deliberately abandoned the Peripatetic dogma by substituting for aether the quint essential, the neo-Platonic spiritual intelligible matter, the *noētē hylē*, and making it in turn the cause of the four elements.

Per Al-Farabi, Aristotle established the continuity and infinity of movement via inductive reasoning. That is, there is “a movement before every movement.” That movement and celestial movement generally are eternal. In short, Al-Farabi argued for the eternity of motion by proceeding from result to cause, which is in a sense complementary to the revealing discussion.

Kitab al Musiqā features no explanation under the entry “Hydraulis” in its section on wind instruments, but its description of multiple pipes has been noted. Al-Farabi likely worked on this instrument, and his experiments with vacuums and ether prove he knew of hydraulics. As Engel (2018, p. 34) recounted:

Ibn Sina (d. 1037), Al-Farabi’s successor in Arabic science and philosophy, mentioned the organ *en passant* in his *Kitab al-shifa'*: “And sometimes there are made instruments that are blown into, of composite structure, when we get the like of the Byzantine instrument known as the organ.” *Rasa'il fi'l-hikma*, also attributed to Ibn Sina, contains the following passage: “Among the appendages to the science of music, is the construction of marvelous, extraordinary instruments, such as the organ (*urghan*) and what resembles it” Farmer noted the Arabian influence on musical theory: The revival of interest in the hydraulis in Europe appears attributable to the Arabs.

From the sixth to the ninth century there is no mention of ancient hydraulis in Europe, but in the ninth–twelfth century the Arabs were constructing both the pneumatic and the hydraulic organ (Farmer, 1931, pp. 73–74).

The Dof is about eleven inches in diameter, and is played and held similarly to the Taar. It has snares" stretched across the inside of the head, which give the instrument a

sharp crisp tone. It is mentioned among the instruments of the Arabs of Spain by Al-Farabi (tenth century), and still in use by them to-day as the Aduf. The Dof of Persia given by Ouseley ("Travels," 1815) is more like a huge tambourine without the metal plates. The Tof of the Hebrews, according to Kircher ("Musurgia Universalis") appears to be like a kettledrum. (Salvador-Daniel, F., & Farmer, H. G. (2013: p.222)

A unique, impressive, mystical, spiritual, therapeutic, and emotional sound can come from a musical instrument that transforms vibrations over water into sound by touching the water. This instrument, the hydraulis, which creates sound from vibrations in water, was actually the first musical instrument. Acoustic instruments produce sound using gaseous air through solid percussion, strings, or wind instruments. The hydraulis, which creates sound through the interaction of the three states of solid percussion or strings, gas, or wind and liquid matter simultaneously, constitutes a single musical instrument category.

Only literary and philosophical societies have illuminated our understanding by applying their reasoning powers to the exploration of unknown phenomena and opening new realms of speculation. They naturally investigate the ways in which direct force can produce motion. A better understanding of the action and nature of a force is always desired. When one object in motion collides with another, the permeability of matter is the first stage of conveying motion to make sense of causality. As a general principle in life, the first bodily movement cannot move without changing the second one.

A vacuum is devoid of matter, a closed area where the substance is located. The air is partially removed so that the significance or gas remaining in the cavity can exert less pressure from the atmosphere. Although difficult to imagine today, man debated for centuries whether vacuums could exist. Some ancient Greek philosophers denied the existence of a vacuum, asking, "How can 'nothing' be something?"

Al-Farabi is considered the focus of scientific research whose changes in information theory are as necessary as the change in the method introduced by quantum physics. Treatises on music and science focus on the theory of knowledge and musical style. One pragmatic aspect of information theory is its openness to varying approaches and theoretical abstractions. However, its mathematical foundations and philosophical implications are fertile ground for conceptual errors. Information theory and the literature of music are replete with conceptual errors, and one aim of this study is to remind some problematic concepts by pointing to their original sources for improvement. "Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi appears to have conducted the first recorded experiments concerning the existence of the vacuum when he investigated handheld water plungers, with inconclusive results" (Jenkins, 2012, p. 15). He concluded that air's volume can expand to fill available space and suggested that the concept of a perfect vacuum was incoherent.

Christians during the Middle Ages believed vacuums were immoral, even heretical. Torricelli argued in 1643 that the space atop a mercury barometer was a vacuum. Boyle experimented on the properties of the vacuum (Boi, 2009, p. 52). As Armstrong (2019)

explained, These mysterious invisible forces also shaped our world and even extended beyond the reach of the cosmos. From an experimental perspective, scholars such as Al-Farabi began to make vacuums using pumps and closed containers, which provoked a range of theories accounting for the contradictory nature of these spaces and how they could ‘actually’ hold the universe together. (p. 127)

The philosopher first begins his article by describing the experiments, observations, and inferences of those who criticize those who accept the existence of the vacuum (al-khala). “If one-third of the air inside a bottle similar to a rose bottle is sucked in, and then that bottle is immersed in water, the water enters one-third of the bottle” (Al-Farabi, 2007b, p. 58).

Contrary to a widespread belief, we cannot conclude that there is a vacuum in one-third of a bottle in Al-Farabi’s description of an experiment, from which the above quotation is taken. Al-Farabi explains this experiment as follows. He assumes that one-third of the air from an air-filled bottle is sucked out, and the part with no air is at the bottom of the bottle. It is evident here that the evacuated part has length, width, and depth. “When the mouth of the bottle, which outer part is completely submerged in water, is opened and one-third of its air is emptied, water

particles begin to enter that bottle. The water travels a distance inside the bottle until it finds its equilibrium position” (Al-Farabi, 2007b, p. 58).

Whatever object is next to the area emptied of air, that object occupies the empty space, which in this case is air or water. Before the air was sucked out, all the air took up its natural volume, and no room was made for water. However, when some of the air in the bottle was sucked out, the air became forced, and when faced with water, it returned to its natural volume and left its place for the water. Al-Farabi also draws attention to “how small a volume of air is and how large a volume it is forced into. He indicates the correlation between the pulling force of the object and the change in volume by stating that its return to its original volume is so fast. We would like to underline the following point here: In order to allow the air to return to its natural volume, water has almost consented to the return of the air to its natural state by displacing it” (Al-Farabi, 2007b, pp. 59–60).

Al-Farabi investigated the emergence and disappearance of virtual particles within the “void” and inquired about the possibility of visualizing a non-energized electron field permeating the universe. He predicted the existence of antielectrons (positrons) and argued that electron fields can generate and absorb electron–positron pairs: We have determined that matter emerges as a whole and is temporary, but that it does not appear and disappear in time (outside of time), and some parts of it appear and disappear as appearances and disappearances. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 18)

Al-Farabi unified quantum theory and relativity and unveiled relativistic quantum field theory. Vacuums— void and space as a field—can be explained as the emergence and disappearance of pairs of virtual particles: Aether, which refers to the essence of matter, does not change. The change of accident in an ore does not spoil its essence; the

transformation of contingencies does not destroy the sense itself; it just makes up for your losses. Both fall into the ‘pure’ category. ‘Void’ means the distance between parts of the body relative to each other, where you can find other parts of the body between these parts. (Al-Farabi, 2008, p. 71)

Al-Farabi provides instructions for the analysis of proofs. “Knowledge or demonstration of the existence is merely knowledge that something exists, whereas knowledge or demonstration of the cause is knowledge why this thing exists. Al-Farabi explains that both kinds of demonstration are valuable for the philosopher and produce knowledge.” (Janos, 2012, p. 77)

The existence of the image in the senses occurs in the imagination, not as an effect, as it is in its concrete existence. In other words, the sense perceives the image of the object in its material state. The presence of the image in the mind depends on the perception of the sensory image; however, the presence of the image in the mind is an immaterial presence that occurs from mental processes. The imaginable form is abstracted from matter and its material relevance. “Knowledge” is gained only in this stage. According to Al-Farabi, form is the thing that puts thought and being into a relationship and ensures harmony between being and thought. There is a harmony between both being and thought as well as the function of being and the function of thought. “Al-Farabi divides the form into two as independent from matter and dependent on the substance. The definition is a classification made by considering all existing things in order to show the nature and nature of objects and to distinguish the object from other objects. The correct definition is that the meaning or image of the object exists in the mind as it exists in the external world. From this point of view, we see that the concepts of the science of logic are related to the objects we experience, that is, to the world of objects. Al-Farabi accepts that there are some basic truth propositions on which man can base himself in all reasoning, not only in the context of absolute conceptions but also in terms of affirmed conceptions, which he calls ‘first knowledge’ or ‘first thought’ following the tradition” (Kızılcık, 2020, p. 52).

Quantum physicists today accept as a plenum what was considered void, vacuum, or nothingness before discovering the relativistic quantum field. Field interactions that cause vacuum fluctuations and the emergence of paired virtual particles occur at micro distances in space and micro periods in time. A vacuum ocean is a positive entity in microphysics, features small fluctuations and giant waves, and is ever changing. In macrophysics, a vacuum ocean is absolute nothingness, motionless, and calm without fluctuations. Virtual particles can become fundamental particles if the vacuum is energized externally.

Al-Farabi posited the attributes of “the First”—i.e., the Prime Being in the hierarchy of existence and first cause. He asserted that the former by definition “can have no reason for which it exists through itself or for its sake.”

In biology, knowledge is a biological or morphogenetic field and appears in society as a collective field. The existence and nature of social spaces have not been explored comprehensively, but it is clear how they relate to physical spaces. Al-Farabi investigated

the interactions of known physical fields and the phenomenon of consciousness, the intertwined functionality of observation, consciousness, and matter, on a single ground if the nature of consciousness is based on fundamental interactions. Al-Farabi was unconvinced by Aristotle's commentary on emptiness and hyle, calling them guesswork and speculation lacking proof through experiment and observation (Al-Farabi, 2007a, pp. 213–214).

The main idea of Al-Farabi's experiments and observations on vacuum, matter, the motion of matter, and the substance state of matter, with the rose essence bottle, is as follows: repeating experiments many times in different environments. The first principle of the first motion and equanimity regarding the change of the state of matter, existence, and the substance of matter—that is, the potential change of state of matter—has been proven right against many thinkers who rejected the theory. Furthermore, it has been a source of inspiration for philosophers and scientists up to the 20th century. The observation notes for this experience allow us to better understand how difficult it is to discuss this question before a gap is artificially and consciously created. These observations relate not only to the reality of the vacuum but also to the nature of absolute space.

6. PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

6.1 Theme of knowledge in the "Big Book of Music"

In the foreword to the treatise, Farabi expressed dissatisfaction with the state and quality of the preserved heritage of ancient music theory, and said that not all of them [music] art had been fully explored, and many of them lacked coherence and clarity in narration.

In the preface of his treatise, Al-Farabi inscribed how comprehensive the purpose of *al Musiqā al Kabir* is: “You uttered me about your interest in the art of music belonging to Qudema (Greek philosophers) and asked me to write a book on this subject, make necessary explanations and concentrate on the issue that those interested in music should know. Thereupon, I abstained from this subject for a while until I studied the works of ancient philosophers on music. These philosophers had authored the books for their successors. You also queried from me to meet your wishes in this matter and not to leave any of the previously discussed issues behind.”

In addition, while respecting the contribution of the "ancients" to the formation and development of the science of music, Al-Farabi explains his shortcomings by the disappearance of many works and the inaccuracy of their Arabic translations. Such a situation in theoretical art, according to the scientist, prompted him to write his own book. Another problem that Farabi pointed out in his previous research is the lack of a methodology for musicology. According to him, previously written and translated works in this field do not explain the foundations of this art, and they were authored without any method or specific point of view to understand philosophy and art.

While describing the contents of the "Great Music Book" he said: [Here] we just followed our own method without combining it with any other method. The following description of the review is intended not only for the theoretical system of music, but also for a broader validation of its methodology. According to the medieval tradition of science, the problem of "knowledge" is inherent in its essence, ways and goals, and its discussion goes beyond the scientific-methodological theme, touching on the deeper aspects of the scientist's worldview.

Al-Farabi is one of the first philosophers of Islamic geography to examine the methodology of knowledge and science in his treatises. The Great Book of Music is one of those treatises that, despite the specific nature of the tract, brings these issues more broadly. The theme of knowledge, defined as a musicology methodology problem in the introduction, forms the inner semantic core of the treatise and brings together various thematic lines.

Also, the repeated attempts to explain the concepts that characterize human cognitive activity, their semantically clear definition in the treatise shows the importance of this subject. In particular, it has a special meaning in raising the issue of the purpose and scope of the art of music, the main problem of theoretical doctrine. In addition, in its interpretation, the author also sees the connection from his own methodological principles in music theory to his philosophical ontology through his platform of cognition in logic and epistemology.

6.2 The doctrine of the mind and the philosophical epistemology of Al-Farabi

One of the main issues that Farabi dealt with in his first introduction to Music is related to the epistemological foundations of some sciences. To strengthen the arguments of Farabi's determinations; he compares music with other sciences such as astronomy and medicine and thus gives an idea of its methods and epistemology. Farabi begins by dividing the sciences into various classifications according to the method necessary to establish his first principles. The tradition of classification of sciences, in essence, emerged as a product of the effort to obtain precise and comprehensive information about entities. Farabi expresses the concept of science, which he stated for science, as synonymous with philosophy in his treatises. Therefore, the classification of sciences made by Farabi is also a classification of philosophy.

Farabi developed the doctrine of knowledge in several ways: it is the study of human cognitive abilities and the epistemological process associated with them, the consideration of the subject-object relations in cognition and the presence in it of the Active Mind, as well as the definition of the third form of reason. A separate branch of his philosophical epistemology is the classification of sciences and the platform of the methodology of scientific knowledge. The Second Master revealed the parts and content of the sciences known in his lifetime, within a plan. Classification of sciences is basically done to achieve two purposes: First, to reveal the relationship between sciences in terms

of subject and method; the second is to establish an order of priority and succession between them.

Among the arts and sciences, there are first principles stemming from perception, although people do not turn to intuition from the moment they are born until they grow up. These principles are called natural knowledge or known sciences. Some of them are also between science and art, some principles, and some are dependent on other sciences. Another part is some principles of the first case, essays on the method outlined in *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir*. The principles of theoretical musical art are also related to this feature. As a matter of fact, some of this art is known by its nature, some of it is proven by other arts, some of it is specific to experience.

Among the arts and sciences, there are first principles stemming from perception, although people do not turn to intuition from the moment they are born until they grow up. These principles are called natural knowledge or known sciences. Some of them are also between science and art, some principles, and some are dependent on other sciences. Another part is some principles of the first case, essays on the method outlined in *Kitab al musiqā*. The principles of theoretical musical art are also related to this feature. As a matter of fact, some of this art is known by its nature, some of it is proven by other arts, some of it is specific to experience.

As for the theoretical knowledge of this science that he studied in *Kitab al Musiqā*; it claims to be innate with regard to the subjects of science. Or as if you learned it later, it is not considered here, and it is not important which one exists. However, all the subjects of the science of music exist with their arts, which indicates that the number of those who know these subjects by nature is few. Al-Farabi supports this claim by giving an example of information. In fact, he also conveys the information it opposes in this example. “Those with Pythagorean knowledge are mistaken in thinking that these objects create a melody in harmony with their movements. This subject has been discussed while explaining the natural sciences. It was said there that this was not possible, that the movements of celestial bodies, planets, heavens and voices were impossible.” (Al-Farabi *Musiqā* 2022: p. 36)

The Second Master reminds that since it is known that all arts exist not with talent but with science, and because he participates in the art of music as a concept, the art of music is thought to be one of the theoretical and practical arts. However, this situation is evaluated only in terms of engineering science. However, he underlines that this situation is only evaluated in terms of engineering science. As a matter of fact, it was pointed out that engineering science "has both theory and practice" in this regard. ‘By the way, the aim of engineering science does not only include engineering knowledge, but also those who have this knowledge can practice in other sciences. On the other hand, engineering is not like medicine. For this reason, many of these arts are called engineering science. Thus, those who have knowledge in the theoretical science of music can also perform other arts. In this way, they are called by the name of the art they make. As for the knowledge requested for practice; This science is outside of theoretical science. Because

practical knowledge is not independent of talent, it is knowledge acquired through practice, just like in carpentry. According to this, all sciences have practical practices, even if they are not in depth theoretical knowledge.' He adds this explanation. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 2022: p. 37)

Kitab al Musiqa points out the things that should be known as follows: It should be known that the method that leads from the last principles to the first foundations in this art is different from the methods that lead from the first foundations to the last principles. There are many reasons for the issues that go to the first principles and causes that started with or originated from it. All that occurs in those matters are reasons for learning. What must occur with itself towards first principles are likewise reasons for existence. This point does not occur in all. For some it is obvious that what he is known for is not his reason for being. Some have doubts. But if the reasons for existence exist in many places and some are like pioneers and some are like purposes, then doubt can be lifted. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960: p. 64)

The faculty of reason is divided into the theoretical and the practical [faculties], and the practical [faculty] is divided into vocational and deliberative [faculties]. The theoretical faculty is what allows man to gain knowledge of anything that he does not act upon in any way, whereas the practical faculty is what allows man to gain knowledge of anything that man does act upon through his volition. The vocational faculty is what allows man to acquire crafts and vocations, while the deliberative faculty is what allows him to think and reflect on any of the things that he should or should not do. (Al-Farabi Demonstration : 2008 p. 18) The significance of the problem of cognition in Farabi derives from a rationalist philosophical system based on the scientist's idea that existence is rational, and that existence can be reasonably recognized. And these sciences are those whose status is that of physical science, theology, and political science. And there is proof of this as well in the fact that those of the mathematical sciences which are closest to physical science, such as the sciences of perspectives, music, and mechanics, because they are closer to physical science than arithmetic and geometry, each of them has, in itself or in its principles, a measure of difficulty and variation in proportion to its proximity to physical science. (Al-Farabi, & DiPasquale 2019: p. 10) Philosophy consists of a number of relatively independent sciences that had been thought through in detail and whose principles had been discussed, subjected to criticism, and commented on by a succession of classical authors whose works were available to be studied in detail and with precision; and it is concerned with the relation among these sciences and the problem of the organization of knowledge. (Mahdi p.97) Al-Farabi's interest in mathematics is evidenced in commentaries on the Elements of Euclid and Almagest of Ptolemy, as well as in several writings on the history and theory of music. Indeed, his Kitab al-Musiqa al Kabir, may well be the most significant work in Arabic on that subject. (Al-Farabi, & Butterworth 2002: p. x)

He describes the reasons for the existence of these arts with Aristotle's "Analytica". Among the 4 reasons Aristotle mentioned in Analytica, "What is this thing?" indicates that

it is based on the issues that point to the question. Farabi thinks that among the faculties of the human soul, the mind is a faculty that is at the highest level. Mu 'allim al-Awwal states that the ultimate goal of man's spiritual development is reason. Farabi indicates that people can obtain the knowledge of something either through emotional perception, imagination or intelligence. Descriptions and evidences reveal the subjects whose existence is desired here in terms of their existence in every field. Examples also consider some theoretical sciences from two perspectives. It teaches the one who points to art with the first and what is shown with the second. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 2022: p. 37)

The main reason for the interest of the philosophers in the medieval Islamic geography and Farabi about knowledge is the relationship they established between knowledge and happiness. According to Al-Muallim Al-Thani, happiness expresses absolute goodness, the last perfection that a person has for himself. Therefore, happiness is something that is desired only for itself, among all goodness and purpose. Farabi considers true happiness as the soul's complete independence from everything material.

The question of happiness, of the moral perfection of man, of the ways and means of achieving it was one of the most problematic issues in the era of the great scientist al-Farabi. Today, this issue has not lost its relevance. Modern education must also be considered from the point of view of al-Farabi's reflections, whose concept of education is focused on the intellectual and moral, achieved with the help of science. Critical study of al-Farabi's scientific heritage in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, geodesy, physics, philosophy, history, Mineralogy and the ideas put forward by him contribute to the enrichment of the philosophy of education and pedagogy and the development of University education. In modern Kazakh science, there is a need for research on the search for fundamental meanings of the life bases of the individual, ways of moral self-determination of a person and society as a whole, modern spiritual strategies of the individual Al-Farabi attached great importance to understanding the place of man in knowledge. Sensory knowledge is realized through perception and imagination, but such knowledge, according to al-Farabi, does not allow us to understand the essence. This is possible only through the mind, which exists in various forms-as a passive current, acquired, active «Treatise on the views of the inhabitants of a virtuous city» - one of the most Mature works of al-Farabi. (Abdildin Zh. M., Burabaev M. S. p. 151)

Farabi reveals that man is a rational being. Human's unique competence, namely happiness, is a process of competence based on reason. In this case, there is a necessary relationship between thinking, which is a function of the mind, and happiness. Based on this idea, Farabi concludes that in order for a person to reach happiness, he must know himself and the universe he lives in, with its reasons. This close relationship between knowledge and happiness is the main reason why Al-Farabi and Islamic philosophers generally concentrate on epistemological issues. For this reason, Farabi first dealt with the subject of "things to know" in all his great treatises on happiness. What should be known includes all the theoretical and practical sciences within the structure of philosophy that Farabi counted in his Tahsilü's-saâde and İhsâu'l-ulûm works.

As is the case with other Islamic philosophers in general, we are informed that the problem of knowledge has two basic dimensions, one of which is psychology and the other one is related to logic, in addition to its metaphysical extension in Farabi's treatises.

Knowledge is a part of psychology as it is a phenomenon that takes place in the subject, that is, in the human mind and in various psychological-physiological processes. In this respect, the problem of knowledge is discussed around the theory of psyche and mind. This discussion emerges as the theory of cognition, which is expressed by almost all Islamic philosophers and deals with the types of cognition that are supposed to be realized in the sense, imagination and mind. To sum up, according to Farabi, the thing that associates thought and being and ensures harmony between being and thought is form. The image expresses the generic distinction, and so the definition means, in a way, the same thing. That is, when we define the object, we define it by removing its image. Accordingly, the equivalent of what exists in thought is also a form. While the form corresponds to the distinction and knowing the close genus in definitions, it also corresponds to the middle term in comparisons. In fact, there is a harmony both between being and thought, and between the functioning mechanism of being and the functioning of thought. (Türker Künyel: 1990 p.575)

On the other hand, knowledge is the subject of the science of logic, which protects the human mind from making mistakes and gives it the methods that make it possible to reach the truth. Farabi, as stated above, accepts that philosophical thought can only be realized with a perfect objection power. The power of understanding enables us to realize that what is true is absolutely true and to believe it firmly; realizing that what is wrong is absolutely wrong and moving away from it; It occurs when we have a power that enables us to realize the wrong that resembles the right and not to make a mistake about it, and not to be deceived by noticing what is essentially right and wrong. Here, the art through which we gain this power is called the art of logic. “The art of logic, when considered in parts of philosophy, is a tool that provides precise information about all things that fall within the scope of both informational and practical arts. Except for the art of logic, there is no way [to reach] the exact truth about any subject that is wanted to be known. In the Classification of Sciences and the Art of Logic, philosophy is divided into four parts: mathematics, physics, theology and civil science. Mathematics is also divided into four parts: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and musical science. Physics/nature science deals with the study of objects and everything that exists naturally in objects, that is, outside of human will.” (Farabi Logic: 2017: p.42) In this respect, Farabi attributes a great value to the art of logic and counts it among the sciences and determines it as an art that must be learned before all sciences.

Al-Farabi states that a musical art form is also different from the above aspect. This form is the theoretical aspect of music and examines it in two separate sections as the theoretical (nazari) music art. In *Kitab al Musiqā*, he deals with each of these three arts one by one. Then Farabi compares them with each other and tries to see their situation. Farabi reveals that all arts consist of forms, innate tendencies and preparatory stage, and

that these three subjects are related to logic, that is, to the mind, between words and meaning.

“One of the actual situations of applied music art, which has the same phrasing and meaning, is the factor that directly affects the imagination and intuition, that occurs in the human spirit. Another is the imagination that occurs in the human soul and occurs in the mind in a way that is not correct. So much so that it is the form in which correct thoughts occur in the mind that is more suitable for the name of applied music art. This shape makes what is said tangible. The second art, named by this name, is the form in which the right thought is effective in the mind and the wording and meaning are observed, and this shape creates the shaped compositions.” (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960: p. 25)

Philosophical discourse is also known as "burhan". Because when it is desired to obtain certain information about something, the truth of the things that will provide this is taught and explained with it. Farabi argues that the ultimate aim of the art of logic is to give methods that lead to certain knowledge. And without this art, he claims that it is not possible to reach certainty in the thing whose knowledge is researched with such a method. When Farabi mentions knowledge, in the first place he means certain knowledge, that is, knowledge based on proven, demonstration, and proof, in particular, includes the laws of philosophical thinking. “I can say that science is the actual occurrence of the existence of something and the reason for its existence in a way that is not different from what we have in our opinion. Then the other conditions and the conditions that are subject to it occur. In this sense, these conditions and other subjects that are subject to this subject are briefly explained in the book "al-Burhan" (demonstration) written on the science of logic. All the topics that indicate this meaning are included in this book. These topics can only be learned from this book.” (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960 p. 34)

When a subject of the art of logic is examined in depth; Kitab al musiqqa explains the emergence of this subject with the art of rhetoric and poetry, which are a part of the art of logic in many subjects that people of all languages have in common with linguistics. It draws attention to the openness of being a part of theoretical and practical teachings. It also indicates that sounds and their attachments can be viewed in terms of the ratio added to them. He reveals that the reason for this is because the art of rhythm is composed of doctrinal science.

We understand that the lowest level of these considerations is that they do not correspond to the amount of trust that comes with the mind's evaluation of the emotion. For this reason, it becomes clear that some people's emotions reach a certain level from birth or from adolescence. For this reason, emotions show how much the mind exists, and the knowledge that these emotions are strengthened by special actions without being noticed by people attracts attention. In this way, it is important at this point that the power and energy of human beings increase in parallel with the development of the mind. This importance here points out that the human mind tries to feel and visualize the things that will occur in the future and try to reach certain information there. Sometimes the obvious

can come to light without understanding how or when, and after all, they are thought of as inspiration and instinct from the very beginning.

After this first thought; Human beings deliberately turn to feelings when certain things are fully enlivened in thought. Therefore, it may not be enough for the mind to think once or twice. On the contrary, he has to think about the same thing or different things over and over. Meanwhile, the mind makes certain leading forces or perfect senses work more or less. Because, in absolute cases, the first principles in the definite arts are with the sharpness of the mind, and these principles have been loaded and determined according to the conditions mentioned as the "Final Analytica".

The principles that the mind uses closely in the situations that occur can be applied to every subject, and this application cannot be done with strong suspicion. Because a strong belief is the belief that other things can come to mind. This opinion on existing issues is for those who are not considered for anything else. As a result of many things being perceived many times according to what the mind does, those things become certain according to one of two things; This is called experience. This experience is similar to detailed research; but not entirely at one with it. Because when detailed research reaches the mind with perception, it is not a special operation of the mind. Trying and experiencing is an action that the mind does in a way that carries the perception to the mind. Things that come from experience, on the other hand, are first principles of evidence. The first bases of evidence are not found in those that consist of detailed investigation. For this reason, as Aristotle said in many places: "Intuition is used in evidential principles". With this he drew attention to the evidential side of intuition.

In fact, what we call a concept is that the form of the object, that is, its meaning, is expressed in words when it needs to be perceived by the subject in abstraction at various abstraction stages. In this respect, the words indicating meanings, hence the meanings in our minds, are either particular and refer to the persons whom Al-Farabi together with Aristotle called the first substances, or they are universal and refer to the second substances, genus and species. Farabi states that the human mind has knowledge about the existing ones through these concepts. The formation of concepts in the mind is the subject of definitions in logic. Identification is a classification made by considering everything that exists in order to show the nature and nature of objects and to distinguish the object from other objects. The accurate definition is that the meaning or image of the object exists in the mind as well as in the outside world. From this point of view, we understand that the concepts of logic are related to the objects we experience, namely the world of objects. In order to make a complete definition; regarding the substance of the object we have defined, it is necessary to determine the essential properties and the accidental properties, therefore, the group that includes the object we define within the entity categories must be determined. (Al-Farabi Isagoge 1986: p. 85)

Among the arts and sciences, although a person does not turn to intuition from birth until he grows up, there are first principles that arise from perception. These principles are called natural knowledge or known sciences. Some of them are also some principles

between science and art, and some of them are dependent on other sciences. Another part is some principles of the first case, the essays on the method we have summarized above. The principles of theoretical musical art are also relevant to this feature. As a matter of fact, some of this art is known by its nature, some of it is proven by other arts, and some of it is specific to experience.

The knowledge that Farabi deals with in this chapter; the basic knowledge that forms the first category that is known by itself that is not formed as a result of a process of thinking and inference but is the principle of all thinking and the basis of all kinds of confirmation. The information that Farabi handles in this section; it is basic knowledge that does not occur as a result of a process of thinking and inference, but is the principle of all thinking and the basis of all verification, and constitutes the first known category by itself. Knowledge of this nature exists because, as Aristotle states in the first sentence of the *Second Analytics*, “every reflective/mental teaching and every learning consists of pre-existing knowledge. “The types of knowledge that result from the first premises that have this kind of certainty. The term “knowing” occurs in a sentence with two meanings—one is “assenting”; the other is “conceptualizing.” There is both a certain and an uncertain assent, and there is both a necessary certainty and a non necessary certainty. Clearly, the term “knowledge” is more applicable to what is necessarily certain than to what is uncertain or to what is certain but not necessarily so. [What is necessarily certain], then, should be termed ‘certain knowledge’.” (Al-Farabi Logic 2017: p. 54)

Kitab al musiqa argues that the composer should have knowledge of melody about the composition and a background such as innate thought. Farabi reminds us of the necessary feature for the songs to be performed as imagined; The most important feature that a composer should have is knowledge of melody, distinguishing what is good from what is not, what sounds good from what is not, and knowing how to move his limbs. On the other hand, the performer must perform the composition without considering the reasons for the things he imagines. As a matter of fact, this knowledge is the highest limit that the musician performing the compositions can reach. This knowledge is called “thing” knowledge, it is obtained by asking the question “What is it?” It is not obtained by asking the “why” question.

Farabi examines this kind of information, that is, the propositions that do not occur as a result of comparison, with four classifications. Acceptance, that is, those based on acceptance; famous, that is, those that are widely used; particularity, that is, they are heard, finally, they are the first to be considered. In his book called *book of demonstration* (*Kitâbu'l-Burhân*), Farabi states that the affirmation of all famous and acceptable propositions is based on testimony/witness and reduces the difference between propositions based on acceptance and propositions based on the amount of testimony. What is meant by this is that; confirmation and intellectual approval in opinions and propositions taken based on testimony are based neither on a thinking process performed by one's own foresight, nor on the principle of conformity with reality. (Al-Farabi Demonstration 2012: p.2)

Al-Farabi states that they are heard and thought for the first time as follows: They are heard (mahsusat) are those that are perceived with one of the five sense organs. They are first thought (al-makûlâtul-uval), (such knowledge that) we find our souls as if created from the beginning of the work as if they had knowledge of them and shaped for their certainty and the knowledge that it is not possible or permissible for them to be in any other way; but we do not know how they were formed in us at the beginning and where they were obtained from.

While Farabi shows the scientific/burhani foundations of music in his work called Kitâb al-Mûsîqa al-Kebir, naturally, within the framework of the first principles of the science of music, he naturally makes the first principles of proof the subject of examination. And in this framework, he refers to the Second Analytics, stating that they occur in the mind based on the sensation of the individuals of the parts that compose them.

“Now, if we go back to the first foundations of this art, we can say the following first: The first principles of conclusive proofs of every art are realized in the soul, as mentioned in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, because one feels the fragments of the works. One of these parts is enough for people's perceptions or what is the need for more perception. In all these principles, there is an action for a particular verb that takes place after its perception has emerged as concrete or imaginary. This action is what sets each principle apart. However, skill is required to evaluate the chapters and to be confident in the subject. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960: p.38)

The Second Master reminds us that it is a well-known fact that values and judgments are not enough to lead to feelings and emotions. If it were enough, it would never be certain. Because emotions are or the final judgment as defined in Posterior Analytics. On the contrary, certainty is an actual state obtained with the mind, which manifests itself in the works achieved by the emotions. For this reason, when some objects are first felt, the mind becomes capable of perceiving those objects. In fact, these feelings repeat themselves in other issues and gain superiority in terms of belief. At this stage, according to Farabi, it is understood from most of these universal premises that individuals are sensitive. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960: p.40) However, Al-Farabi clearly states that it is absolutely wrong to see the sensation as sufficient for these first principles to exist in the mind. Since this cannot constitute a universal proposition by itself, another intellectual action must be involved in order for the universal proposition to be formed. In relation to the senses, it turns out that the soul has an action beyond our perception. According to this act, universals that cover the subjects of these propositions and enable us to make judgments about what we feel and what we do not feel are formed in the mind.

In the relevant passages in the Kitâbu al-Musiqa al Kebir, there are explanations about the origin of these first principles, which were formed without comparison. In other words, if the mind can make a definite judgment about sensory data, as mentioned above, certainty occurs automatically. If it does not have the power to make a final judgment about that thing, that is, what happens in the soul about that thing remains as a kind of assumption at the level of confidence that the mind has about that thing, that is, it exists.

There is no absolute certainty about it. The lowest level of intuition is the level where the mind cannot go beyond the confidence of the judgment provided by the senses, that a person feels certain things when he first comes to the world and in the first moments when he starts to enter the development process. This felt thing comes to mind from sensation as well as at this stage. It is not impossible that the mind, at this initial stage of its development, has the power to carry out its peculiar action on this thing in a way that man is not yet conscious of. Thus, this consciousness continues its development in line with the development of the mind. In the next stages, when the person reaches a state that makes it possible to comprehend what is going on in his mind, he finds some objects of knowledge in his mind that he knows for sure. But man is not aware of how and when certainty about them comes into existence. That is, the formation of this information in the human mind takes place without any voluntary determination, entirely within the development of mental faculties and the natural functioning of the mind. In such a way that they are thought to be things of inspiration and natures created together with man at the beginning of its formation. (Al-Farabi *Musiqā* 1960: p.35)

From these statements we understand that: Al-Farabi does not consider this point of view of Plato, who put forward the theory of innate ideas, as a valid or sufficient explanation. In particular, he maintains the Aristotelian understanding in his logic studies and bases the emergence of the universal in the human mind on the natural activity of the mind, which is dependent on the senses of the individuals. However, there is a closed area that we cannot fully explain in the transition from the sensory to the intelligible universal concept, which Farabi tries to explain with the concept of "the mind's own action". As it is seen, Farabi associates the aforementioned information, which is naturally found in the human mind, to the level of consciousness, with the sense of hearing as an external stimulus. Namely, in some cases, a person realizes the existence of the thing in his mind when he hears the word that indicates this thing. Therefore, Farabi also maintains his approach that requires sensation in the understanding of the first thinkers in the same way. Here, perhaps, considering the pedagogical dimension of the work, he is talking about the sense of hearing, not the sense in general. On the other hand, he discusses of the mind's seeing separately the meanings that are found collectively and implicitly, in a manner similar to the individuation mentioned in the *Kita al Musiqā*, if the things in question exist in the mind as having not attained their individuality. In this case, hearing different words that refer to the things in question causes them to be separated as separate meanings in the mind, and as a result, a person sees his mind and each of them as a separate individual in his own individuality. The act to see, used here with reference to the mind, can be compared with the idiosyncratic act of the mind in *Kitab al Musiqā*. Accordingly, the mind or intellect sees what is inherent in itself and does this with a unique action that consists of separating and combining. But the mind's seeing and realizing its own action has a condition other than itself, which is sensation. In any case, it can be said that Farabi adhered to the principles of Aristotelian epistemology. Al-Farabi clarifies that some of the universal propositions that create necessary certainty without being based on a comparison

also exist based on experience. It seems that those that exist naturally and those that exist based on experience have the same internal and external roots. That is, both groups of propositions are externally related to the senses, and internally they gain certainty thanks to a unique action of the mind.

The main difference between them is that in naturally occurring propositions, as the name suggests, there is no voluntary determination, planned and deliberate orientation, while these latter, that is, those that exist based on experience, gain certainty in a planned and purposeful orientation. Concerning certain things, says Al-Farabi, for the formation of certainty, that is, for the mind to perform its own action on these things, after these things are completed in the soul, their sensual equivalents need to be felt deliberately. Sometimes this can happen with a single sensation. With regard to some things, one or two sensations is not enough for the mind to do its own action, more sensation is needed. While this sensation is sometimes sufficient for the formation of the necessary condition in a single thing, sometimes it needs to be felt in different things, and only then does the mind form definite premises from them as perfect universals or within the framework of the majority. The first principles of necessary things, on the other hand, are certain in the sense that reason obtains certainty that the predicates of these principles exist in all matters, under the conditions set forth in the Posterior Analytics. A question may arise here. What precision do the first principles, which do not express the whole but cover the most, have?

Especially in *Kitab al Musiqā*, experience (*tajribah*) is discussed with a long review. Al-Farabi explains that facts are based on repeated sensation (*iḥsās*) and occur when intellect “acts” (*yafʿal*), then makes a general judgment based on these facts in which it acts. As a result, experience can produce precise knowledge “the things [*al-ashyāʾ*]” and provides us with some of the first principles [*al-mabādiʾ l-ūlā*] necessary for demonstration. In Farabi's words, what is obtained through experience becomes the first basis in demonstration [*barāhīn*].

Throughout his elucidation, Al-Farabi cites Aristotle's Posterior Analytics for support. He even quotes Aristotle in the sense that sensation [*ḥiss*] is used in the principles of proof, but immediately adds that by sensation Aristotle here means the kind of knowledge that leads directly to experience. (Al-Farabi *Musiqā* 1960: p.38-40) Experience is emphasized as the role of the mind in experience in *Musiqā*, which defines the detection of the sensations of various things over and over so that the mind can act with a special act and reach certainty. It is not entirely clear what this particular action “special act” (*fiʿl khāṣṣ*) of the mind is in this excerpt, but juxtaposed with the preceding passage, it can be concluded that it consists of rational judgment (*ḥukm*). The meaning of experience is to consider the particulars of a thing carefully, more precisely, to form a judgment about the universality of the thing insofar as experience finds universality in these particulars. (Al-Farabi *Musiqā* 1960: p. 40) As for the premises made by experience, they are the universal premises about which such certainty occurs, by an intention in us to sense more or less particulars. For experience is that we study the particulars of the

universal premises and trace that predicate in all or most of the particulars, in order to determine whether the predicates of the universal premises are present in each of their particulars, until necessary certainty occurs in us. (Al-Farabi Demonstration 2012: p.2)

Al-Farabi's standing in the history of music is as high as it is in philosophy. Farmer [78] p. 460 describes his Great Book of Music [57] as the greatest work on music which had been written up to his time. In Proportion [73] al-Farabi brings together logic and music in relation to the poetical syllogism though this type of syllogism is not mentioned in Syllogism. (Chatti, Hodges 2020: p.9)

We can clearly deduce from Al-Farabi's discussions on the subject that there is an external source for man's "seeing" the things in question, which is sense and sensation. Therefore, this information occurs only after the formation of the senses. We can say that it is not possible for the aforementioned things to occur in a person who does not have the ability to sense. Sensation is a necessary but insufficient principle. It is necessary because the particulars of the universal existing in the mind are sensible; It is insufficient because the particular can only be the cause of something of a particular character. In that case, the formation of the universal requires something more than sensation, which Al-Farabi calls "the peculiar action of the mind". This, as stated above, results from a power inherent in the mind, which makes it possible to establish certainty by extending the particular data to the whole. The mind, which needs to take this action, reaches the whole to which this part is related from the part that comes to it through sensation, "sees" this whole and believes with a certainty that it is as it sees and knows, excluding all alternatives. In this case, the sensory perception of the senses, as it were, turns on the lamp of the dark room, so that the mind sees exactly what is in the room. Speculative intellect is a faculty to which comes by nature, not by search and not by analogy, the certain knowledge of the universal necessary premises which are the principles of the sciences, e.g. our knowledge that the whole is greater than the part, that quantities equal to the same quantity are equal to one another, and the like premises. It is from these that a man begins, and he goes on to the knowledge of the rest of the speculative existents, which are such that they exist without man's contrivance. This intellect is sometimes in potency, when these first principles do not occur to it, but when they do occur, it becomes intellect in act, and its disposition is strong enough to produce what is prepared for it. This faculty cannot be in error in regard to what occurs to it, but all the species of knowledge which reach it are true and certain and cannot be otherwise. (Al-Farabi Madani 1961:p.42)

On the other hand, the mind's reaching such a certainty and vision through sensation takes place in such an ordinary process of our relationship with things that we do not know when and where we got it. For this process, if it is correct to call it a process, does not occur in connection with a certain act of deliberate sensing. On the contrary, it happens spontaneously and naturally, from the first and earliest times of our lives, as a result of one or more non-intentional sensations, not research-based and inferential, but unconsciously.

In induction, a rational act does not occur on things that come to the mind from the senses, but in experience this act does. In other words, the mind performs its specific action on the data that comes to itself through sensation in experience in a way that creates certainty. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960: p. 39) In other words, in induction, necessary certainty does not occur with a general judgment, while in experience, a necessary certainty occurs with a general judgment. That is, with regard to experience, the mind reaches a general judgment that includes not only the amount it researches and examines, but also the things it does not research, which does not make induction. Demonstrations are not in the position of first principle”. (Al-Farabi Musiqa 1960: p. 40)

6.3 The Affective Impact of Music Examined through Al-Farabi’s Philosophy

Al-Farabi explains the formation of the lyrics as follows: The factor that brings out the songs is the inner feelings of the human being from creation. One of these emotions is the non-random poetic forms that take place in human existence. Another occurs when the person is cheerful or encounters a boring situation. There is also the song form that is used to relieve people's desire to relax after fatigue or to relieve their tiredness in spare time. Because humming while doing business relaxes people; the person does not feel tired and therefore continues to hum without being bored, not understanding how time passes. Because feeling time makes you feel more tired. Also, fatigue is caused by mobility; time follows it. In addition, the two are closely intertwined; they are inseparable. Singing can sometimes be seen instinctively in some other creatures, such as the sounds of camels on long desert journeys, apart from humans. These are the innate emotions that bring out the melody. (Al-Farabi KMK 2022: p.31)

One fascinating feature of the educational accounts of philosophers and scientists is that it pays attention not only to the content of stories and songs, as we might expect, but also to their form or style. The main idea is that the musical mode and measure or rhythm of a song affects the human mind independently of the lyrics that are sung. The question whether music contains emotions or has an effect that can reveal emotions is still at the centre of music philosophy in the current age. In summary, the search for an answer to the fascinating question of how music can encode emotions continues. The view that music encodes the emotion it contains rather than just triggering memories in the listener further supports the need to ask this question.

The person who tries to activate the mind and get help from the lyrics while singing supports these feelings by listening to the compositions made to activate his imagination when he finds it appropriate to increase the joy and reduce the stress. Even if the person continues to listen without getting tired of it, the lyrics are compared with the previously sung lyrics. In this way, the desired point is reached. As a matter of fact, according to what is told, the ignorant poet Alkame b. In the Abbe, the Gassan King al-Haris b. He spoke to Abu Shamar, but the King did not listen to him and did not meet his expectation. When he composed his poem and sang his wish in tune in his presence, he saw that his request was met by the King and he fulfilled this request. For this reason, the desire of those who

are considering writing songs, especially to have musical knowledge, has increased. They spent their wealth and possessions for this cause. As such, races, competitions and demonstrations have also increased. Therefore, the latter did not merely imitate what the former had developed; They continued to work until they perfected it by adding something to it. (Al-Farabi KMK 2022: p.32)

Farabi first deals with this problem by classifying the melodies that trigger emotions. 'The frameworks of the more perfect melodies as 'strong', 'temperate' or 'soft' extending the polarity that also serves to classify tetrachord species as relatively 'strong' (i.e., diatonic) or relatively 'soft' (with less distance between their smallest intervals). Al-Farabi names four emotional states evoked by strong frameworks—enmity, cruelty, anger and boldness—and four evoked by soft frameworks—fear, compassion, anxiety and cowardice—without arranging the emotions along a continuum from strongest to weakest'. Blum S. (2013, 103) Foundations of musical knowledge in the Muslim world

Levinson approaches this issue with formalism. 'The music's persona should be understood as the persona with which we hear a given stretch of music to be invested, the subject of the imaginary act of expression we hear as going on then and there. The expressive hearing of an extended piece of music, as opposed to a particular passage, may thus involve a series of personae, rather than a single one'. Levinson J. (1996, 107) The pleasures of aesthetics: Philosophical essays

This formalistic thesis is attractive in many ways. When listening to music, many people focus on their own feelings created by their experiences rather than listening to the melody, feeling as if the music is telling them something about their dreams and memories. People with a history of depression are more likely than those without to endorse dysfunctional attitudes after a negative mood induction. Jeanne M., Gross J.J., Persons J.B., Hahn J. (1998, 363) Mood matters

The Second Master states that when melodies and melodies are heard and interpreted with another melody with the help of other instruments, they sound better and are more catchy, and the instruments that give the melody are sought after more in order to be heard in the ears. Farabi attributes this explanation to the development of musical instruments. As a result, they tried to find the positions in which the instruments made melodious sounds, to give them a name and to develop them further. They then continued to search for natural and artificial instruments that sounded best based on the capabilities involved. Composition and lyrics work was completed with the applied art of music. In the meantime, it was understood which melodies and sounds were natural and how many were artificial, in other words, they were positive and negative. In this way, the same things were done for the instruments. (Al-Farabi KMK 2022: p.32)

To argue about knowledge, knowledge must exist, and the object must be perceived by the subject. In a sense, knowledge is the process of perceiving an explanation. In other words, it is a relation established between the knower and the known. In this relationship, the part on the knowing side is called the subject and the part on the known side is called the object. Knowledge is not limited to the subject's perception of the object. Moreover,

human beings can acquire knowledge through thinking, remembering, dreaming and designing. ‘The most sublime genus that encompasses all the species that expresses the nature of a sensible object is "called a quality. This sublime genus, which includes all the species denoting the position of the sensible object, is called locality (i.e., site or place). The supreme genus that encompasses all the species that tell the time of the sensible object, whether it is in the past or in the future is called time. The supreme genus that encompasses all the species that declare the sensible object to be relative is called relativity. The highest genus that encompasses all the species that states that the sensible object is in a position or is placed in a position is called position. The most sublime kind that expresses the influence of the sensible object is called influence. The most sublime kind that expresses the affect of the sensible object is called influence’” Al-Farabi A.N. (2007c, 55) *Kitab al-Musiqā al-Kabir*

The Second Master categorises knowledge in two types. The first is sensory knowledge, which comprises the senses and is singular. This knowledge cannot be scientific knowledge because it is singular; however, it is a kind of knowledge that helps to achieve real knowledge. The other kind of knowledge is rational knowledge. By its means, human beings shape information and transform it into judgements through reason. Only in this way can real and precise information be obtained. Al-Farabi A.N. (2007b, 54) Social philosophy ethics aesthetics Data and information are forms transmitted, received and recorded from outside the brain. Knowledge exists only in the brains of human. Akgün A.E., Keskin H (2003, 1:175–88) Knowledge management as a social interaction tool and knowledge management process) Davenport and Prusak (1998) consider information to be a message and describe it as something that is ‘usually in the form of a document or a visual and audio message’. Davenport T.H., Prusak L (1998) *Working knowledge*

Information is based on the communication phenomenon, and the communication phenomenon determines whether the message received is information. Many systems can be viewed in terms of information theory: text messages, communication lines and spoken language, to name a few. Music, too, can be productively analysed from this vantage point. (Manzara L.C., Witten I.H., James M., (1992, 81) On the entropy of music There is no other human cultural activity that reaches, shapes, and controls human behaviour as much as music does (Merriam A.P., Merriam V., (1964, p. 27 *The anthropology of music..*) The structure of the ear and brain implicitly determines a number of evaluations, which is appropriate in the case of speech or music transmission *The anthropology of music.* Shannon C., Weaver W., (1964, 17). In particular, Meyer (1957) hypothesises that the psycho-stylistic conditions that produce musical meaning, whether emotional or intellectual, are the same as those that produce knowledge. This hypothesis is of particular interest because if it can be substantiated, then the seemingly disparate and discrete worlds of physical phenomena, biosocial behaviour and humanistic creation can, at least from this perspective, be brought together and subsumed under a single fundamental principle—that is, the law of entropy.(Meyer L.B., (1957, 412-424) *Meaning in music and information theory*) One of the challenges in musical cognition is explaining how

music makes sense to the listener. (Cox G., (2010, 428-434) On the relationship between entropy and meaning in music) Musical meaning arises when an antecedent situation, requiring an estimate as to the probable modes of pattern continuation, produces uncertainty as to the temporal or tonal nature of the expected consequent. (Meyer L.B., (1957, 412-424) Meaning in music and information theory) Meyer's (1957) definition is formalized through the concept of entropy, a measure of uncertainty and information content (more information is needed to define something that is difficult to predict). (Hiller L., Fuller R., (1967, 60) Structure and information in Webern's Symphonie,) Other musicologists have used measures of entropy in various ways, such as for analysing structure in atonal, stylistic variation in tonal music, and musical differences. (Knopoff, L. & Hutchinson, W. (1981, 17-44). Information theory for musical continua.)

If meaning is related to subjective tension arising from uncertainty, it should be possible to relate measures of entropy to immediate emotional responses to music. If listeners, consciously or unconsciously, have a particular predictive model of the work they are hearing, this offers great insight into the nature of musical cognition and creation. Music contains information because it defines stylistic, emotional and physical phenomena as well as facts other than itself. However, the amount of information a particular piece of music conveys can change as a piece progresses who have learned through practice and experience to understand a particular style. (Cox G., (2010, 428) On the relationship between entropy and meaning in music)

What remains constant from style to style is not scales, modes, harmonies, or manners of performance but the psychology of human mental that processes the ways in which the mind, operating within the context of culturally established norms, selects and organises the stimuli that are presented to it. (Meyer L.B., (1957, 412) Meaning in music and information theory) The characteristic features of any composer or a period allow the listener to understand it using statistical data. If a simple general The composer creates a combination of notes and different melodies and possibilities. The entropy profile of a piece of music can be observed from note to note, sentence to sentence, or chapter to chapter. (Manzara L.C., Witten I.H., James M (1992, 88) On the entropy of music) The effect of entropy on music is associated with the degree of multiplicity or predictability through which musical meaning is conveyed. (Culpepper S.E., (2010, 11) Musical time and information theory entropy) The plurality of musical styles results because styles exist not as unchanging physical processes in the world of nature but as psychological processes ingrained as habits in the perceptions, dispositions and responses of those condition is imposed on a complex system, the configurations required by that condition often show a set of probabilistic properties that are unique and characteristic of them. (Ruelle D., (1991, 115) Chance and chaos) The theory of disorder, or entropy, which can also be defined as the tendency of regularity to turn into disorder, is the second law of thermodynamics, and it is accepted as a stronger and more valid law than gravity. Everything in the universe itself is minimal energy and tending to attract maximum disorder is accepted as a natural flow in terms of the distribution of total energy. Al-Farabi argues that theoretical

foundations are either absolute first ideas or proven ideas in other arts. His perspective is toward the study of sound frequency vibrations, the origin and nature of sounds and their symptoms, which are considered in physics. 'I hold that when substance was given motion sound resulted. It [sound] was divided into three special kinds-high, low and medium. Therefore, there was need of an art through which we might proceed to the knowledge of high sounds, i.e. those that are in the extreme of acuteness, of low sounds, i.e. those that are in the extreme of gravity, and sounds that are midway between these, and the relationship of those to each other [i.e. their ratios], so that nothing may be concealed from us with regard to these things that belong to substance. That art, therefore, was the science of sounds'. (Farabi, Farmer H.G., (1965, 49) *Al-Farabi's Arabic-Latin writings on music, in the Ihsa'al-'ulum*) In this framework, the aim is to study musicology in a multidimensional way, with the contribution of theoretical knowledge created by the data of the sciences that evaluate music in the research areas of the *Kitab al Musiqa*. Al-Farabi defines the art of music as the science of sound and takes this goal to a broader dimension. The effect of these movements is generated by the nature of the original movements that cause sound. Sound is a sensation produced by certain oscillating motions of a body's particles. It is transmitted to the ear usually through a medium such as atmospheric air, producing neural impressions. Thus, the subject naturally divides itself into three branches in relation to sound—production, transmission and perception.⁸

Over the last two decades in particular, the important role of emotion in cognition has been extensively discussed in the literature. (Salovey P., Mayer J.D., (1990, 185-211) *Emotional intelligence*) Research on uncertainty, perception, cognition and emotion in the human mind remain in disjointed disciplines, despite their common theoretical foundations. Cognitive theories of emotion define uncertainty as a cognitive component that characterises emotional states. (Smith C. A., Ellsworth P.C., (1985, 813-838) *Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion*) Despite the advancement of research on the emotions in various scientific disciplines, there remains a lack of understanding or no clear definition of what emotions are. The lack of an interdisciplinary system of study between philosophy and other sciences, as was the case before the 20th century, is a major shortcoming in this regard. Psychologists and philosophers disagree on some fundamental questions such as whether emotions or thoughts come first. (Schachter S., Singer J., (1962i 379, 399) *Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state*)

Intellectual knowledge differs from empirical knowledge in that experience is necessary for empirical knowledge. The world grasped through life and experience is not only objective but also a world of values. In order that the mind may act independently with the understanding of intuition, it is called experience that it perceives and repeats many times until it obtains reliable information by one of these methods.⁹In Al-Farabi's view, '[Experience] is like induction, but not equivalent to it, since it is not characteristic of induction to act as the intelligence acting on the sensations that arise in the mind. The intelligence carries out the thinking process through experience, based on the emotions formed in the mind, until it reaches the truth. Thus the evidence obtained by experience

becomes the primary basis, and that obtained by induction does not. For this reason, Aristotle repeatedly said, “Intuition is used on the basis of evidence”, implying this content. (Al-Farabi A.N., (2007c, 89) Kitab al-Musiqā al-Kabir)

The two main approaches to human cognition and the conflict between them are a focus of the psychology literature. These approaches are defined as the cognitive tradition, which explains human cognition in terms of symbolic operations, and the other as the situated action or situational cognition approach, which focuses on the interaction of the environment, context, and sociocultural conditions in human cognition. (Thompson L., Fine G.A., (1999, 278–302), Socially shared cognition, affect, and behavior) The first of these approaches directed attention to explaining human cognition in terms of information-processing processes such as analysis, the establishment of cause-effect relationships, and memory. The second approach, however, has evolved into a kind of closed-box model trapped in some processing of human cognition in the mind. In other words, it refers to the mutual interaction between the individual and the environment in the processes of reception, use and production of information, which does not consist of specific processes. Thompson and Fine’s (1999) definition of socially shared meaning was defined as socially shared cognition by Levine et al. (1993) , who also argued that the processes are based on the notion that what goes on in the human mind is too profound and too much the product of interaction with the outside world to be attributable to the individual alone. (Levine J.M., Resnick L.B., Higgins T.E., (1993, 585–612) Social foundations of cognition). Al-Farabi evaluated memory and decision-making processes in terms of their interactions. This orientation, which relates to the concept of cultural memory in sociology and anthropology, was the birth of social psychology in that it established the need for individual-oriented psychology to gradually shift to the social. When the concept of shared cognition is evaluated in terms of actions and products, the notion of culture immediately emerges. Farabi argues that part of theoretical knowledge is the first innate knowledge and another part is based on inference and learning.

Al-Farabi defines first knowledge as follows: ‘These are certain premises and first rationales, for which there is no other definite knowledge before them, which is universal, free of error, does not arise from research and comparison, and cannot be proved in art, to which all human beings are common and related. Potentially, the mind takes them from bodies through sense power, then stores these images in the imagination, and eventually they become principles that are actually perceived as sensory impressions. The first knowledge is the principles of mathematics/art, practical reason and metaphysics’. (Al-Farabi AN (2007b) Social philosophy ethics aesthetics: Volume V.)

Music philosophers have focused on psychology and cognitive science to explain traditional philosophical matters such as the emotional expressionism of music. An individual perceptually acquires a mental understanding of form through felt tensions and decisions. As music is part of human nature, our musical experience is subject to the neurobiological constraints of the human mind. Many philosophers, through empirical observations, have sought to understand this, explored the field of preconscious and

irrational responses, and applied the theory to cognitive science. The importance of perceptual, cognitive music theory is clear to understand musical patterns, particularly such metaphorical maps marked by changes in speed and intensity and voluntarily translated into force and motion.

In *Kitab Al Musiqqa*, Farabi reveals which melody and melodies are better, which musical instruments are better and which are not. He states that melodies are like a natural food in this respect. The Second Master likens tunes to fruit. Indicates that this type of song can be played with an instrument. The philosopher draws attention to the fact that among the tunes and tunes suitable for human nature, there are those that do not fit together and give more or less pleasure and sadness. (Al-Farabi KMK 2022: p.32)

‘Neuro philosophical pragmatism, or neuro pragmatism, is a scientifically informed treatment of cognition, knowledge, the body-mind relation, agency, socialisation, and further issues predicated on sound judgements about these basic matters’. (Solymosi T., Shook J., (2014, 20) Neuroscience, neurophilosophy and pragmatism) Making sense of any complex intellectual or historical discipline requires system and method structuring. Philosophers and scientists have also highlighted the reasons for dividing and classifying research fields according to a rationalised network or hierarchy. A key consideration for a philosopher who studies music aesthetics is the potential of the cognitive sciences to influence long-standing philosophical debates. The essence of the cognitive science of music lies in the causal origins of our musical inclinations. Reflecting the essence of philosophy, the Latin *logos* means not only ‘word’ but also ‘sound’.

It is vibration, motion amplified; its first meaning is awareness and signals the first moment creation recognises itself. ‘To account for hierarchical organizational systems like tonality and meter, as well as more general musical concepts like melody and voice leading, consonance and dissonance, and harmony, sensory explanations take as their starting point the mechanisms responsible for organizing complex auditory environments into. In this context, the concept of stability is an emergent property of a more general organizational principle we might call coherence, which refers to the mechanisms by which acoustic components or events cohere as a single entity’. (Stephen Mc A., (1984, 291) *The Auditory Image: A Metaphor for Musical and Psychological Research on Auditory*) Although word, sound, light and thought are relative to one another in neurological, philosophical and theological contexts, they are derived from a unique source.

Al-Farabi approaches all problems through music’s effects on the mind, allowing rhythm and harmony to penetrate one’s inner soul. Offering a physiological metaphor, he argued that sound waves through which the music evolves into direct physical contact are vibrating frequencies that reach the air. Thus, the emotional and aesthetic effects of music clarify its physical properties and its direct origins. Therefore, Al-Farabi’s speculative psychology and experimental proof during the early period remain unique treatises on the philosophical discussions of music.

At last, he resolved to disguise himself and ventured to undertake the journey which promised him a rich harvest. Dressed in a mean costume, he made his appearance at the court just at the time when the caliph was being entertained with his daily concert. Al-Farabi, unknown to everyone, was permitted to exhibit his skill on the lute. Scarcely had he commenced his performance in a certain musical mode when he set all his audience laughing aloud, notwithstanding the efforts of the courtiers to suppress so unbecoming an exhibition of mirth in the royal presence.¹³ In truth, even the caliph himself was compelled to burst out into a fit of laughter. Presently the performer changed to another mode, and the effect was that immediately all his hearers began to sigh, and soon tears of sadness replaced the previous tears of mirth. Again he played in another mode, which excited his audience to such a rage that they would have fought each other if he, seeing the danger, had not directly gone over to an appeasing mode. After this wonderful exhibition of his skill, Al-Farabi concluded in a mode which had the effect of making his listeners fall into a profound sleep, during which he took his departure. It will be seen that this incident is almost identical with one recorded as having happened about twelve hundred years earlier. The distinguished flautist Timotheus successively aroused and subdued different passions by changing the musical modes during his performance, exactly in the same way as did Al-Farabi.

Al-Farabi's experience in the caliph council showed that music is a subjective phenomenon of human experience and not merely a stimulus created over time to fit an acoustic structure or a well-controlled experimental design in the laboratory. Moreover, this experience is not based on a uniform mental capacity but rather on a complex set of perceptive and cognitive operations in one's central nervous system. Does music have a theme? This question is about revealing the semantic logic of musical art in *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir*. The beginning of music sounds internal and starts with the sound of one's being. ¹⁴

Al-Farabi constructs musical thought by revealing the meaning of music and determining its origin and perception. Individuals perceive music subjectively; while it is enough for some to listen to the sound, others do so in a more musical fashion. Therefore, 'listening' is a theoretical and creative process associated with one's material and spiritual activities, that is, the development of a unique approach. 'After playing Chopin', wrote Oscar Wilde, 'After playing Chopin, I feel as if I had been weeping over sins that I had never committed, and mourning over tragedies that were not my own. Music always seems to me to produce that effect. It creates for one a past of which one has been ignorant, and fills one with a sense of sorrows that have been hidden from one's tears'. I can fancy a man who had led a perfectly commonplace life, hearing by chance some curious piece of music, and suddenly discovering that his soul, without his being conscious of it, had passed through terrible experiences, and known fearful joys, or wild romantic loves or great renunciations. And so tell me this story, Ernest. I want to be amused.⁴¹ Philosophers' thought provoking questions are those that they align with the knowledge of truth. Therefore, where is the emotion—in the player, the music or the listener?

Philosophers and scientists have pondered on this question, prioritising theories of music and emotion.

Al-Farabi identifies two sound theories, that is, coming from natural and artificial sources. Each vibrating substance has an acoustic source, and sounds radiate by vibrating with the energy they receive from the source.

‘Seasonal conditions characterise the sounds, pronunciation and flexibility of the mouth and throat cavities. The origin of the impulse to reveal sounds through word formation is the cause of the human desire to understand. The sense of hearing perceives different sounds of air coming from the chest, psalms in the throat, organs in the mouth and throat cavities as an expression of wish. Despite the purposelessness of the word itself, the power of desire motivates one to understand the ultimate goal in the word’s content’.⁴² When one reflects on a physically identical world, they first discover a feature that is essentially the same only through physical exploration and guarantees consciousness. However, we also consider a world that cannot reach this stage— one with different fundamental elements. To address this problem, one would feel more motivated to continue thinking about a network of physics laws and other principles that connect the physical and the phenomenon.

In the first place, one does not need a laboratory to review the body of knowledge about humans’ bodily kinesthetic systems and their physical functioning. Like us, a reasonable observer would argue that nature and its environment are the best laboratories. However, it would be appropriate to first highlight some general principles. The locomotion system functions in a highly complex manner, requiring the integrated coordination of immensely diverse neural and muscular components. ‘The essential nature of electrons or of mass would then be hidden to physical theory, which characterises electrons and mass only extrinsically. 16

If so, it might be that the relevant essential properties are themselves phenomenal or proto phenomenal properties, so that their instantiation could guarantee the existence of consciousness in our world’.⁴³ Hence, although Al-Farabi’s experiment in musical performance is the first stage we advocate, we argue that contemporary observers should have uncovered this body of knowledge by now.

Different kinds of music constantly stimulate diverse impulses and emotions, triggering specific classes of mental experience known as emotion. Of course, the brain mechanism that mediates emotional stimulation through music can be scientifically explained. Therefore, what is the intention of evoking emotions according to the characteristics of music? This idea seems difficult for a philosophical mind to follow, namely that there can be knowledge without words. Indeed, the problem of describing a ‘language’ of feeling permeates the whole area of philosophy and neuroscience research, and highlights the relative futility of trying to classify our emotions— ‘Music is revealing, where words are obscuring’.⁴⁴ In recent years, science professionals have offered some conclusions about the in-depth details and functionality of the brain, and many experiments have focused on the power of neuronal activity to produce music. From these

experiences, neurons have been observed to follow collective dynamics and relate to one another, inspired by a complex but nonrandom community event. Neurons have also been seen to naturally exhibit inhibitory actions that create extremely rhythmic and bass tracks.

One of the main manifestations of life is the expansion of one's memory function, including the diversification of one's working memory, making it possible for humans to pursue different areas of experience simultaneously. The collective consciousness includes faculties focusing on abstract symbolic structures that are fundamental to life forms, tactile and visual images, movement, emotions, sound, language and thought. Such an idea may support the theory that memories—a mental function unique to each collective consciousness—are somehow intertwined with a different type of consciousness. 'What I have called logical musical thinking is the consequential working out of a sustained musical impulse, pursuing a result constantly implicit in it. It is not in any sense a shrewd calculation of what should... happen next. The aural imagination is simply the working of the composer's ear, fully reliable and sure of its direction as it must be, in the service of a clearly envisaged conception.⁴⁵

Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir represents a fundamental perspective shift in the history of music, from a harmonic paradigm to melodic, cognitive and neuroscientific philosophy. In terms of the role of the cognitive sciences in supporting one or more of these explanations, a critical distinction is made between the causal basis of musical expression and the nature of experience that it promotes. A causal explanation provides a specific idea of the properties that allow for music to be used to express emotions and/or the psychological mechanisms for evaluating these properties. Meanwhile, an empirical basis concerns the attempt to characterise, as accurately as possible, the association between the phenomenology of hearing music and emotions. One must examine the relation between musical experience and musical culture and identify the link between sounds and ourselves with a meaning that is neither subjective nor objective and created through collaboration and participation. 18

CONCLUSION

Researching music is not much different from inquiring anything for science. It seeks answers to the what, how and why questions for science. The scientific world has sought an answer to this question in many social areas in line with its own data. Making music and studying music are separate activities. Making music; It means to make music, to sing, to compose. To examine music is to seek answers to questions based on theoretical methods in the name of music. Theoretical studies such as the cultural coding and conceptualization of the music source were not carried out simultaneously with the music performance. Developing a discourse on music also requires thinking about the artist and the music creator. In a sense, it makes it necessary to examine the musical identity. This effort also requires using the psychology of music with the right knowledge.

When we think about the music producer in a creative dimension, it is necessary to examine how the melodies is created the composition. The composers mentally visualizes

the music before bringing it to the audible process. Then they try on one or more instruments. As soon as they are sure of what he hears, they begin to articulate parts of their composition.

This point of certainty is, on the one hand, the moment when he also reveals his appreciation as a listener. What provides this appreciation is his own thought system, which has developed with his talent and education. We know that there are works written by two composers on the same theme or even in the same school. But we see that the resulting music is not the same. This shows us that it is not all content or form that constitutes music. What constitutes music is the intellectual choices of its creator. The wider this field of thought and the more sources it feeds on, the more comprehensive the product will be. The accumulation of music philosophy helps the musicians who make the music to interpret and make sense of the thoughts they apply while creating the music. The more comprehensive and rich the background on the philosophy of music, the more openly and transparently can musicians evaluate their own thoughts and relationships. The philosophy of music enables the composers to transform their natural creativity into mental production. It is based on a great distinction, just as a storytelling becomes an extraordinary literary treatise.

Composers do not structure all their melodic units on liking. They want to create a reaction with them, sometimes revealing fear, for example. However, at this point, they should have an idea about the fears of others, as well as recognizing their own fears. Searching for a structure in music, determining the elements that make up the structure, intuiting and comprehending the harmony between these elements are the searches under the responsibility of the composers. The responsibility for the listener is to perceive, understand and evaluate the melody that is the result of all these searches. Art enters into an increasingly intense and tight relationship with science and technology.

The boundaries between art, science and technique are losing their former clarity, and the intersections are growing and expanding rapidly. In other words, art, science and technology have destroyed the walls between them and have turned into an intertwined production area. In the first part, there are different forms of consciousness: aesthetic consciousness, historical consciousness and scientific consciousness approach, we discussed the basic information in general. Consciousness forms express people's various attitudes towards life, the universe, and human relationships. These forms were formed during the historical development of man. Each reflects various and specific aspects of human life. Our aim in this study was to deal with aesthetic consciousness, which is one of these forms of consciousness that has an important place in the life of the individual.

There is not much discussion about aesthetic consciousness as a human phenomenon. However, one of the primary goals should be to mobilize his potential powers in the upbringing and development of human beings. Because while human nature contains aesthetic potentials, on the other hand, it needs to seek and live beauty as a bio-psychic being. Aesthetic consciousness is an integral part (form) of social consciousness in general. While each form of consciousness is subject to the basic laws of social

consciousness, such as aesthetic consciousness, it also differs with its own specific features. The philosophy of music deals with the problems such as consciousness orientation and human's relationship with nature, living in harmony with nature, having its laws. Each form of consciousness is concerned with various aspects of human activity and desires. However, different forms of consciousness are also related to aesthetic consciousness.

Although many of them have a rational logical character, emotionality is also peculiar to them. Aesthetic consciousness is actually a special relationship of human with nature and society, where emotionality, feelings and excitements come to the fore. At the same time, these features, which are in the aesthetic consciousness, are manifested in the highest way in art. Artistic consciousness is defined as the expression of aesthetic consciousness in a specific way, or rather in the language of art. Aesthetic consciousness covers a wider area than artistic consciousness. Aesthetics generally manifests itself in all types of activities (law, economy, science, ethics, ecology, etc.). It would not be an exaggeration to say that there is aesthetics in each and every one of the purpose-oriented activities. In this respect, as it is known, the area where aesthetic consciousness is exhibited is much wider. However, the features of aesthetics in artistic consciousness are mostly limited to art types and art language. This does not mean that art itself has no relation to other forms of consciousness. It is also necessary to specifically mention the relationship of art with ideological, legal, social, moral and ecological problems. Because these problems are mostly expressed in the language of art. It is possible to give examples of hundreds of works related to these problems in the world art history. These problems are materialized in the language of art and are conveyed to the reader, audience and listener in an emotional way. Artworks aim to convey these problems to people through artistic images in an exciting, emotional and concentrated way. The language of art is a unique language. It is impossible to understand it by abstracting it from elements such as artistic image, feeling, emotion and excitement.

It would be incomplete to explain the educational, transforming perception functions of art independently of the above meanings. Although each type of art is expressed with the burden of emotionality, the aesthetic principles specific to each of them also include features such as form, form, composition and artistic content. Each type of art is capable of expressing certain aspects of life events more clearly and perfectly.

Of course, the role of literature, which is an art of speech, comes to the fore in describing intellectual and philosophical problems. Experts, philosophers, artists have repeatedly emphasized these features; Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and especially Hegel drew attention to this issue in their theories on the classification of art, and specifically mentioned the strengths and weaknesses of art genres in the process of reflecting real reality. The relationship between aesthetic consciousness and scientific consciousness has always been on the agenda of scientists and artists. Science and art have similar aspects as well as different aspects. In our opinion, the common aspect is the imaginativeness of both. In other words, it expresses them imaginatively in the process of reflecting reality in

art and science. But the difference is in the properties of these images. If the image in art has a typical emotional and exciting character, images in science have more rational, logical, character. Although emotions, feelings and emotions take place in science, the main purpose is logically directed towards a certain practical benefit, the desire to know. But artistic images are also far from such utilitarianism and desire to know. In real art, material interest is not a primary goal. Art has been an effective tool in conveying scientific or technological developments to large audiences at certain historical stages.

In general, what is expected from a musical work is to activate the aesthetic sensitivity, to make the listener experience emotional intensity and enthusiasm. But the goal is not just to create a feeling of intensity, as some people understand. By means of this feeling, it is to give people the forms of moral and moral behavior, more precisely, to "construct the human being".

Another concept is aesthetic-idea. Aesthetic-idea is about aesthetic theory and looks. In fact, it expresses the human desire to perceive and reconstruct the universe and reality. Idea can also be seen as the intersection point of the general and the private, with aesthetic enthusiasm. In the social aesthetic consciousness, this idea is evaluated as a social-spiritual idea. Even if the individual consciousness has another aesthetic idea (even if it fits), it cannot be completely isolated from that social ideal. It must have certain criteria within the concept of aesthetic idea. Because it is possible to value things and events in accordance with those criteria. The ideal of the perfect human being has always been a concept that artists, thinkers and philosophers' dwell on. They did not limit the human ideal only to its physical beauty, but also made spiritual wealth important. The ideal of the perfect human being is also related to concepts such as the versatile and harmonious (harmonious, harmonic) development of the human being. The desire to reach such an ideal has always been a source of inspiration for art. People with high artistic-aesthetic culture can take real pleasure from artistic values. The idea (content) of art can be perceived in a more comprehensive way, or rather aesthetically, by people who have an art education and high artistic taste. In fact, it seems impossible to solve problems such as the transformative and especially educational role of art without the process of perceiving works of art in an aesthetic emotionally exciting way. In fact, the effect of art is related to whether the audience, the reader, the listener have the required aesthetic level, and the mission of fulfilling the educational function of the work of art depends on this.

Musical perception is the rendering of musical sensations, namely sound frequencies, as a result of processing and interpretation by the brain.

In musical perception, the sensation reaches the brain, is processed there, and as a result is grouped and interpreted in a process.

Musical perception process; sound patterns take place in four steps as selecting sound patterns, grouping and interpreting sound frequencies. As people's expectations from music differ, their musical perceptions also differ.

The second conclusion we have reached in our examination of the Kitab al Musiqā is that it has given us an idea about the causality and necessity of working on the

philosophy of music, along with the scientific method leading to knowledge of the unknown first and subsequent foundations. The philosophy of music helps to interpret and make sense of thoughts. From a phenomenological perspective, as Al-Farabi also writes, what determines a person's philosophy and thought is the body and the senses. Therefore, as the complete inventory of tools accompanying human action and perception on the world expands, human existence and thought comes to stand out as an undeniable reality. The body, as it had been emphasized from philosophy to science and through sociology, shows the feature of being the foundation on which the relationship that is established with the world is determined.

As is philosophically recognized, being embodied means not only an objective state of presence but also being sensual. In this respect, the concept of bodily expansion corresponds not only to a physical expansion but also to a sensory expansion. The senses of sight and hearing, two of the most basic ones for human beings, also constitute the two most basic imaginary dimensions in human acts that find expression in the multi-layered ground of art. While visual and auditory tools change and transform worldviews and perceptions, they also show a state of being that nourishes artistic production and art practice. Man's embodied nature undeniably determines his relationship with the world, and the tools that act as an interface between the body and the world continue to develop as limbs or extensions that transform this relationship.

Scientific revolutions change our perception of life whether we realize it or not. We argue that the wisdom of music creates a scientific, philosophical world and the consciousness of connection with life. Therefore, music and thought are superior to faith and matter because they have the ability to shape matter, biology, and consciousness. Science is a system that progresses with historical accumulations. The perceptual and imaginative approach of music theoretically reveals that everything happens within a network. Life emerges as a result of intertwined information networks. This connective totality points to the substance of sound—it defines the feature that exists in the substance of the universe. The philosophy of music, with its scientific aspect, explains the connections between particles that create the whole. In other words, connectivity is a discipline that reveals a system that creates knowledge.

Each effective new technology finds a response on the level of philosophy and society. Therefore, every innovation reaches a relational equivalent in art, which shares the same vital values with cultural dynamics. Although the actions and outputs defined as art show multi-layered features related to knowledge, they are embodied as objects or actions of perception and sensation. Thus, as the extension of media that affect and even determine the relationship between humans and changes in the environment, the actions and outputs of art that are embodied or abstracted will also undergo a transformation, and in the same way.

Al-Farabi examined art from a disciplinary perspective of spirit and mind based on the existence of humans' 'creative ability' and its role in knowledge acquisition. He asserts that music and poetry have a sublimation in acquiring creative talent. Music entails

cultural particularisations of humans' capacity to construct multipurpose representations through the integration of knowledge across functional domains of human experience and behaviour, which are generally expressed in sound and temporally expanded or ordered. Al-Farabi's performance in the caliph assembly and his arguments in it help us understand how to deal with this issue. Thus, this experience and evidence sufficiently convince us that music can assume many different emotional states, including preferences and moods.

Through *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir*, Al-Farabi substantiated a highly responsible discipline within the psychology of music and the study of emotion in addition to relevant concepts. Moreover, the multidisciplinary unity that developed in different directions over time but closely examined by many medieval thinkers improves one's multifaceted evaluation.

Al-Farabi devoted his extensive work on music to a repudiation of the claim that music is a pastime with the sole purpose of entertainment. Instead, he claims that the correct and measured utilisation of music is a beneficial activity that fulfils scientific purposes in philosophical disciplines. By explaining how reactions are not between two living beings but rather between a living being and a piece of music, he focuses on the systematic development of a subject. His arguments strongly imply that overall, *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir* goes further than merely discussing the principles of musical art and that providing a respectable place for music is an intensely scientific profession.

Understanding complex intellectual or historical disciplines requires system and method structuring. Philosophers and scientists have also highlighted why research fields have been divided into classifications and divisions associated with a rationalised network or hierarchy. Thus, the analogical method reasonably interconnects the system and the result through a logical perspective. This examination is primarily submitted as a formal inference on the function of philosophy in any related research discipline, such as science, art and neuroscience, and the idea of hierarchy permeates Al-Farabi's philosophy. Given the hierarchy of the cognitive faculties of the human psyche according to philosophy, Al-Farabi systematised the hierarchy of sciences according to degrees of certainty and different hierarchical types in the epistemology and logic of comparative evidence. Therefore, traditions use history, sociology and philosophy to establish a link between the past and the present.

Recent times have witnessed the gradual disappearance of the connection between philosophical studies on conceptual change and scientific practices that have reshaped the history of science. Therefore, this study reiterates the need to strengthen the ties between science and philosophy. Al-Farabi revealed a highly responsible discipline in the psychology of music and the study of emotion, which, along with their concepts, was validated by *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir*. Finally, this review of *Kitab al Musiqā al Kabir* helps future researchers investigate the relation between the listener's responses to music and the emotions revealed by music. The analysed data confirms that interrelated disciplines on systemic and functional methods can have a philosophical basis. This study

offers a tenable suggestion to focus on Al-Farabi's Classification of Sciences, which he established on a systemic structure as a unique key.

REFERENCE

Ainbinder, Bernardo. 2020. "Questions of Genesis as Questions of Validity." In Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology, 303–332. De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110564280-015.

Akgün, Ali E. and Keskin, Halit. 2018. "Information Management Process as a Social Interaction Process,." Journal of Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, 5 (1): 16.

Aktaş, A. Onur. 2012. Understanding Life with Music and Music in the Schopenhauer Philosophy. East West,.

Al-Farabi, A. N. 2007. "Classification of Sciences. Cultural Heritage State Collection Consisting of a Ten-Volume Series Lotus-Astana LLP." (VI): 28-60.

Aristotle, De Anima, I. 1957. (Transt, W. S. Hett), London, , (Loeb).

Aristotle, W. D. ; Ross, J. A. & Smith. 1908. "Works Translated Into English Under the Editorship of W.D. Ross." Clarendon Press.

Aristotle. 1961. "Aristotle's Poetics." New York :Hill and Wang, 11.

Aristotle. 1991. Nicomachean Ethics, W.D. Ross (Tr.), in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II,.

Assmann, J. 2011. "Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 13.

Avicenna, ., & Marmura, M. E. 2004. "The Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text = Al-Ilahi Yat Min Al-Shifa." Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press., 6,7.

Aydın S. Mehmet. 2002. "Philosophy of Religion." İzmir Faculty of Theology Foundation Publications, İzmir, 3–5.

Abdildin Zh. M., Burabaev M. S. Al-Farabi. Historical and philosophical treatises. Translated from Arabic. p.151

Alma-ATA: Nauka, 1985

Burabaev M. S. Problems of being and knowledge in the philosophy of al-Farabi

Bailey, C. 1926. The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, London,.

Barthold, V. V. 1962. "'A History of the Turkmen People.' In Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Translated by V. Minorsky, Vol. 3." Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Barthold, V. V. 1990. "Mongol Invasion Turkish History Institute."

Barthold, V. V. 2010. "In Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Translated by V. Minorsky, Vol. 3. Leiden: E.J." Brill Selenge Publications Istanbul.

Bayladi, Derman. 2008. "Pythagoras, a Mystery Prophet." Istanbul: Say Publications., 92.

Bergson, Henri. 1998. "Matter and Memory." New York: Zone Books.

- Berkeley, G., & Simon, C. 1907. "The Principles of Human Knowledge: A Treatise on the Nature of Material Substance and Its Relation to the Absolute." London: Routledge.
- Burnet, J. 1930. *Early Greek Philosophy*, London,.
- Burnet, John. 2008. "Aristotle on Education." Istanbul: Say Publications., 167.
- Burnet, John. 2013. "Early Greek Philosophy." Istanbul: Idea Publishing House., 225.
- Campen, C. . 2008. "The Hidden Sense: Synesthesia in Art and Science." Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Can, Sefik. 2021. "Classical Greek Mythology, Istanbul,." Ötüken Publishing House, 126.
- Carone, G. R. 2005. 2005. 'Mind and Body in Late Plato', *Archiv F"ur Geschichte Der Philosophie* 87: 227-69.
- Carroll, N. . 2010. "Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction." London: Routledge, 159,169.
- Cassirer, E. 1944. "An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture." New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Caws, Peter. 1987. "'The Scientific Method' Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in Aesthetics, Trans." *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Ed. Paul Edwards, C. 7-8, Macmillan Pub., New York, 339.
- Cetinkaya, Yalcin. 2014. "Music Thought in Ikhwan-i Safa." Istanbul: Human Publications.
- Cherniss, H. 1935. *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, Baltimore.
- Churchland, Paul M. 2012. "Plato's Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals." Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press., 1.
- Condillac, Etienne Bonnot. 2001. *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*. Cambridge University Press.
- Condillac, Etienne Bonnot (2001). 2001. "Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge." Cambridge University Press., 1892–1929.
- Cox, Renee. 1990. "A History of Music." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 48 (4): 395–409.
- Croce, Benedetto. 1922. "Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic." New York: Noonday Press.
- Damasio, A. R. 1999. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*.
- Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes. 1994. "' Error : Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain." New York :G.P. Putnam, .
- Davidson, H. A. 1992. "Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect." New York: Oxford University Press., p.10.

- de Spinoza, Benedict. 1901. "On the Improvement of the Understanding." In *Improvement of the Understanding, Ethics and Correspondence of Benedict de Spinoza.*, 1–38. Washington: M Walter Dunne Publisher. doi:10.1037/13731-001.
- Descartes, René, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane, and G. R. T. Ross. 1911. "The Philosophical Works of Descartes." Cambridge: University Press., 238.
- Descartes, René, and Laurence J. Lafleur. 1961. *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.
- Descartes, René, and Norman Kemp Smith. 1911. *Descartes Philosophical Writings*. New York: Modern Library.
- Descartes, René, and Norman Kemp Smith. 1958. *Descartes Philosophical Writings*. New York: Modern Library.
- Dinçol, B. 2003. "Music in Ancient Near East and Egypt, İstanbul,." Turkish Institute of Ancient Sciences Publications., 2.
- Dogan, M. 2003. "Aesthetic. İzmir:." Dokuz Eylül Publications., 17.
- Dufrenne, Mikel. 1973. "The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. Translated by Edward S. Casey, et. Al." Evanston: Northwestern University Press,.
- Dürüşken, C. 2013. "An Overview of the Concept of "Psyche" in Ancient Age I." *Philosophy Archive* 0, 75.
- Eagleton, T. 1996. "Literary Theory: An Introduction." Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press., 180.
- Egin, Ali. 2012. *Is There a Musical Sociology? East West.*
- Ewing A.C. 1985. "The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy,." Routledge, London, 15-25.
- Farabi., Al. 1967. "Kitab Al-Musiqa Al-Kabir. Al-Qahirah :Dar Al-Katib Al-Arabi Lil-Tibaah Wa-Al-Nashr,." 92–98.
- Fechner, Gustav Theodor. 1948. "Elements of Psychophysics, 1860." In *Readings in the History of Psychology.*, 206–213. East Norwalk: Appleton-Century-Crofts. doi:10.1037/11304-026.
- Ferguson, Kitty. 2012. "The Ancient Brotherhood of Pythagoras." Istanbul: Ayna Publishing House., 83.
- Ferrari. G. R. F. 2007. "Cambridge Collections Online and The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic." Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 189.
- Finkelstein, S. 2000. "What Music Says. (3rd Edition). (Translated by M. H. Spatar)." Istanbul: Kaynak Publications, 13.
- Fischer-Lichte, E. 2008. "The Transformative Power of Performance. 1st Edn." Taylor and Francis.
- Frede, Michael. 1987. "Essays in Ancient Philosophy." Oxford University Press., 4–5.
- Freud, S. 1913. "The Interpretation of Dreams. (Medical Heritage Library)." New York: Macmillan.

- Freud, S. 1997. "Writings on Art and Literature. Stanford,." Calif: Stanford University Press.
- Fubini, Enrico. 1990. "History of Music Aesthetics." Macmillan., 31.
- Fubini Enrico. 2006. "Aesthetics in Music, Trans." Fırat Genç, Dost Publishing House, Ankara, 31.
- Gardner, Howard. 2011. "Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences." New York: Basic Books, 107.
- GökberkMacî. 1980a. History of Philosophy, Remzi Bookstore, 4th Edition, Istanbul 1980,.
- GökberkMacî. 1980b. "History of Philosophy,." Remzi Bookstore, 4th Edition, Istanbul, 14.
- Gokce, S. 2015. "The Function of Aesthetic Concern in the Artistic Creation Process. (Thesis No. 407002) [Master's Thesis,." Pamukkale University]. YÖK Thesis Center Database.
- Gombrich, E. H. (Ernst Hans). 1969. "Art and Illusion; a Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation." [Princeton, N.J.]:Princeton University Press,.
- Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan. 1987. The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library: An Anthology of Ancient Writings Which Relate to Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philosophy. Phanes Press.
- Guthrie, W. K. C. 2011. "History of Greek Philosophy. Early Pre-Socratic Philosophers and Pythagoreans." Istanbul: Kabalci Publishing House.
- Guyer. 2007. "Translated from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Aesthetica , Partial Latin Text and German Translation in Schweizer, H. R. (1973)." Ästhetik Als Philosophie Der Sinnlichen Erkenntnis (§1, 107). Basel: Schwabe.
- Hadot, Pierre. 2011. "What Is Ancient Philosophy?." Ankara: Dost Bookstore., 69.
- Hardie, J. B. 1932. Arabic Musical Instruments a 'Magic Seven' in the Farmer Collection "Kitab Kashf Al-Humum", Part II, , Pp. 50–250.
- Hartmann, Nicolai. 2014. "Translator's Introduction: Hartmann on the Mystery and Value of Art." Aesthetics, December. DE GRUYTER, XIII–XXXII. doi:10.1515/9783110276015.XIII.
- Haydon, G. 1941. "Introduction to Musicology: A Survey of the Fields, Systematic & Historical, of Musical Knowledge & Research." Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press., 9.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Arnold V. Miller, and J. N. Findlay. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1979. "Phenomenology of Spirit (A. V. Miller, Trans.)." Oxford University Press.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1975. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hume, David, and L. A. Selby-Bigge. 1896. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Hünler. 2003. "Solmaz Zelyut, Spinoza,." Paradigma Publications, Istanbul, .38-42.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2010. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Hackett Publishing Company.
- Husserl, Edmund . 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Hackett Publishing Company.
- Huyssen, A. 1995. "Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia." New York: Routledge., 11.
- Iamblichus. 1818. "Life of Pythagoras,." (Trans. By. T. Taylor, J. M. Watkins), London 1818., xxv.
- Immanuel Kant. 2011. "Critique of Judgment, (Trans. Aziz Yardimli),." Istanbul: Idea Publishing House, 61.
- J, Runzo. 2001. "Global Philosophy of Religion." Oneworld Pub., Oxford, 21-23.
- Jaeger, W. 1967. "The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers,." Oxford, 145.
- Jung, Carl G., Author. 2014. Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Volume 7, Collected Works of C.G.
- Jung, CG. 2014. "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. 1st Edn." Taylor and Francis.
- Kagan, M. S Bozkurt. 2008. "Aesthetics and Art Notes. (A. Çalışlar, Trans.)." İzmir: Karakalem Bookstore., 39.
- Kalin, Ibrahim. 2014. Mulla Sadra. Oxford University Press India.
- Kania, Andrew. 2007. "Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, 1st Ed.(Online) [Http://Plato.Stanford.Edu/Entries/Music/.](http://Plato.Stanford.Edu/Entries/Music/)" ,.
- Kant, I. 2001. "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (J. W. Ellington, Trans.; 2nd Ed.)." Hackett Publishing.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1929. "Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Campen, C. . (2008). The Hidden Sense: Synesthesia in Art and Science." Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1998. "Critique of Pure Reason." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kasymzhanov A.Kh. 1982. Abu-Nasr al-Farabi. (Thinkers of the past) M.: Thought, - 198 p.
- Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven. 1957. The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge,.
- Kivy, Peter. 1997. "Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences." Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press., 139.
- Koç V., and T. Yıldırım. 2008. "Introduction to Music Philosophy,." Istanbul: Context Publications 30.
- Kramer, S. N. 2002. "The Sumerians: Their History, Culture, and Character." Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 136,137.

- Langer, Susanne K. 1951. "Philosophy in a New Key; A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art." Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,.
- Leibniz, G. W. 1951. "The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. Translated by Latta, R.,." Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Levine, Justin, Lauren B. Resnick and Edward Tory Higgins. 1993. "Social Foundations of Cognition." Annual Review of Psychology 44: 585-612 .
- Levinson, Jerrold. 1996. "The Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays." Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 107.
- Lifshits, Mikhail Aleksandrovich. 1938. "The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx. New York : Critics Group."
- Lifshitz, M. A. 1973. The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx Translated by Ralph B. Winn London: Pluto.
- Locke, John, and P. H. Nidditch. 1979. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Manzara, Leonard C., Leonard C. Ian H. Mark Witten and Leonard C. Ian H. Mark James. ". 1992. "On the Entropy of Music: An Experiment with Bach Chorale Melodies." Leonardo Music Journal 2, 81-88.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge.
- Merriam, Alan P. 1964. "The Anthropology of Music.," 27.
- Meyer, Leonard B. 1956. "Emotion and Meaning in Music." University of Chicago Press., 32.
- Mimaroglu, I. 1987. "History of Music, 5th Ed. Istanbul." Varlık Publishing House., 16.
- Miranda, Jeanne, James J. Gross, Jacqueline B. Persons, and Judy Hahn. 1998. "Mood Matters: Negative Mood Induction Activates Dysfunctional Attitudes in Women Vulnerable to Depression." Cognitive Therapy and Research 1998 22:4 22 (4). Springer: 363–376. doi:10.1023/A:1018709212986.
- Moran, Dermot Edmund Husserl. 2016. "Founder of Phenomenology. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie" 68 (4): 813-814.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2009. "The Birth of Tragedy." Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publications., 18-19-20–21.
- Nuryшева G., Khasanov M., Petrova V., Khasanova A., 2020 Materials international conference dedicated to the 1150th anniversary of Abu Nasr al-Farabi «PHILOSOPHY OF AL-FARABI IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD CULTURE» p.46 Al-Farabi Kazakh National University
"Kazakh University" publishing house. 050040, Almaty, 71 Al-Farabi Avenue. Published in the publishing house of "Kazakh University" publishing house.
- Nysanbaev A., Kurmangalieva G., Seytakhmetova N. Algy soz /Abu Nasyr Al-Farabi. 10 Volume - Astana: Lotos-Astana LLP (2007-2009); collective monographs: Al-Farabi's heritage and modern philosophy of mutual understanding. - Almaty: IPPR KN MES RK, 2011. - 250 p.;

- O’Leary, D. L. 1963. *Arabic Thought and Its Place in History* / by De Lacy O’Leary, D.D., Lecturer in Aramaic and Syriac, Bristol University.
- Ozcan, Muttalip (2006). 2006. “Human Philosophy: An Inquiry into the What of Man.” Ankara: Science and Art Publications., 74, 80.
- Özen, H. Ömer and Elmalı, Osman. 2018. “History of Ancient Philosophy. Istanbul.” Bilge Culture and Art Publishing House., 47.
- Panofsky, E. (2020). 2020. “Perspective as Symbolic Form.” Zone Books. Available at: <https://www.perlego.com/book/1636423/perspective-as-symbolic-form-pdf> (Accessed: 25 September 2021).., 40.
- Peters, F. E. 1967. “Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon.” New York: New York University Press., 166.
- Plato. 1992. *The Republic* [Trans. G. M. A. Grube] (Pp. 398e–399c). Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Plato. 2013. “The Laws of Plato. Cambridge University Press, 647. Rosenthal, F. (1992).” *The Classical Heritage in Islam*. Routledge, 55.
- Plato. 1943. “Plato’s *The Republic*.” New York :Books, Inc.,.
- Plato. 2005. “State.” Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publications., 85.
- Plato. 2007. “Laws.” Istanbul: Kabalci Publishing House., 95.
- Plato. 2009. “Dialogue.” Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore., 122.
- Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*. 1977. “Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*, Çev. R. Waterfield, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, s. 17-18.”
- Polanyi, Michael, and Marjorie Grene. 1996. “Knowing and Being : Essays.” The University of Chicago Press, 246.
- Popper, K. R., J. C. Eccles. 1977. *The Self and Its Brain*, Germany.,
- Recep, Uslu. 2022. “Müzik Alanında Fikir Üretme ve İfade Özgürlüğü - Akademik Akıl.” Accessed May 21. <https://www.akademikakil.com/muzik-alaninda-fikir-uretme-ve-ifade-ozgurlugu/recepuslu/>.
- Revonsuo, Antti. 2009. *Consciousness: The Science of Subjectivity*. Psychology Press.
- Ridley, Aaron. 2007a. “Music Philosophy,.” Ankara, Dost Publishing House., 92.
- Ridley, Aaron. 2007b. “The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations. Edinburgh University Press.,” 11.
- Rogers, Warren F. 2013. “Physics of Music.” Science and Art, Westmont College, https://westmont.edu/_academics/departments/physics/documents/physicsofmusic.pdf.
- Russell, B. 1959. “The Problems of Philosophy.” New York: Oxford University Press.
- Russell, B. 2019. “The Problems of Philosophy.” In *Alfarabi’s Book of Dialectic (Kitāb Al-Jadal)*, 304–326. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108277822.011.
- Sachs, C. 1955. “Our Musical Heritage: A Short History of Music,” 34.

- Say, A. 2001. "The Book of Music, 1st Bs, Ankara,," Music Encyclopedia Publications.
- Say, A. 2002. "Music Dictionary,," Music Encyclopedia Publications, Ankara, September.
- Schelling, F. W. J. 2008. *The Philosophy of Art*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Schiller. 1999. "On Aesthetics. (M. ÖZGÜ, Trans.)." Istanbul: Kaknüs Publications, 85.
- Schiller, Friedrich. Friedrich Schiller. 1985. *Poet of Freedom*. New York, N.Y.: New Benjamin Franklin House,.
- Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. 1949. "The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana." University of Illinois Press, 13.
- Shannon, Claude Elwood, and Warren Weaver. 1964. "The Mathematical Theory of Communication." Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 17.
- Solso R.L., MacLin O.H., MacLin M. 2013. "Cognitive Psychology (8th Ed.). Yorkshire, Pearson,," Harlow: Pearson Education UK, 37.
- Solymosi T, Shook J. 2014. "Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Brains at Work with the World." Palgrave Macmillan, London, 20.
- Soykan, O. N. 2015. "Aesthetics and Art Philosophy,," Istanbul: Pinhan, 57.
- Soykan, O. N. Schelling. 2016. *Life Philosophy and Works*, Istanbul: Bilge Culture and Art,.
- Söylemez. 2017. "Early Transformations in Aesthetic Methodology and the Influence of Kant,," Hegel, Marx. *Art Art*. (7), 229.
- Stephen McAdams. 1984. "'The Auditory Image: A Metaphor for Musical and Psychological Research on Auditory Organization,' in *Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art*, Ed. W. Ray Crozier and Antony J. Chapman." Amsterdam: North-Holland, 291.
- Storey, J. 2000. "Popular Culture Studies. (Translated by K. Karaşahin)." Istanbul: Babylon Publications., 127.
- Störing, H. J. 2015. "Ancient Philosophy Indo-Chinese-Greek." Istanbul: Yol Publishing., 235–236.
- Stubenberg, Leopold. 1998. *Consciousness and Qualia*. John Benjamins.
- Thompson L, Fine GA. 1999. "Socially Shared Cognition, Affect, and Behavior: A Review and Integration." *Pers Soc Psychol Rev* 3: 278–302.
- Timuçin, A. 2006. "Aesthetic." Istanbul: Cloud Publications, 39.
- Tunali, I. 2004. "Aesthetic." Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore., 13–14.
- Tunali, I. 2007. "Greek Aesthetics." Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore., 168–169.
- Tunali, I. 2011. "Aesthetic Taste (On Contemporary Art Philosophy)." Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore., 23.
- Tunali, Ismail. 1979. "Aesthetic." Istanbul: Cem Publishing House., 140.
- Uçan, A. 1996. "Human and Music Human and Art Education, Music." *Encyclopedia Publications*, Ankara, 13.

Vitruvius Pollio, and M. H. Morgan. 1960. "Vitruvius: The Ten Books on Architecture." New York: Dover Publications.

Walzer, R. 1985. "Al-Faradi on the Perfect State: Abū Nasr Al-Farabi's Mabādi' Ārā Ahi Al-Madīna Al-Fādila. A Revised Text with Introduction, Translation and Commentary." Clarendon Press, 375–376.

Warnock, G. J. 1982. "The Object of Morality." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (3): 255-258.

Weber, Alfred. 1927. "History of Philosophy. Philosophy of the Recent Past." Philosophical Review 3, 6:505.

West, M. L. 1992. "Ancient Greek Music." Oxford [England: Clarendon Press., 33.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2015. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. , Print.

Wolfson, H. A. 1935. "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts." The Harvard Theological Review, 28(2), 69–133. [Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/1508009](http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508009).

Xenophon. 2011. "The Anabasis, Or Expedition of Cyrus: And the Memorabilia of Socrates." H. G. Bohn. p. V., 288.

Yetkin, S. Kemal. 1976. "Aesthetics and Its Main Problems." Istanbul: Revolution and Aka Bookstore., 107.

Zangwill, Nick. 2015. "Music and Aesthetic Reality: Formalism and the Limits of Description." Routledge, 20.

Zeller, Eduard. 2008. "History of Greek Philosophy." Istanbul: Say Publications.